Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003639
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/55809/2024
LP/02891/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reason Issued:
On 21 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between

IK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at Field House on 15 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is a remaking decision following my decision dated 10 October 2025 in which I found an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the appeal.
2. In my error of law decision, the parties had helpfully reduced to writing the agreed facts of the appeal.
3. For ease of reference I reproduce those agreed facts as recorded in my error of law decision. These are:
a. The appellant is a Namibian female aged 43. She is from Otjimbingwe;
b. She is a victim of sexual abuse and gender based violence by her uncle since 2003;
c. This was reported to the police twice;
d. The abuse was reported three times to the traditional authorities;
e. Her uncle was forcing her to marry;
f. Her uncle threatened to kill her;
g. The appellant’s uncle is relatively wealthy;
h. The appellant has a genuine subjective fear of her uncle;
i. The appellant is at risk of persecution (save for the sufficiency of protection internal relocation points requiring resolution).
4. There was no challenge to the findings on Convention Reason, therefore the remaking decision was confined to humanitarian protection grounds only. There were two issues for me to determine: sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
5. In addition to the original composite bundle that had been provided for the Error of Law Hearing I was also in possession of a supplementary bundle provided.
6. I heard brief evidence from the appellant and helpful closing submissions from the advocates after which I reserved my decision.
Sufficiency of protection
7. I remind myself that the issue is not whether Namibia is able to guarantee the appellant's safety or whether every complaint of gender-based violence results in a prosecution or conviction. Applying the principles in Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37, the question is whether there exists a system of protection which operates effectively in practice for this appellant.
8. In considering sufficiency of protection I begin with the particular facts of the appellant's case. The preserved findings are that the appellant was subjected to sexual abuse and gender-based violence perpetrated by her uncle over a prolonged period. She reported the abuse to the police on two occasions and to traditional authorities on three occasions. Despite those reports the abuse continued. In my judgment, the appellant's own experience is a highly relevant indicator of what she could realistically expect were she to return to Namibia. The fact that repeated attempts to secure assistance failed to bring the abuse to an end is an important starting point in assessing whether protection would be effective in practice for this particular appellant. The preserved findings further establish that her uncle threatened to kill her, sought to force her into marriage and is relatively wealthy. These are matters I bear firmly in mind when assessing the effectiveness of the available protection. This is because Immigration Rule 339K requires her past experiences to be treated as a serious indication of future real risk of suffering serious harm absent good reasons to consider this will not be repeated.
9. The parties both took me to Country Policy and Information Note Namibia: Women fearing gender based violence Version 2.0 December 2025 (“the CPIN”) from which I note that since the appellant left Namibia the government of President Nandi-Ndaitwah, elected in November 2024 as Namibia's first female President, has publicly committed itself to women's empowerment and has adopted what is described as a "zero-tolerance" approach to gender-based violence. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare has introduced a range of policies aimed at promoting women's equality and addressing gender-based violence. In particular, the Third National Gender Equality and Equity Plan seeks to reduce gender discrimination, gender-based violence and gender inequality throughout Namibian society. There is therefore a clear message coming from the highest levels of government that gender-based violence is unacceptable and that meaningful change is sought through legislative and policy reform.
10. The CPIN also identifies a number of features which, on their face, are capable of providing effective state protection. These include legislation criminalising gender-based violence, a national police force operating throughout the country, seventeen Gender-Based Violence Protection Units across fourteen regions, specialised units at public hospitals providing forensic examinations and support for victims of sexual violence, and a network of state-supported shelters. Taking these matters at a surface level I accept that those measures are capable of amounting to a reasonable system of protection. In terms of societal attitudes as well again there seems to have been progress, for example, the CPIN highlights from an Afrobarometer survey in 2022 that 73% of Namibians say that domestic violence should be treated as a criminal rather than private matter and that gender based violence is the most important women’s right issue that the government and society must address.
11. However I have found it difficult to reconcile these headline matters highlighted within the CPIN when I read the CPIN holistically.
12. The CPIN accepts that, notwithstanding legislative and policy developments, Namibia remains a patriarchal society in which discriminatory gender stereotypes and harmful practices persist. The country evidence recognises that gender inequality continues to perpetuate harmful social and cultural norms and increases women's vulnerability to gender-based violence. Therefore whilst on one hand societal attitudes seem to be moving in a progressive direction on the issue of gender based violence, there remains a mismatch with how this is playing out on the ground.
13. Considering the country context holistically the reasons for this appear multifaceted. The CPIN highlights the challenges, which include unequal power social relations, poor local responses by police and authorities as well as a history of gender based violence.
14. I was troubled by the repeated references within the CPIN to the limited availability of reliable data concerning gender-based violence. The CPIN records that Namibia does not have an effective Gender-Based Violence Information Management System and does not systematically publish data concerning incidents reported to police or other authorities. The evidence further notes that gender-based violence is substantially underreported because of fear of reprisals, shame and reluctance to engage with authorities. The CPIN expressly notes that available statistics may therefore significantly underestimate the true level of violence experienced by women. In circumstances where the state itself lacks comprehensive data concerning both prevalence and outcomes, I find myself approaching cautiously in reaching conclusions that the existing framework is operating effectively in practice.
15. The respondent's submission is that following a complaint by the appellant her uncle was arrested and subsequently released on bail. That should be viewed in a positive way when assessing sufficiency of protection. I accept that this demonstrates that the authorities were prepared to take some action in response to her allegations. However I do not find that this is a complete answer to the issue of sufficiency of protection.
16. The respondent submitted that there may be reasons why this had not advanced. Put another way the respondent says the absence of a prosecution does not automatically mean that there was no protection available. This certainly submission aligns with what is said in the CPIN which states:
4.1.7 There may be various sound reasons why criminals may not be brought to justice.
17. I accept that the arrest demonstrates a response by the state. However I have to ask myself whether the protection was effective in practice. The appellant’s continued issues with her uncle pull towards it not being, notwithstanding that intervention. I accept that there may be many reason why criminals may not be brought to justice. However, focussing on the appellant’s specific circumstances, within the country context, given the appellant’s uncle’s relative wealth, along with the limitations highlighted within the substance of the CPIN may cast a light on this. Returning therefore to the CPIN.
18. The CPIN identifies a range of significant weaknesses within the protection system. The CPIN records concerns expressed by international organisations and NGOs regarding structural bottlenecks affecting co-ordination between health, protection, law enforcement and justice agencies. It refers to dysfunctional Gender-Based Violence Protection Units, deficiencies in specialist training and shortages of police officers, doctors and social workers. The same CPIN that identifies the existence of protective mechanisms also records substantial evidence that those mechanisms do not always function effectively in practice.
19. Of particular significance is the evidence relating to prosecutions. The CPIN notes that Namibia does not publish comprehensive data relating to arrests, prosecutions and convictions in gender-based violence cases. It further records concerns raised by the United Nations regarding low prosecution and conviction rates. The country evidence identifies factors hampering prosecutions, including limited police capacity, lengthy proceedings and victims withdrawing complaints because of family pressure, shame, fear and threats. Those factors are especially relevant in the present appeal, where the perpetrator is a family member whom the preserved findings establish to be relatively wealthy and threatened to kill the appellant.
20. The Afrobarometer report cited previously paints a concerning picture regarding the prevalence of gender-based violence and the difficulties faced by victims. A majority of respondents regarded violence against women as a common occurrence in Namibia. Significantly, more than four in ten respondents considered it somewhat likely or very likely that a woman reporting gender-based violence to the authorities would be criticised or harassed because she had done so.
21. Those findings are consistent with other material within the CPIN concerning underreporting, fear of reprisals, social shame and the continuing influence of patriarchal attitudes. They also accord with the evidence that victims may be discouraged from pursuing complaints because of threats, family pressure or fear of consequences. Whilst public confidence in law enforcement appears relatively high, the Afrobarometer evidence demonstrates that significant barriers continue to exist between the availability of formal protection and the practical ability of women to obtain that protection.
22. In the appellant's particular circumstances, where the perpetrator is a family member who abused her over many years, threatened to kill her, sought to force her into marriage and continued his conduct notwithstanding repeated reports to police and traditional authorities, the Afrobarometer findings reinforce rather than diminish my concerns regarding the practical effectiveness of the protection available to her. The respondent submitted that the appellant should attempt to secure a protection order against her uncle. Again, in the particular context of the appellant’s case with the preserved findings of fact it is difficult to see how this would afford her effective protection. Her uncle has not been restrained by the other steps and measures she has taken. Overall, I find that even though there is a legal framework and policing structures does not necessarily translate into effective protection for the victims of entrenched familial gender-based violence with a power imbalance in play as is present in the appellant’s case.
23. I have further considered the evidence regarding state-supported shelters. Whilst shelters undoubtedly exist, the country evidence consistently identifies concerns regarding chronic under-resourcing, staffing shortages and limited operational capacity. The CPIN records evidence from both the United States State Department and material considered by the United Nations Human Rights Committee indicating that shelters frequently operate only on an as-needed basis and face significant practical limitations. I also note concerns regarding access to shelters, psychosocial counselling and other support services, particularly for vulnerable women.
24. Drawing the evidence together, I accept that Namibia possesses laws, institutions and policies directed towards combating gender-based violence. Nevertheless, the preserved findings establish that this appellant repeatedly sought assistance from both police and traditional authorities over a prolonged period and yet the abuse and threats persisted. When that personal experience is considered alongside the evidence of systemic weaknesses, resource limitations, underreporting, difficulties with investigation and prosecution, and concerns regarding the practical operation of protective mechanisms, I am satisfied that there is a reasonable likelihood that effective protection would not be available to this appellant upon return.
Internal relocation
25. I have next considered whether there is a part of Namibia to which the appellant could reasonably and safely relocate.
26. I bring forward my findings about sufficiency of protection when having regard to whether internal relocation would be unduly harsh.
27. The respondent relies upon the CPIN's general assessment that women are able to move freely within Namibia and that relocation to urban centres such as Windhoek, Walvis Bay or Rundu is generally available and reasonable. The CPIN notes that Namibia is a large country with a population of approximately three million people and records no formal barriers preventing women from relocating. It also states that economic opportunities and essential services are available in different parts of the country. Those are matters which weigh in favour of the respondent's position.
28. However, as with sufficiency of protection, the assessment must focus on the appellant's individual circumstances rather than general propositions contained within the country guidance material.
29. The preserved findings establish that the appellant is genuinely fearful of her uncle. I have also found that she is at real risk from him in her home area. These findings along with the preserved facts reflect the acceptance of a sustained pattern of abuse, threats and coercive behaviour extending over a period of many years. This is not a case concerning a historic dispute or an isolated incident. The preserved facts demonstrate a determined perpetrator who has exercised control over the appellant for a prolonged period and who has threatened to kill her.
30. Particularly significant is the appellant's evidence, which I accept, that over the years she repeatedly attempted to distance herself from her uncle within Namibia. Notwithstanding those efforts, he was able to locate her and continue exerting pressure and making threats. The history of the claim is therefore important. Even if those previous moves did not constitute relocation in the strict legal sense, they remain indicative of the uncle's ability and determination to locate the appellant.
31. The respondent submits that the appellant was located because she remained within family or social networks known to her uncle and that she could relocate to an area where she had no connections. I have considered that submission carefully. However, I do not feel able to reconcile this with the preserved findings. The issue is not simply whether there is a geographical location distant from Otjimbingwe. The issue is whether, given this perpetrator's persistence, resources and history of pursuing the appellant, relocation would provide a durable solution.
32. I accept that Namibia is geographically large. Equally, the country evidence records that its population is relatively small, at approximately three million people. The appellant's uncle is not merely someone with a passing interest in her whereabouts. The preserved findings establish that he abused her over many years, sought to force her into marriage and threatened to kill her. Those findings demonstrate an unusual degree of persistence. In those circumstances I am not satisfied that physical distance alone would materially reduce the risk.
33. The CPIN considers that internal relocation is more likely possible if the woman can access accommodation, is educated, skilled, has financial means to support herself to be able to support herself and/or has access to support networks.
34. Taking these in reverse through the specific lens of the appellant’s case and taking into account her personal circumstances. She is a survivor of prolonged sexual abuse and gender-based violence. The preserved findings establish that she has lived for many years under the threat posed by her uncle. The evidence before the Tribunal indicates that she has historically relied heavily upon family support, initially her uncle but particularly from female family members. I also remind myself that her daughter is in the care of those family members. Requiring the appellant to relocate alone to an unfamiliar part of Namibia, separated from such support as she possesses and in circumstances where she would continue to fear discovery by her uncle would be challenging given her history.
35. Although the appellant did go to school, she had no work experience. This appears to why at least in part when she tried to live elsewhere she was dependent on friends and family. I note that he grandmother who is still alive did provide her some support. However this is complex. I do not find the grandmother's support to be indicative of independence from the uncle, rather it evidences a continuing nexus with him, exerting pressure upon her. She does not possess independent financial means.
36. I have additionally borne in mind my findings concerning sufficiency of protection. These were relevant in my judgment when considering the support required by the appellant. Her uncle has previously continued his conduct notwithstanding reports to police and traditional authorities, and where I have found that effective protection would not be available to this appellant, the reasonableness of expecting her to relocate in order to evade him is materially diminished. Relevant to this is the absence of sheltered support.
37. Standing back, the appellant cannot reasonably be viewed as sufficiently educated, skilled, or resourced to establish an independent life. She has no experience of living independently and has been subjected to her uncle's persistent pursuit over a prolonged period. I am therefore satisfied that relocation would result in unduly harsh conditions and that internal relocation is not a reasonable option for her
38. Thus the appeal falls to be allowed.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on Humanitarian Protection grounds.

R A Pickering
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Pickering
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
7 July 2026