Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003564

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/64712/2024
LP/12307/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 21st of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

E R
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Eaton, Counsel, Fadiga & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity owing to the nature of the appeal.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant challenges the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Peer (the judge) who dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The appeal is brought pursuant to Section 11(4)(b) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
2. The appellant, a citizen of Iran, appeals the decision of the respondent dated 1st May 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim on 1st January 2023. Sections 30 to 39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply.
Grounds of appeal
3. The grounds of appeal were as follows:
Ground 1
4. The judge misdirected herself on the standard of proof in assessing whether the appellant was a genuine Christian convert. The judge found (on the balance of probabilities) that he was not [66]. It was not disputed he had outwardly converted to Christianity and therefore a Convention reason was engaged but the genuineness of his conversion went to his objective fear of persecution and therefore should have been assessed on the lower standard of proof following JCK v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100.
Ground 2
5. There was a failure to consider the correct facts as to the whether it was a genuine conversion as per Ali Dorodian v Secretary of State for the Home Department (01/TH/1537). There was a failure to consider the totality of the actual evidence in the round, and the judge made erroneous and contradictory findings regarding that evidence as evidence. As in PS (Christianity - risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 46, the proper weight to be given in observance and external evidence when assessing a genuine conversion is as follows:
“10. That leads to our second point: what we mean by ‘Christian convert’. It is not possible to make windows into men’s souls. Whether someone is, or is not, a Christian is a matter of fact that is impossible to objectively verify. For example, an individual may pay very little attention to scripture or sermon but might fervently believe that Jesus Christ is the son of God; Christians with a long-held and deep belief can still face a crisis of faith at any given moment. It is no doubt for that reason that the Tribunal in Ali Dorodian v Secretary of State for the Home Department (01/TH/1537) preferred to focus on the externally observable: ‘as we have said, it is church membership rather than mere belief, which may lead to risk’. This difficulty means that in this jurisdiction decision makers must rely largely on the observations of others to determine whether someone is, or is not, a ‘genuine’ Christian. A further complexity arises. There is no doubt for many a path to wholehearted belief, with gradations marked by life events and a deepening understanding. At what point along that path an individual might become a ‘Christian’ is not clearly signposted. There is certainly no theological consensus on the matter; baptism is an indicator, but it should not be regarded as determinative. The terminology used in this decision must therefore be read with that caveat in mind. For our purposes we are primarily concerned with those whom the Iranian state regard as ‘Christians’.”
6. As is noted it was “church membership rather than mere belief, which may lead to risk”. The judge erred in concluding that the respondent had not accepted the appellant’s baptism and thus should provide further evidence. It was not the respondent’s position in the refusal decision that the appellant had not been through a baptism, rather than it was not of itself evident that the appellant was a genuine convert. Thus, the judge erred in finding that the act of baptism was challenged.
7. It was the judge’s own conclusion that she put considerable weight on the failure to corroborate his baptism [66]. As per PS (Iran) the act of baptism was not determinative. The appellant responded correctly to the points raised in the respondent’s decision providing considerable further evidence including a live witness.
8. The judge erred in finding there was no evidence from the church why the appellant was baptised [55] but the letter from the Brookdale Church confirmed that the appellant had undertaken the “Christian explored course”.
9. The judge relied on an unsubstantiated and incorrect assertion that the contact details of Brookdale Church were wrong. If that were the case it was for the respondent to prove it and they did not do so. Secondly the judge erred in failing to consider the totality of the appellant’s evidence together and that the appellant had shown that he had attended five different churches as he had been rehoused. The judge asserted that he was shown the appellant’s attendance, but the Brookdale Church had set out the course the appellant had attended and the judge contradictorily noted the evidence had been “able to express and develop his very clear commitment” [55].
10. Again, at [57] the judge contradicted herself by finding the evidence of the Weymouth Baptist Church corroborated the applicant’s account of his involvement in the church. The evidence of Pastor Skull clearly went much further than just detailing the appellant’s attendance and should have been given due weight in the round. R (on the application of SS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKUT 164 (IAC). The evidence of Matthew Sharpe was accepted as credible. He had known the appellant for eighteen months. This was the first time he had given evidence, had declined on a previous occasion in circumstances where he had provided a letter of reference in respect of attendance at his church.
Ground 3
11. The judge contravened YL (China) [2004] UKIAT 00145 by placing weight on the discrepancies. The purpose of the screening interview was to establish no more than the general nature of the claim [19] and the appellant did that in his screening interview. The appellant answered in his screening interview “My life is in danger due to demonstrating in Iran” which was consistent with his account.
12. It was contended that the conclusions of the judge were predicated on plausibility and it was unlawful to invoke such a point at [40] to [43] as the basis for rejecting the appellant’s claim to the extent that they relate to the circumstances beyond the Tribunal’s expertise as per HK v the Secretary of State [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, [27] to [30].
13. The appellant made it clear why he believed the authorities were interested in him when he had no previous political profile. Previously he had been storing leaflets for a student. The reason he had stored leaflets was that he was friends with the students and sympathetic to the reasons in the demonstration.
Ground 4
14. The judge misdirected herself as to the correct test of risk upon return when the appellant was interviewed by the Iranian authorities. At point of entry the applicant had expressed his opposition to the Islamic Republic in Iran at demonstrations in the UK and this was accepted by the respondent. The judge had failed to consider the response of the Iran regime to the appellant’s activities when he was returned to Iran and only considered whether the Iranian authorities would have become aware of his activities whilst the applicant was in the UK.
15. As the appellant had exited Iran illegally, he will be interrogated on return. He will be asked about his activities in the UK and cannot be expected to lie about his circumstances in order to keep himself safe. RN (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2008] UKAIT 00083.
Permission to Appeal
16. Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien granted permission to appeal on all grounds, in particular focusing on ground 4, such that the judge misdirected herself as to the correct test of risk on return when the appellant was interviewed by the Iranian authorities at the point of entry.
17. He added that he had grave doubts as to the merits that most of the criticisms raised against the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s conversion to Christianity but “taking a pragmatic approach” did not limit permission.
Submissions
18. In the submissions Mr Eaton advanced that in terms of the judge stating that the evidence was insufficient in relation to the baptism, the judge failed to consider for example the letter from the church in Ilfracombe. The judge had criticised the fact that the appellant went to church over short periods of time but that was not his choice because he was moving around. In totality the letters from the various churches covered a period of two and a half years. Indeed, the judge dealt with further evidence at [52] and additionally Matthew Sharpe was called to give oral evidence. Mr Sharpe was from the Weymouth Independent Evangelical Church, and they had been in communion for about four to five months and stayed in touch with the appellant since and helped him find his current church and had known the appellant for a period of two years. At [66] the judge stated that he considered the failure “to provide further corroborating or other documentary evidence regarding the baptism and Brookdale Church is significant as it would have been reasonable to provide this evidence to address the points in the refusal decision”. However, the Secretary of State had provided nothing to support the assertion raised in the refusal.
19. In terms of ground 3 and in respect of reliance on the screening interview I was referred to [16] of the grounds. The screening interview was undertaken late at night and not read back to the person and merely a processing tool. The judge at [40] to [43] had recorded that the appellant had given a plausible explanation why the Iranian authorities were interested in him. The appellant had always said he had never attended the demonstration but ……… difference was that his life was in danger owing to the demonstration and it had been merely taken that he had attended the demonstration but that was never his case.
20. In terms of ground 4, following HB (Kurds) it was clear that the appellant would be interrogated on return, and it was accepted at [46] of the decision that the appellant had indeed attended demonstrations in the UK. The judge had not dealt with how he would be treated on his return. The appellant had been baptised in the UK and even on the findings that the judge had attended a demonstration and following RT (Zimbabwe) he would not be able to lie.
21. Lastly, turning to ground 1 and the application of JCK, it would appear that the judge had made the assessment of whether there was a subjective fear entirely determinative of the appellant’s credibility. In relation to Section 32(2)(b) of NABA, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, it was always the appellant’s case that one of the reasons he became a Christian was because of the nature of Islam in his country and that it was an aggressive form of Islam. Mr Eaton referred to [25] and [27] of JCK. The judge erred in making the balance of probability, the only test in this appeal.
22. Mr Tufan, in respect of ground 2, advanced that the reasons for refusal letter did not accept the baptism of the appellant when looking at the reasons for refusal letter carefully. The postcode of Brookfield Church on the website differed from that given in the letter provided by the appellant. Moreover, the judge did not make specific findings on this.
23. In relation to Mr Sharpe the judge found that he was credible in his own belief, but what he believed did not necessarily conform with what the judge accepted. Owing to credibility issues, the judge found the appellant himself was not a genuine covert. It is open to the judge to refer to YL (China) and the judge applied the principles of that decision. And at [28] the judge went into detail applying those principles. At [31] the judge pointed out that the appellant was not a Christian on entry to the UK. In terms of the demonstration the judge also found the appellant would not be at risk for attending demonstrations and at the relevant pinch points, when interrogated, he was not a genuine convert. He did not have to say he converted. The Iranian authorities could not know of his conversion and if asked about his belief he would not have to say he attended demonstrations. The Iranian authorities would know that he was just someone trying to claim asylum.
24. Mr Tufan accepted JCK was confusing. The judge however did refer to JCK at [19] of the decision and at [66] and the judge did use the balance of probabilities, but it was clear from the findings that the judge was not credible and on whatever test the appellant was not credible, whether the low or higher test.
25. Mr Eaton submitted that it was not possible to replace one standard of proof with another.
26. In terms of the assessment the facts are quite balanced and if the judge had not misdirected herself on the standard of proof a different conclusion might have reached. Mr Eaton submitted that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
Conclusion
27. It was recorded at [13] by the judge that the respondent accepted that the appellant was a citizen of Iran and if the appellant’s account was held credible in particular that he was a Christian convert there was no sufficiency of protection for him in Iran and internal relocation was not viable. The judge set out the issues at [14].
28. I have taken grounds 1 and 3 first, as they relate to approach to the assessment of the evidence overall and thread through the findings.
29. In relation to ground 1, the judge at [19] noted that the asylum claim was made after 28th June 2022 and that Section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applied. The judge went on to cite to JCK (Section 32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100. The judge stated as follows:
“19. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two- stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a convention reason?
(b) Does the Appellant fear persecution for that convention reason?
20. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(c) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
(e) The Appellant could not internally relocate.”
30. In fact, Section 32 as statute will govern the position if there were any confusion, and states as follows:
“32. Article 1(A)(2): well-founded fear
(1) In deciding for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention whether an asylum seeker’s fear of persecution is well-founded, the following approach is to be taken.
(2) The decision-maker must first determine, on the balance of probabilities—
(a) whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
(b) whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence) as a result of that characteristic.
(See also section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (asylum claims etc: behaviour damaging to claimant’s credibility).)
(3) Subsection (4) applies if the decision-maker finds that—
(a) the asylum seeker has a characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a) (or has such a characteristic attributed to them), and
(b) the asylum seeker fears persecution as mentioned in subsection (2)(b).
(4) The decision-maker must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that, if the asylum seeker were returned to their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence)—
(a) they would be persecuted as a result of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a), and
(b) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 34.
(5) The determination under subsection (4) must also include a consideration of the matter mentioned in section 35 (internal relocation).”
31. The judge, however, at [23] found and recognised that by taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, there were possible Convention reasons of “imputed political opinion and religion relied upon”. On the question at Section 32(2) as to whether the asylum seeker on the balance of probabilities has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an act of persecution), it was entirely open to the judge to assess the credibility of the appellant’s account in relation to the screening interview, the appellant’s asylum interview and his written statement and oral evidence, as she did. I give further detail below on the actual findings.
32. In terms of Ground 3, I am aware that the judge should be cautious before finding an account to be inherently incredible following Y v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223.
33. Y, however, also found at [26] having reviewed the authorities:
26. None of this, however, means that an adjudicator is required to take at face value an account of facts proffered by an appellant, no matter how contrary to common sense and experience of human behaviour the account may be. The decision maker is not expected to suspend his own judgment, nor does Mr Singh contend that he should. In appropriate cases, he is entitled to find that an account of events is so far-fetched and contrary to reason as to be incapable of belief. The point was well put in the Awala case by Lord Brodie at paragraph 24 when he said this:
"… the tribunal of fact need not necessarily accept an applicant's account simply because it is not contradicted at the relevant hearing. The tribunal of fact is entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality, and may reject evidence if it is not consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole".
He then added a little later:
"… while a decision on credibility must be reached rationally, in doing so the decision maker is entitled to draw on his common sense and his ability, as a practical and informed person, to identify what is or is not plausible".
34. In my view that is the approach the judge adopted throughout. The judge made a series of lawful findings in a manner open to her and which I detail below for clarification.
35. The judge directed herself properly in relation to the screening interview making reference to YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145. The judge was aware that an appellant is not expected to set out their case in detail at the initial screening interview but I note that the reason advanced that this was a processing tool only but the purpose of the screening interview is to establish the general nature of the claimant’s case as identified at [19] of YL and so identified by the judge but that, “Asylum seekers are still expected to tell the truth and answers given in screening interviews can be compared fairly with answers given later on.” It is clear that the detail does not have to be given and that elaborate answers do not have to be given. It was noted that the screening interview may be conducted when the asylum seeker was tired.
36. It is clear however in this case that the judge took into account the screening interview, the asylum interview and the appellant’s witness statement and oral evidence when making an assessment on credibility in the round and the judge at [31] specifically noted that the appellant stated “I cannot return to Iran because I was in a demonstration.” At [32] the judge did acknowledge that the screening interview took place very late at night and, in a balanced assessment, accepted that the date of birth error was probably inadvertent; but the judge properly weighed the evidence at [33-34] in relation to the screening interview. The judge clearly questioned the answer that the appellant claimed he was not sure he was in a safe place, when that contrasted with the appellant’s decision to opt to travel to the UK. The judge, however, acknowledged that that with such a setting in Iran the default position would be to avoid an open admission a rejection of Islam and the judge appears to have accepted that his explanation of the matter. The judge noted that the appellant claimed he was not well and corrected the mistake and also identified that the appellant had said his religion was that of a Shia Muslim and that although this contrasted with the later interview that he had given that he considered himself no longer a Muslim in 2019/2020 that is at the time of the screening interview (dated 1st January 2023), he did not profess conversion at that date [32]. Thus, in terms of the conversion the judge questioned the contrast in the screening interview, but it was the appellant’s evidence of his political demonstrations which affected the appellant’s credibility.
37. The judge noted that the screening interview at 4.1 and 3.1 pointed to the appellant recording that he was in the demonstration and that contrasted and was inconsistent with the appellant’s later statements about events in Iran as he was never involved in any demonstrations and which is detailed at [34] of the decision.
38. The judge proceeded to identify that there was no formal correction of the statement in the screening interview at 4.1 that “My life was in danger due to the demonstration in Iran”.
39. Ultimately the judge did in effect find that it was not clear “why the appellant’s representative did not clarify the FTR statements when other details were clarified and it remained unclear why he made the statement during the FTR” and the judge placed some weight, albeit little on the appellant’s screening interview answers of undermining his credibility. The judge also found that the appellant’s behaviour of destroying his passport is associated with his travel as damaging his credibility and that was not challenged. That assessment was open to the judge.
40. At [39] the judge recorded that the respondent noted that the appellant stated he had never been involved in politics in Iran, did not support any political party in Iran, did not participate in a demonstration and did not attend any demonstrations in Iran and did not take part in distributing any leaflets and had only been told on one occasion since leaving Iran the authorities were looking for him. Here, at [39] the judge stated that ‘it is unclear why he gave as a key reason for fleeing Iran at the outset that he attended the demonstration when in fact he had not’.
41. Additionally, it was unarguably properly found at [39] that “on the appellant’s own account he could not have had had any profile of adverse interest to the authorities prior to the leaflet incident as he was not involved in any political activity at all and I find this to be the case”.
42. Further, the judge at [40] found “it is difficult to understand why the appellant agreed to hide the leaflets or run the serious risks he did in so [in hiding the leaflets]”. In this instance the judge appeared to agree with the respondent. The judge at [40]-[43] was effectively recording the submissions and cross examination rather than accepting the account and indeed at [40] the comment is that rather than plausible it ‘was difficult to understand why the appellant agreed to hide the leaflets or run the serious risks he did so in doing’.
43. At [44] the judge concludes that:
“the appellant had evolved his account as to why the authorities would be looking for him when he had no previous political profile whatsoever. The appellant’s statements that an arrested student must have told them are challenged by the respondent as speculative. The appeal statement contains the new detail that the authorities also went to his parents’ house and that it was there that the authorities said the reason they were looking for him was due the student giving his name. The appellant was asked why he hadn’t referred to this when asked similar questions during his asylum interview and had said he wasn’t sure how they got his details.”
44. Clearly the judge found that the appellant had not dealt directly with why he had not given this answer during his interview and she concluded, “I consider there is provision of additional relevant detail here about the authorities attending his parents’ home, in addition to his father-in-law’s home and stating why they were looking for him, which could reasonably have been given during his asylum interview, with a lack of explanation for this difference”. Thus, the judge clearly finds the appellant not credible on this point.
45. Further at [45] the judge found that the fact that the appellant was able to escape from his home lacked coherence and plausibility. She found unarguably logically that
‘In effect, if the appellant’s name had been given by an arrested student, there was no utility in the authorities having the student call the appellant when they could either attend the shop where the leaflets were said to be to remove them or directly seek out the appellant. There are inconsistencies’.
46. The judge clearly found and reasoned significant inconsistencies in the account. The judge noted that none of the appellant’s family members, according to the appellant’s account had come to any harm but had seemingly been questioned and the appellant was able to travel to Tehran and thereafter leave Iran without any difficulty. The judge clearly found that the appellant’s account about being of adverse interest to the authorities and wanted by them was not credible.
47. Having weighed the evidence overall, which contrary to the grounds the judge did, she found for the reasons given that she did not find the account credible. The critical reasons were not even on the balance of probability but simply the political account in Iran overall was per se not credible.
48. Moving on to the sur place activity, the judge describes at [46] the respondent’s approach noting that the appellant had not provided any documentary attendance at the demonstrations in the United Kingdom and that there had been no posting on social media about the protests. Apparently, the appellant had only attended two protests in the UK and those were subsequent to his asylum refusal. Nor had he posted any material.
49. The judge assessed the appellant’s political activity at [47] and considered that it was “indicative of the lack of any real political engagement by the appellant consistent with his lack of political activity in Iran” and the judge stated this:
“47. The limited nature of the appellant’s political activity in the UK is indicative of the lack of any real political engagement by the appellant consistent with his lack of political activity in Iran. On the appellant’s own account, his level and manner of attendance at demonstrations and activity in the UK assessed against the factors in the relevant case law does not support any finding that he has any particular profile of interest to the authorities or that he is of any adverse interest to the authorities, BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC). I find that he is not of adverse interest to the authorities. I further find that he is not under any form of surveillance or monitoring.”
50. At [48] the judge then concluded:
‘Taking account of the appellant’s evidence overall as to political activity and given my findings, I conclude that the appellant had not established to the relevant balance of probabilities standard that he genuinely fears persecution due to political opinion. I further found that I was not satisfied that this had been established to the lower standard.’
51. That was the part of the credibility of the claim and part of the context.
52. It was open to the judge to consider this on the balance of probabilities in the light of Section 32 of NABA but even if this were incorrect the judge found on both limbs, as per JCK (Section 32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100, that this was not satisfied to the lower standard.
53. In relation to ground 3, I find that it was open to the judge to take the approach that she did in relation to the screening interview.
Ground 2
54. In ground 2, turning to the issue on conversion to Christianity, the judge reviewed all the evidence, and, on careful scrutiny, I am not persuaded that she departed from PS. In terms of the externally observable, again the judge carefully considered the written, documentary and also the oral evidence as to conversion.
55. It is important to carefully consider the actual findings of the judge.
56. First the judge found there was a tension between the description of “gradual conversion and conversion of being in the UK for only a month” [51]. The appellant’s account was that he was invited to a church by a friend from the same city as him in January 2023, yet the date of 5th February 2023 (less than a month later in fact) is given during his interview as his date for conversion. The judge was aware that the appellant only arrived in the UK in January 2023.
57. Further the judge found it “incongruous that there is no detail as to the moment the appellant’s understanding and Bible reading crystallised into the spiritual realisation that he was a Christian.” [59]. The judge found at [52-53]
“52. … the appellant’s evidence as to how he arrived at joining the evangelical protestant tradition lacks detail which I find not without significance given his account does provide detail about treatment of women and other aspects as to why on his account he was over a longer period of time turning away from Islam.
53. The appellant relies on a baptism certificate from Brookdale Church dated 23 April 2023 in support of his claims to have converted to Christianity. The appellant was referred to the baptism certificate (HB 62) and asked what he had to do to become baptised. The appellant said they studied the Bible with the priest and were asked questions. The appellant was asked what steps the elders took to know he was genuine in his conversion. The appellant said that they saw them every week and they were aware of their manners and behaviour. The appellant was referred to his statement that there was footage of his baptism (AIR1 30) and asked whether his solicitors had ever asked for that. The appellant initially referred to providing a copy of his certificate and then when the question was repeated said they didn’t tell me anything. I considered that there was no real explanation before the tribunal as to the footage of the baptism and why, if it existed, it had not been provided. The refusal decision holds the certificate and other letters of support as insufficient of themselves to demonstrate genuine conversion and it was submitted that no further evidence had been provided to address this. There is no real detail anywhere in evidence of the baptism itself including in the letter from the Pastor who baptised the appellant. I find this of significance given the centrality of conversion to those who convert and specifically within the evangelical protestant tradition.”
In my view the further evidence the judge had been referring to in this paragraph included the footage of his said baptism.
58. As the judge identified the appellant had been asked of what the detail was of his baptism and as recorded the appellant merely stated that “they studied the Bible with the priest and were asked questions”.
59. I underline that the judge noticed there was no real detail of the baptism itself including in the letter from the pastor who was said to have baptised the appellant. The judge found this of significance given the centrality of conversion to those who converted.
60. The judge does consider the various letters from, for example Tim Martin and David Sinclaire Rees but it is a matter for the judge as to what weight she placed in the evidence. At [54] it was open to the judge to place limited weight on the letters of support given that “their contents are limited to recording attendance at different churches”. As the judge identified at [54] there was no independent verification as to the identity of the letter writer/church dated 11th March 2024.
61. The judge then moved at [55] to a specific assessment of the evidence from Jonathan Smith of Brookdale Church.
62. The reference to ‘very clear commitment’ [on faith] was in fact was not a finding by the judge but the note of a letter written by Jonathan Smith who did not appear to give evidence. In terms of the evidence of Pastor Skull the grounds appear to attempt to draw different conclusions from the evidence when the judge demonstrated she had noted the evidence but, as was unarguably open to her, took a different view for the reasons she gave. It is for the judge to make determinations on the evidence.
63. The key point the judge was making was not that the appellant had dotted around various churches but that he had attended the Brookdale Church
“for a very short period of time of a few months before he was baptised and the letter does not set out any details as to how persons were assessed as ready for baptism or whether there were any particular steps required”.
64. It was open to the judge to raise at [55] the fact that the respondent identified in the refusal of the assertion that the Brookdale Church letter contained incorrect contact address details because the judge states
“there is no detail or explanation in the appellant’s evidence regarding this and no other documentary evidence as to Brookdale Church”.
That was a fact. The issue had been raised in the respondent’s refusal letter and it was open for the appellant to give further detail in relation to Brookdale Church and further documentary evidence of the claim. He did not.
65. It cannot be asserted that the judge failed to consider all of the relevant evidence.
66. The findings on Matthew Sharpe were that he believed his evidence, but simply in the round, the judge did not accept the veracity of the evidence for the purposes of the appellant. Again, that was open to her.
67. As noted by the judge at [58] when addressing Matthew Sharpe’s evidence, the appellant told Mr Sharpe information in detail, which was “not consistent with the appellant’s account overall as referred to above”, in essence being that the letter from Matthew Sharpe records that the appellant told Matthew Sharpe that he fled Iran after becoming involved in politics and as the judge observed that was not consistent with the appellant’ account overall and as found by the judge.
68. The judge also made the following findings as to the evidence of Mr Sharp and which were plainly open to her as follows:
“59. On 10 May 2024, Matthew Sharpe wrote a further letter of support (HB 60). The appellant seems to have been attending two churches in Weymouth at least initially when he moved there in November/December 2023. Matthew Sharpe writes that the appellant told him that he had struggled to find a place at the Weymouth Baptist Church and preferred the smaller church but did not want to cause offence. This is given as the ‘clearest demonstration’ of an example of ‘striving to live according to the way of Christ’. There is no detail in the appellant’s account about this experience with both churches or why given the details about provision of Bible studies in Farsi at the Baptist church the appellant preferred to attend WEIC.
60. Matthew Sharpe gave evidence that he was a pastoral elder and that was a role as leader of the church. He said the pastoral element reflects care of the congregation and relates to shepherding the flock. In cross-examination, Matthew Sharpe was referred to his letter dated 10 May 2024 and his stated recognition of media criticism as to the reason for adopting a ‘cautious tone’ in his previous letter. I found this an odd explanation on the basis that either Matthew Sharpe has something he believes to set out explicitly about the appellant or not and his second letter was only written a month later. Matthew Sharpe said media criticism was a particular issue at the time and in the Weymouth context; there had been an influx into his church due proximity of the Bibby Stockholm barge. Asked what set him apart from someone who was naïve when assessing, he said it was, ‘taking the time to cautiously assess from observable information do the words they speak match behaviours demonstrated.’ The letter of 10 May also refers to his relationship with the appellant as one of friendship and a recognition that this could make his views present as partial.”
The judge from [64] onwards observed and took into account that Matthew Sharpe had given careful evidence and was concerned to reference his friendship with the appellant (maintained remotely) and that this was the first time he had taken the step of attending a Tribunal there was evidence to be tested. The judge found the reason given by Mr Sharpe for his two contrasting letters written relatively closely in time as being satisfactory or sufficient. The judge also reasoned that Matthew Sharpe’s evidence remained primarily based on his observation for relatively short period of time from the end of 2023 to April 2024. Albeit that contact had been maintained and the judge added this, “Further, that the letters record matters reported to Matthew Sharpe by the appellant that are not consistent with the appellant’s account elsewhere of matters in Iran or not mentioned in his account.”
69. It was open the judge to find that whilst Mr Sharpe was credible in his own belief that the appellant was a genuine convert and noted the following:
“65. The respondent submitted that even Mr Sharpe recognised there were those who were well-meaning but naïve in a number of churches supporting asylum seekers and considered in the round attending at churches was not sufficient to demonstrate genuine religious belief and the appellant was an opportunist claiming conversion to bolster his asylum claim. The appellant submitted that the account did not contain real inconsistencies and was both credible and plausible. With regard to conversion, there were letters from 4 churches in different parts of the UK confirming the appellant’s attendance and sincerity and the evidence from Mr Sharpe who had travelled from Weymouth to attend the tribunal and the respondent had not cited any issues with the appellant’s answers regarding his faith.”
70. The judge in summary at [66], concluded that she rejected the appellant’s account genuinely to fear persecution owing to political activity and rejected the account to have been of adverse interest prior to leaving Iran. The judge took into account all of the evidence in assessing the appellant’s claim to be a genuine Christian convert and took account of the fact that she found Mr Sharpe ‘credible in his own belief that the appellant is a genuine Chirstian convert’ but critically the judge concluded the
‘failure to provide further corroborating or other documentary evidence regarding the baptism at Brookdale Church is significant as it would have been reasonable to provide this evidence to address the points in the refusal decision’.
Thus, the judge addressed the ‘external’ aspects and church membership in accordance with PS as well as the genuineness of religious belief.
71. The judge did address the letters from the other churches and referred back to her findings and confirmed on the evidence available and referred to “lack of sufficiency of detail regarding key aspects I consider reasonable to associate with an account of conversion”. Here the judge stated, “I concluded that the appellant had not established to the relevant standard and balance of probabilities that he was a genuine Christian convert with genuine fear of persecution for that reason” [66].
72. As the Court of Appeal said at para 18 of Herrera v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 412, it is necessary to guard against the temptation to characterise as errors of law what are in truth no more than disagreements about the weight to be given to different factors.
73. In this aspect of the claim, I do not accept that the judge erred in her application of the standard of proof and considered that the judge followed Section 32 of NABA for this purpose. Finally, the judge referenced at [68], having considered “the whole of the evidence in the round concluded that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proof as having a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason”. It was accepted that if the appellant had the characteristic of conversion to Christianity the appeal would be at risk on return. It was the assessment of his credibility, which on either standard, failed to be credible.
74. I am not persuaded that the judge applied the wrong standard of proof in relation to Ground 1 and, for the reasons given above, considered that in relation to ground 2 the judge did consider the correct factors in setting genuineness at conversion.
75. Turning to ground 4, the judge clearly found the appellant had no political motive and had not attended demonstrations in Iran and had no political beliefs in Iran, as per [39]. As per [47] the judge found that the limited nature of the appellant’s political activity in the UK was indicative that there was a lack of any real political engagement and was consistent with his lack of political activity in Iran.
76. As such, even if the appellant were interrogated, he would be able to tell the truth and confirmed that he had no political interest in activity either in Iran or here in the UK and would not be relying on RN (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2008] UKAIT 00083. The assessment as to the return to Iran is clearly embedded in the overall decision.
77. The judge soundly reasoned her rejection of fear of persecution owing to political activity, and judge also found that there was a lack of evidence, which could reasonably have been provided, as to baptism, and a rejection that he is a genuine Christian covert.
78. I was not referred to S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482 but at [49] it was held as follows:
‘… Moreover, reflecting the findings of Judge…, there was no reason why the appellant could not close his Facebook accounts prior to the first pinch-point, when he applied for his emergency travel document, nor why he should disclose the existence of them, which would not have previously been known to the authorities, as like his attendance at demonstrations, their apparent contents did not reflect any genuinely held belief by the appellant. Although the judge did not say so in terms, it inevitably follows that the same would apply to the appellant's attendance at demonstrations since his arrival in the UK.’
79. In this instance it is important to consider the clear findings of the judge. The judge rejected the appellant's claim that he was genuinely a political activist, and ultimately at [66] a religious convert. At [67] she specifically addressed his return citing SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 308 IAC and PS. She noted that all persons will be questioned on return to Iran but concluded that the appellant was not at risk.
80. There was no evidence provided that the appellant’s contrived sur place activities had or were likely to have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities or that they were likely to do so at the pinch points of applying for travel documents and returning to Iran. The judge explained why the appellant was unlikely to already have come to the Iranian authorities' attention [47] (not least the appellant had provided minimal evidence as to his sur place activity as per demonstrations). Having rejected the appellant's claim on the clear findings of judge, it is reasonably inferred that the appellant would not be expected to volunteer information about his contrived activities in the UK when questioned on arrival in Iran.
81. It was thus open for the judge in effect to conclude that the appellant would not be at risk or be perceived to be at risk by the authorities on return. The decision contains no material error of law.

Notice of decision
I find no material error in the FtT judge’s decision and the decision will stand. The appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19th January 2026