Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003626

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51453/2024
LP/02488/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

Between

JOYTI PRADYUMNA SHAH
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Anzani, Counsel, instructed by Nag Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrel, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant appeals with permission a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing her human rights (article 8 ECHR) appeal.
2. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Bunting (“the Judge”) was sent to the parties on 19 June 2025.
Relevant Facts
3. The appellant is a citizen of India and is presently aged 76. She is a widow. Her son and daughter are naturalised British citizens and reside in this country. The appellant has visited the United Kingdom on several occasions, having previously been granted visitor visas from 2006 onwards. Her latest visitor visa was issued on 6 December 2019 and expires on 27 March 2030. She entered the United Kingdom on 11 May 2022 and has remained here to date.
4. On 20 October 2022 the appellant applied for leave to remain on human rights grounds. In her application she relied upon article 8 private life rights in respect of her health:
“I am 73 years old retired school teacher. My husband, Mr Pradyumna Navnitlal Shah, passed away. My son, Mr. Shalin Pradyuman Shah and daughter, Mrs. Rutu Manish Shah, both have settled in the UK and made this their permanent home. I am currently staying with my son and my daughter in law, Mrs. Shraddha Shah. I have been visiting UK every year since last 15 years. I don't have anyone to stay with in India. Over last few years my health is deteriorating seriously. Travelling is becoming impossible. I need constant support and care for my everyday routine. I have serious difficulty in standing up and sitting down. I have severe osteoarthritis and unable to walk without support. I get pain in my knees and hand joints which stops me doing usual activities. My biggest worry is fainting while standing. In past 6 months, I fainted twice and once hurt back of my head seriously. I am diabetic and need special diet. I need lot of care and support for this diet control.”
5. The respondent refused the application by a decision dated 8 January 2024.
6. As the appellant’s case has progressed over time Ms Anzani accepted that its basis has moved from reliance upon her private life rights to family life rights protected under article 8 ECHR, as incorporated domestically by the Human Rights Act 1998.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
7. The appeal was heard by the Judge sitting at Taylor House on 16 June 2025. The appellant attended the hearing with her son, Shalin Pradyuman Shah, and her daughter, Rutu Manish Shah. All three gave evidence and the Judge found them to be credible witnesses. The appellant also relied upon a medical report prepared by Dr Anand J Mehta FRCP, Consultant Physician, dated 20 June 2024 and an independent social worker report, dated 27 June 2024.
8. The Judge noted at [41] of his decision that though the appellant had sought medical help whilst present in this country her medication continues to be provided by a pharmacy in India and is couriered to this country. Ms Anzani informed me that this step is undertaken to ensure that the appellant is not a burden on the National Health Service.
9. It was observed at [42] of the decision that though able to wash and bathe herself to some extent, the appellant’s family provide an important role in these tasks. The Judge noted the appellant’s evidence that she has arthritis which makes dressing difficult.
10. The Judge concluded that the appellant’s health concerns have stabilised, at [43]:
11. At [46], the Judge directed himself as to the test that he was to apply and observed that it is not whether the appellant’s situation in life would be better if she lived with her family in the United Kingdom, it was as to how she would fare if returned to India. He observed that this was a “real world” assessment and the adoption of such approach was not criticised by Ms Anzani.
12. The son was considered by the Judge to be a “high earner” who continues to provide for his mother without any difficulty, at [46], and would continue to provide financially if his mother were to be returned to India, at [47].
13. Relevant to my analysis below are the following paragraphs of the Judge’s decision:
“50. I accept that the appellant benefits from the family support, but I consider that the appellant’s family have underestimated the difficultly in obtaining similar care (on a paid basis) in India.
51. There does not appear to be a reason why paid care could not be ‘bought in’ in India, which would ensure someone went to the appellant’s address on a daily basis if needed. Her son states that he is concerned there is not an equivalent of DBS checks in India, although there is no evidence put forward in support of this.
52. This care would not need to be from a medical professional (such as a qualified nurse), although such care would be affordable and may provide extra reassurance for the family.”
14. The Judge reasoned, inter alia, that the provision of such care would ensure the appellant would be able to leave her home on a daily basis if required, at [53]. Additionally, the Judge found that the family had not explored the possibility of the appellant moving home to accommodation without stairs or to some form of supported accommodation where her needs could clearly be met, at [54].
15. On the balance of probabilities, the Judge found that the appellant does require some assistance to take her medication daily, to wash, to dress, and to cook, at [57]. However, the appellant’s identified care needs were found not to be “at a high level” and consequently the Judge concluded that on the evidence provided, he could not find that the care required unavailable in India and it was not suggested by the family that such care provision would be unaffordable, at [58].
16. As to article 8, the Judge found that the appellant had a family life with her son and daughter in the United Kingdom and had developed a private life, at [64]. However, he gave reasons as to why the appellant could not succeed under paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules, observing that the appellant had lived almost her entire life in India where she was integrated, did not suffer from a language barrier, and could receive support from her son so that she would have no need to be concerned by any financial aspect of living there. The Judge was satisfied that on the evidence provided to him, if the appellant returned to India an appropriate care package could be put in place to ensure that her care needs could be safely met, at [69]-[75].
17. The Judge considered section 117B of the Nationality and Immigration Act 2002 and undertook a balancing exercise at [85] and [86]:
“85. I consider that on the appellant’s side is the following:
(a) The appellant has now been in the United Kingdom (on this occasion) for three years. She has a good immigration history in the sense that she has come here on a number of occasions and left when required.
(b) The appellant can, and would be, more than adequately supported in the United Kingdom without recourse to public funds.
(c) She has a strong relationship with her children and grandchildren, who are all British citizens. This would be disrupted if she was required to leave.
(d) She has a number of medical issues and care needs, which her family help her with.
86. Against that, there is the following:
(a) There is a strong public interest in maintaining confidence in the immigration system.
(b) The appellant cannot meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules as she is currently in the United Kingdom.
(c) It has not been shown that the appellant cannot receive adequate care in her home country.”
18. The Judge concluded that there was not anything in the appellant’s case that overcame the public interest in immigration control, at [87]-[90].
Grounds of Appeal
19. The grounds of appeal were succinctly and carefully drafted by Ms Anzani, who represented the appellant before the First-tier Tribunal.
20. Two grounds are advanced:
(i) The Judge failed to make findings on material issues.
(ii) The Judge undertook a flawed assessment of article 8 ECHR.
21. Upper Tribunal Judge Kamara granted permission to appeal on both grounds by a decision sent to the parties on 22 September 2025.
Analysis
22. Ms Anzani helpfully indicated at the outset of the hearing her acceptance that there was greater force in ground one and that would be where she would concentrate her submissions.
23. She confirmed that she was not withdrawing ground two, but in discussion accepted that if the appellant could not succeed in respect of family life and her health condition, there was an uphill difficulty in establishing that the Judge had erred in his consideration of article 8 outside of the Rules.
Ground One
24. Ms Anzani’s observed at [57] of the decision the Judge’s acceptance, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant requires assistance with daily tasks, including her taking medication, and with washing, dressing and cooking. However, at [58], the Judge concluded that the appellant’s care needs were not at this stage at a high level and, additionally, the required care was available in India. Ms Anzani contended that the Judge failed to engage with the personal and intimate nature of the care that the appellant requires. This assistance requires intimate body contact. Ms Anzani observed that the appellant and both of her children consider that due to cultural norms such care “must” be provided by a gender specific family member. I was referred to the Judge’s finding that the appellant does not have any familial network in India, with the centre of gravity of her life having relocated to the United Kingdom and her son’s home, at [66].
25. The core of the appellant’s case in this appeal is that having accepted the appellant’s need for personal care, the Judge materially erred in law by failing to make findings as to the specific nature of the intimate care required and whether it would be reasonably proportionate to expect the appellant to receive such intimate assistance from strangers in India. It is said that the Judge’s reasoning at [58] was limited solely to the availability and affordability of care in India, without addressing whether such care would be culturally appropriate or practically accessible in the appellant’s circumstances.
26. I am not with the appellant in respect of this contention. The Judge’s decision must properly be considered in the round. Before the First-tier Tribunal, Ms Anzani placed front and centre at [20] and [28] of her carefully written appellant’s skeleton argument that reliance was being placed upon the provision of care that was of an intimate nature.
27. It is not asserted by the appellant that the Judge had not read the papers, including the appellant’s skeleton argument. In a carefully detailed decision, the Judge considered various elements of the evidence presented before him. He was aware that the narrow issue as to intimate care was the primary limb of the appeal before him, provided by the appellant’s daughter-in-law and in her absence, the appellant’s daughter.
28. I agree with Mr Terrell that two paragraphs of the decision relevant to my consideration are:
“43. The medical evidence is from June 2024, so there has been nothing for the last year. At that point it was confirmed that her condition has stabilised, and no further action was taken other than to keep up with her medication (and some exercises) and have check ups.
44. From the oral evidence the appellant’s condition has continued to be stable since then.”
29. The Judge had before him medical evidence but was also aware from oral evidence before him that the appellant’s condition was stable. He made a finding at [50] that is unchallenged before me; whilst the appellant benefits from the support of her family, her family have “underestimated” the difficulty in obtaining similar care on a paid basis in India. As found at [51] no cogent reasons were provided on behalf of the appellant as to why she could not receive the support of paid care.
30. Importantly, the Judge concludes at [52] that the care provided would not need to be from a medical professional, such as a qualified nurse, but that such care from a medical professional would be affordable and “may provide extra reassurance for the family”. The Judge therefore considered that care could practicably be available to the appellant being from a qualified nurse. The evidence before the Judge, by means of the witness statements of the son, daughter and daughter-in-law, as well as the oral evidence was that the appellant’s care needs were in essence concerned with her dressing and undressing, her bathing, and her cooking. Such care needs had stabilised. It is undoubtedly a reasonable inference from [50]-[52] of the decision that the Judge’s reference to a qualified nurse was in relation to intimate care as well as the taking of medication because it would provide “extra reassurance” for the family in respect of their expressed primary concern, which had been put from and centre in the appellant’s skeleton argument. When considering the careful and detailed decision in the round, it cannot reasonably be concluded that the Judge had failed to grapple with the core contention of the appellant’s case before him. I accept Mr Terrell’s submission that the references to the potential of affordable care from a medical professional such as a qualified nurse was an express consideration of the intimate care concern advanced by the appellant.
31. I am satisfied that this is the case because at [57] of the decision the Judge expressly found on the balance of probabilities “that the appellant does require some assistance to take her medication on a daily basis, wash and dress, and cook”. This paragraph establishes with clarity that the Judge was fully aware of the appellant’s concerns as to washing and dressing. I therefore find that the conclusion at [58] that the care needs are not at this stage at a high level, that care is available in India, and that such care is affordable to the family was one reasonably and lawfully open to the Judge.
32. Accordingly, ground one is properly to be dismissed.
Ground two
33. At [64] of his decision the Judge accepted that the appellant enjoys family life in the United Kingdom with her children and grandchildren. Ms Anzani accepts that the Judge referred to section 117B in his decision.
34. A foundation to the appellant’s complaint is [82]:
“82. However, her immigration position has always been ‘precarious’ for the purposes of s117B(5). In those circumstances, I must place little weight on her private life. That does not mean that I give no weight, just that the weight is limited.”
35. Ms Anzani accepted that section 117B(5) mandates that little weight be given to private life established while a person’s immigration status is precarious. The appellant’s position is that the Judge failed to make clear what weight, if any, was given to the appellant’s family life when conducting the overall balancing exercise. Ms Anzani contended that the decision accordingly lacked sufficient reasoning to demonstrate that the appellant’s family life was properly weighed against the public interest in immigration control.
36. I conclude that ground two identifies no material error of law. The Judge properly noted that the core of the appellant’s family life claim, as advanced before him, was founded upon her medical and care needs, which he had decided upon. These factors were expressly considered in the proportionality assessment, at [84], which was undertaken by means of the balance sheet approach, at [85]-[86].
37. The appellant does not contend that matters were placed on the wrong side of the balance sheet. Rather, this ground is advanced in simple terms: a failure to clearly identify what weight was given to the appellant’s family life.
38. The Judge expressly placed on the appellant’s side of the ledger the appellant’s “strong relationship” with her children and grandchildren, and that this relationship would be disrupted if she were required to leave. I am satisfied that the Judge did identify the substance of the existing family life through the “strong relationship” but gave cogent and lawful reasons as to why the appellant’s existing family life was not sufficient to outweigh the public interest in the proportionality assessment.
39. For these reasons ground 2 is to be dismissed.
Notice of Decision
40. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 19 June 2025 does not contain a material error of law.
41. The appeal is dismissed.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 November 2025