Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003610

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62463/2024
LP/13202/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KUDHAIL

Between

WA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Alam, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Gordan-Lennox promulgated on 13 June 2025, in which the Appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim dated 25 April 2024 was dismissed.
Background
2. The Appellant is a national of Pakistan who claimed asylum on the basis that he is gay and thus at risk on return due to his sexuality as an openly gay man. Alternatively, he argued he is entitled to humanitarian protection.
3. The Respondent refused the application as the Appellant’s core account was not deemed credible. It was not accepted he is gay as claimed. Thus, the Appellant would not be at risk as a consequence of his sexuality.
First-tier Tribunal Decision
4. The Judge dismissed the appeal finding that the Appellant was not gay as claimed. In doing so the Judge made the following findings which were supportive of the Appellant’s claim:
a) The Appellant gave a detailed account of how he realised he was gay and how it felt to be gay knowing societal attitudes. This account was reasonable [§26]
b) The Appellant provided a consistent account of meeting U and how U informed his parents of their relationship, leading to the Appellant’s parents being told [§27];
c) The Appellant’s account of meeting UN in June 2024 and how their relationship developed was broadly consistent and plausible [§42–43]
5. The Judge made the following findings which were not supportive of the claim:
a) The Appellant was inconsistent about when he first met U stating in the first interview it was at the start of 2018 but also stating it was the middle 2018 [§29];
b) The Appellant failed to provide evidence of calls and WhatsApp messages with U [§30];
c) The Appellant provided a vague and inconsistent account of when his mother found out he was gay [§31];
d) The Appellant was inconsistent about why he did not return to Pakistan in May 2023[§32];
e) The Appellant was inconsistent about when he received the notice that he had been disowned [§33-34];
f) The Appellant did not provide the WhatsApp message from his father [§35];
g) The Appellant was inconsistent about the contents of the notice [§37];
h) The letter from the Appellant’s mother, was fabricated to bolster his claim as the contents was inconsistent with the stated aim [§38];
i) The email from U was fabricated due to several inconsistencies such as using email rather than WhatsApp, providing a screen shot as opposed to the email itself, details of who sent the email being vague, not including the senders details and the contents being inconsistent with other evidence of contact[§39];
j) The photos of the Appellant and U were not reliable as there was no evidence of the identity of U. This was easily obtainable at the point of refusal when the Respondent raised this [§40];
k) He was not satisfied U existed or that there was a relationship which led to his parents finding out [§41];
l) The Appellant and UN’s evidence about their trip to Bath was inconsistent as to who proposed to who [§42];
m) The pride photographs do not prove sexuality plus they all post date the refusal [§45];
n) The documentation provided by the Appellant was not reliable due to inconsistencies in his evidence [§47-47];
o) Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 behaviors in that the Appellant delayed making his asylum claim [ 53]
Permission to Appeal
6. Permission to appeal was granted on the following grounds:
a) Ground 4: The Judge failed to consider evidence before him with regards to the Appellant’s mother’s knowledge, this evidence discloses there is no vagueness or inconsistency [at §31];
b) Ground 5: The Judges finding the Appellant could have returned in May 2023 , failed to take into account evidence that his partner had warned the Appellant in May that he would have to tell his parents due to their insistence he marry [at §32];
c) Ground 6: The Judge failed to consider evidence before him with regards to the notice given the Appellant’s evidence in interview [§37] ;
d) Ground 7: The Judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the photographs with U given he accepted obtaining identity documents from U would be difficult given their breakup [§40];
e) Ground 8: In view of the Judge’s positive findings of the relationship with UN, the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the relationship [§46];
f) Ground 9: The Judge’s finding that the email was fabricated was inadequately reasoned and it was unfair as it was not put to the Appellant [§49];
g) Ground 10: the Judge failed to apply the Lucas direction at §52.
Discussion and Findings
7. The principal controversial issue in this appeal is whether the Appellant is gay as claimed. The Judge identified this was the sole issue before him. As identified above the Judge made some positive findings and some findings which ultimately dissuaded him. Grounds four-six can be considered together, as they relate to the claim that the Judge did not adequately consider the evidence before him. Mr Pugh submitted the Appellant had been selective in the grounds by only producing evidence from the substantive interviews which supported the claim. He drew my attention to other aspects of the interview which he submitted provided proper context for the Judges findings which were well reasoned. With respect to ground 4, I am satisfied the Appellant was not vague or inconsistent about when his mother found out. The Appellant repeatedly states his mother had some insight that he was gay but that prior to entering a relationship with U, the Appellant told her, as she was the only person he could confide in[Q35-71]. I am satisfied this is an error of law, as the judge failed to consider the entirety of the evidence before him.
8. Turning to Ground five, Mr Pugh submitted that the Judge placed reliance on oral evidence as well as the interviews in finding inconsistencies about the Appellant claim’s he could not return to Pakistan in May 2023 as he was fearful of his parents. Mr Pugh submitted the natural reading of the evidence is that the fear arose when the parents found out in August 2023. Mr Alam argued the evidence before the Judge was clear that U had informed the Appellant that he would tell his parents as they were pressuring him to get married. At paragraph 32, the Judge records the Appellant’s evidence that his father may become aware as U had informed him he “would be telling his parents”. Further that the Appellant became aware that his parents were told in August 2023. The Judge records that the Appellant confirmed when asked to clarify, that his fear arose when his parents were told. This is an inconsistency and the Judge was entitled to find it was so. There is no error of law in this regard.
9. Ground six, relates to the notice issued by the Appellant’s father disowning him. The Judge finds inconsistency as the notice cites disobedience rather than sexuality, yet in interview the Appellant stated his father demonstrated his legal identity in court. Mr Alam submitted there is aa mistake of fact. Mr Pugh accepted there was tension with the notice and what is said elsewhere about sexuality. He submitted the Appellant had stated his sexuality was widely known and also said his father did not refer to it specifically within the notice but referred to it as disobedience. The Judge he submitted was entitled to attach weight to this. At Question 39 [SAI], the Appellant states his father had to produce evidence of his (the father’s) legal identity to the court to get the notice. This is logical. I am satisfied that the Judge mistook identity to mean sexual identity. I am also satisfied that in a country where there is open homophobia, it is unsurprising the father would not seek to openly expose himself and his family to the perceived shame. I am satisfied the Judge mistakenly referred to legal identity as sexuality identity and did not consider country context. This I find, is a mistake of fact on a material matter.
10. I am satisfied the Judge erred in law in grounds 4 and 6, as he failed to take into account facts and evidence on material matters.
11. With regards to Ground seven, it was submitted by Mr Alam that the Judge gave inconsistent findings and failed to properly consider the evidence before him with respect to acquiring identity evidence from U and the photographs. Mr Alam pointed to the email evidence which stated the relationship was over, not to contact him and that U now had a new number. The Judge recognised the Appellant would struggle to get such evidence in view of the circumstances of the breakup yet found its absence damaging as the Appellant could have obtained it before they broke up. Mr Alam submitted these findings were inconsistent. Mr Pugh submitted that the proper reading of the Judge’s findings disclose he took issue with the period of inactivity from the point of refusal in April 2023 to when the Appellant received the email from his former partner in May 2023. He submitted the Judge was entitled to find that the lack of identification was damaging as the Appellant could have obtained this during this period. Mr Pugh submitted it was noticeable that the Appellant’s LGBTI activity increased post refusal this he submitted was indicative that the Appellant was not genuinely gay.
12. The evidence before the Judge is that the relationship broke down on 22 May 2024. He refers to the respondent’s refusal decision as being a reason the Appellant should have obtained the identity documents The refusal decision simply states the photographs show two men, one of which is accepted as being the Appellant. The decision does not refer to the absence of identity documents. Thus, I am satisfied the Appellant was not on notice that this was an issue and thus required. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the Judge to put this to the appellant at the hearing to ensure fairness. As it was not, I find there is an error of law.
13. Ground eight raises that the Judge failed to give sufficient or adequate reasons for finding the relationship with UN was not genuine. As set out at paragraph 4 (c), the Judge accepted aspects of their evidence such as how, where and when they met. The judge accepts they were broadly consistent. He did not however accept their account of how the relationship became formal as he did not accept they would not know who proposed to who. In this regard they gave an inconsistent account. Mr Alam submitted given the positive findings it was unclear why the Judge placed significant weight on this one aspect of the evidence of the couple., whilst finding they were broadly consistent. Mr Pugh accepted there was some confusion about marriage proposal or formalising the relationship. However, he argued this was a peripheral matter. He submitted the Judge gave adequate reasons as he expressed they should know who proposed to who.
14. I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953 at para [36]. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC). Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…”
15. Having carefully considered the evidence before the Judge I am satisfied the Judge has not set out reasons why this inconsistency displaces the other evidence which he found credible. This relationship is central to the core issue, as if it accepted then the Appellant is plainly gay. This I am satisfied is a material error in law.
16. The Upper Tribunal interferes only with caution in the findings of fact by a First-tier Tribunal which has heard and seen the parties give their evidence and made proper findings of fact. This has been stated numerously by the higher courts, for example recently in Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464. When I stand back and assess the overall decision, the concerns I have outlined above lead me to the conclusion that the Judge’s fact-finding approach cannot be reconciled with the applicable standard of proof to assess whether the factual claims which underpin the protection claim were credible to the balance of probabilities. I am satisfied that the overall fact-finding process was vitiated by legal error such that it is appropriate to set the decision aside.
17. It is unnecessary to consider ground nine and ten because I have already concluded that the decision involved material errors of law and that the decision falls to be set aside.
Disposal
18. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President's Practice Statement. Given that an entirely new fact-finding process is necessary, I am satisfied that the appropriate venue for a de novo hearing is the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is necessary to set aside the decision.
The decision to allow the appeal is therefore confirmed, I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

S K KUDHAIL

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 December 2025