Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003571

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66234/2024
LP/13463/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

A B
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Ahmad, Counsel instructed by Hanson Law.
For the Respondent: Mrs S Abdul-Karim, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 15 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant seeks to appeal the First-tier Tribunal’s (‘the FtT’) decision promulgated on 9th April 2025 and in which the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 13th May 2024.
2. I have maintained the anonymity order in respect of the Appellant. I consider that on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection, are such that an anonymity order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
Factual and Procedural Background
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Iran, of Kurdish ethnicity. He left Iran in April 2020 and entered the UK, claiming asylum on 20th April 2020. This initial claim was refused by the Respondent on 28th April 2022. The Appellant duly appealed that decision to the FtT and that appeal was dismissed on 19th October 2022 (‘the 2022 appeal’). Following the submission of further representations, the Respondent considered and treated these as a fresh claim, issuing her refusal decision on 13th May 2024 – the decision, which the Appellant subsequently appealed to the FtT and which has resulted in the appeal proceedings in the FtT and now in this Tribunal.
4. The Appellant maintains that he is at risk on return to Iran as a result of his political opinion, including his sur place activities in the UK. He also maintains that he would be at risk, additionally or in the alternative as a result of not having undertaken military service and a lack of documentation.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. In dismissing the appeal and insofar as is relevant to these proceedings, the Judge’s findings of fact and conclusions include the following:
(a) The Appellant’s claim and appeal fell to be considered against the provisions contained in s.32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022;
(b) After summarising and considering the findings reached by the previous judge in the 2022 appeal at [24], the Judge concluded at [25]-[26] that there was no new evidence and no reason to depart from the findings reached by the Judge in the 2022 appeal;
(c) At [31], the Judge noted the Appellant’s written evidence setting out his disagreements with the 2022 appeal findings but did not consider that this, on its own and with no new evidence provided by him was sufficient to amount to very good reasons to enable the Judge to depart from the 2022 decision. On this basis, the Judge concluded at [33] that the Appellant had not demonstrated that he has come to the adverse attention of the authorities through the claimed events in Iran;
(d) With regards to the Appellant’s sur place activity, the Judge accepted at [35] that the Appellant has attended close to 20 demonstrations at the Iranian Embassy in London;
(e) The evidence of the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations shows the Appellant to be a low level participant and does not demonstrate that he is a prominent person or someone with any leadership role. On this basis, the Judge did not consider at [36] that the evidence demonstrated the Appellant to have had a sufficiently active role at the demonstrations to have brought himself to the attention of the Iranian authorities;
(f) The Appellant opened his Facebook account after the 2022 appeal determination and he started posting in February 2023, doing so roughly a few times a months – [37];
(g) With no translations submitted for the Appellant’s Facebook posts, the Judge accepted that some of the posts at least could be discerned as being anti-regime/pro-Kurdish. The Judge was also able to accept that some of the comments to the Appellant’s posts support the Appellant making anti-regime/pro-Kurdish comments – [38];
(h) The Appellant had not demonstrated that he is someone with a significant online presence that would have come to the attention of the authorities. The Judge considered this at [39] for a number of reasons: the relatively short time the Appellant had been posting, a relatively limited number of posts, and no translations having been provided. Neither did the Judge consider at [40] that the Appellant’s number of friends and comments on Facebook displaced this;
(i) The Judge considered at [42] that the timeline in which the Appellant, on his own evidence, started posting on Facebook and attending demonstrations, was not “demonstrative of someone who has realised the freedoms they have here (in the UK) to express their views and taken the opportunity to do so, rather, given the timing, it is indicative of someone who is seeking to develop their activity so as to be able to make a fresh claim”. The Judge concluded from this and the fact that the Appellant was not politically active in Iran, that the Appellant did not hold a genuine political view and has only created his Facebook account and attended demonstrations with a view to being able to rely on and bolster a fresh claim;
(j) At [46]-[53], the Judge went on to consider in the alternative whether the Appellant would be at risk of harm, on the lower standard of proof, on return. Having considered the relevant country guidance decisions, the Judge concluded at [52] that because the Appellant is not likely to have already come to the adverse attention of the authorities, the mitigation of any future risk is available to him through the deletion of his Facebook account. The Judge noted that the Appellant had not set out in his evidence what he intended to do upon any return vis-à-vis expressing of any political opinion held. This coupled with the Judge’s findings as to him not holding genuine political beliefs meant that it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to delete his account and this would not entail an expectation of the Appellant to lie;
(k) With the Judge having rejected the credibility of the Appellant’s account, the Judge did not accept either that he did not have any Iranian documentation or the ability to obtain an Iranian passport;
(l) At [55], the Judge considered ultimately that the Appellant was not yet 40 years old and so still had time to complete military service. The Judge also found he evidence did not support that as an evader, the Appellant would be prosecuted and subjected to detention. While the Appellant may not wish to undertake military service, he was in no different a position compared to other Iranian males and would, as things stand, be able to complete his service if returned - it did not follow that the Appellant would be at risk as a consequence of having not completed military service.
6. Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The Appellant put forward four grounds of appeal. I summarise these as follows:
(1) The Judge overly relied upon the previous findings of the FtT from the 2022 appeal;
(2) The Judge reached conclusions without consideration or application of relevant country guidance and/or background evidence, including the CPINs;
(3) The Judge erred in approaching the issues of documentation, ethnicity and illegal exit with reference to credibility - application of background evidence was required;
(4) As above with Ground 3, in relation to the issue of military service.
8. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal by the Upper Tribunal on 3rd September 2025. In granting permission, the Upper Tribunal noted the following:
“I give permission on all grounds but my main concern is that the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant would not be at risk because of what he has shown that he has done is either not supported by the evidence or is not explained adequately.”
9. In response, the Respondent filed and served a reply pursuant to Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules, defending the Judge’s decision.
10. At the hearing, both parties’ advocates made further oral submissions on each of the grounds of appeal pursued and Mrs Abdul-Karim, on behalf of the Respondent, defended the FtT’s decision. I have addressed the parties’ respective written pleadings and oral submissions in the section below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.
11. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision and provide this below with my reasons.
Analysis and Conclusions
The Appellant’s first ground of appeal
12. Whilst the Appellant’s first ground appears to raise a challenge against the Judge’s approach to the previous findings from the 2022 FtT appeal, the submissions at para 3 of the grounds also appear to raise an issue as to the Judge purportedly applying a higher standard of proof with the use of the word ‘a balance’ at [33] when finding that the Appellant had not come to the attention of the authorities. It is then stated that “no evidence of this is provided” and no consideration was given to WAS (Pakistan), where it was held that direct evidence of being covertly monitored was not required.
13. This ground is difficult to follow, both seeking to attack the Judge’s approach to the previous appeal findings and the Judge’s own findings on whether the Appellant would have come to the attention of the authorities through their own surveillance.
14. I was assisted at the hearing by Mr Ahmad, Counsel for the Appellant. He submitted that the Judge had effectively contradicted themselves by recording at [32] that the Appellant had addressed in his written evidence the previous findings but also that there was no “new evidence” addressing those same findings. From this, Mr Ahmad submitted that the Judge had erred in their approach to the evidence available addressing the previous findings, since the Appellant’s written statement did amount to “new evidence”. In turn, the Judge had erred in their consideration as to whether or not they were permitted to depart from these findings.
15. I have very carefully considered the submissions from the Appellant before me concerning the Judge’s approach to the previous findings but I am satisfied that there is no error of law in the Judge’s approach. The Judge clearly directly themselves correctly to the relevant guidance and principles at [21]-[23] and summarised the relevant previous findings comprehensively at [24]. It is necessary to read the Judge’s reasons at [25] with the rest of the decision as a whole. When doing so, it is plain that the Judge was recording that no fresh evidence, which sought to address the findings of the previous FtT Judge – it is implied in the form of any documentary or other witness evidence (other than the Appellant’s statement) - was submitted in support of the further representations by the Appellant when making his fresh claim. The only evidence before the Judge addressing this was what was contained in the Appellant’s written statement (with four paragraphs in response to the previous appeal findings). Whilst it is correct that this amounts to evidence, it is also clear that the Judge considered this at [25] and determined at [26] that this was not sufficient to justify the Judge reaching a different conclusion.
16. It is also necessary to read the Judge’s assessment and conclusions at [25]-[26] with the reasons given at [32]. Having recorded what the Appellant stated in disagreement with the previous findings at [31], I am satisfied that the Judge gave sufficient and adequate reasons at [32] for why this was not sufficient to justify a departure from the previous findings. It remains the case that the burden rested on the Appellant and the fresh claim submitted did not appear to focus on the previous findings, as recorded by the Judge at [25] but instead on the Appellant’s sur place activities that had taken place since.
The Appellant’s second ground of appeal
17. The written submissions plead at para 4 that the Judge had not given sufficient or adequate reason(s) for their finding that the Appellant’s low-level role was insufficient to come to the attention of the authorities and that there was no consideration of relevant country guidance.
18. It was also submitted in writing at paras 5 and 7 that the Judge had failed to consider the Facebook evidence and the risk that flowed from this, pursuant to relevant country guidance, as opposed to when the account was open. The submission at para 8 is difficult to understand but it appears that the Appellant seeks to argue that the Judge’s finding that the Appellant did not genuinely hold a political belief was perverse.
19. Once again, I was assisted by Mr Ahmad in oral submissions, who reiterated the submission that the Judge had not considered the guidance given in WAS (Pakistan) with regards to the likelihood, or lack of, direct evidence of being monitored or of surveillance being conducted by the authorities. I raised with Mr Ahmad that I had understood the Judge’s reasons to be an assessment that the nature of the Appellant’s activities, being low-level, were unlikely to have meant he would have been targeted or monitored for surveillance by the authorities rather than the Judge expecting, or noting, a lack of direct evidence of such surveillance and monitoring.
20. In response, Mr Ahmad maintained that there was no reference to the country guidance decisions and CPIN evidence to support the Judge’s assessment and there was no link or reasons to support the conclusion drawn at [36] from the matters noted at [35]. I disagree. Firstly, it is clear from the matters considered by the Judge that they had the relevant country guidance in mind and they expressly referred to the relevant decisions at [50]-[51]. It is not necessary for a Judge to summarise or otherwise rehearse the various aspects of the country guidance as long as this is clearly applied to the case before them and I am satisfied that the Judge did so.
21. Secondly, the Judge’s reasons for finding that the Appellant has not carried out to date a sufficiently active role to have brought himself to the attention of the Iranian authorities are clearly set out at [36] and [39]. These include not being an organiser, not having led any of the demonstrations, what the photographs available in evidence depicted, and the timescales and particularities of the Appellant’s Facebook account. This is in line with the country guidance as summarised by the Upper Tribunal in XX at [92].
22. Mr Ahmad also submitted that it is not necessary to have opened a Facebook account by a certain period of time and that the Judge consequently erred in law when holding this against the Appellant at [37] and [42]. However, this submission is misconceived since it was entirely open to the Judge to take all relevant matters into account, which included when the Appellant had opened his Facebook account and that this was only after his first asylum appeal had been dismissed. Not to take this factor into account and weigh this in the round would have been an error of law.
23. Mr Ahmad added that the Judge’s adverse credibility findings on the Appellant’s political views and opinions, and whether these are genuinely held, were only based on the timeline associated with the Appellant’s Facebook account. This is not correct – the Judge noted that he started attending demonstrations in February 2023 at [35], the nature of his involvement in those demonstrations at [36], the nature of his Facebook posts and the available evidence of these at [37]-[39], and the Appellant’s explanation at [41]-[42]. The Judge also considered other aspects of the Appellant’s written and oral evidence.
24. Mr Ahmad submitted that even if the Judge was correct to find no genuine political belief, the Judge should still have gone on to consider risk and the failure to do so amounted to an error of law. The difficulty with this submission is that the Judge did go on to assess matters in the alternative – see [46], where this is expressly confirmed. The Judge then directed themselves correctly at [48] to the fact that the Appellant’s ethnicity and illegal exit from Iran would increase the risk to him but were not in themselves sufficient to lead to persecutory treatment. This is pursuant to applicable country guidance.
25. The Judge subsequently concluded at [52] that the Appellant would be able to mitigate any risk by deleting his Facebook account in light of the fact that the Appellant had not already come to the attention of the authorities. That conclusion was entirely open and reasonable for the Judge to draw, from the specific evidential assessment conducted in the Appellant’s case and from the country guidance contained in XX.
26. For the reasons above, I am satisfied that the Appellant’s second ground of appeal does not succeed either.
The Appellant’s third and fourth grounds of appeal
27. I consider and address these two grounds together. Mr Ahmad submitted under Ground 3 that there was no consideration of the pinch-point, when this would arise with the Appellant likely requiring an Emergency Travel Document (‘ETD’). Whilst this is correct, I do not consider that this amounts to an error of law since the Judge’s finding that the Appellant can delete his Facebook account was open to the Judge and sustainable on the evidence, including country guidance, before them. This also mitigates risk in advance of any such ETD pinch-point – see XX at [100].
28. With regards to the Appellant’s fourth ground, Mr Ahmad submitted that there was no reference by the Judge at [55] to the CPIN ‘Military Service’ of November 2022 and in particular, para 2.4.12 of that CPIN which confirmed that draft evaders were liable for prosecution and paras 9.1.3-4, confirming that prosecution can amount to persecution because of the poor detention conditions. This in turn was also relevant as an additional risk factor pursuant to the country guidance decision of HB (Kurds).
29. Mrs Abdul-Karim submitted that the CPIN, whilst not expressly referred to by the Judge, had clearly been considered by them. It was not necessary of the Judge to extract or otherwise refer to the CPIN in more detail. This was particularly so when the CPIN at 2.4.8 confirmed that in general, the conditions and/or treatment likely to be faced by a person required to undertake compulsory military service would not, by virtue of its nature or repetition, be so harsh as to amount to a real risk of serious harm or persecution. The CPIN reminds caseworkers that each case must be considered on its facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they face a risk of serious harm or persecution.
30. In addition, para 2.4.12 did confirm, as Mr Ahmad submitted that draft evaders are liable for prosecution but importantly, Mrs Abdul-Karim was able to submit that the CPIN went on to specify the following:
“An individual who evades military service by leaving the country must complete their service on return if they are under the age of 40. For those over 40, a fine is the most common punishment. Draft evaders may lose social benefits and civil rights including access to employment, education and ability to leave the country.”
31. The Judge expressly noted at [55] that the Appellant was under the age of 40 years old. I am satisfied that this is both indicative of the Judge having considered the relevant parts of the CPIN and of providing reasons as to why the Appellant not having yet conducted military service was not in itself a risk factor nor when taken cumulatively with the remainder of the Judge’s findings.
32. It appears that the Appellant has relied upon his lack of military service completion as a bare assertion that this places him at risk and there was little before the Judge to demonstrate that this is the case on the specific facts of his claim and appeal. The Appellant’s statement in support of his further representations is silent on this issue and his statement for the FtT appeal contains one short sentence on this issue.
33. For the reasons above, I am not satisfied that the Appellant’s third and fourth grounds of appeal are made out either.
Notice of Decision
34. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of material errors of law and the decision shall stand. The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23.02.2026