Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003545

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/61960/2023
LP/00437/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

ID
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr K. Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms A. Smith, Counsel instructed by JCWI

Heard at Field House on 6 November 2025

Although the appellant in the appeal before the Upper Tribunal is the Secretary of State for the Home Department, for ease of reference I to refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal (FtT). Hereafter I refer to ID as the appellant and the Secretary of State as the respondent.

Anonymity

Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. This is an appeal brought by the respondent against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the Judge’) promulgated on 5 March 2025, in which she allowed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim made in the context of an application to revoke the Deportation Order against him. The appellant is a citizen of Dominica. His full immigration history is set out in the respondent’s refusal decision (HB/412). He was first granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom on 25 June 2003.
2. The background to this appeal is set out at [2] to [7] of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) and does not require verbatim repetition herein. In summary, following the appellant’s conviction on 5 March 2012 for being knowingly concerned in fraudulently evading prohibition/restriction on importation of a controlled drug (conspiracy), he was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment. His submissions in respect of the decision to deport him were refused and his appeal against that refusal was dismissed by the FtT on 9 May 2017. The appellant made representations concerning the revocation of his deportation order on 6 January 2021. It is the respondent’s decision in relation to these submissions which were the subject of his appeal in the FtT. The appellant’s appeal was allowed by the FtT for reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 5 March 2025.
The Decision of the FtT Judge
3. I shall set out the decision and findings in some detail in the light of the nature of the respondent’s challenge.
4. The Judge recorded that there were no factual disputes between the parties, and it was accepted by the appellant that he was required to meet the “very compelling circumstances” test. The respondent accepted that it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s 17-year-old son to relocate to Dominica should the appellant be deported.
5. The Judge heard oral evidence from the appellant, his partner, his 22-year-old daughter and 17-year-old son.
6. The decision sets out at [23] the findings of the FtT decision dated 9 May 2017 which were treated as the Judge’s starting point in accordance with the Devaseelan principles. The previous findings included: the appellant had a genuine and subsisting relationship with his two children and his partner; the appellant was unable to demonstrate “very compelling circumstances” to outweigh the public interest in the Article 8 analysis; and the appellant was substantially rehabilitated.
7. The Judge referred to the index offence at [25] to [27] of her decision, recording that it was a “very serious offence” and that she has regard to the fact that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in a person’s deportation.
8. At [28] the Judge refers to the appellant’s compliance with the terms of his criminal licence which expired on 12 September 2017, and with the conditions of immigration bail granted on 30 September 2014.
9. At [29] the Judge refers to the content of a Risk Assessment Report by a Probation Officer dated 15 January 2025 which referred to the appellant’s remorse and financial motivation for his offending in 2011, that he accepted full responsibility for his actions and behaviour, did not seek to minimise his actions, and displayed remorse and regret which appears to be genuine.
10. The Judge then summarised the content of the Independent Social Worker report dated 13 October 2024 which refers to the family’s ongoing financial constraints which have not been a trigger to any further offending by the appellant. The report states that the appellant’s partner is the fee-earner in the family, working all hours to provide for the family, and the appellant takes care of the home and provides support to his partner and children. The Judge found the fact that the family’s financial circumstances had not been a trigger to any further offending over the years validated the OASys assessment of 27 October 2014 which concluded the appellant presented a low risk of reoffending; a conclusion echoed by the recent Risk Assessment Report. The Judge concluded that the appellant was unlikely to reoffend.
11. Addressing section 117C(5) of the 2002 Act, the Judge found that the evidence indicated the closeness and importance of the appellant’s family unit and the particularly close nature of the appellant’s relationship with his teenage son. At [36] of the decision the Judge refers to problems the appellant’s son has experienced, the challenges for his son at the prospect of the appellant’s deportation, the fact the son had had therapy, and the support the appellant has provided his son with. The Judge considered the appellant's best interests applying section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. The Judge records at [38] that since the appellant’s release from immigration detention in 2014, the appellant had lived with his partner and children in one family unit and that the son was “very close to the appellant to whom he turns to for any discussions and advice and who has been supporting him through his football, studies and a police investigation”. The decision goes on to state that “he is not receiving the same support from [his mother] who works every day of the week to provide for the family”. Reference is made at [39] to the Independent Social Work Assessment and the opinion expressed in the report that the appellant’s deportation “will have a significantly detrimental impact upon his whole family”.
12. At [46] of the decision the Judge records that she found credible the evidence about how close the family members are and the repercussions for the family should the appellant to be deported. The decision states at [43] that the closeness of the family since 2017 has become stronger on account of the years that have passed and what they have faced. The Judge concludes at [46] that the appellant’s deportation would “not be merely an inconvenience” for the family, that the appellant is at the very centre of the family unit, his deportation would lead to a complete change in the dynamics and relationships of the family, and that on balance it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s son and partner to remain in the United Kingdom without the appellant if he were to be deported, and that it would be unduly harsh for his partner to relocate to Dominica with the appellant. Thus, the Judge found that Exception 2 was met.
13. In respect of Exception 1 (section 117C(4) NIAA), the Judge found that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. Although the appellant had committed a very serious offence and spent time in prison, he had only committed one single offence and there had been no subsequent offending in the 14 years following the index offence, which included over 10 years living in the community. No issues had been raised by Probation and there had been no suggestion of any police interest in the appellant. When he was permitted to, he had previously worked. However, the Judge found that any challenges the appellant might face on return to Dominica did not amount to very significant obstacles and it was accepted that the appellant has not had lawful residence in the UK for over half of his life. Exception 1 could not be satisfied.
14. From [54] of the decision the Judge took forward her findings from the assessment of Exceptions 1 and 2 and considered further factors which she considered were relevant in her assessment of “very compelling circumstances”. Applying Kugathas, although now 22 years of age, the Judge found the appellant’s daughter continued to enjoy family life with the appellant. She continued to live in the family home with him whilst she was attending University and was emotionally dependent on him. The appellant’s daughter stated in evidence that she could not comprehend her life without the appellant especially with her mental health issues, and she stated in her witness statement that “If my dad is removed from here and sent to Dominica, everything, I have, will crash”.
15. In concluding the Article 8 balancing exercise, the Judge summarised the respondent’s position in the appeal at [61], reminding herself again of the serious nature of the appellant’s offence and that the more serious the offence the greater the public interest in the appellant’s removal, and summarised the factors weighing in the appellant's favour at [62]. The Judge referred to the fact that over 14 years had passed since commission of the index offence; the appellant had not committed any further offences since that time; he had been assessed as presenting a low risk of reoffending; he had shown strong evidence of rehabilitation and the Judge found was unlikely to reoffend; he had complied with reporting to the Home Office weekly since 2014; he has been living in the UK for 22 years; he was socially and culturally integrated into life in the UK; he meets Exception 2; the family unit would “crumble” without him given the central role he plays through his support for each family member; and, he remains in a very close relationship with his daughter notwithstanding that she is now an adult. Having conducted the balancing exercise between the competing interests and considered all of the factors, the Judge found that the appellant had shown on balance that there are very compelling circumstances that go over and above meeting Exception 2 and which in the particular circumstances of the case outweigh the very strong public interest in deportation.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
16. The respondent claims the decision of the FtT is vitiated by material errors of law. Two grounds of appeal are relied upon:
1) “Ground 1: Failing to give adequate reasons for findings on a material matter: very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 & 2 s.117C NIAA 2002.”
2) “Ground 2: Failing to give adequate reasons for findings on a material matter: Social and cultural integration.”
17. Permission to appeal was granted by UTJ Hoffman on 11 September 2025.
The Hearing Before Me
18. Mr Ojo adopted the grounds of appeal although he did not address me separately on ground 2. He accepted that the grounds had been pleaded as a challenge to the adequacy of reasons given by the Judge as opposed to a challenge on the basis of a misdirection of law.
19. Although accepting that the decision under challenge is detailed, in Mr Ojo’s submission the Judge had failed to provide sufficient reasons to demonstrate that the appellant’s circumstances go above and beyond the Exceptions to deportation. He points also to the failure to take into account the ages of the children and the fact that most of the appellant’s lengthy residence in the UK was unlawful. He accepted there was evidence of “vulnerabilities” before the Judge in relation to the appellant’s son but submitted that there was very little evidence in relation to the appellant’s daughter to support the claim that she was vulnerable; the medical evidence largely pointing to physical rather than mental health issues.
20. In reply, Ms Smith adopted her detailed Rule 24 response and skeleton argument which does not require detailed repetition herein. In essence, in Ms Smith’s submission the Judge plainly gave full and detailed reasons for her findings. The grounds had focused on [62] of the decision, however, on a proper reading of the decision it is apparent this paragraph is a summary of the detailed findings that came before, just as [61] was a summary of the respondent’s position. In Ms Smith’s submission the respondent simply disagrees with a decision that was plainly open to the Judge.
Analysis and Decision
21. I have had in mind throughout the need to exercise judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the FtT. It is now well established that the Upper Tribunal is not entitled to find an error of law simply because it does not agree with the decision, or because the Tribunal thinks the decision could be more clearly expressed or another judge could come to a different decision. Baroness Hale put it in this way in AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678), at [30]:
"Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirection simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently."
22. Mr Ojo accepted that the grounds as pleaded are limited to a reasons challenge; that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasoning in reaching her findings. I remind myself of the relevant jurisprudence in relation to adequacy of reasoning and the Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions (4 June 2024).
23. The appellant appealed the respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights claim under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA”) on the ground that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
24. Section 117A in Part 5A of the NIAA 2002 provides that, when a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and, as a result, would be unlawful under section 6 of the HRA 1998, the court, in considering the public interest question, must (in particular) have regard to the considerations listed in section 117B and, additionally, in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals, to the considerations listed in section 117C. Section 117C specifically deals with the weight to be attached to the public interest in deporting foreign criminals and provides a structure for conducting the necessary balancing exercise, dependent in part, on the length of sentence imposed. Section 117C(6) provides:
“In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.”
25. It was accepted in this case that the appellant was required to demonstrate very compelling circumstances due to the length of his sentence.
26. In HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, Lord Hamblen referred to the “very compelling circumstances” test. He cited the judgment of Sales LJ in Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 1 W.L.R 4203, at [50], that the test "provides a safety valve, with an appropriately high threshold of application, for those exceptional cases involving foreign criminals in which the private and family life considerations are so strong that it would be disproportionate and in violation of article 8 to remove them”.
27. In Yalcin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] 1 WLR 1626, Lord Justice Underhill explained:
“53. The starting-point is to identify the basic structure of the law in this area. At para. 47 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) Lord Hamblen approved the summary which I gave at para. 29 of my judgment in this Court:
"(A) In the cases covered by the two Exceptions in subsections (4)-(5), which apply only to medium offenders, the public interest question is answered in favour of the foreign criminal, without the need for a full proportionality assessment. Parliament has pre-determined that in the circumstances there specified the public interest in the deportation of medium offenders does not outweigh the article 8 interests of the foreign criminal or his family: they are, given, so to speak, a short cut. The consideration of whether those Exceptions apply is a self-contained exercise governed by their particular terms.
(B) In cases where the two Exceptions do not apply – that is, in the case of a serious offender or in the case of a medium offender who cannot satisfy their requirements – a full proportionality assessment is required, weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. In conducting that assessment the decision-maker is required by section 117C(6) (and paragraph 398 of the Rules) to proceed on the basis that 'the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2'."
…
57. NA (Pakistan) thus establishes that the effect of the over-and-above requirement is that, in a case where the "very compelling circumstances" on which a claimant relies under section 117C(6) include an Exception-specified circumstance ("an Exception-overlap case") it is necessary that there be something substantially more than the minimum that would be necessary to qualify for the relevant Exception under subsection (4) or (5): as Jackson LJ puts it at para. 29, the article 8 case must be "especially strong". That higher threshold may be reached either because the circumstance in question is present to a degree which is "well beyond" what would be sufficient to establish a "bare case", or – as shown by the phrases which I have italicised in paras. 29 and 30 – because it is complemented by other relevant circumstances, or because of a combination of both. I will refer to those considerations, of whichever kind, as "something more". To take a concrete example, if the Exception-related circumstance is the impact of the claimant's deportation on a child (Exception 2) the something more will have to be either that the undue harshness would be of an elevated degree ("unduly unduly harsh"?) or that it was complemented by another factor or factors – perhaps very long residence in this country (even if Exception 1 is not satisfied) – to a sufficient extent to meet the higher threshold; or, as I have said, a combination of the two.
…
62. … I agree that it would in principle conduce to transparent decision-making if the tribunal identified with precision in every case what the something more consisted of; but that will not always be straightforward. The proportionality assessment is generally multi-factorial and requires a holistic approach. A tribunal must of course in its reasons identify the factors to which it has given significant weight in reaching its overall conclusion. It is no doubt also desirable that it should indicate the relative importance of those factors, but there are limits to the extent to which that is practically possible: the factors in play are of their nature incommensurable, and calibrating their relative weights will often be an artificial exercise. It would in my view place an unrealistic burden on tribunals for them to have to decide, and specify, in every case whether the something more consists of the Exception-specific circumstance being present to an elevated degree, or of some other circumstance or circumstances, or a combination of the two. There may be cases where for some reason peculiar to the case this degree of specificity is necessary; but I do not believe that there is any universal rule. We should not make decision-making in this area more complicated than it regrettably already is.” (my emphasis)
28. In relation to the question of very compelling circumstances, it is therefore sensible for a tribunal to first consider whether a case involves circumstances of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2. The Exceptions to deportation set out particularly significant factors bearing upon respect for private life (Exception 1) and respect for family life (Exception 2). They also provide a helpful basis on which an assessment can be made on whether there are "very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2". That is, the identification of “something more” as described by Underhill LJ.
29. I address ground 2 first of all because it relates to a factor which was assessed by the Judge in relation to “very compelling circumstances” which is the subject of challenge in ground 1.
30. Mr Ojo declined to address me in submissions on this specific ground. The grounds assert that the Judge seemingly makes the finding that the Judge is socially and culturally integrated on the basis of his long residence, which she asserts is insufficient. Further, the respondent’s position is that the Judge failed to take into account the time the appellant had spent in prison and she submits that the fact the appellant had not reoffended is no more than a “neutral consideration”.
31. It is wholly apparent from the decision that the Judge did not base her conclusion that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK solely on the basis of his long residence. Based on the judicial findings in 2017, the Judge’s starting point was that the appellant was substantially rehabilitated. The Judge indicated at [50] that she considered all evidence in the round in relation to this issue and factored in the fact the appellant had committed one single offence (in 2011) and that there had been no further offending since his release from prison and detention over a decade before. In the decision the Judge provides detailed reasoning for her finding that the appellant is unlikely to reoffend. This finding was supported by expert evidence. Although the appellant had worked previously he was not permitted to work at present, but he was the primary carer for his family, consisting of his two British citizen children.
32. At [51] of SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 15, Lord Stephens, giving the judgment of the Supreme Court, said that: “Whether a foreign criminal is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom in section 117C(4)(b) is to be determined in accordance with common sense”. Lord Stephens then approved the following formulation of how a Judge must approach this issue:
“a judge should simply ask whether, having regard to his upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friends, lifestyle and any other relevant factors, the individual was at the time of the hearing socially and culturally integrated in the UK.”
33. Just as criminality has a bearing on the assessment of a person’s integrative links where it demonstrates a blatant disregard for fellow citizens and is manifestly anti-social (Binbuga v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 551), the absence of criminality for an extended period can be a relevant factor in the Judge’s common sense determination of an appellant’s social and cultural integration at the time of the hearing.
34. The submissions set out at ground 2 are without merit. The Judge provided wholly adequate reasoning for finding that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK. She reached a decision that was patently open to her on the evidence, and which was free from any material misdirection of law. Contrary to the assertion in the grounds, the Judge did consider that the appellant had spent time in prison. The Judge provided cogent reasons for finding that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK whilst applying the correct legal principles.
35. I turn to address ground 1.
36. This ground contains submissions which stray beyond a simple assertion of a failure to provide adequate reasons, and which Mr Ojo did not specifically address me on. Since these submissions relate to factors which formed part of the Judge’s overall assessment of very compelling circumstances, it is logical to address these at the outset of an assessment of this ground of appeal.
37. The grounds assert that the Judge “failed to consider that the breakdown of a family is insufficient to reach the unduly harsh threshold”. In my view this is a mischaracterisation of the Judge’s assessment of Exception 2.
38. The Judge heard evidence from the appellant, his partner and both of his children. She found their evidence to be credible. At [46] of the decision it is recorded that the respondent’s Presenting Officer at the hearing “did not challenge any of the witnesses in cross-examination nor make any adverse credibility submissions in closing about the strength and closeness of the family unit”. At [36] the Judge noted the evidence of the particularly close relationship between the appellant and his son, and how the prospect of the appellant being deported had been a particular challenge for his son. Evidence was noted that the son was not stable and how behavioural problems had started to arise after a visit to the appellant in prison had been cancelled because the prison was in lockdown. It was recorded that the appellant’s son had received therapy and how the appellant had supported him through a recent police investigation as well as in his studies and footballing pursuits. It was noted that the appellant is the primary care giver in the family and at [38] the Judge noted that since the appellant’s release from immigration detention, the appellant had now lived with his son for over 10 years and were “very close”.

39. At [39] the Judge refers to the expert evidence of the Independent Social Worker who opines that the appellant’s deportation would have a detrimental effect on his children’s educational and employment attainment and the “significantly detrimental impact upon the whole family” given the appellant’s role in the family and the emotional support that he provides to his son and daughter. The Judge found at [40] that, applying common sense, the consequences of deportation of the appellant on his partner would also necessarily affect his son and daughter.

40. The emotional closeness between the appellant’s family members and in particular between him and his son is referred to at various points in the decision. The Judge found at [43] that the evidence of the closeness of the family unit and repercussions for the family members should the appellant be deported, to be credible. She found that the closeness has continued since the 2017 Tribunal decision and has become stronger still on account of the years spent together and what they had faced.

41. At [44] of the decision, factoring in the best interest of the appellant’s son as a child, the Judge found that the deportation of the appellant would be unduly harsh for his son. At [44] the decision states:

“[The appellant’s son] has been in fear of being separated from the appellant for most of his life. The appellant has been an everyday physical presence, from the moment he gets back from college through to leaving home to go to college the next day. [The appellant’s partner] works a high number of hours, as the only wage earner in the family unit. The appellant is there for him every day and it is to him that [his son] turns when he has a problem or something he needs to discuss.”

42. There is no indication in the decision that the Judge was not aware of and had not factored in the age of the appellant’s son in her assessment of undue harshness. The decision specifically references the Independent Social Worker’s report which refers to the negative impact of the appellant’s deportation on his children “regardless of their chronological age”.

43. The Judge sets out her conclusions at [45] regarding the appellant’s partner and that it would be unduly harsh for her to remain in the UK if the appellant is deported and to relocate to Dominica with him.

44. In my view the Judge unarguably provides detailed and cogent reasoning for her conclusions in respect of Exception 2, and her conclusions are rooted in the evidence before her and are based upon the detailed evidence of the impact of deportation on the appellant’s family members in light of the particular family circumstances and the issues and vulnerabilities facing each family member. At [46] the Judge recorded that the impact of the appellant's deportation would not merely be an inconvenience, noting that the “family unit is close and its members depend on each other, with the appellant at the very centre of that unit”. The Judge based her findings upon the unchallenged evidence before her and there is no indication from her reasoning or her findings that she did not appreciate the elevated threshold required to meet the requirements of Exception 2.

45. The Judge carried forward her findings in relation to Exception 2 and the appellant’s social and cultural integration, to her assessment of very compelling circumstances at [54] et seq. The grounds specifically reference the Judge’s reasoning at [62] of the decision in support of the contention that the Judge’s reasoning was inadequate. However, it is clear that [62] is a summary of the appellant’s case and the Judge’s previous findings, just as [61] is a summary of the respondent’s position. The decision must be read as a whole. The Judge’s findings start at [22] of the decision. The Judge conducted a multi-factorial and holistic proportionality assessment in line with that envisaged by Underhill LJ in Yalcin.

46. In addition to the detailed findings in respect of Exception 2 and the appellant’s social and cultural integration, the Judge assessed the negative impact of the appellant’s deportation on his daughter, who was now a young adult but who still lives in the family home whilst she continues her university studies. The Judge found that she continues to enjoy family life with the appellant. The Judge noted that the appellant’s daughter had been referred to the Mental Health team, had undertaken Talking Therapy with the NHS found, suffers from anxiety and is “still struggling”. Additional factors beyond this which are specifically referenced by the Judge in the decision include: the 22 years the appellant has lived in the United Kingdom; his compliance with weekly reporting whilst on immigration bail for over a decade; that over 14 years had elapsed since the commission of his offence; his low risk of re-offending; and, the appellant had shown strong evidence of rehabilitation and was unlikely to reoffend.

47. I find that the Judge demonstrated that she had the seriousness of the appellant’s offending and the public interest in deportation firmly in her mind. There are references in the decision to the public interest on multiple occasions (at [23], [27], [61] and [63]) and to the serious offence (at [27], [5] and [61]).

48. In my view, the submission in the grounds that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasoning for how the appellant met the threshold of very compelling circumstances is without substance.

49. In the assessment of very compelling circumstances, a fact sensitive assessment is required. Whether the “something more” required to establish that there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, will depend on an almost infinitely variable range of circumstances. As the losing party, the respondent is entitled to know what those very compelling circumstances are. Reading the decision as a whole and having regard to the Judge’s findings from [22] et seq, and in particular from [34], the Judge’s reasoning for finding there are very compelling circumstances is clearly discernible from what is said. The Judge unquestionably provided reasons which are sufficient to enable the losing party to understand why she has lost and to enable this Tribunal to examine her decision.

50. The Judge’s Article 8 assessment was conducted within the correct legal framework, applying the correct legal principles. The Judge conducted a careful, balanced and fully reasoned analysis and there is no merit in the respondent’s assertion that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons. Although not specifically pleaded, I also record that there is no basis for me to consider that the Judge misdirected herself in law. The finding that the appellant was able to demonstrate very compelling circumstances necessary to outweigh the public interest in deportation was an outcome rationally open to the Judge and the fact that the respondent disagrees, or that another judge may have reached a different conclusion, does not mean the Judge’s decision can or should be interfered with.

51. It follows from what I have said that I am not satisfied that the grounds of appeal are made out in any respect. The decision of the FtT is not vitiated by any material error of law and must consequently stand.

Notice of Decision
The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law and therefore stands

S. Grey
Upper Tribunal Judge Grey

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 November 2025