Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003566

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65514/2023
LP/09941/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 6th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

SGPR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. A. Bandegani, Counsel, instructed by MTC & Co Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms. S. Keerty, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity Order
1. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in this appeal because the appellant has made a claim for international protection. No party asked for this to be set aside and I consider it appropriate for that order to continue because the public interest in the UK’s compliance with its international obligations and in the confidentiality of the asylum system outweigh any identifiable public interest in the precise details of this appellant’s identity.
Background
2. The appellant appeals with permission the decision of First-tier Tribunal dated 10 April 2025 dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 3 December 2023 refusing his protection claim.
3. The appellant is a national of Sri Lanka of Singhalese ethnicity. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 9 July 2010 on a student visa which expired on 22 May 2012. The appellant claimed asylum on 10 November 2018.
4. The appellant claims he has a well-founded fear of persecution owing to his political opinion or perceived political opinion. The essence of this claim is that he had volunteered with the Bodu Bala Sena Group when it was an informal organisation promoting community development. However, when the organisation became extremist, the appellant was asked to attack churches and mosques which he refused to do and warned his Muslim and Tamil friends about the plans of the BBS. On 29 July 2010 the appellant was taken from his house by CID, beaten and asked about who had been sharing information with, accusing the appellant of betraying the BBS. He was detained, beaten and sexually assaulted. He was released on 8 July 2010 and collected from the side of the road by his mother. He had previously applied for and been granted his study visa and left for the UK the next day.
5. In the UK he has participated in events organised by the TGTE, having developed feelings of solidarity with the Tamil people after his experiences of the Sri Lankan authorities.
6. The appellant’s claim is thus based on events in Sri Lanka and his sur place activities.
First-tier Decision
7. The FtT did not find the appellant’s account of events in Sri Lanka to be credible. At [16] to [21] the FtT considers the appellant’s claim to have been persecuted as a result of a perceived betrayal of the BBS with the objective evidence in the appellant’s bundle and the CPIN from February 2025. She finds that “the appellant cannot possibly have been involved with the BBS in 2010 because they did not come into existence until 2012.”
8. At [22], the FtT sets out other relevant factors undermining the credibility of the appellant. The FtT found the appellant’s statement in his witness statement that he left the country to take up his student to be inconsistent with his presentation in his witness statement and his oral evidence that he had to flee the country. The FtT also cites the fact that appellant did not mention the BBS in his screening interview. Further, she rejected the appellant’s explanation for the eight year delay in claiming asylum, that being he didn’t know what he needed to do. These factors are repeated and expanded on at [28].
9. The FtT considered the appellant’s sur place activities at [24] to [29]. She gave a self-direction at [24] that notwithstanding the adverse credibility findings she made in respect of events in Sri Lanka, she was obliged to consider credibility and the evidence in relation to his sur place activities separately.
10. The FtT considered the appellant’s evidence about how he came find solidarity with the Sri Lankan Tamils and his claim to have attended yearly demonstrations together with the photographic evidence of his having attended a Heroes’ Day celebration on 27 November 2024 and a demonstration outside the Sri Lankan embassy in London on 4th February 2025, Independence Day.
11. The FtT found the appellant failed to substantiate his claim that he had attended yearly events as the only evidence provided in support thereof were photographs from two events in 2024 and 2025. Both, she observed, occurred after the appellant’s claim was refused in December 2023. The FtT also took note that there was no evidence that the photos had been publicly distributed.
12. At [26] the FtT stated that she
had regard to the country evidence regrading risk to those who are perceived to be supporters of proscribed organisations – of which the TGTE is one. The Government of Sri Lanka does take interest in those who are perceived to be supporters of the TGTE or sympathisers to the Tamil separatist movements cause
13. The FtT consequently found at [27] that the appellant’s profile, taken at its highest, was not sufficient to warrant adverse attention and cause him to be placed on a watch or stop list or warrant detention on return. She further observed that the appellant was able to leave the country on his own passport without difficulty. She took account of his not being Tamil in that it would not prima facie be viewed with suspicion. She considered that the appellant had involved himself with the TGTE solely to bolster his asylum claim and therefore would not feel it necessary to engage in separatists political activities on return.
14. The FtT therefore found at [29] and [30] that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason and was not a real risk of his suffering serious harm on return.
Grounds of Appeal and Rule 24 response
15. The two grounds of appeal on which the appellant sought permission to appeal can be summarised as follows:
a. The FtT erred in dismissing the appellant’s account of his association with the BBS by failing to take into account the appellant’s own evidence about his involvement with the BBS
b. The FtT erred in finding that he would not be at risk owing to sur place activities and failed to determine whether the appellant would in fact undertake political activism for the LTTE on return.
16. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 22 October 2025. In relation to Ground 1, the respondent argues that the FtT considered the appellant’s evidence with respect to his activities with the BBS alongside the objective evidence relied on by the appellant. Having done so she was entitled to place weight on the objective evidence and make the adverse credibility findings she did. The respondent also draws attention to [22] where the FtT sets out other factors undermining the appellant’s credibility. It was averred that Ground 1 therefore discloses no error of law.
17. In relation to Ground 2, the respondent submits that the FtT sets out her reasoning for finding the appellant’s sur place activities were not genuinely motivated but undertaken solely to bolster his protection claim. She was therefore entitled to find that the appellant would not engage in Tamil separatist activities upon return to Sri Lanka and there is therefore no error of law.
Hearing
18. At the outset of the hearing, Mr. Bandegani applied to amend the grounds of appeal to include a new ground that the judge failed to apply the country guidance in KK and RS (Sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 00130 (IAC). Mr. Bandegani accepted that the application was extremely late and was unable to offer any explanation as to why this was not included in the grounds as drafted or why an application to amend was not filed at an earlier stage, the parties having been notified that permission was granted on 16 October 2025.
19. Ms. Keerty objected to the application which sought to advance an entirely new ground of appeal at a very late stage. She argued that the application fell foul of the requirement of procedural rigour and fairness in proceedings, referring me to The Queen on the application of Talpada v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 814 in which Singh LJ states at [69]
Courts should be prepared to take robust decisions and not permit grounds to be advanced if they have not been properly pleaded or where permission has not been granted to raise them. Otherwise there is a risk that there will be unfairness, not only to the other party to the case, but potentially to the wider public interest, which is an important facet of public law litigation.
20. Alternatively, she submitted that the application lacked merit as the FtT specifically states at [14] that she took KK into account in her decision.
21. Mr. Bandegani responded that the Tribunal maintains the power to allow an amendment to the grounds of appeal and in this case given that country guidance is authoritative and the failure to apply it would be an error of law, I ought to use my discretion to allow the application.
22. Accepting Mr. Bandegani’s argument that if I was persuaded that the FtT had in fact failed to apply KK properly or at all it was likely to constitute a material error of law, and therefore potentially determinative of the appeal, I invited further submissions on the application. I was particularly keen to understand whether Ms. Keerty would be in a position to respond as fully as she would wish, if I allowed additional time, given the lateness of the application. Mr. Bandegani was not instructed to apply for an adjournment should I dismiss the application.
23. Amplifying his submissions, Mr. Bandegani argued that the FtT had failed to apply sufficiently or at all the guidance in Headnotes 5, 6 and 8 of KK. He further submitted that the judge erred in taking into account the appellant’s credibility and genuineness of his political engagement in assessing the risk arising from his sur place activities.
24. I reminded myself of the dicta of Singh LJ in Talpada set out above and Jackson LJ in Ronnie Latayan v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 191 endorsing and emphasising Singh LJ’s dicta in Talpada but confirming the ability of the appeal court to “entertain a new argument of law where it was in the interests of justice to do so(thought it will be slow to do so).
25. In considering whether it was in the interests of justice to allow the appellant to advance this new ground of appeal, I took into account the potential significance of the ground, the fact that the reliance on KK had been part of the appellant’s case at FtT and thus was not a novel point, and Ms. Keerty’s clear ability to respond to the substance of points raised and relied upon by Mr. Bandegani.
26. It was my view that whilst the respondent was significantly inconvenienced by the inexcusably late application, she was not substantively prejudiced.
27. Thus having due regard to the overriding objective and all of the factors in rule 2 (2) (a)-(e), I allowed the appellant’s application but adjourned the hearing for a short time to allow Ms. Keerty the time she requested to formulate submissions directed at the new ground.
28. Mr. Bandegani confirmed that he would be making no submissions in respect of Ground 2.
29. The matters for me to determine were therefore Ground 1 and (new) Ground 3 relating to the application of KK. I will consider each in turn. In reaching my decision, I have taken into consideration the contents of the bundle and the submissions of Mr. Bandegani and Ms. Keerty which will not be rehearsed at length, but I will refer to the aspects I considered to be material in the discussion below.
Discussion
Ground 1
30. The thrust of Mr. Bandegani’s submissions on this point is that the judge failed to take account, sufficiently or at all the appellant’s own evidence about his involvement with the BBS as a volunteer when the BBS was an informal organisation. He suggested that the FtT should have taken as common sense that organisations don’t arise out of nowhere. He argued that as a matter of law it is not necessary for the appellant to provide corroboration of his account and if the judge was troubled by an apparent inconsistency with what the appellant claimed and the objective evidence, he should have told the appellant at the hearing that he required assistance with that part of his evidence. Mr. Bandegani submitted that whilst the FtT identified other factors undermining the appellant’s credibility, those were not determinative as the she refers to the core of the appellant’s claim, that is, his previous involvement with the BBS, being undermined by the objective evidence.
31. Ms. Keerty referred me to [18] of the FtT decision which refers directly to the appellant’s witness statement and what the appellant says in that statement about his involvement with the BBS. Whilst the FtT does not state the paragraph number of the statement (which is 4), Ms. Keerty submitted that it is clear the FtT had taken into account the appellant’s evidence about his involvement with the BBS. Ms. Keerty argued that the FtT was entitled to consider and place weight on the objective material as weight is a matter for the judge. It is for the appellant to prove his case and there was no evidence in the country information he relied on which suggests that that BBS existed before 2012. Ms. Keerty further referred to the factors undermining credibility set out in the decision at [22b] and argued this suggested the FtT considered all matters in the round.
32. Ground 1 is a challenge to the FtT’s credibility assessment. It is trite law that the assessment of an appellant’s credibility must be holistic, with all of the evidence considered in the round. The principles guiding the approach to credibility by tribunals of fact has been established by a long line of authorities MAH (Egypt) [2023] EWCA Civ 216); SB (Sri Lanka v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160, KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC). I had those principles in mind in reaching my decision on this ground.
33. It could not be clearer that the FtT’s decision on the appellant’s overall credibility did not turn on her findings in relation to the inconsistency between the appellant’s account and the country information on the BBS as she states at [28]
If in any event, I was wrong about the formation of the BBS, then I reject his account to have been detained and tortured in relation to any activities of the BBS. His account lacked detail and the claim to have fled the country on release is inconsistent with his application for a student visa. His student visa expired in 2013, but in fact his leave was curtailed to May 2012 as the college licence was revoked. The appellant was not contactable so may not have received notice of the curtailment of his leave however he would have been aware in 2013 that he had no leave to remain. He has chosen to do nothing about that situation and gives very little account of himself over the ensuing decade.
34. No issue was raised in the grounds of appeal about the FtT’s findings at [28].
35. Moreover, in considering the weight to be given to the appellant’s account in comparison with the country information, the FtT was entitled to consider the appellant’s overall credibility and take into consideration the internal inconsistency in the appellant’s accounts she identifies at [18] and the factors she sets out at [22a].
36. At [18], the FtT refers to the appellant’s witness statement (at paragraph 6) where he says did not have any political allegiance with the JHU but solely volunteered for the BBS. The FtT notes this conflicts in his screening interview. In that interview he states that he was working for the political party called Helauruma at [CB471] and in answer to the question about support for pro-government, political religious or armed or violent organisations, the appellant responded that he was a supporter of the political organisation Helauruma from 2010 but was not any more [CB 477] he does not mention BBS at all in his screening interview.
37. No issue was taken in the grounds of appeal as to the FtT’s identification of this inconsistency.
38. Further, the FtT properly considered the consistency (or otherwise) of the appellant’s narrative claim with his actual conduct at earlier stages and periods of time. At [22a] the FtT identifies an inconsistency in the appellant presenting as having to flee the country with his ability to leave on a pre-arranged flight to take up his student visa. No complaint is made of this finding in the grounds of appeal.
39. At [22b] the FtT refers to the gap of 8 years between the expiry of the appellant’s arrival in the UK and his claim for asylum and rejected his explanation (that he did not know how) for failing to do so. No complaint is made in respect of this finding in the grounds of appeal.
40. These are all findings that the judge was wholly entitled to make on the evidence and no complaint was raised in the grounds in respect of the FtT analysis of any of those factors or their relevance to the assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
41. I find that the FtT set out multiple, cogent and evidenced-based reasons for rejecting the appellant’s credibility independent of the appellant’s involvement with the BBS and her findings thereon are therefore immaterial.
42. I find therefore, therefore the FtT made no material error of law in her assessment of the appellant’s credibility in respect of his account of events in Sri Lanka.
Ground 3
43. Mr. Bandegani accepts that the FtT refers to some but not all of the guidance in KK in the decision. However, he submits that this is insufficient, and that the analysis undertaken is inconsistent with the country guidance. He argues that the FtT’s failure to consider the elevated risk arising from association with the TGTE as set out in Headnotes 5 and 6, is apparent from the omission of the word “adverse” at paragraph [26], where the FtT states that the GoSL has an interest in individuals with links to the TGTE. He submits there is a lack of clarity as to the judge’s finding regarding the appellant’s failure to substantiate that he attended demonstrations yearly. Further Mr. Bandegani refers to the failure of the FtT to refer at all to the extensive intelligence gathering regime in the UK as detailed in Headnote 8. Therefore, Mr. Bandegani submits that the FtT failed to engage with and apply the country guidance and her failure to do so constitutes a material error of law.
44. Ms. Keerty accepts that the FtT did not refer to each Headnote in KK, but submits that she clearly had the guidance in mind. In considering whether the appellant’s profile was such as to attract the adverse interest of the GoSL, the FtT undertook the analysis required in Headnote 21 of KK, even though it was not referred to specifically, taking into account, for example the limited evidence of the appellant’s involvement and engagement with pro-Tamil events. Similarly with respect of Headnote 10, the FtT considers the appellant’s evidence in respect of the matters outlined, albeit without naming the Headnote when doing so. In particular Ms. Keerty noted that FtT took into account the absence of evidence of distribution of the photographs of his attendance at the pro-Tamil events. Ms. Keerty did not accept there was any lack of clarity around the FtT’s finding that the appellant failed to substantiate his “yearly” attendance at pro-Tamil demonstrations. In sum, Ms. Keerty submitted it does not follow from reading the decision as a whole that the FtT did not consider KK and therefore no material error of law arises.
45. It is a well-established principle that experienced judges in specialist tribunals are taken to be aware of and apply relevant authorities without needing to specifically refer to them “unless it is clear from their language that they failed to do so” AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 Popplewell, LJ at [34].
46. At [14] the FtT states that she took into account GJ and others (post-civil war: returnees) Sri Lanka CG [2013] UKUT 000319 and KK. It is right that the FtT did not refer in her decision to the specific Headnotes in KK. However, as will be seen, it is clear to me after careful consideration of the substance of the FtT’s decision and the substance of the guidance in KK, that the FtT had the guidance well in mind and applied it properly.
47. The FtT did not refer to the extensive intelligence gathering by the GoSL in the United Kingdom as set out in Headnote 8 and discussed at [403] to [418] of KK. However the significance or otherwise of the surveillance regime in the appellant’s case cannot be considered in isolation from the facts of the appellant’s case and the information the GoSL will be reasonably likely to have obtained (Headnote 10) which will inform the evaluation of an individual’s profile ([419] to [432] of KK).
48. This is made clear in KK at [403], citing these findings in GJ on the extent of monitoring of the diaspora:
336. The former Tamil areas and the diaspora are heavily penetrated by the security forces. Photographs are taken of public demonstrations and the GOSL may be using face recognition technology: it is sponsoring a face recognition technology project at the University of Colombo. However, the question which concerns the GOSL is the identification of Tamil activists working for Tamil separatism and to destabilise the unitary Sri Lankan state. We do not consider that attendance at demonstrations in the diaspora alone is sufficient to create a real risk or a reasonable degree of likelihood that a person will attract adverse attention on return to Sri Lanka.”
49. And in the discussion of the stages of processing of information obtained:
420. What this initial sift does in our view achieve though is to place a proposed returnee in one of two categories which may be fairly crudely described as “something relevant known” or “nothing relevant known”. Those in the second category might include an individual who, for example, has only attended one or two demonstrations or meetings, without more. It may be, depending on specific findings of fact, that these activities have never become known to the authorities. Alternatively, it may be the case that, whilst known of, such activities are deemed so minimal as to be unworthy of reporting back.
50. At [27], the FtT finds the appellant’s profile would not bring him to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities, having considered the facts and evidence of the appellant’s sur place activities at [25] and [26].
51. To determine whether those findings are consistent with the guidance in KK it is necessary to consider the FtT decision in the context of the factors set out in in Headnote 21 and discussed at [433] to [502] which are as follows: .
i. the nature of any diaspora organisation on behalf of which an individual has been active. That an organisation has been proscribed under the 2012 UN Regulations will be relatively significant in terms of the level of adverse interest reasonably likely to be attributed to an individual associated with it;
ii. the type of activities undertaken;
iii. the extent of any activities;
iv. the duration of any activities;
v. any relevant history in Sri Lanka;
52. The FtT accepts at [28] that the appellant involved himself with the TGTE and at [26] acknowledges the risk to those perceived to be supporters of proscribed organisations noting that the TGTE is one such organisation. I am not satisfied that the omission of the word “adverse” permits an inference that the FtT failed to appreciate the heightened risk associated with involvement with the TGTE. The FtT expressly stated that she considered the “country information” regarding the risk. Whether she meant country guidance or country evidence matters is immaterial as it would have been abundantly clear from either that there is an elevated risk arising from links to the TGTE. As stated and will be seen, I am satisfied that the FtT had the principles of KK firmly in mind, including Headnotes 5 and 6.
53. I find that the FtT properly put the appellant’s association with the TGTE in the context of all of the evidence in respect of his sur place activities. It is important to note here that at [467] of KK the UT rejected the proposition that “any” form of association with the TGTE will result in risk on return.
54. At [25] and [26] the FtT considers the type of the appellant’s activities, namely his attendance at the Heroes’ Day on 27 November 2024 and Independence Day on 4th February 2025. The FtT noted the particular significance of Heroes Day for Sri Lankan Tamils.
55. The UT in KK considers attendance at demonstrations at [483] giving qualified support for the conclusion in 351 of GJ that presence at one or several demonstrations was not “of itself” evidence of genuine commitment to Tamil separatism with the caveat that whether attendance was sufficient to show commitment would depend on the facts of the case.
56. The FtT at [25] and [26] considers the extent and duration of activities with which the appellant engaged. She notes that the appellant claimed to have attended such events “yearly” but had not produced evidence to substantiate his attendance at any events other than the two for which photographs were provided and the earliest of which was on 27 November 2024. The FtT also observes that there was no evidence that the photographs were publicly distributed.
57. In my judgment, there is no lack of clarity in the FtT’s finding that the appellant failed to substantiate his claim of yearly attendance at demonstrations yearly given that he produced evidence of only two such events. In any event, this point was not advanced in the grounds of appeal and is distinct from the application of the guidance in KK.
58. There was no evidence before the FtT that the appellant had taken an active role at the demonstrations or in organising them. Nor was there any evidence before the FtT of the appellant having any social media profile.
59. At [486] to [491] the UT further considers the significance attendance at demonstrations saying at [486] :
it might be open to serious question as to whether GoSL would be reasonably likely to perceive an individual who had attended two, three or more demonstrations, standing passively at the back of a crowd and without having engaged in any other diaspora activity, as a threat to the integrity of the state, even assuming that the attendance was known about in the first place.
60. At [488] to [491] the UT identifies other factors relevant to evaluating the risk from attending demonstrations, those being the role the appellant took (eg speaking and/or organising) and the nature of the organisation behind the demonstration. The UT did find that those factors themselves may significantly increase the importance of attendance at demonstrations and give rise to the perception by the GoSL that an individual constitutes a risk but emphasised that this depends on the facts specific to the case.
61. With regard to duration, the UT [493] posits that the longer an activity has been pursued, the greater the possibility that GoSL may considered the individual may be committed to separatism.
62. As to whether the appellant had relevant history in Sri Lanka, the FtT states at [27] that as she rejected the appellant’s account of events in Sri Lanka, that is not a factor which would bring him to the adverse interest of the authorities. In so doing, I find that the FtT was applying the factors in Headnote 21 in KK and not impermissibly importing general adverse credibility findings into the assessment of risk arising from the appellant’s sur place activities on which she gave the self-direction I referred to at [9] above.
63. Similarly, in finding that the appellant’s sur place activities were contrived to bolster his asylum claim, I find that the clear reading of the FtT’s decision at [28] is that the FtT did not take motivation into account in assessing risk but rather in respect of whether the appellant would wish to engage in separatist activities on return. This is entirely consistent with [494] and [495] of KK.
64. In sum, the extent of the evidence before the FtT regarding the appellant’s sur place activities was the appellant’s passive attendance at two pro-Tamil TGTE events, the earliest of which took place in November 2024 with no evidence that photographs from those events were publicly distributed. In my judgment, the appellant’s Sinhalese ethnicity was also a legitimate and arguably obvious factor for the FtT to take into account in her evaluation of the appellant’s risk profile.
65. It would have been helpful for the FtT to have referred to specific Headnotes in KK to avoid any doubt that she had applied the principles of the Country Guidance. However, considering the facts and evidence in the appellant’s case alongside the discussion in KK, in particular the passages referred to above, it is my judgment that the FtT’s analysis and findings demonstrate the application of and is consistent with the country guidance in KK.
66. In my judgment, therefore, this ground of appeal discloses no material error of law.

Notice of Decision
67. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

Martha Walsh

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 February 2026