Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003542
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59841/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

10th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

SAIDA SAMADI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Jebb
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Royal Courts of Justice (Belfast) on 15 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a male Iranian Kurd who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against a decision of the Secretary of State dated 26 November 2021 refusing his international protection claim. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed his appeal. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
The Grounds of Appeal
2. There are, in essence, two bases for the appeal. First, the appellant asserts that the First-tier Tribunal made an ‘irrational finding’ at [32]:
Fundamentally, I believe the appellant, with an eye on [HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (I AC)] has patterned his claim (sic) to establish a risk based on his father's alleged insurgent activities on behalf of KDPI with which he in turn will be connected many years later, but that again is undermined by his [screening interview] claim, and therefore all that he says about obstacles to return I find self-serving and part of that modified claim.
The appellant says that that finding is irrational because he could not have had any knowledge of the case of HB ‘without legal assistance’. The case is first referred to in papers drafted by the appellant’s lawyers (the skeleton argument filed with the First-tier Tribunal) months after the appellant had claimed that his parents had been accused of being linked to the KDPI. The appellant could not possibly have known of the decision in HB until his legal representatives told him about it.
Secondly. the judge had found that the appellant’s account of past events in Iran was not reliable principally because the appellant had failed to mention in his screening interview that he had fled Iran because his parents had been threatened regarding an alleged connection with the KDPI. By contrast, in his screening interview, the appellant had said that he had fled the country because he had a ‘tribal feud problem.’ He had not mentioned his parents’ problem at all. The judge considered the entire basis of the appellant’s claim had changed between the two interviews. The grounds assert that the judge failed to take into account that screening interview answers ‘may not be complete’ and that judges should be cautious before placing weight on inconsistencies between screening and asylum interviews (see JA (Afghanistan) 2014 EWCA Civ 450).
The Grant of Permission
3. Granting permission to appeal, Upper Tribunal Judge Neville wrote that: ‘It is arguable that the mention of a blood feud in the screening interview carried sufficient weight in the overall credibility analysis that a lawful finding of fact required account to be taken of the caution expressed in JA (Afghanistan) at [24], and for Judge Gillespie's reasoning to disclose (however concisely) that such account had been taken. All grounds are arguable.’ The JA (Afghanistan) point is, as I have noted, in the grounds but otherwise it seems that Judge Neville may have misunderstood the appeal; it is not clear why mentioning a blood feud in the screening interview (a claim which he later discarded in favour of another) might be relevant to the grounds as summarised above.
Discussion
4. I find that the judge’s remark at [32], whilst possibly infelicitous, does not infect and vitiate his entire analysis. First, I do not accept that the appellant could not have known of the decision in HB or, at least in general terms, known what the case says without first being told by lawyers. I take judicial notice of the fact that principles of United Kingdom immigration case law, rules and statutes are known within asylum seeker communities here and abroad. Indeed, if one were intending to seek asylum in the United Kingdom, it would make sense to have some idea of the manner in which the United Kingdom judicial system operates and the bases upon which one might successfully seek asylum. Secondly, the judge’s remark is neither offensive nor does it indicate that he failed to consider the appeal with an open mind. He makes the remark having given a wholly cogent reason for rejecting the appellant’s credibility (the very substantial discrepancy between what the appellant said at the screening interview and his later asylum interview). That discrepancy and the remark are not obviously connected and the remark does not diminish the force of the judge’s finding on credibility. Other than urging caution and claiming, in effect, that mistakes can occur, the appellant has been unable to explain why the entire basis for his claim changed in the way it did. Thirdly, I note Ms Ahmed’s submission that this was not a case in which an exhausted and frightened appellant was required to give a screening interview within hours of arriving in the United Kingdom. The screening interview took place six days after he had arrived and had been well-treated and accommodated by the United Kingdom authorities. The appellant’s claim that he ‘did not think’ that he was ‘in a safe country’ when he gave his answers at the screening interview is, in the circumstances, not credible. I find that the judge was entitled to find that that appellant’s account lacked credibility for the reasons he gives. Had the appellant been telling the truth, then he would have had no difficulty giving a consistent account of the basis of his claim.
5. In my opinion, neither part of the challenge to the judge’s decision set out in the grounds has any merit. I therefore dismiss the appellant’s appeal.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

C. N. Lane

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 16 May 2026