Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003644

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62486/2023
LP/12993/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between

HM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at Field House on 8 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Anonymity was ordered by the Upper Tribunal. No application to discharge was made. It remains in force in the terms below.

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal for international protection.
Background to the appellant’s case
2. The appellant’s case in summary is that he is at risk on return to Bangladesh because of his actual or imputed political opinion. The appellant as a member of the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chatra Dal (BJCD) which is the student wing of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). The appellant was active, held positions of responsibility and he was detained in 2018 for three months. There was a further false case lodged against the appellant in 2021 where allegations were made of sexual assault albeit the appellant said that this had a political motivation underpinning it.
The respondent’s refusal of the appellant’s asylum claim
3. The respondent accepted that the appellant was a low level member of the BNP. The respondent did not accept that the appellant was of adverse interest to the authorities. The respondent considered the fact that the appellant was able to leave lawfully was demonstrative of a lack of risk. There were inconsistencies and the account was lacking in detail which all were said to further undermine the credibility of the claim.
The First-tier Tribunal’s decision
4. The Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal. Whilst the Judge accepted that the appellant was a low level member of the BNP and the appellant had been detained the Judge ultimately concluded that there was not a real risk to the appellant on return to Bangladesh.
Grounds and discussion at the hearing
5. For clarity I have referred to the grounds in the format that they were made in the application for permission to appeal rather than the grant, therefore as letters rather than numbers. The advocates assisted me greatly in setting out their respective positions, however, for the reasons given below I ultimately concluded that the determination of the First-tier does not contain errors of law.
6. Tuning to Ground A which avers that the Judge gave inadequate reasons for rejecting the credibility of the appellant’s claim. It is trite to say that the determination must be read as whole, but this is an important overarching point because when the determination is considered in that way it is clear, structured and it is apparent to the reader why the Judge came to the decision that they did. It is submitted that the Judge “relied heavily” on the fact that the appellant was able to leave Bangladesh legally and inadequate reasons were given for why this undermined the core of the account. On one hand properly understood that ground of challenge is also a challenge to the weight that the Judge attached to the appellant’s ability to leave legally without difficulty. It is trite to say, but weight is of course a matter for the Judge. However even placing this observation to one side in fairness to the Judge the ability to leave lawful is one factor that causes the Judge to conclude that the appellant’s claim to be at risk was not a credible one. At §15-16 of the determination the Judge explains that notwithstanding the period of detention he noted unimpeded political activity, the absence of further detention and regular reporting in addition to the lawful exit were all factors that pulled away from risk. As to the criminal proceedings, the Judge addressed these at §§17–20 and gave cogent reasons for finding that the allegations lacked a political motive, thereby detracting from the claimed risk arising from political opinion. In reality, this ground discloses no more than disagreement with findings that were rationally open to the Judge.
7. Ground A also raises a discreet issue about Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc. ) Act 2004 and it is said that the Judge erred in their approach as this was not a determinative factor. Again having considered the determination as a whole, there is nothing in form or substance within the determination to indicate that delay was accorded determinative weight. The Judge was statutorily required to consider the delay point but he has not elevated this to being a determinative factor. In fact in §16 the Judge considers it along with the other evidence, which is the correct approach, and explains the reason why it weighs against the appellant being credible about his risk.
8. For the reasons given above Ground A does not disclose an error of law.
9. Moving to Ground B in which it is advanced that the Judge failed to give adequate weight to the appellant’s past persecution. Whilst it is correct there is no direct reference to 339K of the Immigration Rules within the body of the determination there is no requirement for the Judge to cite it. The Judge clearly refers within their decision to the previous detention at §15. However it is important to bear in mind the wording of 339K and that it is not drafted as being determinative of future risk. Put another way, it was open to the Judge to find, on the basis that there was no ongoing adverse interest by the authorities in the three years preceding the Appellant’s departure, despite his continuing political activity. That was a decision that was open to the Judge to reach. It is also averred that the Judge gave insufficient consideration of the appellant’s attack on his brother. Quite properly the grounds do not allege that there has been no consideration of this as it is clearly recorded within the determination at §25. The Judge ultimately gave reasons for attaching limited weight to this aspect of the evidence, his reasons are detailed at §25 and included the change in the country conditions, which I shall touch upon in my consideration of Ground C in more depth. The Judge considered the expert evidence (it is not suggested that he did not) and gave reasons for attenuating the weight attached to that report at §23. The Judge gave adequate reasons for why he reached a finding that was open to him. Ground B therefore does not disclose an error of law.
10. Finally on Ground C and the failure to consider the country evidence in the round. Drilled down this ground is a complaint about the treatment of the Country Policy Information Note CPIN (Bangladesh: Political Parties and Affiliation) (‘the CPIN’). Again this is not a ground where it is suggested that the Judge has not considered the CPIN or indeed that he should not have considered it. Rather it is submitted that it has not been considered sufficiently fulsomely and in the round. Specific paragraphs have been highlighted but again this approach could be said to be “cherry picking” which is in effect the criticism of the Judge’s approach to the CPIN. There is no requirement for the Judge to quote each part of the evidence. At §22-25 of the determination the Judge grapples with the CPIN and concludes that low-level BNP members are not at real risk in the current climate. The Judge has not assumed that regime change automatically eliminated all risk. Rather, the judge considered the appellant’s personal profile and the evidence before them, including the expert report and the background information, and reached the sustainable finding that nothing demonstrated a present individualised risk.
11. On the final point raised in Ground C this misunderstands the Judge’s decision in that there was no requirement to consider state protection as it was found that there was no risk to the appellant. Ground C does not demonstrate an error of law.
12. For the reasons I have set out above the grounds have not demonstrated that the determination contains a material error of law.

Notice of Decision
13. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.
14. There is an anonymity order in this case which continues

RA Pickering
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Date: 16 February 2026