The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003583

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62252/2023
LP/07511/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GIBBS

Between

GS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Aziz, Counsel instructed by Leu Dat & Baig Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms. McKenzie, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 November 2025

ORDER REGARDING ANONYMITY

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, and any family member likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal brought by appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Williams (the Judge) to refuse his appeal against a decision made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department refusing his protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The appellant is an ethnic Kurd and citizen of Iran. He claims to have been a Kolbar in Iran involved in the transportation of alcohol. His uncle was arrested and consequently the appellant was placed at risk. Since his arrival in the United Kingdom the appellant has attended demonstrations and posted on Facebook. He believes that he will be at risk on return to Iran because of these activities.
3. The Judge accepted that the appellant was a Kolbar. They did not however find that his uncle had been arrested or that the appellant was at risk. With regards to his sur place activities the Judge found that the appellant’s role was too low profile to place him at risk.
Grounds of Appeal
4. The Grounds of Appeal are twofold.
5. Ground 1 asserts that the Judge’s failed to consider the interview record adequately; had they done so they would have found ample detail about the arrest of the appellant’s uncle. Further the appellant was not questioned about his uncle’s activities at the appeal hearing and the appellant was therefore deprived of an opportunity to answer the Judge’s concerns.
6. Ground 2 is that the Judge failed to apply the country guidance case law PS (Christianity- risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 00046 (IAC) regarding the scrutiny that the appellant will face on return to Iran. Also, he cannot be expected to lie (HJ Iran and HT Cameroon [2010] UKSC 31).
Grant of Permission
7. First-tier Tribunal Judge Turner granted permission to appeal in a decision dated 5 August 2025. They found merit in both grounds.
8. Following the grant of permission the respondent did not file a rule 24 response to the appeal.
9. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
10. With regards to the first ground I note that Mr. Aziz was Counsel at the appeal hearing before FtT Judge Williams. I accept his submission that the Judge did not indicate that they had any concerns regarding the appellant’s evidence pertaining to his uncle’s arrest. Further, I accept that this particular aspect of the appellant’s evidence was not challenged in the respondent’s reasons for refusal letter. The appellant was therefore deprived of the opportunity to address this matter. I am satisfied that this amounts to a material error of law.
11. On the second ground I am also persuaded that the Judge made a material error of law. This is because they accepted that the appellant would likely be questioned on return to Iran (paragraph 21) and concluded that, provided he lied about his activities in the United Kingdom he would not be at risk.
12. For these reasons the Judge’s decision will be set aside. In considering whether the case should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal or retained in the Upper Tribunal, the parties agreed that if the appeal was allowed on ground one it should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal but if it was allowed only on ground 2 the matter could be decided by the Upper Tribunal. I am therefore satisfied that it is not appropriate to preserve any findings and to remit the appeal in its entirety to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
13. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
14. The appeal is returned to the First-tier Tribunal in Manchester for a de novo rehearing before any Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge C J Williams.


L K Gibbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
9 December 2025