Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003577
PA/53739/2023
LP/08791/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

FM (IRAN)
Appellant
AND

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Ajala, Almond Legals
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on the 26 January 2026

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him, any of his witnesses or any member of his family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a national of Iran born in 2006. He appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss his appeal on protection and human rights grounds.

2. The Appellant arrived in the UK by small boat on the day after his 16th birthday. He claimed protection, stating that he feared return to Iran because his father was extremely abusive. He was beaten on a daily basis and sent out to work long hours, for which he was not paid. Protection was refused on 13 June 2023. Because of the Appellant’s young age the Respondent granted a limited period of discretionary leave, but refused to grant protection.

3. By the time that the Appellant’s appeal reached the First-tier Tribunal his claim had developed to include risk factors that had arisen sur place. The Appellant had been taking part in protests against the Iranian regime in this country, but he had also, he claimed, converted to Christianity. In respect of the former he relied upon HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC) to the submit that the Iranian authorities have a “hair trigger” approach to Kurdish returnees perceived of political opposition. In respect of the latter he relied upon PS (Christianity – risk) [2020] UKUT 00046 (IAC).

4. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal in a decision dated 27 May 2025. In brief summary it did not accept that the Appellant was interested in Kurdish politics or that he was a Christian. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, which was granted by UTJ Loughran on 14 October 2025.

Persecution for Reasons of Political Opinion

5. The gist of the Appellant’s sur place claim to have a protected political belief was that he had become involved in anti-regime activities as part of the Iranian diaspora in the UK. He had attended demonstrations and had been active on social media. He had also featured in a video which had been posted on the ‘Instagram’ account of an Iranian dissident with 54,000 followers. The Appellant submitted that there was a real risk that the Iranians already knew about his political activity; in the alternative submitted that he had taken part in these activities because of his genuinely-held opposition to the Iranian state and that he should not be expected to disavow them in order to be safe; finally he submitted that as a ethnic Kurd there was a real risk that admission to such activities would place him at a real risk of harm, regardless of whether the beliefs were genuinely held.

6. In considering this evidence the First-tier Tribunal notes that the Appellant does not personally know the account holder with 54,000 followers, and finds that it is “not reasonably likely he could be singled out and identified from the video on an Instagram page of someone he does not personally know”. The decision then reads as follows:

27. In the video he is one of about a dozen men taking part in the street performance which, the Appellant tells me, is symbolic of all the ethnic minorities in Iran coming together to overthrow the regime. This, he says, is the politics he believes in. He does not claim that his Kurdish ethnicity in particular is a motivation or that his Kurdish ethnicity caused him any problems in Iran before he left. The Appellant does not support any Kurdish political party.

28. The Appellant’s primary language is Farsi and he requested the services of a Farsi interpreter for the hearing before me. This, in my judgement, is indicative of the Appellant being a Kurd who has fully integrated into the Iranian way of life and his political motivation is not to further the Kurdish cause. This would diminish the adverse interest the Iranian Authorities would have in him.

7. Noting the absence of evidence relating to the Appellant personally, the Tribunal finds that he does not therefore have a public profile “as a politically motivated person seeking to bring about the downfall of the Iranian Regime”. There is no further analysis of the Appellant’s political beliefs, other than at paragraph 52 the Tribunal records “he has no political motivation”. The Tribunal directs itself to various country guidance cases to find that the Appellant would not face a real risk of harm as someone who exited Iran illegally. As he does not claim to have come to the adverse attention of the authorities prior to his departure from Iran, the Iranian authorities would not have any adverse interest in him. He would not therefore be questioned about his political beliefs at the airport.

8. The grounds of appeal are that in so finding the First-tier Tribunal erred by

i) Failing to have regard to ‘objective’ country background material to the effect that the Iranian authorities actively monitor social media sites to identify dissidents;

ii) Engaging in impermissible speculation in its finding about the significance of the Appellant being a Farsi speaker;

iii) Failing to apply the country guidance in HB (Iran), in particular the finding that returning Kurds are subject to heightened scrutiny.

9. In his submissions Mr Ajala expanded on (i) to suggest that the photographs in the bundle of the Appellant on protests would somehow have come to the authorities’ attention in Iran. There is obviously absolutely nothing in this point, since he could not tell me where these images might have been viewed by the Iranian security services, and it does not appear that there was anything before the First-tier Tribunal to say that they might have been.

10. There is however more in the point about the account with 54,000 followers. The video posted to that site was of the Appellant and friends performing street theatre in Newcastle city centre, in a skit devised by someone Mr Ajala describes as an Iranian activist. Since the individual in question is presumably Iranian, and is certainly ‘active’ in that he or she had the wherewithal to organise a piece of anti-regime street theatre, that is probably a fair description. The First-tier Tribunal discounts any risk to the Appellant arising from this incident on the basis that the account holder is not known to him personally. With respect, I do not understand the logic of that reasoning. In XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC) the Upper Tribunal accepted that the Iranian state are certainly keen to monitor dissident content online. Whilst they are unable to effectively do so at volume, the Tribunal accepted that they can, and do, monitor the accounts of those who are of significant adverse interest, and that one measure of that will be the individual’s “social graph”, that is to say, who they interact with. The real question for the First-tier Tribunal here was not whether the Appellant knew the poster personally (this seems to me to be an entirely irrelevant factor) but a) whether an account posting anti-regime content with a wide following would be monitored and b) whether there any such monitoring would have attracted their attention to the Appellant. This ground is made out.

11. I am, as far as ground (i) is concerned, far more concerned with the Tribunal’s analysis of whether the Appellant holds any political views. The Appellant came to this country as child, with no stated political views one way or the other. He has however now been in this country for approaching four years, during which time he has been immersed in the Iranian diaspora, many of whom, naturally, are opposed to the Iranian government. It is his interaction with those members of the diaspora that have led him to perform political street theatre in Newcastle city centre and express the views that he did in this appeal. The primary question for the Tribunal, following OM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1585, was whether that expressed sentiment was real. If it was, and it could get him in trouble at home - a matter expressly conceded by the Secretary of State – then he had to succeed in his appeal.

12. In the passages I cite above, the Tribunal notes the Appellant’s evidence that he is not a Kurdish separatist. He expressly disavowed any loyalty to any Kurdish organisation. It is therefore puzzling that in the very next paragraph the Tribunal seizes upon the Appellant’s use of Farsi to find “this, in my judgement, is indicative of the Appellant being a Kurd who has fully integrated into the Iranian way of life and his political motivation is not to further the Kurdish cause”. I agree with Mr Ajala that it is hard to fathom why this is expressed as a negative credibility finding when this is precisely the Appellant’s evidence. What the Tribunal does not do, anywhere in its decision, is consider the Appellant’s actual evidence about his political belief: he explained his view that all the different ethnicities in Iran should come together to overthrow the regime. The decision proceeds from there to discount any risk as a failed asylum seeker, to dissect at length the evidence on Christianity, before settling at paragraph 52 on the finding that the Appellant has no political motivation. Before me Ms Ahmed accepted that the decision does not reflect any consideration or reasoning on the Appellant’s stated political beliefs, but asked me to find that they are “implicitly rejected”. In the context of Iran, and the findings in HB (Kurds), I do not think that this would be a safe basis upon which to proceed. The Tribunal has failed to make findings on a key issue in the appeal, and this ground is made out.

Persecution for Reasons of Religion

13. Before the First-tier Tribunal the Appellant claimed that he has converted to Christianity. In the summer of 2024 he had been dispersed to Gateshead and was feeling depressed. He explained that he had heard from his family in Iran that his little brother had been in an accident and was in a coma. A friend suggested to the Appellant that he attend church with her. He found it comforting and his depression lifted. Then he heard from his family that his brother had recovered, which he attributed to his prayers in church. He started attending Farsi prayer sessions, and has since completed the Alpha course and been baptised. At the time of the appeal he was undertaking a second course on Christian practice, and was regularly attending Church. The Appellant was supported in this claim by a Mr Stephen Sanders, a lay reader with the Alive Church, St. George’s in Gateshead.

14. The First-tier Tribunal accepted that Mr Sanders is a suitably qualified Dorodian witness. Mr Sanders told the court that he normally spends between 16 and 20 hours a week volunteering at that church and that he communicates with the Appellant in English. He sees him twice a week, and could confirm that the Appellant is attending bible study groups as well as services. I pause here to note that none of this appears to be in issue and that Mr Sanders’ evidence about the Appellant’s outward commitment to the church appears to have been accepted. It was his assessment of the Appellant’s sincerity that was doubted by the Tribunal:

37. Mr. Sanders explained a person is expected to put himself forward for baptism and once they expressed a wish to be baptised, a curate or assistant minister would make sure they knew what they were doing. He had not been part of that process but he confirmed he was present at the Appellant’s baptism and heard his profession of faith but could not recall if it was spoken in English or was interpreted from Farsi. He did feel sympathetic about how the Appellant got there and felt it was genuine and heartfelt. The problem with this is, if Mr. Sanders cannot recall if the Appellant spoke in English or had his words spoken in Farsi interpreted, then it is unlikely the impression the Appellant made was that great. If his words were interpreted, Mr. Sanders would not know if the words he heard were those spoken by the Appellant or an interpretation of them by the interpreter. I am not told if the interpretation at the church is done by properly qualified and certified interpreters or by friends of the baptismal candidates. For this reason, I do not rely on Mr. Sanders having formed the opinion that the Appellant had made a statement that was genuine and heartfelt.

15. Mr Ajala criticised this reasoning as “speculative”. I don’t know what that means. I am however satisfied that the reasoning is irrational. Mr Sanders is a committed Christian who confirmed to the court that he well understands that some Iranians will fake a conversion in order to make a fraudulent claim for protection. He had however taken the time to come to court to support the Appellant because in his knowledge of the Appellant, having met with him twice a week over the preceding year and having observed his learning journey, he believes this young man to be genuine. It was against this background that he described the Appellant’s decision to be baptised as being “genuine and heartfelt”. It was in my view wholly irrational for the Tribunal to have focused in the way it did simply on the words spoken during that ceremony. No one was able to explain to me what the commentary about the interpreters might be intended to convey. If the Judge was suggesting that the interpreters who attend these services – presumably because they have a connection to the church – cannot be trusted to have properly translated the baptismal candidate’s words, I consider this too to be irrational.

16. I am further accept Mr Ajala’s submission that the Tribunal’s assessment of why the Appellant might have converted is flawed for an impermissible requirement of corroboration. At paragraph 53 of the decision the Tribunal says this:

53. The Appellant explained that one of the reasons he believes in Jesus was the fact his brother recovered after being in a coma following an accident. He provided no details of the accident or what injuries his brother had suffered. The absence of documentary evidence in respect of this and his mother’s depression leading to Alzheimer’s is relevant as without this, the Appellant has no explanation as to why he felt drawn to a belief in Jesus. The Appellant also claims that his attendance at church has been beneficial to his own mental health. He claimed to be suffering from depression which was lifted after attending the church. I note, however, that he did receive counselling and that this helped him recover too.

17. The language used in this passage is stark. It does not say that without corroboration there is a limit to the weight that can be attached to the Appellant’s claims about his motivation. It reads: “without this, the Appellant has no explanation as to why he felt drawn to a belief in Jesus”. It is trite in this jurisdiction that asylum seekers should not be required, save where readily accessible, to produce corroboration in the form of documentary evidence. The Tribunal was quite wrong to say that there was “no explanation”. The Appellant had given one. He had said that it was his brother’s recovery, the compassion shown to him by fellow congregants, and the camaraderie he felt in being part of that community. I should add that contrary to the views expressed by the First-tier Tribunal it seems to me that all of these reasons would be perfectly good ones: it seems to me likely that many of those who identify as Christians in this country are similarly motivated by the religion’s compassion, and the sense of solidarity that being a member of the church brings.

18. Having found both grounds to be made out, I am satisfied that the decision in this appeal falls to be set aside in its entirety. Given the extent of the fact finding required, I am satisfied that the correct forum for that remaking is the First-tier Tribunal. In the hiatus between the Upper Tribunal hearing and this decision being promulgated, there have been significant developments in Iran, in that the country is currently subject to attack by the United States and Israel. Whether those events should result in a stay in proceedings will be a matter for the First-tier Tribunal.

Decisions

19. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.

20. The decision is to be remade de novo in the First-tier Tribunal

21. There is an order for anonymity.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
8 March 2026