Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003602

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/57485/2024
LH/01760/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

13th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP

Between

GERMAN HERNANDEZ PINILLA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME OFFICE
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Unrepresented and not present in person
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of First-tier Judge Cotton dated 21 July 2025 on the basis that it contains an error of law. The judge dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim under Article 8 of the ECHR.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Colombia and has been in the UK since 19 October 2014 initially on a visit visa to 9 March 2015 and thereafter without leave. He has made a number of applications to the respondent and the First-tier Tribunal on various grounds, all of which have been refused and none of which are relevant to the current appeal.
3. The appellant current claim is that he enjoys a private life protected by Article 8 of the ECHR with his wife, a Colombian national with leave to remain in the UK who is undergoing medical treatment, including cancer, in the UK.
4. The respondent refused the appellant’s application to remain in the UK, on 17 May 2024, on the basis that whilst it was accepted the appellant had a genuine and subsisting relationship with a partner in the UK there was not sufficient evidence of insurmountable obstacles to family life with that partner continuing outside the UK within EX.2 to Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules nor were there exceptional circumstances which would render removal unjustifiably harsh in breach of Article 8 within Gen 3.2 of Appendix FM.
5. The judge dismissed the appeal on the papers on the basis that no evidence had been put before him on the availability of suitable medical care in Colombia nor any evidence that the appellant’s wife would not be able to travel and relocate with him and hence insurmountable obstacles to the continuation of family life outside the UK had not been established. In addition, in applying the proportionately test in the Article 8 analysis the maintenance of effective immigration control outweighed the appellant’s right to a family life and therefore his removal would not be unjustifiably harsh and would be proportionate.
6. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Judge Singer on 7 August 2025 on the following basis:
“1. The application, which is in-time, argues in the grounds that the Tribunal materially erred in law by (i) failing to properly consider the full impact of the medical evidence and the exceptional circumstances of the appellant’s wife, who is undergoing ongoing cancer treatment, awaiting surgery, and is dependent on the appellant as her sole carer, (ii) giving insufficient weight to medical letters from various professionals, including a psychologist, and overlooking the cumulative evidence of her serious condition and the absence of family support, (iii) failing to properly assess the disproportionate consequences of removal under Article 8 ECHR, and (iv) making an unreasonable finding that the appellant’s removal would not be unjustifiably harsh and was unsupported by the evidence.
2. It is arguable that the Judge did not make clear or adequate findings of fact regarding the impact of the Appellant’s removal on his wife in accordance with Beoku-Betts v SSHD [2008] UKHL 39, It is also arguable that the Judge did not make a clear finding as to whether or not it was reasonable to expect the Appellant’s wife to relocate to Colombia in accordance with Huang v SSHD [2007] UKHL 11: see TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1109 at [28].
3. All the grounds may be argued.”
Preliminary Matters
7. The appellant is a litigant in person and notified the Tribunal by email on 16 October 2025 that he would not be able to attend the hearing today due to his wife’s medical condition and asked that I exercise my power under Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to proceed with the hearing. Having had no observations from Mr Ojo, I have concluded that it was in the interests of justice to so proceed.
8. The consolidated bundle contains an updated witness statement of the appellant dated 7 May 2025 and a statement setting out the reasons for the appellant contesting the decision of the judge, which I have fully taken account of in my decision. The appellant sent medical information for this appeal set out on pages 20 to 35 of the consolidated bundle but having reviewed the evidence, all such information had previously been available to the judge and reference had been made to the relevant documentation in the decision. Mr Ojo confirmed my understanding.
9. Mr Ojo relied on his Rule 24 reply.
Analysis
10. The issue for me is to determine is whether the judge made an error of law in coming to his decision and if so whether the decision should be set aside in whole or in part. It is not my role to substitute my own view of the evidence before the judge.
11. The first ground of appeal was the failure by the judge to properly consider the full impact on the exceptional circumstances of the appellant’s wife medical situation and dependence on the appellant as her sole carer. The judge noted that evidence submitted in the case was “sparse”. In paragraphs 13 to 16 he goes through each piece of substantive medical evidence and concludes at paragraph 18 that whilst he accepts the veracity of the documents he places reduced weight on them in absence of explanation of what questions were asked of the medical professionals or what information about the appellant they were given in coming to their conclusions. There is nothing to suggest in the judge’s analysis that he did anything other to consider the evidence before him fairly and provides adequate reasons for his decision for not accepting the documents at their face value.
12. The second ground of appeal was the failure to give sufficient weight to medical letters and overlooking the impact on the appellant’s wife of the absence of family support. This substantially overlaps with the first and third ground and, in effect, amounts to a disagreement with the judge’s decision rather than identifying any error of law.
13. The third ground relates to the failure by the judge to properly assess the disproportionate consequences of removal under Article 8. In particular, whether the judge made a clear or adequate finding of fact on whether it was reasonable to expect the appellant's wife to relocate to Colombia or on the impact of the appellant’s removal on his wife.
14. The appellant in his latest witness statement re-iterated that his wife cannot travel or relocate due to her illness and there are no adequate medical facilities available in Colombia to meet her needs. The judge considers this issue at paragraph 19 and whilst noting the appellant’s view concludes that no third-party evidence has been presented to him which would discharge the burden of proof on the appellant that there were insurmountable obstacles to the parties continuing their family life together in Colombia.
15. Likewise, the judge has considered the evidence on the impact on the appellant's wife if he was not available as her carer. Aside from the appellant’s witness statement, the key evidence on this issue was a letter dated 6 February 2025 from Dr Maria Martinez, Consulting Psychologist at Talking Therapies Southwark and referred to in paragraph 16 which sets out the concerns of the appellant’s wife if the appellant was not available to support her in terms of shopping, cooking and travelling to medical appointments and the adverse impact on her mental and emotional well-being. Dr Martinez expresses the view that the appellant was “essential” in light of his wife’s mental health challenges for her “stability and daily functioning”. The judge put only “minimal weight” on the letter given it was unclear whether the psychologist had assessed the care needs of the spouse and whether the appellant’s daughter who lived in the UK would be available to assist in meeting her care needs beyond the statement “She has no other family or support network in the UK apart from her daughter, who is independent and does not live with them”. Similarly, the letter from Dr Perez dated 8 September 2023 which identified the importance of the appellant’s support in his wife’s recovery, was given little weight in absence of evidence about the expertise of the writer.
16. The judge was legitimately able to take the view he did on the absence of insurmountable obstacles based on the evidence presented and sets out clear and rational reasons for doing so.
17. The final ground is that the judge had irrationally found that the appellant’s removal would not be unjustifiably harsh and was unsupported by the evidence. Again, this ground is little more than a disagreement with the judge’s conclusions and has no merit. In paragraph 11 the judge clearly sets out the appropriate test for a successful Article 8 appeal and in paragraph 22 applies the appropriate proportionality test giving greater weight to the importance of effective immigration control when balanced against the appellant’s private and family life, taking into account the appellant’s precarious immigration status and lack of financial means.
Notice of Decision
18. For the reasons set out above, there were no errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and I decline to set the decision aside.
19. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

Mark Stamp

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 November 2025