UI-2025-003585
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
UI-2025-003585
PA/56214/2023
IA/00382/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21st of November 2025
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS
Between
UDV
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Decided under Rule 34 of the
Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
On 10 November 2025
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant’s protection and human rights claim was refused by the Secretary of State on 22 August 2023. The Appellant appealed against that decision. His appeal was dismissed by Judge Kempton of the First-tier Tribunal in a decision of 8 May 2025 following a hearing.
2. The Appellant sought permission to appeal the decision and First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes refused permission but on renewal Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien granted permission to the Appellant on 5 September 2025 (but sent to the parties on 23 September 2025) on all grounds.
3. UTJ O’Brien stated: “The grounds assert that the judge erred as follows. The judge wrongly required the appellant to provide corroboration. The judge overlooked material evidence: a witness statement from the appellant’s mother. The judge unreasonably required evidence that a state actor had sanctioned the appellant’s killing. The judge at [27] and [41] criticises the appellant for not producing a statement from his mother. However, such a statement was to be found at pages 51-53 of his inventory of productions, with photographs/screenshots exhibited at pages 54-56. This evidence was referred to in the ASA at paragraph 21. It is arguable that the judge left material evidence out of account. Furthermore, it arguable that the judge’s approach to the risk to the appellant from a state actor, whose adverse in him had been accepted by the respondent was unreasonable. Permission is granted on all pleaded grounds.”
4. The Respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 1 October 2025. In that response it is stated that “Whilst the R considers that corroborative evidence can be expected in certain contexts (see TK Burundi EWCA 2009), it is accepted the FTTJ materially erred when finding there was no evidence from the appellant’s mother; the FTTJ overlooked material evidence as identified in the grounds and grant of permission. The R also notes that the FTTJ when identifying the issues at [15]-[23] does not make conclusive findings relating to whether a sufficiency of protection exists and/or whether internal relocation is a viable alternative”.
5. In directions sent to the parties, I wrote to the parties as follows:
“Having considered the grounds of appeal, the grant of permission, and the rule 24 response in this case, the grounds have clear merit, as is recognised by the Secretary of State where it is accepted that the FtTJ materially erred in law as material evidence was overlooked as relevant to credibility and also risk but also that there were no conclusive findings relating to issues of sufficiency protection and/or internal relocation.
In the circumstances I propose to set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision for error of law and remit the appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal at Glasgow for a fresh hearing with no findings preserved.
Any representations to the contrary made on behalf of the parties will be considered if received within 7 days of the date of these directions”
6. The directions were served on the parties on 31 October 2025. No reply has been received from either party. Neither party has dissented from my proposal.
7. I now set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal for error of law as identified in the grounds of appeal and the grant of permission. I remit the appeal for a decision afresh by the First-tier Tribunal. I am satisfied that in light of the errors of law identified and the fact findings which will be necessary, the appeal falls within paragraphs 7.2 (b) of the practice statement.
8. Accordingly, I am satisfied that it would in all circumstances be appropriate to set aside the decision in its entirety and for it to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh.
9. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim.
Rule 14: The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008: Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings
Decision
10. The decision of the First -tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law; the decision is set aside and shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh.
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
10 November 2025