Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003633
UI-2025-003634
First-tier Tribunal Nos:
HU/51192/2024
HU/51193/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7th April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

AICHA NAYEF AL KASEM
KASEEM MOHAMMAD KHATTAB
(nO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Nadeem, Legal Representative, Allison Wells Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mrs Abdul-Karim, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at the Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 16 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.

Background
2. The Appellants, nationals of Syria, are a husband and wife. They were aged 75 and 68 at the date of the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal. They appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Gordon-Lennox (“the Judge”) dated 13 July 2025 whereby their appeals based on Appendix Adult Dependent Relative of the Immigration Rules and Article 8 ECHR were dismissed.
3. The Appellants’ sponsor is one of their sons. He is in the United Kingdom with refugee protection status.
4. The task before me is to decide whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If there is then I shall either order that the decision be remade either here at the Upper Tribunal or at the First-tier Tribunal. If I do not find there to be a material error of law in the Judge’s decision then the Appellants’ appeal will remain dismissed.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
5. The Appellants had sought permission to appeal on 3 grounds. Permission was granted only one of those 3 grounds by First-tier Tribunal Judge Nightingale on the following terms:
“It is argued the Judge failed to consider the Rules requiring adequate, sustainable and long-term personal care available to these appellants; particularly in view of the age of the maternal aunt. The Judge failed to consider the collapsed infrastructure of Syria and the availability of care in context. It is also argued that the proportionality exercise is flawed in that it fails, inter alia, to factor in that the sponsor is a recognised refugee who cannot return to Syria.
The Judge considered the availability of care in Syria and was entitled to conclude, on the evidence before the Tribunal, that no attempts had been made to find professional care. The Judge accepted the age of the aunt, at paragraph 27, also noted that neighbours and friends were providing care and no reasons had been advanced why this could not continue. Read as a whole, I find no merit in either ground 1 or ground 2 as pleaded and permission is refused.
Ground 3, however, I find raises an arguable error with regard to the failure to weigh into the balance that the sponsor was unable, due to his refugee status, to return to Syria in order to enjoy his family life with his dependent parents. The Judge noted, at paragraph 45(b) that Article 8 did not provide an individual the choice of country of residence but did not consider that Syria was not a choice open to this family in view of the status of the sponsor. I accept an arguable error of law arises which may have been material to the outcome. Permission is granted but limited to ground 3 only.”
6. The Judge’s findings had including at paragraph 24 that,
“On the basis of the above, I accept that the Appellants have medical conditions but I am not satisfied that they have demonstrated that as a consequence of their medical conditions, medical care is not available or accessible to them.”
7. At paragraphs 26 to 28 the Judge concluded,
“The Sponsor said that the Appellants have no savings, having sold their assets and subsequently funded the Sponsor and his siblings journeys to the UK and are reliant on support from the UK. It was confirmed that they are living in the family home. I accept this evidence.
27. I accept that the Appellants require support performing everyday tasks and that this is long term given their age. While there is no immediate family in Syria to help perform this task, it was confirmed that the Sponsor’s maternal aunt helps them. I recognise that the Appellants have been supported by the maternal aunt, neighbours and friends following the departure of the Sponsor’s wife. There was no evidence to say that the current arrangements could not continue, although I recognise that the maternal aunt is aging as well.
28. In any event, the Sponsor was asked whether he had investigated his parents receiving support in Syria from an agency or similar type of organisation. In answering this question he explained about the neighbours supporting his parents. There is therefore no evidence before me to confirm that the care they require cannot be provided in Syria or, assuming it can, that it would not be affordable to them taking account of the financial support provided from the UK. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the Appellants have demonstrated that they meet paragraphs 5.1 – 5.2 of Appendix ADR”
8. Then at paragraphs 32 to 34 the Judge said,
“The Sponsor confirmed that if the Appellants’ applications were to be refused then they would continue to send money to assist them. I accept this evidence.
33. The Sponsor described the hard situation faced when he and then his wife left Syria, leaving his parents without familial support. The evidence also reflected not wanting to leave the Appellants living alone and vulnerable or being lonely and suffering. I accept that this was the evidence.
34. While I recognise that Syria has been a conflict area, the statement from Kaseem Al Khattab does not refer to any particularly difficulties for him or his wife as a consequence, rather referring to a general view of it likely to be a number of generations before the region is safe and infrastructure rebuilt. I accept his evidence in this respect. None of the other evidence describes any ongoing consequences of the conflict.”
9. The Judge had dismissed the appeal based on the Immigration Rules. As I have said, there has been no permission granted against that part of the Judge’s decision and so that part of the Appellants’ appeal remains dismissed.
10. The Judge had gone onto consider Article 8 ECHR. The Judge said at paragraph 35 that Article 8(1) was engaged. The Judge considered the Appellants’ 16 grandchildren living in the UK. The Judge concluded it was in those grandchildren’s best interests to remain in the UK.
11. At paragraphs 40 and 41 the Judge said,
“40. However, the fact that they are now in Syria in the circumstances that they are arises from a number of decisions that have led most recently to the Sponsor’s wife coming to the UK. This is in no way a criticism of what was no doubt a difficult choice, but it was a choice nonetheless. While the Appellants have medical conditions, they are currently receiving medical support and treatment for them in Syria. They are also receiving support for their everyday care needs from family and friends and it was not said that this could not continue. The care and support they receive is being paid for, in whole or in part, with support from the UK, which it was confirmed would continue.
41. In addition, the family would be able to maintain their relationships through modern forms of communication, which is what is happening currently. I do not suggest that this is the same but it does enable relationships to be maintained. It has been the way that they have been maintaining relationships since the various departures from Syria.”
12. Then at paragraphs 44 onwards the Judge considered Article 8 ECHR and the balancing exercise. The Judge conclude that, “On balance I find that the factors raised by the Appellant do not outweigh the public interest factors”.
The Hearing Before Me
13. Mr Nadeem took me through the grounds of appeal. He also referred to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department v IA and others [2025] EWCA Civ 1516; [2026] HRLR 4. Indeed, this appeal before me had been stayed pending the Court of Appeal’s judgment in that case.
14. Mr Nadeem stressed that the Judge erred in law because he had not referred to the Appellant’s refugee status, as was identified by the Judge who had granted permission to appeal. The refusal of the appeal would mean a permanent enforced separation between the Appellants and the UK family. Mr Nadeem also stressed that the Sponsor cannot return to Syria. Asked whether the Appellants could meet the Sponsor and others in a third country, Mr Nadeem said that this had not been specifically dealt with in the decision nor raised as a possibility. He invited me to allow the appeal.
15. Mrs Abdul-Karim relied on the Respondent’s Rule 24 response and invited me to conclude that there was no material error of law. It was said that the Judge had considered the balancing exercise in his decision and had considered the issue of unjustifiably harsh consequences. There was no evidence before the Judge that the current arrangement could not continue, or that alternative care or other necessary care could not be provided in Syria if needed. It was submitted that the Sponsor being unable to return to Syria as a refugee was immaterial.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
16. The legal test to be met by an Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
17. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular I note the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
Consideration and Analysis
18. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department v IA is important and I therefore refer to several paragraphs of the judgment:
“158. It is necessary, in this as in other connections, to consider closely the actual wording of article 8(2) itself. As we pointed out at [8] above, article 8(2) prohibits interference by a public authority with the exercise of the right to family life, except "such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of … the economic well-being of the country … or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others". As Lord Reed made clear in Agyarko (see [109]-[112] above), in considering how the balance is struck in individual cases, the courts "have to take the [SSHD's] policy into account and to attach considerable weight to it at a general level, as well as considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case". The requirement for "exceptional circumstances" for leave to remain (and therefore also entry clearance) to be granted outside the rules was not inconsistent with either the ECtHR or domestic authorities, and section 117B(1) of the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002 required consideration to be given to the maintenance of effective immigration controls.
159. The SSHD's point is that it is not her policy (as represented by the Rules) to admit all persons who share family life with a person lawfully settled in the UK. *133 That is not a question of floodgates or numbers likely to apply from war zones across the world. It is a question of respect for the UK's laws and democratic process, and for what the Government determines is necessary in that society to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK. The courts must always, as Lord Reed said, attach considerable weight to the SSHD's immigration policies at a general level, alongside considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case…
167. The SSHD's policy is a matter for her and for the UK Government. It is, as we have also already said, not a question of floodgates or numbers likely to apply from war zones across the world. It is a question of respect for the UK's laws and democratic process. The decision as to what is necessary in UK society to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK is the business of the SSHD and the Government. The courts must, as Lord Reed said in Agyarko , and we would respectfully endorse, attach considerable weight to the SSHD's immigration policies at a general level, alongside considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case.
168. Again, under this heading, the UT fell into error. It may, understandably, have been driven by its quite natural human reaction to the evidence of what the family were enduring in Gaza. But that reaction should not, in our judgment, have prevented the UT from giving effect to the Government's immigration policies (which are not, as Lord Reed also said in Agyarko , in general, inconsistent with the ECHR). The UT could only, in effect, override those policies in very exceptional or compelling circumstances, which we do not believe existed here as we shall now explain. Those policies, as we have also said, did not include a resettlement policy concerning Gaza. Had they done so, as we have also said, the balance might have been struck differently.
173. All those factors relating to the family's individual case had to be balanced against the SSHD's policies as reflected in the Rules, to which considerable weight had to be attached at a general level. As we have said, very exceptional or compelling circumstances had to be shown for entry clearance to be granted outside the Rules. There were, to put the matter starkly, no exceptional or compelling circumstances here. The family life with the sponsor, recently revived, was short-lived and must have been developed in the knowledge that entry clearance might not be obtained. As we have now said repeatedly, this is not a question of floodgates or numbers likely to apply from war zones across the world. It is a question of respect for the UK's laws and democratic process, and for the SSHD's decisions as to what is necessary to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK. As a matter of fact, the policies of the SSHD did not include a Gaza resettlement scheme. Had it done so, the balance might, as we have said, been very different.”
19. I am cognizant of the UK family and the Appellants wishing to be together in one country. That is perfectly understandable and one sees the human desire to seek to achieve that, but as has been highlighted in Secretary of State for the Home Department v IA and others, the public interest takes high priority. It is for the Secretary of State to make the Immigration Rules. In this case, it is important to have firmly in mind that the Appellants had applied for entry clearance, not for a mere visit, but as Adult Dependent Relatives. The Judge had refused their appeal on that basis. The appeal before me is not in respect of the Immigration Rules because that part of the Judge’s decision remains intact. The reason why that part of the appeal is not before me is because permission to appeal was refused against those parts of the Judge’s decision. The findings therefore remain intact.
20. Therefore, the Appellants must show, as was correctly noted by the Judge, something exceptional or compelling for entry clearance to be granted outside of the Rules. The Judge had considered the correct test and had correctly applied it. In particular paragraphs 40 and 41 and then paragraph 44 onwards of his judgment the Judge unarguably correctly concluded why he had to dismiss the appeal. I have referred to those paragraphs in full already earlier in my judgment.
21. Whilst it is clear that the Appellant’s adult children and grandchildren dearly wish to have their parents here in the UK and the Appellants wish to see them, that is not the appropriate test. Whilst the Judge said that there was the existence of family life for the purposes of Article 8(1) ECHR, that did not mean that Article 8(2) was satisfied. A higher test had to be satisfied to meet Article 8(2). As the Court of Appeal made clear in Secretary of State for the Home Department v IA “It is a question of respect for the UK's laws and democratic process, and for the SSHD's decisions as to what is necessary to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK”. The Judge was correct to focus on the Appellants and not the Sponsor or others in the UK, albeit the Judge considered the unitary nature of the family life.
22. In my judgment, the Judge was clearly well aware of the Sponsor’s refugee status. He was well aware because he had specifically referred to that protection status at paragraph 8(c) of his decision. I therefore reject the ground of appeal and submissions which contend that the Judge had not taken this into account in his assessment of the case.
23. Even if I am wrong and the Judge did not take the Sponsor’s refugee status into account, in my judgment, in view of the unassailable findings and decision of the Judge at paragraphs 28 and 34 (in particular), which are not the subject of appeal in any event, the Appellants cannot succeed. The Judge said at paragraphs 28 and 34:
“In any event, the Sponsor was asked whether he had investigated his parents receiving support in Syria from an agency or similar type of organisation. In answering this question he explained about the neighbours supporting his parents. There is therefore no evidence before me to confirm that the care they require cannot be provided in Syria or, assuming it can, that it would not be affordable to them taking account of the financial support provided from the UK.
While I recognise that Syria has been a conflict area, the statement from Kaseem Al Khattab does not refer to any particularly difficulties for him or his wife as a consequence, rather referring to a general view of it likely to be a number of generations before the region is safe and infrastructure rebuilt. I accept his evidence in this respect. None of the other evidence describes any ongoing consequences of the conflict.”
24. Reminding myself of the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal and reminding myself that the Judge had heard live evidence from the Sponsor and other witnesses, I conclude that this is not a case in which there is a material error of law.
25. Therefore, despite Mr Nadeem’s helpful and clear submissions, I am unable to agree with him. His submissions in reality amount to an attempt to re-argue the case.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain a material error of law.
Therefore, I dismiss the Appellants’ appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellants’ appeal on all grounds.
I do not make an anonymity order.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 February 2026