Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003632

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68893/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE S RASTOGI
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE T BIBI

Between

MZN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
And

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Rajiv Sharma, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Arifa Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 08 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (“the judge”) dated 14 July 2025, refusing his asylum appeal.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Afghanistan who claims he was born in August 2005. He appeals against the decision of the respondent dated 02 August 2024 refusing his asylum and humanitarian protection claim.
3. The basis of his claim for asylum is his imputed political opinion. His father was killed by the Taliban. His brother came to the adverse attention of the authorities due to a car he was repairing which allegedly belonged to the Taliban. His brother was arrested and later released on payment of a bribe. The appellant claims that he was an unaccompanied minor when he left Afghanistan and fears that he will be killed by the Taliban because they believe that he wants to retaliate against them for killing his father. He also fears that his life would be in danger because the Taliban have taken over the country.
4. The respondent in a letter dated 02 August 2024 rejected the appellant’s claim for asylum. She did not accept that the appellant was an under the age of 18 when he arrived in the United Kingdom and claimed asylum. She accepted his nationality and was satisfied that he is 26 years old.
5. The appellant’s immigration history is that he travelled through Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Greece, Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, Italy and France before arriving in the United Kingdom illegally on 4 July 2022. He claimed asylum on 06 July 2022. His appeal against that decision came before the judge at a hearing on 29 April 2025.
6. The parties agreed that the issues before the judge were (i) whether the Appellant was a minor when he claimed asylum, (ii) whether he would be at risk on return, (iii) whether he meets the requirements of paragraph PL.5.1 (b) in respect of very significant obstacles to his integration into Afghanistan and, (vi) whether there would be a disproportionate breach of his Article 8 private life.
7. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The appellant sought permission to appeal on the grounds that firstly, the judge admitted late evidence in the form of an age assessment report prepared on behalf of the respondent. Secondly, the judge refused the appellant’s application to adjourn to allow the appellant an opportunity to challenge that evidence, thus deprived him of a fair trial. The ground argues that the remainder of the judge’s credibility findings are infected by that error. The appellant submits that there are other factual errors within the decision, such that appellant submits that the judge has failed to properly consider the evidence he has given.
8. Permission was granted on all grounds by First-tier Tribunal Judge N Karbani on 11 August 2025
9. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response. In summary, it opposes all the grounds raised by the appellant.
Submissions
10. On behalf of the respondent Ms Ahmed at the outset accepted that the judge had materially erred in law in her decision to permit the submission of the late evidence as to the appellant’s age from the respondent but to refuse the adjournment request made by the appellant. She accepted that the judge’s decision to refuse the adjournment was procedurally unfair. She referred to the test of fairness referred to in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418. She referred us to §12 to §14 of the decision where the judge considered the adjournment application and did not direct herself on the issue of fairness. She accepted that the decision to refuse the adjournment amounted to a material error and procedural unfairness, as a result of this the credibility findings were infected.
11. Mr Sharma accepted the concession made by the respondent. As a matter of housekeeping, he informed the panel that the appellant has not been served with the IS97 even though a reference had been made by the respondent to this being issued in her refusal letter.
12. At the hearing we confirmed that we were satisfied that there was a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Our reasons for that decision are set out below.
Decision on the appeal
13. We find that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error of law for the following reasons.
14. The principles and cautious approach to be applied by an appeal court to first instance findings of fact are well established and set out in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2]. We remind ourselves of the role of the First-tier Tribunal as an expert Tribunal and also bear in mind that a determination should not be ‘picked over’ or subjected to narrow textual analysis: HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, 1 WLR 3784 at §72.
15. Ms Ahmed’s concession was properly made. The judge has clearly stated at §12 of the decision “I took into account the appellant’s age which has been an issue since he claimed asylum and it was raised both in the respondent’s refusal the letter and in the review. I considered that the appellant was not disadvantaged. It was an issue which the appellant’s representatives were aware of for some time. Mr Sharma submitted that had the appellant seen the age assessment report prior to the hearing, he would have been in a position to obtain his own age assessment report in rebuttal. I do not find that persuasive. I found that the appellant’s age has been an issue from the time he claimed asylum. His representatives could have obtained an age assessment reported at any time.”
16. The judge goes onto state at §13 “I find that the appellant’s representatives have had ample opportunity to obtain an age assessment report. The report submitted by Mr Mitchell is a very short opinion by two Home Office officials in relation to what they believe is the appellant's likely age.” The judge then goes onto refuse the adjournment application §14.
17. We have considered the issue of fairness. The headnote in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418 (IAC) states:-
“If a Tribunal refuses to accede to an adjournment request, such decision could, in principle, be erroneous in law in several respects: these include a failure to take into account all material considerations; permitting immaterial considerations to intrude; denying the party concerned a fair hearing; failing to apply the correct test; and acting irrationally. In practice, in most cases the question will be whether the refusal deprived the affected party of his right to a fair hearing. Where an adjournment refusal is challenged on fairness grounds, it is important to recognise that the question for the Upper Tribunal is not whether the First-tier Tribunal acted reasonably. Rather, the test to be applied is that of fairness: was there any deprivation of the affected party’s right to a fair hearing? See SH (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1284.”
18. We find that the judge has not considered the impact of failing to adjourn on the fairness of proceedings, or on the prospects of success. The judge has focused on the appellant’s age which the judge states has been an issue since he claimed asylum, and it was raised both in the respondent’s refusal the letter and in the review. The judge has not turned her mind to whether the appeal can be justly determined without the evidence for the purposes of which the application adjournment was made. The evidence which the appellant wanted to adduce was central to his appeal and material to whether his appeal would succeed.
19. Nwaigwe is clear that there are a number of considerations to be taken into account, and we find that the judge has not done this. Although it was open to the appellant to adduce evidence of his age prior to the hearing, he did not apprehend late service of evidence by the respondent. The judge has failed to consider whether her decision to admit late evidence and refuse an adjournment to allow the appellant to challenge that evidence deprived the appellant of his right to a fair hearing. Finally, we accept that the remainder of the judge’s credibility findings are infected by that error.
20. Given that the decision involves a procedural unfairness, we find that the appellant has been deprived of a fair hearing. The judge’s decision involves the making of a material error of law. Accordingly, the First-tier Tribunal’s decision must be set aside in its entirety and the decision re-made. Ms Ahmed agreed that there are no findings which are capable of being preserved. The appropriate course, in such circumstances, is for the matter to be decided afresh and for the case to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
21. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.
22. We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different Judge, with no findings of fact preserved.

T Bibi

T Bibi
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
14 October 2025