Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003587

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/08290/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BAGRAL

Between

MUNNA MIAH
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Z Malik KC, instructed by JKR Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) dated 4 April 2025, dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 16 August 2019 refusing the Appellant’s claim for protection on asylum and human rights grounds.
2. The Appellant is a Bangladeshi national who claims to have entered the United Kingdom clandestinely in 1998. He was first encountered following his arrest by the police on 2 March 2010. After his release, he failed to report and was subsequently listed as an absconder in 2012. On 23 October 2012, he applied for leave to remain in the United Kingdom on human rights grounds; this application was refused on 24 May 2013 with no right of appeal. He claimed asylum on 5 September 2017.
3. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim for protection in her decision dated 16 August 2019, rejecting the Appellant’s claims that (a) he was a member of the Bangladesh National Party; (b) he was persecuted in consequence in Bangladesh; (c) his sur places activities in the United Kingdom would result in a consequential risk on return, and (d) he had not established a 20-year period of residence in the United Kingdom and could not otherwise qualify for leave to remain on private life grounds under the Immigration Rules or outside of them on an exceptional basis.
4. The Appellant’s onward appeal came before the FtT on 2 April 2025. The Respondent was represented before the FtT and the Appellant was represented by Mr Malik KC. As the FtT observed, although the Appellant’s appeal was pleaded on the basis of several grounds, Mr Malik KC pursued the appeal on a single ground, namely, whether the Appellant met the requirements of Paragraph PL 5.1(a) of Appendix Private Life to the Immigration Rules for leave to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of 20 years’ continuous residence. Mr Malik KC conceded that, unless the Appellant succeeded in establishing that contention, the appeal was bound to be dismissed.
5. At the outset of the hearing before the FtT, the Respondent applied for an adjournment, unopposed by Mr Malik KC, on the basis that the Appellant’s wife’s asylum claim remained outstanding and could have a bearing on this appeal. The FtT refused that application. The FtT heard oral evidence from eleven witnesses, including the Appellant, his wife, extended family members and political colleagues and friends.
6. The FtT accepted that the Appellant had been continuously resident in the United Kingdom since 2 March 2010. However, the FtT did not accept that the Appellant had established residence prior to that date. The FtT acknowledged that individuals residing unlawfully in the United Kingdom may encounter difficulties in obtaining official documentation particularly following the introduction of the so-called ‘hostile environment’ in 2012, but nevertheless observed that the period relevant to this appeal was before 2010, when such difficulties were less pronounced.
7. The FtT noted that the Appellant’s witness statement lacked detail regarding his circumstances prior to 2010 and further observed that the Appellant distanced himself from the long residence application made in 2012, claiming ignorance of its contents. The FtT noted a contradiction between the written and oral evidence of the Appellant’s uncle and found his evidence was vague and superficial. The FtT found that the evidence of the supporting witnesses also lacked specificity, finding their witness statements were vague and insubstantial. The FtT concluded that family members were motivated to assist the Appellant in his attempt to remain in the United Kingdom. The appeal was accordingly dismissed on human rights grounds.
8. I will consider the FtT’s decision in more detail below.
Grounds of Appeal
9. The Appellant sought permission to appeal against the FtT’s decision on grounds which can be summarised as follows:
Ground 1 – the FtT erred in refusing to adjourn the appeal in light of the agreement of the parties and the reasons why the adjournment was sought.
Ground 2 - the FtT erred in its treatment of the witness evidence.
Ground 3 - the FtT erred in making findings not based on the evidence.
Ground 4 - the FtT erred in not adequately reasoning its decision.
Ground 5 - the FtT erred in its failure to address the apparent concession in the Respondent’s refusal letter.
Permission to appeal
10. Permission to appeal was initially refused, but granted upon renewed application to the Upper Tribunal, by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst, who considered all grounds were arguable.
The Hearing
11. I had before me a composite bundle which included the documents relevant to the appeal, and the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the FtT. Ms Isherwood confirmed the Respondent had not filed a Rule 24 Response, but the appeal was nonetheless opposed. Having heard submissions from Ms Isherwood and Mr Malik KC, I reserved my decision. With regret this decision has been delayed due to an administrative error.
Discussion
12. The matter comes before me to determine whether the FtT’s decision contains an error(s) of law. If I conclude that it does, I must then consider whether to set aside the FtT’s decision. If I set aside the FtT’s decision, I must then either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the FtT to do so.
13. I have considered the FtT’s decision, the composite bundle, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing before coming to a decision in this appeal.
14. I begin by reminding myself of the following principles. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find the Tribunal misdirected itself simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. These principles have been reinforced in many subsequent authorities including Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4], Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50]-[51], and Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46]-[47].
15. Having applied the above principles and after careful consideration of the representatives’ submissions, although I do not agree with all of the grounds as pleaded, I find the FtT’s decision is vitiated by material errors of law. I shall deal with each ground in turn.
Ground 1
16. The first ground asserts that the FtT erred in refusing the adjournment application. Following observations from the Tribunal, Mr Malik KC, did not pursue this ground, and rightly so. The FtT gave cogent reasons for refusing the application to adjourn the hearing and committed no error in doing so.
Ground 2
17. This ground contends that the FtT erred in law in concluding that the principles enunciated in Ullah (supra) did not apply and, in turn, acted unfairly in rejecting the evidence of the witnesses absent any challenge to that evidence.
18. Before I turn to the FtT’s decision it is perhaps useful to summarise the principles from the authorities insofar as they are applicable to this appeal, which are helpfully referred to in the grounds settled by Mr Malik KC.
19. In Griffiths v Tui (UK) Ltd [2023] UKSC 48, the Supreme Court set out the status and application of the rule in Browne v Dunn. It seems to me that the Supreme Court in Tui was concerned with the necessity for a party to put to a witness in cross-examination any material point of that witnesses’ evidence that the party wishes to submit to the court should not be accepted. The court points out that this is part of ensuring a fair trial, enabling the judge to make a proper assessment of all the evidence, and allowing the witness to explain or clarify his or her evidence. The rule extends to both witnesses as to fact and expert witnesses. However, the rule is not to be applied rigidly. Its application depends upon the circumstances of the case as the criterion is the overall fairness of the trial. The Supreme Court identified at [61]-[68] a non-exhaustive list of circumstances where the rule may not apply, but it is not argued that the exclusions referred to therein apply in this case.
20. In Abdi v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455, the Court of Appeal (referring to Tui) emphasised that:
“… fairness generally requires that if the evidence of a witness is to be rejected, it should be challenged at the hearing so as to give them an opportunity to address the challenge; and that that is a matter of fairness to the witness as well as fairness to the parties…”
21. The Court of Appeal confirmed in Ullah, at [39], that the principle addressed in Tui applies in the field of public law and in reaffirming the above principle at [37] held:
“Cross-examination gives the witness the opportunity to explain or clarify his or her evidence. That opportunity is particularly important when the opposing party intends to accuse the witness of dishonesty, but there is no principled basis for confining the rule to cases of dishonesty.”
22. I agree with Mr Malik KC that the principles addressed in the authorities stress that the rule applies whenever a Court or Tribunal proposes to reject unchallenged oral evidence on material matters. Before the FtT, Mr Malik KC invited it to consider these principles in light of the Respondent’s representatives failure to put to the witnesses that their evidence was untruthful (at [27]). The FtT gave short shrift to that submission on the basis that Ullah was a case about dishonesty, and was thus not applicable to the Appellant’s case (at [28]). While the FtT was correct in stating that the Appellant’s case did not concern dishonesty, the Court of Appeal made clear in its judgement that the rule is not restricted to such cases. Ms Isherwood in fairness struggled to defend the FtT’s decision in this regard. I reject her initial submission that the grounds seek to reargue the Appellant’s case when it is clear the grounds raise issues of law and procedural fairness. When pressed Mr Isherwood appeared to acknowledge the error but submitted it was not material. She referred to witness statements of some witnesses to support her submission that their evidence did not address a material issue, namely, one of continuous residency, however, Mr Malik KC aptly demonstrated in reply that those witnesses had in fact made reference to the Appellant’s continuous residence in the UK. Whether or not the witnesses referred to that issue is not however the point Mr Malik KC is making. The point is that the FtT reached adverse conclusions on the basis of a misapplication of the law and procedurally erred in doing so.
23. I have already stated my view that the FtT misdirected itself in respect of the application of Ullah, the question is whether the error is material. After careful consideration I conclude that the error is material for the following reasons. First, as asserted in the grounds, there is no dispute the evidence of the witnesses was not challenged on the basis that the witnesses were either mistaken, unreliable or dishonest. The Respondent’s case as advanced in submissions by her representative before the FtT, was that the evidence was essentially self-serving (at [10]). There is no indication that the evidence of the witnesses was challenged on the basis of the perceived deficiencies the FtT identified at [18]–[26], and whilst those matters could have been a fair assessment of the evidence, the issues raised were not part of the Respondent’s case and there is no dispute that the witnesses were not given an opportunity to address the FtT’s concerns, which, in fairness, were required to be put to the witnesses if they were to be relied upon to reject their evidence.
24. I am reinforced in that view because it seems to me that the FtT’s operative reasoning may have been underpinned by its conclusion ‘that there [was] motivation on the family’s part to support the appellant in his attempt to remain in the United Kingdom…’ (at [23]). That was not a matter on which the concerned witnesses were given an opportunity to comment upon. I am satisfied that the FtT procedurally erred in rejecting the witnesses evidence. Ground 2 is made out.
Ground 3
25. In view of my findings in respect of Ground 2, I can deal with the other grounds relatively swiftly. Ground 2 to an extent dovetails into Ground 3 because it concerns the FtT’s treatment of the evidence of the Appellant’s uncle. In respect of his evidence the FtT found as follows:
“21. I consider that the appellant’s uncle, experienced in running a restaurant would have some awareness about immigration requirements and the need to regularise somebody’s immigration status. Particularly as he is part of the Bangladeshi diaspora and part of this reasonably large extended family that appeared before me which has relatives born in the United Kingdom and others who were born in Bangladesh who have come to the United Kingdom and obtain citizenship in the United Kingdom. I find that this is not a family that is completely ignorant of immigration matters.”
26. Although Ms Isherwood noted that some of the witnesses were born in Bangladesh and later migrated to the United Kingdom, she was unable to identify any evidence demonstrating that the Appellant’s uncle possessed any particular knowledge of immigration requirements arising from his experience of running a restaurant. The witness was not asked to address, nor did he give evidence regarding, any understanding of immigration law. I therefore accept Mr Malik KC’s submission that there was no evidential foundation for such a finding. It is unsupported by the evidence and amounts to conjecture. Ground 3 is accordingly made out.
Ground 4
27. This ground is a reasons challenge. Mr Malik KC submits the FtT’s reasoning is inadequate; the FtT failing to explain why it considered the evidence was vague. Ms Isherwood submits the FtT was entitled to conclude as it did. I have had regard to the judgment of Dove J, UTIAC President, and Judge Plimmer, FTTIAC President (as they then were), in TC (PS compliance - "Issues-based reasoning") Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 164 (IAC), which provides at [25]:
“25. In approaching submissions reliant upon inadequate reasoning, it is helpful to bear firmly in mind the observations of Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood in South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953. Whilst a case about the duty to give reasons in the decisions of planning inspectors, it appears to us to provide appropriate legal parameters for decisions in the FTT. Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:
“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”
28. The Presidential Panel’s judgment also contains an Appendix, specifically setting out principles that can be derived from the authorities in relation to the giving of reasons by the FtT and the subsequent scrutiny on appeal in this tribunal. These numbered principles include the following:
“1. Reasons can be briefly stated and concision is to be encouraged but FTT decisions must be careful decisions, reflecting the overarching task to determine matters relevant to fundamental human rights and /or international protection.
...
3. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and adequate in the sense that they must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was, and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’.
...
9. The reasoning should enable the losing party to understand why they have lost.”
29. I note that these principles are also echoed within “The Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions’, dated 4 June 2024; indeed, the Appendix within TC is repeatedly referenced in footnotes to the Practice Direction, which I have taken into account.
30. I find, agreeing with Mr Malik KC’s submissions, that the FtT’s reasons for dismissing the appeal were not adequate in law. Whilst I acknowledge Ms Isherwood’s submission that the FtT gave some reasons for rejecting the evidence of the Appellant and his uncle, the overarching tenure of the reasoning is that the evidence of the witnesses was vague, superficial, and lacking in detail. These are conclusionary statements and do not explain adequately to the reader why that conclusion was reached. I find Ground 4 is made out.
Ground 5
31. I am not persuaded by Mr Malik’s KC’s submission that the FtT failed to have regard to the Respondent’s ‘concession’ at §40 of her decision. Here the Respondent was considering section 8 matters in respect of the asylum claim and in doing so stated: “You arrived in the United Kingdom in 1998….”. First, it is not clear the Respondent was in fact making any concession and it is appreciably clear on a wholesale reading of the Respondent’s refusal and review letter, that she did not accept the Appellant’s claimed date of arrival, which I further observe according to his witness statement was 1 January 1999. Second, it has not been demonstrated that the issue was raised before the FtT, whether by reference to the evidence, the Appellant’s skeleton argument, any Record of Proceedings, or the Tribunal’s decision itself. This ground is not made out.
32. This is inconsequential in view of my findings in respect of the other grounds.
Conclusion
33. For the reasons stated earlier I find the FtT erred materially in law and that the decision should be set aside.
Disposal
34. Both parties agreed that in the event that Ground 2 was made out, fresh findings of fact would need to be made and the matter ought to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Given the extent of the findings fact that will need to be made in this matter, I am of view that it is appropriate that the matter should be remitted to the First tier Tribunal.
35. I canvassed with the parties the possibility of remitting the appeal to myself, sitting as a Judge of the First‑tier Tribunal. Neither party raised any objection to that course. In light of that agreement, and given my familiarity with the documentation, I consider it appropriate to proceed on that basis.
Notice of Decision
(i) The decision involved the making of one or more material errors of law.
(ii) The decision is set aside.
(iii) The appeal is remitted to the FTT to be heard a fresh by Judge Bagral with no findings preserved.

Judge Bagral
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
6 February 2026