Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003575

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67606/2023
LP/03203/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 14th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILDING

Between

IH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE
HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Jegarajah, Counsel instructed by Chancery Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity as he was in the First-tier Tribunal.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh. He brings this appeal, with permission, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Row who dismissed his appeal on 23 May 2025.
Background
2. The appellant came to the UK in 2021 on a student visa. He had fled Bangladesh on account of continued issues in his country over his support for the BNP. He identifies several incidents, including false claims being made against him to the police in 2018 and 2021, and a violent assault in 2018.
3. After coming to the UK he claimed asylum in August 2021. His application was refused in December 2023, and his appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Row (‘the Judge’) on 23 May 2025. The Judge dismissed the appeal on 31 May 2025. In doing so the Judge found, amongst other things, as follows:
37. The evidence in that note indicates that Bangladesh is subject to high levels of corruption throughout society. The credibility of Bangladesh documents is generally low. The use of fraudulent documents and fraudulently obtained genuine documents is widespread amongst Bangladesh nationals.
38. This is unfortunate for honest Bangladesh nationals. There will be some. I bear in mind that the appellant may be one of them. It does indicate however that circumspection must be exercised in dealing with documents emanating from that country.
39. The appellant knew what the respondent’s position was with regard to these documents. The matter could have been resolved in a straightforward manner. These documents are said to emanate from courts and from police stations. The obvious way for the authenticity of those documents to be proved would have been for the appellant’s solicitors to write to the courts concerned, to send copies of the relevant documents, and to ask the court to confirm that the documents were genuine and matched the court records.
40. Presumably the court would either have confirmed that they were or have said that they had never heard of the appellant. Either way it would have resolved the matter.
41. The appellant’s solicitors would only have done this if they had instructions from the appellant to do so. Presumably he would only have instructed them to do so if he felt that any reply which was received would assist his case.
42. For whatever reason this has not been done.
43. I will consider what weight to put upon these documents in the light of all the evidence.
…
47. The obvious way of resolving the matter would have been for the appellant’s solicitors to write directly to the people concerned to ask whether the letter was genuine. For whatever reason this has not been done. I will decide what weight to put upon this document in the light of all the evidence.
48. There is a statement said to be by the appellant’s father. It is dated 7 December 2023 and is at page 44. It supports the appellant’s case. That witness did not attend court to give evidence. This is unsurprising as the appellant’s father is said to be in Bangladesh. However this does limit the weight of which can be put upon it. There was no evidence of identity of the writer. It could have been written by by anyone. The witness could not be cross-examined as to the contents of his statement.
…
50. The appellant gave evidence in accordance with his statement. There are matters which could affect the appellant’s credibility.
51. There are matters which could damage the appellant’s credibility by virtue of section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.
52. The respondent argues that the appellant intended to claim asylum when he came to the United Kingdom. He therefore misled the immigration officer on entry. I do not consider that to be a valid point. The appellant’s case is that he had intended to return to Bangladesh after his study.
53. The delay in claiming asylum is relevant. The appellant says that he had come to the United Kingdom to avoid the false accusations being made against him and the danger from the Awami league. It might be expected that he would have mentioned this on arrival. He did not.
54. He did not claim asylum until 12 August 2021. This was shortly before his leave was due to expire. He says that he had realized at that time that he could not extend his student visa because he could not finance the course. One interpretation of that is that he claimed asylum in order to find a way to remain.
55. The respondent argues that the appellant left Bangladesh using his own passport and identity having obtained a visa from the UK government. The respondent says it is not credible that if he were facing serious charges and was being sought by the police in connection with those charges that he would be able to freely leave Bangladesh in this way or that he would have obtained a visa to come to the United Kingdom.
Conclusions on Asylum Claim
56. I take into account all the above matters. I take into account that the standard of proof in an asylum claim of this date is a low one. Even taking that into account I do not believe what the appellant says.
57. I put little weight on the documents that he has produced. This is because of the background evidence that documents from Bangladesh can be unreliable. It is also because the appellant and his representatives have failed to take straightforward steps to confirm that the documents were genuine.
58. I put little weight on the statement said to be from the appellant’s father. The witness did not attend to give evidence and could not be cross-examined.
59. I put little weight on the letter from the BNP for the same reasons. There were straightforward steps which the appellant and his representative could have taken to check its authenticity which they have failed to take.
60. I find that the appellant’s failure to claim asylum until he realized that he would be unable to extend his visa damages his credibility.
61. I find that the appellant was a BNP member in Bangladesh. The respondent accepts this. I do not find that he was involved in any significant way in that organization. I do not find that he was attacked by members of the Awami league. I do not find that the appellant has been prosecuted because of his political opinions. I find that these parts of his account of fabricated.
62. The appellant is not at risk from anyone in Bangladesh and can safely return there.
4. Dissatisfied the appellant appealed. Permission was initially refused by the FTT, however upon renewal, Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins granted the application in a decision communicated on 13 September 2025.
The hearing
5. I heard submissions from both representatives. Ms Jegarajah invited me to allow the appeal, the Judge had materially erred in several notable respects, most obviously that the Judge had held against the appellant the general observations in the CPIN about the reliability of documents from Bangladesh as impugning the appellant’s credibility or truthfulness as a witness.
6. Further, the Judge had not given any reasons for concluding that the appellant is not credible, and has failed to take the evidence in the round when assessing his credibility, he has failed to take into account not only the contents of the documents, but also the appellant’s statement as well.
7. The decision as whole falls into legal error and should be set aside.
8. Mr Hulme relied on the rule 24 response and submitted that the Judge did not materially err and that the criticisms by the appellant were not material errors, and amounted to little more than disagreement. He invited me to uphold the decision of the Judge.
9. At the hearing I gave my decision that I found there was a material error of law, that the decision was to be set aside, and the appeal remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be before another Judge other than Judge Row. My reasons for this are below.
Decision and reasons
10. The decision of the Judge is unsatisfactory in a number of material respects. Firstly, the Judge finds at paragraph 56 that “I do not believe what the appellant says”, that is a clearly unequivocal finding that the appellant has not given a credible account. No reasons are given for coming to this conclusion. There is nothing in the Judge’s decision to understand why the appellant’s narrative as to what he claims happened to him in Bangladesh, and why he fled, has been rejected. Simply stating that the Judge does not believe what the appellant says without more is wholly inadequate. Mr Hulme was unable to take me to any reasons given for this finding.
11. The Judge fails further to take into account the documentary evidence in the round, I come to this conclusion for two distinct reasons. Firstly, it is absolutely clear that the Judge has rejected the documents as being unreliable before he has considered any of the other evidence. At paragraphs 35 – 49, the Judge has given clear reasons why he cannot place weight on the documents, what other steps the appellant’s solicitors could have taken to in relation to corroborating the documents, and how such is the unreliability of documents from Bangladesh none can be accepted.
12. I find particularly troublesome paragraphs 37 – 38:
37. The evidence in that note indicates that Bangladesh is subject to high levels of corruption throughout society. The credibility of Bangladesh documents is generally low. The use of fraudulent documents and fraudulently obtained genuine documents is widespread amongst Bangladesh nationals.
38. This is unfortunate for honest Bangladesh nationals. There will be some. I bear in mind that the appellant may be one of them. It does indicate however that circumspection must be exercised in dealing with documents emanating from that country.
13. The above paragraphs clearly identify that documents provided in Bangladeshi case may be fraudulent, they may also be genuine documents which have been fraudulently obtained. It is obvious that the former would be of no evidential value, however the same cannot be said for the latter. The latter may be a false document, generated by the authorities upon payment, i.e. a genuine document, with false facts in it, issued fraudulently. Alternatively, they could be genuine documents, containing genuine facts, issued in illicit or unofficial ways. In such circumstances a Judge would have to consider all of the evidence in the round, come to clear conclusions on the evidence, including documentary evidence, and come to an overall conclusion. The Judge properly recognises this, but fails to then move on to consider the documents provided in the present case, in the round, with the appellant’s credibility.
14. Secondly, the Judge appears to impugn the appellant’s credibility by seeking to rely on documents, even if he was an “honest Bangladeshi” national. This may not have been what the Judge was trying to say, but absent any reasons given for rejecting his account as identified above, I am unable to find that the Judge’s summary of the CPIN and his general summary of the situation vis a vis documents from Bangladesh is anything other than a rejection of the appellant’s documentary evidence, and by extension his own credibility, before he has considered any other aspect of the case.
15. I am fortified in this conclusion by the Judge’s criticisms of the failure to obtain any further evidence from Bangladesh, the Judge finding:
40. Presumably the court would either have confirmed that they were or have said that they had never heard of the appellant. Either way it would have resolved the matter.
41. The appellant’s solicitors would only have done this if they had instructions from the appellant to do so. Presumably he would only have instructed them to do so if he felt that any reply which was received would assist his case.
16. The above finding essentially finds that there is a nefarious reason to the appellant’s solicitors not requesting further information, and that is due the appellant’s mindset. I do not consider this is a finding the Judge was entitled to come to at this juncture. Firstly it is in a section of the decision only, it is said, looking at the documents. Secondly, it does not appear to have ever been put to the appellant. Thirdly, it fails to reason why he has come to that conclusion. Fourthly, it fails to take into account the rest of the evidence, including his oral evidence, as a whole.
17. The Judge in assessing the appellant’s credibility not only fails to give any reasons for rejecting it, but it also appears to fail to take into account, on the face of it, the consistency between his account and the contents of the documentary evidence.
18. The Judge’s decision as a whole fails to show a decision taking everything into account, with reasons given for rejecting the narrative. The decision is lacking both in terms of lack of reasons, but also in terms of failing to take a holistic assessment, to the lower standard, of all the evidence relied on by the appellant.
19. For these reasons the Judge has materially erred in law and his decision is set aside. No findings of fact can be preserved. The appeal will need to start afresh before any Judge other than Judge Row, such is the fact finding required the appropriate forum for that is the Firs-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside due to material error of law.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal before any Judge other than Judge Row.

Judge T. S. Wilding

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Date: 10th November 2025