The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003596

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66182/2023
LP/11402/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 29th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

MP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Considered on the papers

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, who is a national of Albania, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge M B Hussain (“the judge”) promulgated on 22 March 2025 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 8 December 2023 refusing her asylum claim.

2. As the respondent has accepted that the judge made a material error of law in his decision, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to determine this appeal on the papers.

Anonymity

3. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in respect of the appellant. There has been no application to set aside that order. While I recognise the strong factors in favour of open justice, in the present case I am satisfied that it is appropriate to continue the anonymity order given that the appellant seeks international protection.

The grounds of appeal

4. On 22 September 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge McWilliam granted the appellant permission to appeal on all three grounds, which I summarise below:

◦ Ground 1: In considering the appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim, the judge:

i. failed to consider the factors weighing in favour of the appellant;
ii. failed to carry out his own assessment, and instead merely endorsed the respondent’s reasoning; and
iii. applied the wrong threshold when determining the Article 8 claim.

◦ Ground 2: The judge failed to take into account the best interests of the appellant’s child.

◦ Ground 3: The judge made irrational findings in respect of the appellant’s credibility and took points against her that had not been put to her in cross-examination.

The respondent’s Rule 24 response

5. In a Rule 24 response dated 29 September 2025, the respondent concedes that the judge made material errors of law in his decision. In particular, the respondent accepts that the judge: (a) failed to consider the best interests of the appellant’s child; and (b) made a number of adverse credibility findings in respect of the appellant’s claim to have been trafficked to the United Kingdom for sexual exploitation, notwithstanding that the Competent Authority had already determined, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant had been trafficked.

Discussion

6. I am satisfied that the respondent’s concession was properly made and that the judge did err for the reasons described in the Rule 24 response. The appeal therefore succeeds on Grounds 2 and 3.

7. For completeness, I am also satisfied that Ground 1 is made out. The judge addressed the appellant’s Article 8 claim at [52] and [59]. At [52], he stated: “In so far as the appellant’s human rights claim is concerned, the respondent has dealt with that adequately.” As the appellant correctly submits, the judge was not conducting a judicial review of the respondent’s decision; he was required to undertake his own assessment of the Article 8 claim, weighing the competing interests of the parties. However, there is no indication that he carried out such an assessment at [59], where he stated:

“I am also required to consider whether the appellant's claim engages any rights protected under the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Human Rights Convention). I have examined whether the appellant's rights as enshrined in those Articles may be breached on her return. However, in the light of my findings above, I find that there are no substantial grounds for believing that that will be the case. I therefore find against the appellant on human rights grounds also.”

8. Furthermore, as the appellant submits, “substantial grounds” is not the correct test when assessing Article 8. The judge was required to undertake a balancing exercise and determine whether it would be proportionate to remove the appellant and her child to Albania.

Disposal

9. The general principle is that cases will be retained by the Upper Tribunal for remaking subject to the exceptions set out at paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal. The respondent’s position is that the appeal should be remitted to be heard de novo. I am satisfied that is the correct approach. The judge’s errors infect his reasoning in relation to both the asylum and protection claim, as well as the Article 8 claim, with the result that the necessary fact‑finding is likely to be extensive. I also take into account the appellant’s assertion that the judge took points against her that had not been put in cross‑examination, such that the hearing may also have been tainted by procedural unfairness.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors on a point of law.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside with no findings preserved.

The remaking of the decision in the appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Taylor House, to be remade afresh and heard by any judge other than Judge Hussain.



M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


27th January 2026