Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003642
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56032/2022
LP/01738/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 April 2026

Before

THE HON. MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
And

KB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Holborn, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr D Furner, Solicitor, Birnberg Peirce

Heard at Field House on 15 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, KB is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of KB, likely to lead members of the public to identify her. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
(1) Introduction
1. The respondent appeals, with the permission of an Upper Tribunal Judge, against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the FtTJ”), promulgated after a 3-day hearing in April 2025, allowing the appellant’s appeal on asylum grounds against the respondent’s decision of 16 December 2022 refusing her protection and human rights claims consequent on the making of a deportation order.
2. It is important to note that the FtTJ’s finding that the appellant’s removal would be a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”) has not been challenged.
3. For convenience, references below to the appellant and the respondent are to the appellant and the respondent as they were before the First-tier Tribunal. We continue the anonymity order made in the First-Tier Tribunal for the same reasons given by the FtTJ, in particular the potential impact of publicity on the appellant’s minor child, the appellant’s children being described as damaged as a consequence of her criminal conduct.
(2) Background
4. The appellant is a national of Algeria. She entered the United Kingdom (“the UK”) unlawfully in 2002. She has two children who are British citizens, one of whom is under 18.
5. On 15 December 2020 she was sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment, with a one-year extended licence period, for two counts of distributing and circulating a terrorist publication.
6. The principal issues before the FtTJ were as follows:
(1) The appellant contended that, due to her profile as a person convicted of terrorism-related offences in the UK and her links to two known terrorists, she would be at risk on return to Algeria of being persecuted for her imputed political opinion [59]. The respondent’s case was that the country guidance on this issue was outdated following the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (“the ECtHR”) in AM v France (application no 12148/18) (“AM”). The respondent accepted that the appellant might be put under surveillance, but not that this would lead to a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”) [61].
(2) The respondent’s case was that the presumption under section 72(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 applied, so that, in any event, the appellant could not qualify for asylum [81]. The appellant said that she was now rehabilitated and significantly changed and had rebutted the presumption, such that she posed no danger to the community [82].
7. The FtTJ found for the appellant on both points.
8. There are two grounds of appeal, which we will consider in turn, but first we set out the relevant country guidance.
(3) Relevant Country Guidance
9. The most recent country guidance is to be found in AF (Terrorist Suspects – HS (Algeria) confirmed) Algeria CG [2009] UKAIT 00023 (“AF”). Its headnote says as follows:
“i). An appellant who can establish that he has a history that suggests he may have connections to international terrorism is at real risk of being detained on arrival in Algeria, and investigated.
ii). It is reasonably likely that when the suspicion is of international terrorism such a returnee will be passed into the hands of the Department du Renséignement de la Securité (“DRS”) for further interrogation.
iii) The historic evidence about the DRS’s propensity to use torture as a means of interrogation, together with the continuing absence of any evidence of accountability or monitoring, strongly suggests that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the DRS still uses torture and other serious ill-treatment in its places of secret incommunicado detention.
iv) In the light of the further report from Dr Seddon, and of both Y, BB and U v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKSIAC 32/2005, and PP v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKSIAC 54/2006, the Tribunal sees no basis for doing other than confirming that HS (Terrorist suspect – risk) Algeria CG [2008] UKAIT 00048 (heard before the SIAC Cases) was correct and that the risk categories set out therein do not require widening.”
10. HS (Terrorist suspect – risk) Algeria CG [2008] UKAIT 00048, confirmed in AF as correct, gave the following guidance:
“Where there are grounds for believing that a returnee may be suspected by the Algerian authorities of having been involved in terrorist activity abroad, he may be at real risk on return in the absence of specific assurances from the Algerian government and/or monitoring by the British Embassy in Algiers. The risk arises from the time that he may spend in the custody of the DRS (Département du Renseignement de la Securité) while his background is investigated.”
(4) Ground 1
(4)(a) Ground 1: Submissions
11. Ground 1 avers that the FtTJ erred as to risk on return. It is said that she failed properly to take into account AM and speculated, or relied on the country expert’s speculation, about the treatment on return of a lesser offender such as the appellant and speculated that the Algerian authorities would have identified the appellant as a person of interest to them. It was said that AM‘s terrorist offending was much more serious than that of the appellant and that the examples given in the country expert’s report: had a much more significant international profile than the appellant’s; were related to terrorism within Algeria; or were permanently connected to and/or had knowledge of Al Qaeda or ISIS. It was submitted that the expert had not identified anyone who had been deported to Algeria who had been of interest to the authorities, but who had committed such low level terrorist offences as the appellant, and that she had not identified any woman who had been persecuted on these grounds.
12. Mr Holborn submitted that the test for departing from country guidance was clearly met. He said that the situation on the ground had changed and required re-evaluation. The change on the ground in Algeria could be seen from reading AM. The DRS had been dissolved in 2016 ([28]) and the Algerian constitution amended ([29]). He said that it was apparent from reading AF that the country guidance had been based on the findings that the DRS had a reputation for using torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, such that it was reasonably likely that a person suspected of terrorism would be referred to the DRS and that, although conditions throughout the rest of the legal and security systems may have improved, the tribunal was not persuaded that the DRS had materially changed ([107] to [109]). The dissolving of the DRS was therefore a material change, enabling a departure from the country guidance. The appellant’s country expert had also acknowledged that there had been a change and that a number of different steps had been taken by the government to improve the position. That did not mean that there were not still abuses, but he submitted that these were not abuses of the type which would mean that a person in the appellant’s position would be at real risk of a breach of her rights under Article 3 ECHR.
13. Mr Holborn said that the respondent was not challenging the FtTJ’s conclusion that the appellant would come to the attention of the authorities. There had been no application to withdraw the concession that she would be under surveillance, but that did not mean that she would be a person of importance to the authorities. The examples given by the appellant’s expert of persons whom the authorities would be interested in and who would be at risk were those who were far more prominent and who had committed far more significant offences. There were simply no examples of anyone with the appellant’s profile being tortured. Even if the authorities went so far as to detain the appellant, it would not necessarily follow that there would be a risk of a breach of Article 3 ECHR, since the risk of such treatment in detention had come from the DRS’s use of torture.
14. His submission was that the last sentence of [80] showed that the FtTJ was unsustainably still applying AF. She was not assessing the risk on a free-standing basis. It might be that the FtTJ could lawfully have decided, taking account of all of the evidence, that there was still a risk to the appellant, but the FtTJ had not done that. She had not approached the exercise afresh in the light of AM. She had not assessed the risk properly. She had relied on the quotation at [77] from the US State Department report of 2023, but, although that showed that the human rights situation in Algeria had deteriorated during the year, which might suggest that the situation was not as good as it had been in 2017, the time referred to in AM, it did not mean that the situation was as bad as it had been in 2009, at the time of AF. What the FtTJ had not done was to say that the risk was the same because the Direction de services de Sécurité (“the DSS”) was the same as the DRS, which it had replaced.
15. In his rule 24 response, Mr Furber submitted that there were no very strong grounds, supported by cogent evidence, for departing from the country guidance in AF. The country expert explained that, at the time AM was decided, there was a brief period of optimism for reform, but Algeria today was more repressive and more aggressive in respect of its approach to Islamic terrorism than ever. Moreover, the respondent’s counsel had not made submissions at the hearing before the FtTJ that the approach in Saiki v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“Saiki”: an unreported case of the First-tier Tribunal) should be departed from. That case explained why there were not very strong grounds, supported by cogent evidence., which justified departing from the country guidance in AF. In his skeleton argument, Mr Furber added that it was not right that the country expert gave no examples of the ill-treatment of those with a comparable profile. She had given in oral evidence the example of the wife of an FIS activist who had been detained during a visit to Algeria, ill-treated and interrogated about the old activities of her husband. The expert’s point had been that lower profile individuals were less likely to have their torture reported, but not less likely to be tortured.
16. In developing his submissions at the hearing, Mr Furber submitted that the respondent’s challenge was really a disagreement with the lawful findings of the FtTJ. The question was whether the FtTJ was reasonably entitled to form the view which she did about not departing from the country guidance in AF. He took us through the paragraphs in Saiki ([57] to [59]) where the Tribunal had explained its reasoning and had concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to show a demonstrable change for the better in the treatment of those forcibly returned to Algeria after being convicted of involvement in terrorism. He submitted that the respondent had not challenged that approach at the hearing and that that was understandable, as it was the correct approach.
17. Mr Furber submitted that the respondent appeared to be suggesting that the appellant would not be at risk because a comparator could not be found. The country expert had explained why there would be red flags for the authorities in the appellant’s case, even though her offence was not as serious as the offences committed by others. The expert was clear that the “rebadging” of the DRS as the DSS meant nothing and that the DSS was as repressive as its predecessor. The FtTJ had not speculated, but had assessed risk, as was her job. She had relied on the evidence of a well-qualified expert and she had explained that there were no very strong grounds, supported by cogent evidence, to depart from AF. Ultimately, she had reached a rational conclusion which was not perverse. Her approach was unimpeachable.
18. Mr Holborn replied that Saiki was not a precedent to be followed. If the FtTJ had meant to say that she was adopting the reasoning in Saiki, then she was adopting what another tribunal had decided on different evidence and on evidence which was not before her. The reasoning in Saiki could be challenged and adopting that reasoning was an error of approach itself. What she should have done was to consider whether there were reasons for departing from the country guidance in AF and then to consider, looking at the position as it was at the time of the hearing, whether there was a real risk. She had not done that.
(4)(b) Ground 1: Decision
19. The Court of Appeal in SB (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 160 at [74] – [75] set out the approach to be taken to country guidance, quoting SG (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] 1 WLR 41; [2012] EWCA Civ 940 at [67] for the proposition that country guidance remains authoritative unless and until set aside on appeal or replaced by a subsequent country guidance. The court continued at [75]:
“In so far as this might indicate that Country Guidance binds in every case regardless of the instant facts in SG(Iraq) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 940, Stanley Burnton LJ made clear (ibid paragraph [47]) that Country Guidance was indeed a powerful source of guidance but was not to be applied without qualification: “ … decision makers and tribunal judges are required to take Country Guidance determinations into account, and to follow them unless very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence are adduced justifying their not doing so.” This must be right. The Guidance is by its nature incapable of covering every conceivable scenario that might arise and which might place a person at jeopardy if returned. It is, though, a very important starting point, is to be taken into account, and carries significant weight.”
20. In AM the ECtHR, in April 2019, concluded that the general situation in relation to the treatment of persons with terrorist links in Algeria did not, in itself, preclude the removal to Algeria of the applicant, an Algerian national sentenced by the French court to six years’ imprisonment for participation in a criminal conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism linked with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [126]. The court relied on the developments in the situation since 2015 (when the ECtHR had, in an earlier judgment, found that Article 3 ECHR would be violated by the deportation to Algeria of an Algerian national convicted in France of terrorist activities) and specifically the following:
(i) It noted institutional and legislative developments, in particular the 2016 revision of the Algerian constitution, the dissolution of the DRS in 2016 and the organisation of regular human rights training for police officers by the Direction Générale de la Sûrété Nationale (“the DGSN”) [121].
(ii) Whilst there was some worrying information, in particular the observations of the UN Human Rights Committee that torture and ill-treatment continued to be used in counter-terrorism operations, in particular by personnel of the DSS, the majority of the reports available no longer recorded allegations of torture against persons with terrorist links. The UK Embassy in Algiers were informed by human rights organisations in 2017 that they had no evidence of the existence of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR and the applicant could not establish that any comparable third party would in fact have been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in 2017 or 2018. The DGSN had not received any information from the public in 2017 about ill-treatment and the DSS had been incorporated into a new framework governing its activities, with enhanced protection of human rights. The restructuring of the security services coincided with the disappearance of allegations of ill-treatment from most international reports [122].
(iii) The French government had provided the Court with a list of Algerian nationals deported to Algeria on account of links with terrorism or a radical Islamist movement and none had alleged that they were subjected to ill-treatment at the hands of the Algerian authorities [123].
(iv) Several courts in Member States of the Council of Europe had recently concluded that there was no risk of violation of Article 3 ECHR in the event of the deportation to Algeria of people with terrorist links [124].
(v) Although certain features of the criminal procedure in Algeria might raise doubts as to their compliance with the right to a fair trial, it could not be concluded on that basis alone that there was a general risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR for a particular category of people [125].
21. The ECtHR then examined the specific situation of the appellant AM and concluded that he had not shown that the Algerian authorities had a particular interest in him and that, although his past might mean that he was the subject of control and surveillance measures on return, or even of judicial proceedings, that was not, as such, treatment prohibited by Article 3 ECHR.
22. The FtTJ did not herself examine the legal effect of the judgment of the ECtHR in AM. However, she relied on and adopted the observations of the panel in Saiki (see [76]). Those observations cited (at [54]) what was said in the judgment in R. (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 A.C. 323 to the effect that, whilst Strasbourg case-law was not strictly binding, courts should, in the absence of some special circumstances, follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court. The panel in Saiki also cited (at [55]) the judgment in AMM and others (conflict; humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia CG [2011] UKUT 445 (IAC) to the effect that it was doubtful whether a domestic court or tribunal was necessarily obliged to draw exactly the same conclusions as regards risk to returnees as were reached by the ECtHR, even where the raw evidence was precisely the same, as a fact-finding tribunal in the UK was entitled, within public law principles, to decide what weight to give to each material element of the evidence before it. The tribunal was not bound to place precisely the same weight on a particular piece of evidence as the ECtHR, albeit they were required to “have regard” to the weight the ECtHR had placed upon the piece of evidence.
23. It is clear from those principles that the judgment of the ECtHR in 2019 does not somehow of itself “overrule” the country guidance in AF, so that there is no need to consider the country guidance, nor, from the perspective of April 2025, six years after the judgment of the ECtHR, can it be said that, just because of the decision in AM and without further examination of the circumstances now, there are very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence for departing from the country guidance in AF. The situation must be looked at in the round. We appreciate the submissions that the country guidance panel in AF came to the conclusion which they did because a detainee suspected of international terrorism would come into the hands of the DRS and, despite improvements in the legal and security system in Algeria generally, the country guidance panel were not persuaded that the DRS had materially changed, but we do not consider that it follows that, just because the DRS has been replaced, and it has not been said that the DRS and DSS are identical, there are very strong grounds, supported by cogent evidence, for departing from the country guidance in AF. The country guidance is guidance on the risk to a terrorist suspect and that must be considered in the light of the evidence as a whole.
24. With that in mind, we consider that the FtTJ approached her task properly and came to a conclusion which she was entitled to reach on the facts, as we explain below. We consider that the FtTJ was entitled not to depart from the country guidance in AF. Whilst we note that the last sentence of the FtTJ’s conclusion on this issue at [80] explicitly followed the country guidance, it was evident, as we explain below, that she accepted the expert’s conclusions that there was a real risk of the appellant being detained and tortured on return, i.e. that there was a real risk to the appellant in the specific circumstances of her case, regardless of the country guidance. We conclude, again as we explain below, that she made no legal error in accepting the expert’s conclusions.
25. The FtTJ was particularly impressed by the country expert’s written and oral evidence. She found the expert’s report to be balanced and properly sourced [68] and she attached significant weight to it. She found the expert to be impressive as a witness and found that she was able to address each of the points put to her by the respondent [70]. She found that the expert’s oral evidence was well balanced, properly sourced and measured, that she answered questions with examples and that she did not stray into speculation.
26. The FtTJ considered the written report carefully over more than two pages, noting, so far as the general situation was concerned, that the expert explained that those arrested continued to be at risk of torture and abuse in detention, including at the hands of the DSS, and that the DSS had continued to commit gross human rights abuses, including torture and enforced disappearances [62]. We note that in the report, to which, as we have said, the FtTJ attached significant weight, the expert explained in more detail why she concluded that those arrested continued to be at risk of torture and abuse in detention, including at the hands of the DSS, and that, while the restructuring (from DRS to DSS) represented an important change, insofar as it marked the triumph of the Presidency over powerful figures within the intelligence services, it did not equate to any major change in institutional culture (see paragraphs [1.6] to [1.9] of the report). The expert analysed comments suggesting that it was only a cosmetic exercise and explained why she considered that the comments were probably exaggerated (in that the President wanted to rein in the intelligence services, to have more direct control and also to overhaul some of their worst practices: see paragraph [1.10] of the report). However, she concluded that the DSS was a potent force with far-reaching powers and that, after President Bouteflika had stepped down in April 2019 (which was, we observe, after the hearing in AM), the acting president had reinstated the DSS powers which had been stripped away, a number of officers were reinstated and there was further restructuring (see paragraph [1.10] of the report). The expert then explained why she concluded that the fundamental underpinnings of the Algerian state remained unchanged and that it was still a military-backed authoritarian regime which did not tolerate dissent and continued to practice torture and arbitrary arrest (see paragraph [1.14] of the report). She had earlier commented that the current President was less flexible than Bouteflika (see paragraph [1.4] of the report), who had permitted some margin for dissenting voices and had operated a reconciliation programme for Islamist militants. The current President had clamped down heavily on opposition activism and freedom of speech, arbitrarily arresting and detaining hundreds of Algerians, many of them charged with terrorism.
27. Moreover, the expert specifically considered the position after the judgment in AM, detailing how Algeria had slipped further back into repression and highlighting an increase in complaints of torture in 2021. The expert then considered specific, post-AM allegations of torture (see paragraphs [4.3] to [4.14] of the report). It does not appear that the expert was cross-examined on the general position she had expressed in the report.
28. The FtTJ then considered the AM judgment and adopted the approach which the panel in Siaki had taken, which was not being satisfied that there were very strong grounds, supported by cogent evidence, for departing from the two country guidance cases, notwithstanding the passage of time and the judgment in AM. She explained that the country situation was subject to change and that she had had the benefit of specific expert evidence, which had not been before the ECtHR. The panel in Saiki had considered written evidence from the same expert and her evidence before the FtTJ maintained the same position as she had in Saiki. The FtTJ then turned to consider what might have changed since Saiki (which had been heard in May 2024). She set out that there was a more recent CPIN, which referred to the US State Department report for 2023 and quoted from that report at [77]. The quote referred to a deterioration in the human rights situation in Algeria during the year and said that the significant human rights issues included credible reports of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by members of the security forces.
29. It is right that the FtTJ was only using that quote as evidence that the country situation had not changed, or at least had not changed for the better, in the past year since a tribunal panel had considered the position with the benefit of similar evidence from the same expert. The quote could not possibly be used to say that the country situation was the same as it was in 2007 and 2009, but it was not for the appellant to prove, or necessary for the FTJ to find, as we have said above, that the situation was exactly the same as it was at the time when the country guidance cases were promulgated. It was for the respondent to show that there were very strong grounds, supported by cogent evidence, for not following the country guidance in AF. The FtTJ made no error of law in following that country guidance. She considered the effects of AM appropriately; she considered the change in the country situation since then with the benefit of expert evidence and she accepted the expert evidence, which was that the change to the DSS did not equate to a major change in institutional culture and that after AM there continued to be credible reports of torture, the situation in Algeria having slipped back into repression. There is nothing irrational, perverse or evidencing other legal error in her findings relevant to following the country guidance in AM.
30. The respondent clarified, through Mr Holborn, that she was not challenging the FtTJ’s finding that the appellant would come to the attention of the authorities and the FtTJ clearly explained how, based on information publicly available in the UK, the appellant’s profile would come to the attention of the Algerian authorities as a person convicted of terror-related offences and a suspected terrorist, at the latest upon arrival and questioning [79]. The FtTJ could simply have concluded that the appellant was at risk following the country guidance in AM.
31. However, those were not the FtTJ’s only findings. The FtTJ recorded the expert’s conclusion in her report that the Algerian authorities would have a particular interest in the appellant because of “red flags” for them in her background [64] and that she concluded that even though the torture of females was less common, given the nature of the appellant’s convictions and connections, there was a real risk that she would be subjected to physical mistreatment and abuse during detention [66]. The expert was cross-examined on this aspect of her evidence and similar points were put to her as were raised in the grounds about the lack of evidence of a specific comparable, but she maintained that there was a real risk that the appellant would be stopped, questioned and detained, regardless of her gender or the lack of a comparable example, because she had a conviction for terror-related offences, she was being forcibly returned and the “red flag” factors of the appellant’s connections would excite the interest of the authorities. The FtTJ attached weight to her opinion [72]. The FtTJ then concluded that there was a real risk, given the appellant’s profile, of the appellant being immediately detained and tortured in detention, bearing in mind the country evidence, particularly the evidence of the expert [80].
32. That there were no precise comparators did not mean that it was improper speculation for the FtTJ to accept the expert’s conclusion that there was a real risk to the appellant immediately on return. The FtTJ accepted the expert’s conclusion that the appellant fell into a particular profile which would trigger the interest of the Algerian authorities. This was not improper speculation, but, as she explained, acceptance of the expert’s opinion, which was based on her direct knowledge and her consideration of the various sources in the context of the other background information. In the recent well-known discussion by the Court of Appeal of the standard of proof in asylum cases, MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216; [2023] Imm. A.R. 713, the Court of Appeal described the standard of proof as more accurately an assessment of risk, endorsed the formulation that it must be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, risk of future events happening, and said that even a 10% chance that an appellant would face persecution for a convention reason might satisfy the relevant test. The FtTJ was entitled to conclude that, on the evidence, including the expert evidence, there was a real, rather than a fanciful, risk to the appellant. We conclude that no error of law has been shown in her approach.
(5) Ground 2
(5)(a) Ground 2: Submissions
33. Ground 2 avers that it was not rational or reasonable for the FtTJ to find that the appellant was not a danger to the community because she had not in the past exhibited an extremist mindset. The findings of the criminal court should have been followed. It was perverse to conclude that the appellant was not a risk now, based on her personality and parenting, when she had been found to be a risk in the past with the same personality and parenting. It was also averred that it was even more perverse to treat the appellant’s MAPPA level 2 status as evidence of a lack of risk, when it was evidence of continuing risk, albeit the risk of serious harm had been downgraded.
34. In submissions Mr Holborn took us to the sentencing remarks and the ruling following the Newton hearing. There was a finding of an extremist mindset. It was problematic for the FtTJ to accept the report of Professor Silke, a criminologist, as a persuasive snapshot of current risk and the radicalisation profile over time, because Professor Silke had disagreed with the conclusions of the criminal court. When the FtTJ concluded at [104] that the appellant did not possess extremist ideologies, she was wrongly weighing up the sentencing remarks against Professor Silke’s report when coming to a factual conclusion as to historic extremism. The FtTJ should instead have made factual findings as to what the position was, with the starting point being the sentencing remarks, and then deciding whether things had changed. The FtTJ had simply taken the wrong starting point. After reconsidering the MAPPA point made in the grounds in the context of Professor Silke’s report, Mr Holborn withdrew the perversity argument insofar as it concerned the appellant’s MAPPA status.
35. Mr Furber argued in the rule 24 response that the sentencing remarks and the findings from the Newton hearing formed the FtTJ’s starting point, but that dangerousness was a forward-looking assessment. The FtTJ’s findings did not constitute any relitigation of the criminal court’s decision. He acknowledged that different judges might have reached different conclusions, but the finding that the FtTJ reached, i.e. that the appellant no longer posed a danger to the community, was open to her on the evidence. He submitted at the hearing that the FtTJ clearly framed the correct question for herself and began at [83] with the sentencing judge’s remarks. She did not go behind those remarks: instead, she looked at the progress made in the past 5 years. It was a forward-looking assessment of the danger presented now. He took us through Professor Silke’s report to show that, whilst Professor Silke had said that there were some areas where the available evidence was not consistent with the descriptions of the appellant’s motivations and mindset in previous documents and decisions, none of those inconsistencies would affect his assessment of current risk (see paragraph [70] of his report). The FtTJ had been very careful in her assessment, taking account of matters which damaged the appellant’s case as well as those matters which supported her case.
(5)(b) Ground 2: Decision
36. The FtTJ correctly reminded herself of the law at [81]. Under section 72(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, a person is presumed to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime and to constitute a danger to the community if they are convicted of an offence for which they are sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least two years. The presumption that the person constitutes a danger to the community is rebuttable by that person (section 72(6)).
37. The FtTJ summarised the sentencing judge’s remarks in detail at [83] and the Newton hearing ruling at [84]. She attached weight to them, and we consider that she was not simply looking at everything in the round. Rather, she was clear that the sentencing remarks set out the basis of the conviction and sentence at that time [83] and, when the FtTJ stood back and looked at whether there had been sufficient progress to conclude that the appellant had rebutted the presumption that she constituted a danger to the community, she began by saying:
“I again take into account the [sentencing] remarks about the appellant minimising her role and culpability at all stages, setting out a narrative to meet that objective.” [103].
38. The FtTJ carefully weighed all of the other evidence, including the evidence telling against the appellant, such as the Parole Board decision and those matters which were damaging to the appellant’s credibility. Where she was not impressed by pieces of evidence, she did not simply dismiss that evidence, but again carefully explained the weight which she gave to it. She was particularly impressed by the extremism risk guidance 22+ report, which assisted the appellant, because it was specifically prepared to consider the risk the appellant posed and to identify appropriate risk management for release. She was also particularly impressed by the report and the evidence of Professor Silke, who was extensively cross-examined, and she explained why she was impressed by his report and evidence [96]. Her acceptance of Professor Silke’s evidence that the appellant did not possess extremist ideologies was done in the context of her finding that the appellant had taken active steps to change her life [104]. Mr Furber showed us that the conclusion of Professor Silke’s report makes clear that he was saying that, whatever his thoughts about the past, they did not affect his assessment of current risk or the current mindset. The FtTJ was impressed by the consistency of the evidence, which assessed the appellant as posing a low risk of re-offending [103] and described the active steps which the appellant had taken to change her life, with the aid of the rehabilitation courses and programmes which she had taken, the support structures around her and the fact that she had complied with all of the measures deemed appropriate to manage risk, such as undertaking rehabilitation work, reforming her religious perspective, meeting licence conditions and not returning to her previous lifestyle after her licence had expired [104].
39. Mr Holborn was right not to pursue the MAPPA point in the grounds. Professor Silke set out in his report that terrorism-connected offenders must all be managed at either level 2 or level 3 of MAPPA and they are automatically covered by MAPPA on release.
40. The FtTJ directed herself properly as to the law and considered all of the evidence, explaining why she was giving pieces of evidence more or less weight. She clearly explained why she concluded that the appellant had changed and her conclusions were fully reasoned. Her assessment was forward-looking. Whilst, as in many cases, it could be said that other judges might have reached a different conclusion, the FtTJ’s conclusions cannot begin to be called perverse.
(6) Conclusion
41. There is no error in the FtTJ’s thorough and carefully analysed decision. Its conclusions stand.
(7) Notice of Decision
42. The judge’s decision contains no error of law and stands. The Secretary of State’s appeal fails and is dismissed.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 April 2026