Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003589

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/69126/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 6th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

WU
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Winter, counsel instructed by Maguire Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr T Lindsay, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan who claims asylum on the basis of a membership of a particular social group, namely that he is a gay man.
2. The appellant appeals from the First-tier Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal on two grounds, namely that the First-tier Tribunal Judge erred in law firstly by failing to consider evidence of the appellant’s previous relationships, his associations with gay organisations and his presentation as a gay man. Even if this was considered, says the appellant, the judge has failed to provide adequate reasons for attaching little weight to evidence.
3. The second ground, advanced by the appellant, asserts irrationality in that the judge has concluded that the appellant could live discretely in Pakistan as a gay man but failed to consider the risk to him from his family or that he would live discretely because he feared harm.
4. I am grateful to both parties for their submissions. I gave an ex-tempore judgment from which this written judgment is drawn. I heard first from the respondent, who concedes that the first ground is made out. The respondent tells me that the Home Secretary accepts a material error of law on the first ground and that the respondent accepts there is not an adequate assessment of whether the appellant is a gay person. The respondent also points towards the expression of the standard of proof used by the judge at paragraph 36 of the judgment of not being “sure on the balance of probabilities” and the respondent accepts that it is not sufficiently clear for the reader of the judgement to understand how the judge came to the conclusion that evidence could have been manufactured. Further, says the respondent, the judge noted in paragraph 35 that the appellant was vulnerable and had some difficulty in giving evidence and that was not factored on the face of the judgment into the assessment of the evidence.
5. I heard submissions by Mr Winter on behalf of the appellant and those were to the effect that in light of the Home Office concessions that the appellant did not see the need to expand on the written submissions. I was assisted by the written submissions and I agree with Mr Winter that that was not necessary to expand on them.
6. I remind myself of my function and the need to respect the finding of the First-tier Tribunal where this case was heard by an experienced judge with extensive skills and experience in a specialist jurisdiction. I remind myself that my function is to consider any errors of law and whether any errors are material and not to concern myself with the preference of style or approach.
7. I am persuaded that there is an error of law and I find that the judge has slipped into error in the expression of the standard of proof and further that it is not sufficiently clear how the judge has approached the entirety of the evidence of the appellant being a gay man.
8. Finally, it is not sufficiently clear to both parties how the judge approached the vulnerability of the appellant in assessing the evidence. I pause there and mention that it is very clear to me that the judge did identify that the appellant was vulnerable and did take that into consideration in assessing how properly to run the hearing and handle the case in front of the court on the day.
9. I consider that having slipped into error, this is material because the parties are left in a position where they cannot sufficiently understand the judge’s determination on the face of it.
10. I have sympathy with the judge in having to strike a balance between providing a succinct judgment that is accessible to the reader whilst at the same time placing sufficient detail of their analysis into it and I find that the judge has simply missed that balance on this occasion.
11. I allow the appeal. I set the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. I retain no findings because the issue on which I have found an error goes to the heart of the case and it seems to me that it would improperly tie the hands of any Tribunal considering the case if I were to retain findings of fact.
12. I heard submissions on whether I should remit this case to the First-tier Tribunal or retain it in the Upper Tribunal. I am grateful to the Home Office for their submissions centred around the speed of disposal of this case and keep in mind the vulnerability of the appellant. The Home Office submitted that this matter might properly be kept in the Upper Tribunal because it might be that the case can be more swiftly listed in the Upper Tribunal. However, I take the view that the proper route would be remit this matter to the First-tier Tribunal and I keep in mind the appellant’s submissions that the location of the First-tier Tribunal will be of benefit to the vulnerable appellant. I chose to remit it to the First-tier Tribunal in accordance with the relevant guidance, primarily because of the extent of the fact-finding that is necessary to dispose of this appeal at rehearing.
13. The First-tier Tribunal will issue further directions in due course.
Notice of Decision
The determination of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law.
I allow the appeal.
I remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with no retained findings.

D Cotton

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
19 December 2025