Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Case Number: UI-2025-003586
First-tier Tribunal Ref: HU/50999/2023
LH/03607/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 7 October 2025

31st October 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J K SWANEY

Between

SS
(anonymity direction made)
Appellant

and

the secretary of state for the home department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Gazzain, counsel, instructed by Briton Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, senior presenting officer

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity order
1. An anonymity order was made on 22 August 2025. I have maintained that order because the need to discharge the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the public interest in open justice.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of India. He appeals the decision made on 13 May 2025 to dismiss his appeal against the refusal of his international protection and human rights claims.
3. The appellant first arrived in the United Kingdom on 8 January 2010 with entry clearance as a working holidaymaker which was valid until 3 December 2011. He made applications for leave to remain on private and family life grounds on 25 November 2013 and 6 February 2014. Both applications were rejected for failure to pay the required application fee.
4. On 7 February 2014 the appellant applied for a residence card as the extended family member of an EEA national. The application was refused on 22 March 2014.
5. The appellant made applications outside the Immigration Rules on 23 December 2014 and on private and family life grounds on 16 October 2015 and 14 September 2016. All three applications were rejected, as his applications for fee waivers were refused.
6. On 21 November 2016 the appellant made an application for a residence card as the family member of an EEA national. The application was refused on 10 May 2017.
7. On 10 September 2021 the appellant made an application for leave to remain on human rights grounds (articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR). His application was based on medical grounds (mental health) and his conversion to Christianity. The application was refused on 17 January 2023, and the appellant appealed the decision.
8. While his appeal was pending, on 27 October 2023 the appellant claimed asylum. His claim was refused on 29 October 2024. His asylum and human rights claims were certified under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) as being clearly unfounded. The effect of certification is that the appellant did not have a right of appeal against the decision. There is no evidence to suggest that the appellant challenged the certification of his asylum claim.
9. Meanwhile, his appeal against the decision made on 17 January 2023 to refuse his human rights claim continued. His appeal was dismissed on 13 May 2025. The First-tier Tribunal judge (the judge) made the following findings:
(i) The appellant suffers from a mental health condition which is treated with medication with no specialist input.
(ii) The appellant’s condition does not meet the high threshold for engagement of article 3 of the ECHR.
(iii) The appellant has a sister in India and would not be precluded from resuming contact with her.
(iv) The appellant’s conversion to Christianity would not necessarily give rise to very significant obstacles to his integration in India.
(v) There are medical resources in India which the appellant would be able to access.
(vi) There would be some difficulties for the appellant on return to India, but they do not reach the threshold of very significant obstacles.
(vii) The appellant’s circumstances are not exceptional such that removal would give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences.
10. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 5 August 2025. Permission was granted on the basis that the judge failed to consider and/or make findings in relation to the social stigma the appellant claimed he would face; and that the judge failed to consider the asserted obstacles to integration cumulatively, and failed to have regard to their impact on the appellant’s ability to integrate, applying SSHD v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813.
11. My reasons for finding that there was no material error of law in the judge’s decision follow.
Discussion
12. There were two issues in which permission to appeal was granted and I deal with each in turn. I heard oral submissions from both representatives and considered the composite bundle and two Country Policy and Information Notes (CPINs) that were relied on in the First-tier Tribunal before making my decision.
Failure to consider social stigma and/or make adequate findings
13. Mr Gazzain submitted that the judge correctly recognised that it was submitted that there were two factors relied on by the appellant as to why he would be stigmatised on return to India, namely his conversion to Christianity and his poor mental health. He submitted that the judge failed to consider the substance of the evidence before her, including the CPINs. Mr Gazzain submitted that paragraph 15.4 of the CPIN India: Medical and healthcare provision (the medical CPIN) was cited, which specifically relates to stigma.
14. There is a sole reference to stigma cited in the CPIN, the source of which was an opinion piece published in the Times of India on 27 August 2021. It states that there is a ‘big stigma’ around people suffering from any kind of mental health issues; and that physical problems are given priority due to limited finances and the lack of visibility of mental health problems when compared to physical issues. It also states that people consider mental health issues as taboo; that they try to hide them; and don’t discuss them openly with others.
15. The judge refers expressly to the appellant’s reliance on paragraph 15.4 of the medical CPIN at paragraph 61 of the decision. While the judge may not have made reference to this paragraph in her findings, this must be considered in light of her findings about the appellant’s mental health and the severity of his condition. In particular, the finding that the appellant’s condition is not so severe as to engage article 3 of the ECHR (in other words, he is not a seriously ill person) and her finding at paragraph 68, that if the appellant’s mental health was affecting him to the degree claimed, he would have sought assistance from his GP at an earlier date.
16. There was no evidence before the judge to suggest that the appellant considers that his mental health issues are taboo or that he experiences any difficulty in talking about them. He has sought and obtained medical treatment from his GP and has been seen by a psychiatrist and another medical professional. He accesses medication prescribed to him and there is no indication that he has any difficulty in doing so. In September 2021 the appellant was diagnosed as having an adjustment disorder, which is described as being a condition in which an individual is in a ‘state of subjective distress and emotional disturbance, usually interfering with social functioning and performance, arising in the period of adaptation to a significant life change or a stressful life event’. It is stated that the way this manifests includes through depressed mood and anxiety.
17. In December 2023 the appellant was found to fulfil the diagnostic criteria for anxiety and depression with adjustment disorder. In September 2024 he was found to have severe depression and anxiety. Notwithstanding the apparent severity of his symptoms, the appellant continued to be prescribed 10mg of Amitriptyline, to be taken at night, but did not access any other mental health services as had been recommended. When asked about this at the hearing, the judge records that the appellant said he had simply forgotten or that he was not given any further information about CBT.
18. There is reference to the appellant isolating himself in the medical evidence, but little detail as to what this means in practice. There was no evidence before the judge that he required support from another person to function in his daily life or that he was unable to participate in society. To the contrary, the evidence shows that he was an active member of his Church, regularly attending services and being involved in the community. There is nothing in the evidence before the judge that would suggest that the appellant’s condition manifested itself in such a way that he might reasonably be identified by members of the community in India as suffering from a mental health condition. The appellant had been able to access medication from his GP and, aside from cost, to which I will return below, there was nothing to suggest that he could not continue to do so, or that to do so would expose him to stigmatisation. He would not have to disclose to anyone other than his doctor that he was taking medication should he choose not to.
19. I was not referred to any evidence that was before the judge which would suggest that the appellant’s anxiety and depression were of such severity that he was unable to operate in society or form the kinds of ties and relationships that would give substance to his family and/or private life.
20. The appellant suggested that he would be unable to access medication in India due to the cost and his own financial instability and lack of support. The appellant has been able to access treatment in the United Kingdom, including medication. Given his immigration status, it appears that he would have to pay for prescriptions unless exempt, for example if he was in receipt of asylum support while his asylum claim was pending. I asked Mr Gazzain how the appellant supports himself in the United Kingdom and where in the bundle the evidence of this could be found. Mr Gazzain stated that the appellant was supported by friends but confirmed that no evidence of this was before the judge.
21. The judge states at paragraph 74 that the low cost in India of the appellant’s medication at the dose he requires was confirmed by the presenting officer. There is nothing to suggest that the evidence about the cost of medication was disputed by the appellant. The appellant’s evidence was that he could not afford medication, but there was no evidence before the judge to support his assertion. In his witness statement dated 8 September 2023 the appellant states ‘I want to confirm to the court that I will take treatment for my mental health issues, and some friends will help me for these all expenses’. The appellant’s own evidence before the judge was that he did have help with his medical expenses.
22. There was no evidence before the judge that the appellant’s mental health was so poor that he would be unable to seek help from a medical professional on return should he require it. I conclude for these reasons that the judge was entitled to find that the appellant would be able to access medication on return.
23. The second aspect of the appellant’s claim that he would face stigmatisation was in respect of his conversion to Christianity. The judge records the passages of the CPIN India: Religious minorities and Scheduled Castes and Tribes (the religious minorities CPIN) relied on by the appellant. The judge also expressly confirms that she considered the background evidence relied on by the appellant and the information in the refusal letter, which reference appears to be to the refusal of the appellant’s asylum claim in which the respondent deals with the substance of the appellant’s conversion to Christianity.
24. The focus of the appellant’s asylum claim was his fear of his family, but as the respondent noted in her refusal letter, he had not had any contact with the people he feared for over nine years and there was no evidence that they maintained any adverse interest in him or would have the ability to find him if he were to return to India. The respondent went on to consider the position for Christians in India, relying on WF (Internal relocation – Christian) India CG [2002] UKIAT 04874 and the evidence regarding the position since that case was determined.
25. The respondent accepted that there was evidence of attacks on Christians, of a lack of action by police in response to reports such attacks, and of the use of reports to police as a weapon by anti-Christian individuals. The respondent considered that the evidence did not show that this was State sanctioned and was the criminal acts of non-State actors. The respondent’s position was that there is effective police and judicial apparatus in India and that while it may be subject to come corruption, that apparatus is generally willing and able to protect individuals against acts committed by non-State actors.
26. As was held by the Court of Appeal in NC v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1379, the assessment must focus on the obstacles to integration and their significance to the appellant, but the test is not subjective. In other words, the tribunal must consider more than just what the appellant perceives the obstacles will be; it must consider all other aspects of the appellant’s likely situation on return, including objective evidence, and requires consideration of any reasonable step the appellant could take to avoid or mitigate the obstacles.
27. The respondent referred to evidence about the position in states which have large Christian populations, where there are no anti-conversion laws in force, where the appellant would be free to practice his religion openly, and where, as a member of a minority religion, the appellant would be eligible for government assistance. This was relevant to the judge’s consideration of what stigma the appellant would face on return and whether it might amount to very significant obstacles to integration. The appellant did not address this before the judge or explain why these would not be reasonable steps for him to take.
28. The judge’s findings were brief; however, when read as a whole, they are sufficient and were open to her on the evidence. None of the findings themselves were challenged as being perverse or irrational. I find that the judge did consider the issue of stigma, both in relation to the appellant’s mental health, and his conversion to Christianity.
Very significant obstacles to integration
29. There are two elements to the test of very significant obstacles to integration. The first is the concept of ‘integration’, and the second is whether the obstacles to integration which have been identified are ‘very significant’. The appellant’s complaint is that the judge failed to have regard to the guidance relating to integration as identified in Kamara, and that in assessing whether the obstacles are very significant, failed to consider them cumulatively.
30. While it is true that the judge did not refer expressly to Kamara, this can only be a material error of law where the judge failed to apply the principles identified. The factors considered by the judge included: the appellant has family in India, albeit that he had not been in contact with his sister for some time; he would not be precluded from re-establishing contact with his sister; he had spent the majority of his life in India and is clearly familiar with the lifestyle and customs there; his absence from India for a number of years; his mental health problems; and the availability of medical resources. Based on this, I find that the judge clearly had in mind matters that are relevant to the appellant’s understanding how life in society in India is carried on, the appellant’s ability to participate in society and be accepted there, to operate on a daily basis, and to form relationships that will give substance to his family and/or private life. I find that the judge did have regard to what ‘integration’ means and that her failure to expressly mention Kamara is not a material error of law.
31. The judge clearly records the submission made on the appellant’s behalf that the appellant’s mental health and the fact of his conversion to Christianity must be considered cumulatively when having regard to whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration. Although the judge considered each of the two factors separately when making her findings of fact, there is no evidence that when she came to assess the factors identified by the appellant and the findings she made in relation to them, that she did not have regard to their combined effect. Her conclusion that the obstacles to integration that the appellant would face are not very significant was reasonably open to her and did not involve the making of a material error of law.
Conclusions
32. For the reasons set out above, I find that:
(i) The judge made adequate findings in relation to the claimed stigma the appellant would face on return both in relation to his mental health and his conversion to Christianity.
(ii) The judge considered and applied the correct test in relation to whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to his integration in India and made adequate and sustainable findings that he would not.
Decision
33. The judge’s decision does not contain a material error of law.
34. The appeal is dismissed.

Signed J K Swaney Date 21 October 2025
Judge J K Swaney
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge