Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003617

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/54487/2024
LH/00303/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE IQBAL

Between

Adeshiji Adefemi Francis Haastrup
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Broachwalla, Counsel instructed by Sunrise Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant is the Secretary of State for the Home Department but in order to maintain consistency with the decision of the First-tier Tribunal I shall refer to the parties as they were in that hearing thus the Secretary of State is once again the “respondent” and Mr Haastrup is “the appellant”.
2. The appellant is a Nigerian national who appealed against the respondent’s decision of 15 April 2024 refusing his application for leave to remain on 30 August 2022. He relied on his private and family life with his partner in the United Kingdom and his medical conditions, namely that he had been diagnosed with Parkinson’s. His human rights appeal was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”) in a decision dated 3 July 2025 following a hearing on 24 March 2025. Permission to appeal was sought by the respondent and granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Jackson in a decision dated 19 September 2025.
The First-tier Tribunal’s Decision
3. The judge’s decision at [8] the judge outlined the agreed issues which included whether:
(i) the appellant’s removal produced a real risk of harm contrary to Article 3 on the basis of a serious deterioration in the appellant’s physical health;
(ii) whether EX.1 applied with reference to insurmountable obstacles on return to Nigeria; and
(iii) whether the appellant’s removal was likely to create a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights under the ECHR on the basis of there being very significant obstacles to integration contrary to paragraph 276ADE(i)(vi)/Appendix PL 5.1 of the Immigration Rules.
4. At [9] – [14], the judge recorded the basis of the appellant’s case based both on medical grounds under Article 3 and Article 8 grounds. At [15] the judge noted the respondent accepted the medical evidence confirmed the appellant’s medical diagnosis of Parkinson’s.
5. At [28] the judge recorded the appellant’s noting his arrival in the UK on a visit visa in 2007, the breakdown of his previous marriage and that he had an elder sister who is 78 years old caring for her 91 year old husband with health issues. At [29] the judge noted the appellant’s partner was settled in the UK, employed full-time as an NHS practice nurse, with her own challenges and caring responsibilities for her elderly father aged 98 years old. The judge further recorded she was of mixed race, Nigerian by origin and had experienced serious difficulties there, including the kidnapping of her sister and an attack on her mother. She had last travelled to Nigeria in 2019 and paid for private security and stated she would not risk returning.
6. The judge recorded that as a nurse with medical knowledge, her evidence was that “whilst there may be private hospitals in Nigeria who could provide treatment for the Appellant it would not be accessible to the Appellant and treatment would be very expensive.” The judge noted that Parkinson’s decease was degenerative and the appellant’s mobility was unstable and he was prone to falling. When asked if she could assist the appellant financially to access medical treatment, the judge recorded, “her evidence given as a medical professional was at [sic] the costs would be huge and that none of them have that level of money. She said the costs would be tripled. She stated that all she knows about how things are in Nigeria at the moment, everything is expensive, including fuel, transportation. This includes medical costs. The last time she was in Nigeria was in 2019.”
7. At [30] the judge recorded that the appellant’s Parkinson’s disease was of moderate severity worsened by under stress. He had not lived in Nigeria for many years and that he experienced tremors on the left side, had mobility problems which required assistance with daily tasks. At 60 years old, his ability to secure work and accommodation was unlikely. The judge noted that none of these issues were materially disputed by the respondent and the medical evidence demonstrated he was taking medication and under the care of the physiotherapy team.
8. At [31] the judge went on to consider whether there were insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in Nigeria, noting the appellant’s partner was settled in the UK at full-time work as a practice nurse with caring responsibilities for her 90 year old father. She had experienced problems in Nigeria due to being mixed race and was not prepared to return to Nigeria. The judge noted reference to the FCDO advice in relation to prevalent terrorist attacks in Nigeria and that someone such as herself would face, as mixed race would be a target. Her evidence recorded by the judge was that she would be unable to support herself, her elderly father in the UK and to pay for the appellant’s support in Nigeria, including accommodation and costs of medical treatment given her modest salary.
9. At [32] the judge concluded that it was likely that even a short period of time, whether pending an entry clearance from Nigeria or the appellant on his own in Nigeria, would present insurmountable obstacles or very significant difficulties that would also adversely impact his health due to stress and lack of accessibility to treatment due to costs.
10. At [33] the judge concluded the appellant was “a seriously ill person” and he was prone to falls and could not manage daily living tasks unassisted.
11. At [34] – [37] the judge considered the availability of required treatment noting the respondent’s position based on the MedCOI information that neurological services were available in Nigeria for treatment of Parkinson’s disease, together with the Stalevo prescribed to the appellant and as his condition was not life threatening, nor was he unable to travel.
12. The judge considered THTN [2023] EWCA Civ 1222 and Savran v Denmark [2022] Imm LR 3 and at [37] the judge found:
“the Appellant’s partner’s evidence to be authoritative in relation to availability and likely costs of medical treatment in Nigeria because she is herself a medical professional. She last travelled to Nigeria in 2019 and she has family remaining there. I accept that medical treatment is not free and I accept that due to her own responsibilities and commitments in the UK including work and care of her elderly father, that she would neither be able to go to Nigeria with the Appellant (which in any event would not be safe for her as a person of mixed-race) nor to support him financially to the extent necessary to pay for the medical treatment he requires and all other support costs including accommodation and living expenses.”
13. At [38] – [39] the judge considered “accessibility of the required treatment”. The judge noted the appellant suffered from uncontrollable tremors due to Parkinson’s and even if the treatment were available it would not be accessible on a practical level due to mobility problems, further that affordability would likely be a problem as the appellant would be unable to work due to Parkinson’s disease and no accommodation was available to him. Therefore the inability to receive treatment promptly would likely have an adverse impact on his health. At [39] the judge considering affordability and concluded the appellant was unable to work, had no accommodation in Nigeria where he had not lived there for seventeen years. His partner could not return with him given her circumstances in the United Kingdom and he could not live with his elderly sister and husband who had dementia and did not have any friends or family with whom he could stay in Nigeria.
14. At [40] – [41] the judge considered “serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her state of health resulting in intense suffering or significant reduction in life expectancy” and noted:
“Without the level of care he is currently receiving together with adequate medical treatment his life expectancy would be reduced. His medical condition is of moderate severity and without treatment this health would decline irreversibly. Even the stress of having to travel alone and live alone in Nigeria, a country he has not lived in for 17 years, would adversely affect his physical health and his mobility which is already poor.”
15. The judge found the appellant’s oral evidence was detailed, consistent and consistent internally with documentary evidence, including medical evidence, which was undisputed. Both the appellant and his partner were found credible witnesses, with his partner demonstrating knowledge and understanding of the cost of private treatment in Nigeria and awareness of the appellant’s condition, which was already of moderate severity. Against this background, the judge concluded at [42] that having been away from Nigeria for 17 years and with no family support beyond an elder sister who would be unable to accommodate him, the appellant would lack accommodation and financial support, be unable to work remain vulnerable. At [43] the judge noted that:
“The Appellant only has to provide evidence capable of demonstrating lack of accessibility to the treatment the Appellant requires to keep him alive. It is then for the Respondent to dispel any ‘serious doubts’ raised by the Appellant’s evidence. The Appellant has therefore established a prima facie case and the Respondent has not dispelled ‘serious doubts.’ The Respondent refers to the CPIN but this information does not cover accessibility issues if the Appellant is unable to effectively access or afford the treatment he requires.”
16. At [44] the judge noted that the appellant’s evidence and that of his partner was consistent with background evidence and was credible in relation to affordability and accessibility of treatment in Nigeria, much of which was unchallenged by the respondent, who relied on the COI.
17. At [45] the judge concluded there was a real risk that the appellant would be “exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy”. In the alternative, the judge at [46] – [47] found on the same factual matrix that EX.1 was met. Accordingly the appeal was allowed.
Grounds of Appeal
18. There were essentially two grounds of appeal. First, it was argued that the judge had materially erred in law by allowing the appellant’s appeal on Article 3 grounds without adhering to the correct threshold outlined by the Supreme Court in AM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2020 UKSC 17. Second, it was argued that the material error of law in ground 1 was carried over and infected findings at [46] and [47] which allowed the appellant’s appeal in the alternative under Article 8 of the ECHR.
Error of law hearing
19. There was a composite bundle before me of 233 pages and the appellant confirmed there was no Rule 24 response.
20. For the sake of completeness at the hearing, the appellant’s representative raised the fact that in the first instance permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal on both grounds and that the respondent in renewing an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal had added two further grounds; first, failing to resolve reasons for the appellant’s health deteriorating with no reference to medical evidence to support findings in relation to decline in health and second, considering the partner’s evidence as ‘authoritative’ on medical treatment in Nigeria
21. It was accepted that these ‘new’ grounds did not advance the arguments previously raised but were in substance, an extension of ground 1 concerning Article 3 of the ECHR. Both parties agreed therefore that this did not present a material difficulty and that the issues for determination were confined to two questions: first whether the judge had materially erred in her findings on Article 3 of the ECHR; and secondly, whether that error infected the Article 8 assessment.
22. Permission was refused by the First-tier Tribunal but granted by the Upper Tribunal which considered it arguable that the First-tier erred in law in its approach to Article 3 “in particular arguable that it erred in law as in treating as ‘authoritative’ the Appellant’s partner’s evidence on availability and cost treatment based on her role as a nurse in the UK.” It was further considered arguable that there was an absence of adequate reasoning as to the adverse impact of any ability to obtain treatment promptly, as well as the lack of reasons for the conclusion that there would be a reduction of life expectancy.
23. Mr Ojo made a number of submissions expanding on the grounds before me highlighting that the judge had materially erred at [43] where she highlighted that the appellant need only provide evidence capable of demonstrating lack of accessibility to treatment required to keep him alive. He pointed to the appeal skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal and submitted that in relation to Article 3, it was silent on whether it was being argued that the appellant would be exposed to serious, rapid and irreversible decline and that the medical evidence presented did not support such a finding. He relied on AAW (expert evidence - weight) Somalia [2015] UKUT 673 (IAC) and further submitted that the judge at [37] in concluding the appellant’s partner’s evidence was “authoritative”, appeared to have elevated her evidence to that of an expert witness and this amounted to an error of law.
24. He further submitted that there was no background evidence as to the cost of treatment in Nigeria and that the appellant’s partner had highlighted that she worked two days a week and when she worked friends would help with the appellant. There was no reason why likewise a similar arrangement could not continue in Nigeria with the help of friends and sister in Nigeria. With reference to the evidence considered by the judge as determinative, in considering Parveen v The Secretary State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932 [19] more than bare assertions were required. In considering Article 8 he submitted referring to AA (Morocco) [2025] EWCA Civ 144 he submitted consideration of Article 8 of the ECHR required something more when looking at the same facts on which Article 3 was decided however, this was not something that was evident from the judge’s findings.
25. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Broachwalla submitted that the respondent’s challenge was simply an attempt to reargue the respondent’s case as they were not happy with the judge’s findings. At [41] and [44], the judge accepted the appellant and his partner had given credible evidence and accepted accordingly what would happen to the appellant on return. The respondent had also sought to go beyond the remit of the grounds in submitting the appellant could seek the assistance of friends and his sister in Nigeria, He further submitted that the respondent simply referred to one paragraph of the CPIN with reference to the availability of medical treatment available for the appellant on return, which was insufficient. He submitted the judge at [44] found the appellant’s evidence and that of his partner to be consistent with background evidence provided. He noted that there was no need for documentary evidence to support their evidence and this was consistent with Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35 at [31] where Lady Hale concluded that:
“if the judiciary in this country regularly found themselves in this state of mind, our civil and family justice systems would rapidly grind to a halt. In this country we do not require documentary proof. We rely heavily on oral evidence, especially from those who were present when the alleged events took place. … are guided by many things, including the inherent probabilities, any contemporaneous documentation or records, any circumstantial evidence tending to support one account rather than the other, and their overall impression of the characters and motivations of the witnesses. …”
26. He further submitted that ground 1 was a rationality ground and that the judge had properly considered the relevant test against the evidence and appellant’s circumstances. The judge at [36] had further considered relevant case of THTN v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1222 and relevant guidance as drawn from Paposhvili. Further, when considering the evidence of his partner as authoritative, it was clear that the judge found the evidence “weighty” and the use of the word authoritative was simply the judge’s way of expressing the nature of the evidence. Further with reference to ground 2, judge had fully considered at [47] the appellant’s circumstances in the alternative, therefore it was wrong for the respondent to state that the findings of Article 3 infected those of Article 8.
27. I sought to clarify the appellant’s position with reference to [44] and the evidence the judge had considered when reaching the finding that she found the appellant’s evidence and that of his partner to be consistent with the background evidence specifically as the judge commented that it was credible in relation to affordability and accessibility of treatment in Nigeria. Mr Broachwalla submitted that the background evidence before the judge related to the FCDO position on travel to Nigeria and terrorist activity. I specifically asked whether there was any evidence on the medical circumstances of the appellant however I was not pointed to anything.
28. I also clarified whether it was fair to observe that the appeal skeleton argument was focused on the appellant’s Article 8 circumstances. Mr Broachwalla agreed however submitted that as the Tribunal system was one that was inquisitorial then the case pursued was dependent on the evidence that was heard by the judge and the Article 3 had accordingly emerged at the hearing. Mr Ojo was able to respond to the issues raised and I then reserved my decision, which I now give with full reasons.
Analysis and Conclusion
29. I have considered that the judge correctly identified the correct test in relation to Article 3 medical cases confirmed by the Supreme Court in AM (Zimbabwe) which approved the test set out in Paposhvilli v Belgium (application no. 41738/10) [2017] Immigration Rules A.R 867. There is no challenge to the judge’s finding at [33] that the appellant, who is suffering with Parkinson’s disease, of moderate severity, is someone who is to be considered “a seriously ill person”. I specifically clarified this with Mr Ojo who took no issue with this point. The appellant must of course establish a prima facie case with evidence capable of demonstrating substantial grounds were shown for believing that the appellant would face a real risk of either:
(a) an absence of appropriate treatment in a receiving country, or
(b) the inability to access appropriate treatment.
30. I find that whilst the judge has properly cited the correct test she has failed to properly apply it. The judge’s reasoning focused on the availability and cost of treatment in Nigeria, placing weight on the evidence of the appellant’s partner, described as ‘authoritative’ because of her status as a nurse in the United Kingdom [37]. That approach was flawed and the judge should have distinguished between weighty lay evidence and expert opinion where the issue concerned medical infrastructure and cost in a foreign jurisdiction. The partner’s evidence was lay testimony and did not amount to expert evidence on the cost or accessibility of treatment for Parkinsons disease in Nigeria. There was no corroborative material before the Tribunal to substantiate her assertions, therefore elevating her evidence in these circumstances to authoritative status was an error of law.

31. Further, the conclusion that the treatment would be inaccessible due to affordability at [38] – [39] was unsupported by background evidence. There was no documentary or country material which was cited to establish the actual cost of medication or care in Nigeria, neither was I taken to any that may have appeared in the hearing bundle. Further there was no analysis of whether financial support could be provided by the appellant’s partner who was said to meet the financial threshold for an entry clearance application.

32. Similarly the judge’s findings at [40]-[41] that the appellant’s life expectancy would be reduced without treatment was similarly unsubstantiated. The only medical evidence comprised two letters confirming a diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease of moderate severity and stability on medication. This as per the letter from Dr Weeks of 21 November 2023 in which he found the appellant “had Parkinson’s disease for seven years. He is taking Stalevo … he is reasonable, stable”.

33. A further letter of 13 June 2024, in which he outlined the appellant’s medication and repeated the diagnosis of the appellant’s disease to be of moderate severity noting that “given Parkinson’s disease is a chronic progressive neurological condition his severity is likely to be at least the same or slightly worse.” There was no evidence of imminent or rapid deterioration, nor of a significant reduction in life expectancy absent treatment. The evidence does not meet the high threshold required under Article 3.
34. In these circumstances the judge has materially erred in law by misapplying the Article 3 threshold as clarified in AM (Zimbabwe). While the judge correctly cited the relevant test, the reasoning failed to demonstrate substantial grounds for believing that the appellant faced a real risk of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy. The findings at [37] were based on speculative assertions without reference to any objective evidence.
35. As to Article 8, the judge’s findings at [46] and [47] were expressly based on the “same factual matrix” as the assessment under Article 3. Given the error in relation to Article 3, those finding cannot safely stand. The proportionality analysis under Article 8 was not conducted independently of the flawed reasoning on medical risk and accessibility of treatment.
36. For these reasons set out above the First-tier Tribunal’s decision will be set aside for material error of law.
37. In relation to disposal of the appeal I did not hear submissions from the parties. Bearing in mind the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements and the guidance in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 (see also MM (Unfairness; ER) Sudan [2014] UKUT 00105 (IAC) and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC)), I find given the nature and extent of the findings required against the appellant’s medical prognosis, cost and accessibility of treatment in Nigeria and proportionality under Article 8 that the appeal ought to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before a judge other than the original judge
38. The finding at [33] as accepted by the respondent, that the appellant suffers with Parkinson’s disease, of moderate severity and is to be considered “a seriously ill person”, is preserved.
Notice of Decision
39. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 3 July 2025 is set aside for a material error of law.
40. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo rehearing taking into account the preserved finding above, before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Hosie.

Signed

S Iqbal

Deputy Judge Iqbal of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber Date 29th December 2025