Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003557

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01404/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

29th October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RICHARDS

Between

MHMT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S. Saifolahi, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms R. Tariq, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background and procedural history
1. The appellant is an Egyptian national who arrived in the UK as an unaccompanied minor on 9 February 2023 when aged 16. He claimed asylum the following day and his claim was refused by the respondent on 6 October 2023.
2. The appellant appealed and his appeal was heard on 3 March 2025 at the First-tier Tribunal. By the time his appeal was heard, the appellant was an adult. The First-tier Tribunal judge (“the judge”) promulgated the Tribunal’s decision on 5 June 2025 dismissing all grounds of appeal.
3. We note that an anonymity order was made by the First-tier Tribunal, and that the Appellant has made an asylum application (and was an asylum-seeking child at the time of application) and we continue the anonymity order in this case. In doing so we have had regard to Guidance Note 2022 No.2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private and Kambadzi v SSHD [2011] UKSC 23. We have considered the strong public interest in open justice. Nonetheless, in this case it is outweighed by the United Kingdom’s obligations towards applicants for international protection.
4. The appellant applied for permission to appeal this decision and permission was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 22 July 2025.
5. The appellant was not legally represented at the First-tier Tribunal although he is in these appellate proceedings. His representatives applied to the Upper Tribunal for directions requesting the respondent’s record of proceedings and First-tier Tribunal’s record of proceedings in relation to their concern that [34] of the First-tier Tribunal’s judgment (“the judgment”) did not align with the appellant’s recollection of what was said at the hearing. We issued directions in advance of the hearing before us that were complied with and the respondent’s record of proceedings is now before us and the parties.
6. The appellant’s representative made a Rule 15(2A) application to adduce into evidence certified translations of Arabic documents (two police reports and one medical report) which were before the First-tier Tribunal. The representative submitted that these are translations of documents that were before the First-tier Tribunal and link to Ground 2 of the appeal relating to a failure to give proper weight to corroborative evidence. The senior presenting office submitted that this evidence should not be admitted as it was not before the First-tier Tribunal and that this hearing is an error of law hearing only.
7. The appellant’s representative and the senior presenting officer made further oral submissions before us on the substantive matters of the appeal at the hearing on 6 October 2025 and we reserved our judgment.
Grounds of appeal
8. At the grant of permission to appeal stage, there were four grounds of appeal submitted on behalf of the appellant, and permission was granted in relation to all of these.
9. However by the conclusion of the hearing before us, the appellant’s representative confirmed that Grounds 3 and 4 were not being pursued, and thus the issues before us are Grounds 1 and 2.
10. Ground 1 is that the judge erred in their credibility assessment of the appellant because they failed to assess the appellant’s claim in light of the facts that the appellant was an unaccompanied minor when he arrived in the UK and was a minor at the date of interview and date of refusal.
11. In the judgment the judge dealt explicitly with the age of the appellant in the following paragraphs:
“7. The appellant was a minor when he arrived in the UK and claimed political asylum but was no longer a minor at the time of his appeal hearing. The appellant was 17 years old at the date of his asylum interview at which point he was represented. His representative submitted post-interview representations.
…
32. I acknowledge that the appellant was a minor when he claimed political asylum in the UK although he was no longer a minor at the date he was interviewed.”
12. Ground 2 is that the judge erred by failing to give proper weight to the two police reports and one medical report.
13. The judge explained how she considered these documents in the following paragraphs:
“19. The appellant gave oral evidence before me with the assistance of the official interpreter in the Arabic language. The interpreter confirmed that they understood each other. The appellant adopted his witness statement and asylum interview record as part of his evidence in chief. The appellant indicated that his previous representatives asked him if he had any proof in support of his claim and he now submitted that proof being the medical report and police document. He did not have the originals and just received a copy from a solicitor in Egypt. These documents were photocopies of the original documents. The appellant was asked why the documents were in English responded because his support worker did this. The appellant indicated was the early indicated that these were copies of the original documents that he had in fact handed over the documents in Arabic and a support worker translated them. He had the documents saved on his phone which was not in his possession. He had not seen the Arabic version of these documents. The appellant indicated there were quite a lot of mistakes in the reason for refusal letter.
…
40. The appellant produced some late evidence in support of his claim. He did not produce the original documents. He did not produce the documents in Arabic. The translations are of a very poor quality and the interpreter has not certified them or indicated who they were. In these circumstances, I attach no weight to this documentation. Should I consider the documentation, I would apply Tanveer Ahmed and considering this documentation in the round, I would attach very little weight to the same in any event.”
Submissions
For the appellant
14. The appellant’s representative submitted that although the judge made reference to the age of the appellant in two paragraphs (once [7] under the subheading ‘Issues under appeal’ and once [32] under the subheading ‘Decision’), she has not engaged with how the appellant’s age played a role in their assessment of his credibility. She submitted that the judge needed to deal with how the appellant’s age may have affected the evidence he gave in the initial asylum claim and interview when he was still a minor. (It is common ground between the parties that the judge was incorrect in his statement at [32] that the appellant “was no longer a minor at the date he was interviewed”.)
15. She drew our attention to the case of JA (child – risk of persecution) Nigeria [2016] UKUT 00560 (IAC) where it says:
“15. The Convention on the Rights of the Child is clearly a relevant consideration that this Tribunal and indeed all who deal with asylum issues should take into account, and it is clear that a child could be at risk of persecutory harm contrary to the Convention in circumstances where a comparably placed adult would not be at such risk. The contrary is not I think argued by Mr Melvin who makes the point that the findings of both judges below cannot be criticised on the basis that they adopted a proper approach and that what would be suffered was not sufficient to amount to persecution. …
16. But as the UNHCR has observed in its Guidelines, ill-treatment which may not arise to the level of persecution in the case of an adult, may do so in the case of a child, and the child's youth immaturity, vulnerability etc will rightly be related to how that child experiences or fears harm.”
16. She submitted that this was of relevance to the judge’s findings at [34] and [38] of their judgment.
17. These paragraphs say as follows:
“34. Before me, the appellant stated that his father had handed over his share of his inheritance and therefore there would be no cause for his uncles to continue to pursue his father, the appellant or his other family members. At this juncture, the appellant for the first time sought to raise a claim that there were other issues between his father and his uncles, the details of which he was not aware. I find that if this was the case, that the appellant would have raised this claim at an earlier juncture. I find that the appellant indicated before me that there was no longer any good calls for his uncles to be pursuing any member of his family and when confronted with this he sought to raise a new claim. I find this to be an attempt by the appellant to enhance and bolster a week asylum claim and find it to be damaging to his credibility.
…
38. The appellant claims not to have had contact with his family for 1 ½-2 years. The appellant has a support worker in the UK. The role of the International Red Cross in reuniting family members across the world is widely known. Despite this, the appellant indicated that he had not approached Red Cross or asked his support worker to do so on his behalf. I find this to be indicative of the fact that the appellant has not lost contact with his family members and is in contact with them and they remain safely in the family home in Egypt.”
18. In relation to Ground 2, the appellant’s representative submitted that the appellant’s age was also relevant to this Ground. She submitted that the appellant was young and representing himself at the First-tier Tribunal. She submitted that the judge erred in attaching no weight to the documents as the documents before them appeared to support the appellant’s case and were submitted by a senior support worker from a county council. She submitted that if the documents that are subject to the Rule 15(2A) application are admitted, they support the appellant’s case.
19. She submitted that if an error of law is found, the case should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a rehearing.
For the respondent
20. The senior presenting officer submitted that both Grounds of appeal are opposed. She endorsed the Rule 24 response and expanded on the points therein.
21. In relation to Ground 1, she submitted that it was sufficiently clear from [32] that the judge factored in the appellant’s age when assessing credibility and that this is supported by reading her reasoning at [37]. This is notwithstanding the error, which she submitted should reasonably interpreted as a typo when read in the context of the whole decision, describing the appellant as no longer a minor at the time of interview.
22. The judge’s reasoning at [37] is as follows:
“The appellant claims that whilst he, his younger brother and mother were all attacked and targeted by his uncles, that his mother and brother were able to remain in Egypt in the family home without any issues and were not subsequently targeted. I find that if this was the case that the appellant too could have safely remained in the country being a minor at the time and that he would not have been targeted or at risk.”
23. It was further submitted that the credibility issues identified by the judge were not of the type that it may be unfair to hold against an appellant attempting to recall events that took place when they were a minor. She submitted that there were a range of factors that the judge used to support their credibility findings including that he sought to advance a wholly new claim for the first time at the First-tier Tribunal hearing and that many aspects of the claim were not consistent with the background evidence.
24. It was submitted that the judge was entitled to consider the point that the appellant whilst a minor of 16 and 17 would be expected to make reasonable efforts via the Red Cross to trace their parents if they had genuinely lost contact with their parents, particularly given that they had the assistance of a support worker.
25. It was further submitted that any error in the credibility analysis would be immaterial in light of the findings made in the alternative on risk, state protection, and internal relocation.
26. In relation to Ground 2, she submitted that the judge was entitled to give minimal weight to this documentary evidence for the reasons she provided in [40]. She submitted that because of the poor quality of the documents and the lack of certification from the translator it would be unsafe to attach any more than minimal weight to them. She submitted that the principles in Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00439 apply.
27. She submitted that if an error of law was found, then the case should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a rehearing.
Rule 15(2A) application
28. We refuse to admit the new evidence because it was not before the First-tier Tribunal. Although it is submitted that the new evidence is said to be certified translations of documents that were before the First-tier Tribunal, in our judgment this is new evidence and in the context of the task before the judge there is a qualitative difference between the evidence before them and that which is now applied to be admitted before us.
29. We note that there is no ground of appeal, and no application to amend the grounds of appeal, stating that the judge made a procedural error in not adjourning the hearing to allow the appellant a further opportunity to provide appropriately certified translations of the documents he wished to rely on. Whilst we make no comment on whether or not that potential ground would be made out as it was not raised or argued before us, we note that it may have been the appropriate ground to make in relation to the disputed documents.
Findings – error of law
Ground 1
30. We find that the judge did not materially err in their consideration of the age of the appellant within their analysis and conclusions on the appellant’s credibility.
31. Notwithstanding what we accept was a typographical error in [37], it is clear to us that the judge appropriately factored in the appellant’s age because she referred explicitly to it in [7], and in [32] and [37] within the part of the judgment titled “Decision”. We find that the judge was aware of the appellant’s age throughout the course of events relevant to their claim and she duly factored this into her consideration.
32. We have also examined the credibility findings that the judge made and when considered holistically we find that even if the judge did err in failing to properly consider the appellant’s age of 16 and 17 when some of the relevant events happened (which we do not accept), this would not be a material error to their credibility findings because the findings do not rely in the most part on factors that would reasonably be materially affected by an appellant being of age 16 and 17 in the circumstances of this appellant.
33. The judge made adverse credibility findings against the appellant at paragraphs [34], [35], [36], and [39] in relation to making a claim for the first time at the First-tier Tribunal hearing (when an adult) and giving evidence contrary to the objective evidence. We are not persuaded that the appellant’s age during the course of the relevant events had a material impact on any of these findings.
34. The only paragraph where the judge made credibility findings that are potentially relevant to the appellant’s age are in [38] which deals with the agreed fact that the appellant had not approached Red Cross or asked his support worker to do so in order to reunite the appellant with family members he claimed he had had no contact with for 1.5-2 years. However we find that the judge was entitled to legitimately form the view that it was not credible for a 16 or 17 year old in the position that the appellant said he was in, with the assistance of a senior support worker from the local Council, to not make any efforts to approach the Red Cross to help make contact with his family. We note that the appellant had the advantage of a senior support worker, and for a period during his claim had the assistance of legal representatives.
35. We reject the submission that JA (child – risk of persecution) Nigeria [2016] UKUT 00560 (IAC) has material relevance to Ground 1 as it deals with how a child may experience or fear harm and not the primary reasons why the judge made an adverse credibility assessment of the appellant.
36. We further reject the submission that the respondent’s record of proceedings of the First-tier Tribunal hearing is not consistent with the judge’s findings at [34] which it was submitted was relevant to the judge’s consideration of the appellant’s age within their credibility findings.
37. We find that on a fair and holistic reading of both the record of proceedings and the judgment, taking the texts in their full contexts, there is no material inconsistency between them.
38. As such, Ground 1 is dismissed.
Ground 2
39. We find that the judge did not materially err in their consideration of the police and medical documents in attaching no weight to them as per [40].
40. It was open to the judge to reject these documents as they were what appears to be poorly translated versions of Arabic documents, the original documents were not before the judge and indeed the appellant’s evidence was that they had never seen the original documents, the documents were not certified by the translator, and the translator did not indicate who they were.
41. We reject the contention that the age of the appellant throughout their claim materially infects the judge’s consideration of these documents. We note that the appellant was an adult at the time of the First-tier Tribunal hearing when they sought to adduce and rely on this evidence, and we find that the appellant’s age is not materially relevant to the weight that should be placed on the documents.
42. The judge was correct to refer herself to Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD and in our judgment applied it appropriately.
43. As such Ground 2 is dismissed.
Conclusion
44. We have carefully considered the written and oral submissions put forward on behalf of the appellant and respondent and find that none of the grounds of appeal are substantiated and that in our judgment there was no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal proceedings and determination. Thus, this appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error of law and stands.

DUTJ Richards

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16th October 2025