Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003646
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66977/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

9th July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEITH

Between

‘SU’
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Mavrantonis of Counsel, instructed by Barclay Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. This is because the appeal relates to a claimed fear of persecution.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. In a decision promulgated on 18 November 2025 (annexed to this decision), Upper Tribunal Judge Keith found an error of law in the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cottis who dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 13 December 2023 refusing his protection and human rights claims. The decision was set aside with preserved findings of fact (set out further below) and this is the remaking of the Appellant’s appeal on three outstanding issues: first, whether the Appellant is at real risk on return to Bangladesh; secondly, whether there is a sufficiency of protection available to the Appellant in Bangladesh; and finally whether the Appellant could internally relocate in Bangladesh. There was no challenge to the findings in relation to the Appellant’s Article 8 claim, at paragraph 38 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, which are preserved as a whole and the Appellant’s position that his Article 8 claim in any event stands or falls with his protection claim. As a consequence, no further detailed findings on Article 8 are made in this decision.
2. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh who first arrived in the United Kingdom on 3 April 2021 with leave to enter as student. He ceased studying a few months into his course when he was unable to continue paying the fees for it. The Appellant claimed asylum on 23 September 2021, further to which he was interviewed and made further representations in support of his claim.
3. The essence of the Appellant’s claim before us is that he remains at risk on return to Bangladesh on the basis of his political opinion and affiliation with Jamaat-e-Islami (“Jel”) and its student wing, Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibi (“BICS”) from members of the Awami League and that the risk subsists despite the fall of the Awami League government in August 2024 and a newly elected government in February 2026, during which elections Jel won 77 seats albeit is not in power (the Bangladeshi National Party having won the majority of seats).
4. The Respondent initially refused the claim, in summary, on the basis that the Appellant’s claim was not considered to be credible as it was inconsistent, lacking in evidence, elements were implausible and inconsistent with external information, and the documents relied upon in support had no weight when considered in the round. The Respondent also decided that the Appellant was not entitled to humanitarian protection on essentially the same grounds that he would not be at risk on return to Bangladesh. In relation to private and family life, the claim was refused on the basis that the Appellant did not meet the requirements of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds (essentially as there were no very significant obstacles to reintegration) and no claimed family life in the United Kingdom. Finally, there were no exceptional or compassionate circumstances to warrant a grant of leave to remain outside of the Immigration Rules.
5. The detailed reasons are set out below, but the Respondent’s position in summary now is that following the change of government in Bangladesh, the Appellant is not in any event at risk on return from the Awami League as initially claimed and that in any event, there are now options of internal relocation and a sufficiency of protection available to him on return to Bangladesh.
6. Before addressing the detail in this appeal, we record that during the course of the hearing, we raised a number of issues in relation to the expert report such that instructions could be taken, if necessary, on those matters, during the brief adjournment due to interpreter issues (set out further below). Following that, Mr Mavrantonis made an application for an adjournment to seek further information from the expert. We refused that application on the basis that on reflection, the points we raised as potential issues were not ones which were raised by or relied upon by the Respondent and were not necessary to consider to fairly decide this appeal. In addition, there had already been a number of delays and adjournments in the final hearing of this appeal and any further delays were not in the parties’ interests.
The appeal
Legal framework
7. There is no dispute between the parties as to the applicable legal framework under the Refugee Convention, which we therefore set out only in the briefest of terms. . To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof is upon the Appellant. As per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. We must determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
a) Taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason;
b) Considering the credibility of the account, the Appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason;
c) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
e) The Appellant could not internally relocate.
8. Given the Appellant’s prior treatment, we have considered Para [339K] of the Immigration Rules, specifically:
“339K. The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.”
9. In referring to Para [339K], we have not excluded from our consideration Paras [339L] to [339N].
Appellant’s evidence
10. In the course of this appeal, the Appellant has made three written statements. In his first statement, signed and dated 14 June 2024, the Appellant responds to the reasons for refusal of his claim. This statement was made prior to the fall of the Awami League government in August 2024 and in the main deals with matters upon which there are preserved findings of fact; such that we do not set out the detail from this statement save for on the following points which may have relevance to the remaining live issues.
11. First, in that statement the Appellant stated that the false case against him from 2013 is still running and that he has been deemed an absconder since 4 June 2015, with a live arrest warrant against him because he did not appear in Court in Bangladesh. The Appellant noticed that there was a mistake by the Bangladeshi Court as to the date of case documents (2023 not 2013) which he was seeking to have amended through a lawyer in Bangladesh.
12. Secondly, in relation to sur place activity, the Appellant refers to online posts against the Awami League and in favour of Jel which has drawn adverse attention and threats. The Appellant posts regularly online, including poems and has written a book about how people leave Bangladesh for a better and safe life abroad (a copy of the book is included in the Tribunal bundle). The Appellant has also attended meetings and demonstrations against the former Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina. He is a member and Assistant Secretary of a human rights organisation in the United Kingdom (Nirapod), assisting in organising and running campaigns, demonstrations and seminars focusing on breach of civil liberties and lack of democratic accountability in Bangladesh.
13. In his second written statement signed and dated 16 December 2024, he states that Bangladesh is in disorder following the resignation of Sheikh Hasina with uncertain circumstances, but the Awami League continue to have considerable power with members still remaining in public positions and a lack of likelihood of Jel gaining any power in government, despite the ban on it being lifted. Leaders and activists of Jel remain in detention or hiding due to past charges which have not been dropped.
14. In his final written statement, signed and dated 8 December 2025, the Appellant maintains his fear on return to Bangladesh as a member of Jel from the Awami League and describes the situation in Bangladesh as one of uncertainty and disorder. In particular, he states that the Awami League still has a lot of power and remain officially active in all departments of the country, government and police, including the offices of the President and current Army leaders. The Appellant states that the Awami League continue to conduct illegal and terrorist activities in Bangladesh and may return to power at any time. As to the then forthcoming elections, the Appellant stated that there was no likelihood of Jel gaining any power in government.
15. The Appellant states that there remains a live arrest warrant against him, that he is currently deemed an absconder and on return he will be arrested, detained, heavily persecuted and prosecuted. The Appellant maintains that his parents have been threatened that he will be killed on return to Bangladesh if he does not stop his online activities and take down his posts; the threats being made in person and on the phone. The Appellant states he would be known as a Jel member anywhere in the country and there would be no state protection as there is too much else going on in the country and because he is a political opponent. The Appellant ends by seeking permission to remain in the United Kingdom based on his subjective fear, his established private life and exceptional circumstances.
16. The Appellant attended the hearing, adopted his written statements and gave oral evidence through a court appointed Syhleti interpreter. During the initial part of the Appellant’s oral evidence, there were clear difficulties with the interpretation of his evidence by the interpreter and although we gave directions to the interpreter as to the type and standard of interpretation required and a brief break for her to consider the same, the difficulties continued to the extent that we were not satisfied that sufficiently accurate interpretation was begin given. The primary difficulty in interpretation was that this was being in done in the third person rather than word-for-word translation, but the interpreter also informed us that she was both confused and uncomfortable during the hearing; such that it was not fair to anyone to continue. We adjourned the hearing until later in the day when a new interpreter could attend, resuming in the afternoon for the Appellant to conclude his evidence. With the benefit of a new interpreter, we gave the parties the opportunity to re-put any particular questions to the Appellant if there were any concerns as to previous answers or to put any matters to him for clarification. Nothing further was asked or raised.
17. In cross-examination, the Appellant was asked about whether he had taken any steps to have the case against him in Bangladesh reviewed or dropped. He first stated only that his case was ongoing, then when asked again that he had tried but his opponent did not let him. On further questioning, the Appellant stated that he tried to do this when the interim government was in power and again through his father and political leaders but they could not do anything about the case. When asked why there was no evidence of this, the Appellant stated that his lawyer and father tried to do it, but there were no written documents. There were phone conversations between his father and the lawyers and other political leaders also tried to do this through the courts but it did not happen. The Appellant was asked if his political party had referred his case to the inter-ministerial group considering politically motivated cases, to which he stated that there are many other cases being tried before his, so they haven’t got to his yet. When clarification was sought, the Appellant stated that his political party has not contacted anyone about his case, he asked his local leader, Faqrul Islam to do so on the phone, but he said he has no power to do anything, the court case will proceed.
18. The Appellant was asked whether there were any recent threats from his political opponents. He stated that there were, that his father was indirectly threatened about him and he was personally getting bad messages and threats on Facebook messenger and comments on posts. He confirmed that he has not provided any recent examples, only the letter from his father. The Appellant stated that his father had been to the police about two months ago, on a single occasion, to file a FIR about the threats but his complaint was not accepted.
19. We asked some further questions for clarification. The Appellant stated that Faqrul Islam is the president of Syhlet Jamaat, the local leader of his party. The Appellant had spoken directly to his lawyer in Bangladesh and his understanding of what happens next in his case is that his lawyer told him it was a very difficult matter, that the court may give a verdict against him, take him to jail and punish him. He said that there was no procedure for having the case set aside, it can not be dropped and is ongoing, with a hearing due in a very long time, maybe in six months time, which was the Appellant’s estimate based on there being a lot of cases to be handled.
20. We asked why the Appellant’s case could not be referred to the inter-ministerial committee, to which he replied that the police are still existing as before and are letting the case go ahead, and that the Appellant is seen as a personal threat because of what he has written and his online activity for an opposition political party. The Appellant stated that the police could stop his case being referred to the committee because they are the people who made the case against him. After a pause for the new interpreter, we asked the question again as to how the police would stop Mr Islam from referring the Appellant’s case to the inter-ministerial committee, to which he stated that he was told Mr Islam contacted the police as he said this was the only way, that it was the police who had to withdraw the case. After being referred to the expert report about cases being referred by the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”) and Jel to the committee, the Appellant stated that it was only BNP cases that were being referred and not Jel ones as they were in opposition. When referred to the report which included numbers of Jel cases being reviewed, the Appellant stated that this was only during the interim government and now the BNP is in power they are not taking any such cases and there are still 100,000 cases pending in the capital alone. The Appellant stated that his political leader told him that no Jel cases were being considered now. In re-examination, the Appellant stated most of these outstanding cases were Jel ones.
21. The Appellant stated that all of the police and judges in place are still those that were initially appointed by the Awami League, such that they will not give him a fair judgment as they were the ones who originally fabricated the case against him and will proceed with the false case.
22. If arrested on return, the Appellant did not know if he could apply for bail and when asked if he had spoken to his solicitor about this, he stated he was told that if he returned, he fears what they would do to the Appellant, the police may arrest him, or may disappear him. In re-examination the Appellant said he was not sure about this as he was confused by what his solicitor told him.
Expert evidence
23. A written expert report from Md Solaiman (Tushar) dated 8 December 2025 was available, which we do not set out the detail of as it was amended/updated on 16 March 2026 and so far as can be ascertained, the latter includes all of the original report, albeit the amendments are not marked up in any way to identify these specifically.
24. The updated report of 16 March 2026 did not, at the time of filing, contain the annexures referred to within the report as to the Expert’s profile and qualifications or the expert’s declaration as to his duty to the Tribunal. We were told at the hearing that this was an oversight by the Appellant’s solicitors who received two separate files and the annexes were forwarded separately to us and the Respondent during the course of the hearing. No issue was taken on this by the Respondent.
25. Md Solaiman (Tushar) is a practicing Advocate at the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, is a member of the Bangladesh Supreme Court Bar Association and Head of Chambers at ‘LexAria & Jurists’ in Dhaka; has legal qualifications from the United Kingdom and was called to the Bar in England and Wales. His EIN profile as an expert states that he is legally qualified to verify any legal documents. In addition, Mr Solaiman is a journalist in Bangladesh and holds the post of ‘Legal Affairs and Political Editor’ of the Daily Campus, as well as being a columnist with regular articles in the Daily Sun, the Daily Observer, the Daily New Nation, the Daily Prothom Alo, the Daily Manabzamin, the Dainik Bangla 71, the Daily Campus and the Daily Amar Desh; writing on issues including human rights, the criminal justice system, politics, education and so on. He cites some 56 countries, including Bangladesh, on which he has capacity and experience to give expert opinions on, with a range of topics given for each country.
26. We summarise the main parts of the report by the questions put to Mr Solaiman to answer as follows:
a) What is the current backlog in cases, and how long will it take for the Appellant’s bail to be heard and also for his case to be heard? [paras 6 to 10] In essence, Mr Solaiman states that the case documents the Appellant has submitted are reliable and genuine; that there are significant and growing backlogs in the court system (over 46.52 lakh across all the courts, some 6.16 lakh of which were in the High Court and 37,0002 pending appeal cases); that generally bail applications can be heard and decided on relatively quickly, sometimes within a few working days and appeals can be heard within a few weeks, but each case is dependent on its facts and court availability
b) If the Appellant is arrested and detained on return to Bangladesh, how long is he likely to be detained for? [paras 11 to 17] The report sets out the punishments for the different sections of the Penal Code that the Appellant stands accused of. Some background information on arrest warrants is provided and a statement that it is likely that the Appellant would need to surrender on return and he would be sent to prison as he has absconded, and it is unlikely that he would be granted bail. Mr Solaiman states that as the Appellant is overseas and has absconded, “these procedural requirements render him unable to defend the case” thereby weakening his legal position (the procedural requirements are not set out) and the “rules of the criminal legal system deny legal benefits to absconding individuals, further eroding the Appellant’s ability to secure a fair hearing or contest the allegations against him” (the rules are not set out) and diminishes his legal standing. The arrest warrant remains indefinitely and in the author’s opinion, on return to Bangladesh he would be at risk of enforced disappearance, arrest, or extra judicial killing.
c) Can the Appellant’s case be summarily dismissed without full trial? [para 18]The report states that in general terms, if there is sufficient prosecution evidence, a case cannot be summarily dismissed, but if not, or if there are significant procedural errors, it can be.
d) Are politically motivated cases being withdrawn by the government? [paras 19 to 28] The report refers to a statement on 14 August 2025 by Dr Nazrul that all cases filed based on the student movement from 1 July to 5 August 2025 will be withdrawn and on 16 March 2025, the interim government recommended withdrawing 6,202 “politically motivated” cases filed during the Awami League government and a central committee formed by the home ministry reviewed cases submitted by field-level committees. The interim government was preparing to withdraw a further 11,448 “political harassment” cases against activists in the BNP, Jel and Hifazat-e-Islam following recommendations from an inter-ministerial committee, out of 17,244 cases referred (the process for the remainder was ongoing). Political parties were invited to send new lists of cases to the inter-ministerial committee, with around 16,000 submitted by the BNP in January 2025; 1200 by Jel in April 2025 and 44 by Hifazat-e-Islam on May 2025; with roughly half cleared for withdrawal. Progress in some cases is said to have been slow due to missing documents. Over 1200 further cases were withdrawn by February 2026.
i) Mr Solaiman states [at 23] that there has been no systematic review or dismissal of cases filed during the Awami League government against opposition activists; with a focus on general law and order rather than addressing politically targeted prosecutions, which continue [at 24].
ii) He further states that reports from credible human rights organisations (not named) and local media (not cited) confirm that “opposition members still face harassment, arbitrary arrests, and ongoing legal threats despite the political transition at the national level. Therefore, there is no evidence that the interim government has taken meaningful steps to quash politically motivated criminal charges, and affected individuals remain at serious risk if returned to Bangladesh” [at 25].
e) What are prison conditions like in Bangladesh? [paras 29 to 36] As set out below, the Appellant is not pursuing his appeal on the basis of any risk of breach of Article 3 in relation to prison conditions and therefore we do not set out here any summary of the expert evidence on this point.
f) What is the current situation with police, and law and order in Bangladesh? Has there been significant and durable political changes in Bangladesh? [paras 37 to 62] In short, Mr Solaiman’s opinion was that whilst there had been significant factual changes since the fall of the previous government, the current situation is unstable, with violent clashes, robberies and attacks, including some killings, as well as election-based violence (with specific incidents detailed) and widespread lawlessness. The author states that, “the government has struggled to maintain order amidst attempted coups, judicial challenges, and organized retaliatory actions by Awami League supporters, creating an environment of extreme volatility and impunity” [at 53] with opposition members facing systematic targeting, with a well-documented pattern of politically motivated arrests, false cases and attacks (at para [54]).
i) Reference is made to reports from credible international observers (not identified, nor are reports cited) of human rights violations, with disproportionate risk faced by opposition party members (at para [56]).
ii) Overall Mr Solaiman concludes that the Appellant’s fear of persecution and violence is credible and immediate, with his return to Bangladesh placing him at serious risk of detention, ill-treatment or death (at para 57]).
iii) The report refers to the BNP winning a two-thirds majority in the elections held on 12 February 2026 and the return of the BNP leader to Bangladesh after spending 17 years in the United Kingdom; with 84 cases against him being cleared by the court and multiple criminal cases being dropped (at para [58 and 59]).
g) What are the political protections available to individuals in Bangladesh? [paras 63 to 65] This section of the report sets out the constitutional protections and means of redress against violations, but states that there are significant challenges to the practical implementation of such rights, including due to impunity for abuses and corruption.
h) Comment on the reliability and independent of the Bangladeshi judiciary in politically sensitive cases? [paras 66 to 70] In summary, the independence of the judiciary is considered to be weak due to the politicisation of it, lack of due process and executive interference. Details of numbers of judges are given, including 1841 out of 2185 appointed during the Awami League government, with party members being given priority in appointments and therefore the Appellant would be unlikely to get a fair trial from one of these judges appointed during the previous regime. The author concludes that “Given that the charges against the Appellant are demonstrably false and politically motivated, and that his political opponents wield influence over law enforcement and the judiciary in his locality, it is extremely unlikely that he would receive an impartial trial. Arrest and detention would expose him to prolonged imprisonment, ill-treatment, and potentially life-threatening circumstances without any realistic prospect of justice.” (at [para 70]).
i) Viability and safety of internal relocation? [paras 71 to 75] In summary, Mr Solaiman’s opinion is that neither internal relocation nor state protection would be reasonable or effective for the Appellant because of the highly personal, politically motivated and entrenched risks he faces; including those received directly and to his parents by the Awami League; with localised politicians having the means and motivation to pursue the Appellant anywhere in Bangladesh and without reliable or meaningful protection from either complicit or ineffective state institutions.
j) The remainder of the report contained general observations, much of which detailed particular incidents or violence, primarily from 2024; a statement that the Awami League is now actively working to take revenge for their removal from power [at 81] and a reiteration of the risks already identified in relation to the Appellant.
27. In relation to the supplementary expert report of Mr Solaiman dated 16 March 2026, the Respondent, in a position statement dated 8 May 2026, accepted the author’s general expertise and noted that his CV was available and accessible in the EIN expert’s directory. On substantive matters in the report, the Respondent made the following points:
a) In relation to [parass 7 and 8] of the addendum report, the author has not demonstrated that he is a document expert, nor was there any reference to or consideration of the relevant CPIN and therefore little weight should be placed on his opinion that the documents are reliable and genuine.
b) In relation to [para 17], the author has not cited any sources for the statements made as to the risk of arrest by security forces and that there would be no state protection if attacked by the Awami League.
c) In relation to [paras20 and 23], the author does not cite any sources in support of the assertion at 23 that “there has been no systematic review or dismissal of cases filed during her government against opposition activities”, which is contrary to the withdrawal of 11,448 political harassment cases cited at [para 20].
d) In relation to [paras 24 and 25], there is again a lack of sources identified despite the reference therein to reports from credible human rights organisations about risks faced by opposition members.
e) In relation to the report generally, the opinion is based on references to outdated and isolated incidents taking place, mostly from 2024 (paras [39, 40 and 41] in particular) rather than reflecting the current situation now.
f) In relation to [paras 82 and 83] as to possible risks to the Appellant on return to Bangladesh, these are based on an assumption that the Appellant’s claim is credible rather than based on objective background country information as to the current political situation.
28. Mr Solaiman responded to the Respondent’s points above on 14 May 2026, including in a number of places to simply repeat matters stated in the addendum report without further explanation or sources being cited and not all matters were responded to at all.
29. In response to (a), Mr Solaiman set out his professional qualifications and experience to state that he is legally qualified to verify any legal documents in Bangladesh and regularly does so.
30. In response to (b) he refers to section 75 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a warrant remains in force indefinitely and due to the political instability and political rivalry, members of Jel and BICS are at risk from the Awami League and as member of BICS, the “Appellant is not out of risk”. Further, due to the history of politically motivated abuse by law enforcement officers under the Awami League, the Appellant may not be able to rely on effective state protection due to the risk of rogue Awami League members.
31. In response to (c), Mr Solaiman refers to the election in February 2026 in which the BNP won a two thirds majority with 212 seats out of 299; compared with 77 seats won by the Jel.
32. In response to (d), Mr Solaiman refers to a number of specific instances of violence reported by Odhikar and the Human Rights Support Society, with press articles cited as sources and the ‘Tri-Country Parliamentary Elections, Referendums and Human Rights Situation Review: Expectations of Civil Society’ report (essentially repeating what was substantively contained already in the addendum report).
Other documentary evidence
33. There is an affidavit dated 3 December 2025 from the Appellant’s father who sets out the Appellant’s history (not repeated here as there are preserved findings of fact in relation to this) and claims that because of the Appellant’s continued online activism against the Awami League, people have been sending him threats online and turning up at the family home in Bangladesh to threaten his father directly about him. He states that on many occasions, people from the Awami League have marched to his house to threaten him and threaten to kill the Appellant unless he stops. The Appellant’s father has been sworn at, harassed and has received threatening calls and he states that he does not have the connections or resources to protect the Appellant nor take care of him in Bangladesh.
34. The Appellant’s father also states that the current political situation in Bangladesh is violent, messy and uncertain, with problems and attacks on a daily basis and no order has been created even by the new Prime Minister.
35. There are three letters from Mohd Delwar Hossain, Advocate, enrolled with the Bangladesh Bar Counsel and a member of the District Bar Association. The first is dated 4 April 2023 and states that there is a case against the Appellant in the Metropolitan Magistrate 1st Court, Sylhet and as he did not appear before the court, a warrant of arrest was issued. A certified copy of the case from the Court was attached.
36. The second letter is dated 4 June 2024 stating that on behalf of the Appellant he has collected documents from the court and that the current status of the case against him is ‘taking witness’. Mr Hossain states that he is worried the Appellant will be sentenced in this case and that he is not able to make any representations on his behalf as he has absconded (since 4 June 2017). There remains a valid arrest warrant for the Appellant.
37. The last letter is dated 28 November 2025 and states that having contacted the Court for an update on the Appellant’s case, he has been informed that the case remains open. There has been no change since the last letter, there is a valid arrest warrant against the Appellant as he absconded pending conviction and he did not appear before the Court. Mr Hossain’s experience is that similar cases and most politically motivated cases remain actively pursued and open and have not been struck out despite the change in government.
38. The Appellant’s bundle also contains various news articles and background country reports dating between 2019 and 2023, and a number of letters of support dating back to 2023 or earlier. These all cover the period prior to change of government and as such do not require individual reference here to determine the outstanding issues. None of this earlier material was specifically relied upon by either party at the hearing before us.
39. The Appellant has also provided translated copies of various Facebook posts from 2020 onwards, upon which preserved findings of fact have already been made and no new material from Facebook was added to the bundle for this stage of the appeal.
40. The parties both refer to the Respondent’s ‘Country Policy and Information Note, Bangladesh: Political situation’ version 1, dated December 2024 (the “CPIN”); which we have considered in full.
Closing submissions
The Respondent
41. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Clewley relied on the reasons for refusal letter, the Respondent’s review and the supplementary correspondence as to the more recent developments in Bangladesh and in relation to the expert evidence. Ms Clewley noted that further to the preserved findings, there was no further Facebook evidence relied upon by the Appellant and although he has maintained that he and his parents continue to face regular threats due to his political opinion, there was insufficient evidence of this to justify any departure from the preserved finding against the Appellant on this point.
42. In relation to the expert report, Ms Clewley made a number of specific criticisms of this, the main ones of which we set out as follows. First, in relation to [paras 19 to 21] she questioned how the expert’s opinion that there had been no systematic review of politically motivated cases could be reconciled with the statistics he cited of more than 31,000 cases having been cleared (over 20,000 up to May 2025 and a further 11,448 since) and details as to the broadening of the scope of review of such cases to allow parties to submit names of those affected. Further, by reference to [paras 58, 60 and 73] Ms Clewley submitted that the expert’s conclusion based on an expectation that there should have been a blanket withdrawal of every single case rather than individual consideration, did not rationally support the conclusion that there had been no meaningful action to address politically motivated cases and the author failed entirely to consider the efficacy of reviews so far. The efficacy of a review is not undermined in any way by the absence of every single politically motivated case not being quashed and the process was still ongoing. In this particular appeal, the Appellant stated that his name had not yet been put forward for consideration of his own case being quashed.
43. Secondly, as a more general submission, Ms Clewley identified the lack of source material for much of the expert report (including, for example, the incidents in [para 56] of the addendum report and [para 11] of the reply); which contained numerous unsupported assertions and failed to directly address the specific facts of this Appellant’s case. There were also examples where the source material cited was of poor quality (for example, footnotes 8 and 9 in the expert’s reply which were online articles with no identified author or sources) and did not fully support the propositions in the report.
44. Thirdly, in [para 59] of the report, the author referred to the outstanding cases and convictions against the now Prime Minister being quashed and allowing his return to Bangladesh in December 2025. The report does not state that the process required his physical presence in Bangladesh to deal with these cases and to the contrary, indicates that at least some cases were cleared whilst he was in exile. There is no consideration as to why no such process would be open to the Appellant to have the case against him cleared prior to his return to Bangladesh.
45. Fourthly, in relation to [paras 69 and 70] of the addendum report as to the Judiciary in Bangladesh, the author fails to reconcile the relevance of this to the Appellant with the available process set out in [paras 19 and 20] for cases to be withdrawn by a central committee formed by the home ministry and not requiring court proceedings or judicial involvement. The paragraphs also fail to consider the structural changes that have been made since August 2024, including the replacement of officials and promotion of Judges to overcome previous political appointments and reinstatement of police offices forced out by the Awami League (all of which were referred to in the CPIN). Further, the author confirms in paragraph 70 that the “charges against the Appellant are demonstrably false and politically motivated” but concludes that for this reason he would not receive an impartial trial without addressing why if this were the case, there would logically be no difficulty in the Appellant successfully seeking to have his case withdrawn before that point.
46. Fifthly, in relation to [para 18] of the report, Ms Clewley submitted that the single sentence dealing with the question as to whether the Appellant’s case could be summarily dismissed, was wholly inadequate and made no reference at all to the Appellant’s particular circumstances, the evidence against him or the process for possible withdrawal of the case. Further, none of these points were dealt with by the Appellant’s lawyer either.
47. Sixthly, as a general point, Ms Clewley highlighted the use of bias language, such as the reference to ‘miscreants’ in [parah 77] of the addendum report and both a readiness and tendency by the author to adopt or align with a particular political view. She contrasted this with the CPIN which was well-sourced and researched from a variety of identified sources.
48. Finally, in relation to the expert’s reply to the Respondent’s concerns on the addendum report, Ms Clewley again identified the lack of source material for assertions made, such as to procedural requirements referred to in [para 16] and there was a lack of explanation as to why these were not available to this Appellant. The evidence from the Appellant’s lawyer did not support the assertion either. Further, there was no explanation as to whether the Appellant could defend himself in these proceedings, or whether he could engage in them from abroad, or whether there were different procedures which would apply in these circumstances.
49. In relation to the lawyer’s letter, Ms Clewley submitted that this failed to contain relevant information as to what steps the Appellant could take in relation to the outstanding case to have it withdrawn and there is no explanation of why no steps have been taken to do so. The Appellant’s own evidence was that he had not proactively taken any steps in relation to the false charge against him either and Ms Clewley put this as high as him sitting on his hands to bolster his protection claim. The Appellant claims to have held significant political roles, to be politically informed, with various political contacts (including direct contact with the president of his local district in Bangladesh) and financial resources available to him (enough to pursue several applications through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office for the expert to give live evidence from Bangladesh) such that it would be reasonable to expect that the Appellant would have taken steps to pursue the withdrawal of the case against him and no explanation as to why his case has not been referred for review by the Jel given that there is a specific process available for this to be done.
50. Ms Clewley noted that the Appellant has not specifically pursued an Article 3 claim on the basis of prison conditions in Bangladesh, but for completeness relied on SH (prison conditions) Bangladesh CG [2008] UKAIT 00076 that there would be no such violation for ordinary prisoners. The expert report in [para 34] referring to overcrowding and harsh prison conditions does not provide sufficient grounds for departure from this decision and in any event refers to the situation in 2003 (and earlier in relation not medical provision) and fails to reflect the large numbers of politically motivated cases cleared and prisoners released since the fall of the previous government in August 2024. The author also has no relevant expertise in prison conditions and fails to identify sufficient sources for the statements made in relation to it. Finally, in the Appellant’s circumstances, any imprisonment would only be short and as the expert states in [para 15], bail hearings are normally available within days, with no reason why this Appellant would not be granted bail.
51. Overall, the Respondent’s case was that the Appellant had not established a real risk on return to Bangladesh now and that in any event there would be a sufficiency of protection available to him and the option of internal relocation. The expert’s opinion to the contrary on internal relocation was dependent on the Appellant’s claim of ongoing threats to his family on which there is already a preserved finding of fact against him.
52. In relation to Article 8, Ms Clewley submitted that there were no very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration in Bangladesh absent any risk on return and overall, no disproportionate interference with his right to respect for private life.
The Appellant
53. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Mavrantonis relied specifically on the expert evidence and the unusual circumstances that repeated efforts were made approaching both the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the authorities in Bangladesh to allow him to give oral evidence from Bangladesh which were ultimately unsuccessful. The expert evidence relied upon by the Appellant was also noted to be much more up to date than the Respondent’s CPIN, covering the elections in February 2026. Mr Mavrantonis submitted that full weight should be placed on the expert evidence given his expertise and experience to be able to comment on matters in Bangladesh, including on the authenticity of documents.
54. In relation to the specific criticisms of the expert report, these were not on the whole accepted by Mr Mavrantonis, albeit he did not respond individually to the points raised, instead highlighting the paragraphs of the reports that supported the Appellant’s claim. Mr Mavrantonis did accept that there were aspects of the expert reports that failed to focus on the facts of this particular Appellant’s case (as opposed to the general position) and that lacked sufficient detail, such as the failure to set out what procedural requirements were relied upon in [para 15] of the addendum report.
55. Mr Mavrantonis also drew our attention to the evidence from the Appellant’s father; the Appellant’s published book (the fact of which would make him a more known person in Bangladesh), the Facebook evidence (albeit there was no further evidence of this nature since the First-tier Tribunal hearing, on the basis that these documents were relevant to show the Appellant’s profile and risk on return) and the previous newspaper articles.
56. As to the human rights claims, Mr Mavrantonis confirmed that the Appellant was not pursuing any Article 3 claim based on prison conditions in Bangladesh and that his Article 8 claim stood or fell with his protection claim.
Findings and reasons
57. We begin by setting out the preserved findings of fact from the First-tier Tribunal and then consider the weight to be attached to the various sources of evidence; before setting out our findings on the three issues outstanding in this appeal.
58. The preserved findings of fact are as follows:
“11. The key facts in the appellant’s claim may be summarised as follows:
(a) The appellant joined BICS in 2011 and remained an active member of it until he left Bangladesh for the UK on a student visa in April 2021, holding increasingly senior positions during that time, including membership of the BICS Sylhet City central committee and becoming president of various units, organisations and regions forming part of BICS.
(b) As well as activities in person, he was an online activitist, using his abilities as a writer and poet to spread the word of BICS, including being very vocal against the Awami League (“AL”) government. This attracted the adverse attention of members of the AL and its student wing, who targeted and harassed him.
(c) In November 2013 there was a strike against the government which the appellant attended along with other Jel members. In March 2014 he was arrested in connection with this and charged (with others) with throwing Molotov cocktails, damaging a rickshaw and causing public panic. He was detained for around a month and tortured while in police custody, before being released on bail. He subsequently failed to appear at court proceedings in connection with the case. There is an outstanding warrant for his arrest as a result.
(d) He remained in Bangladesh, not able to appear in public and unable to continue his studies, until he obtained a student visa to study at a UK university, leaving for the UK in April 2021. Relatively soon after his arrival his father suffered business problems and failed to make further payments of fees, with the result that he could not continue his studies in the UK. He claimed asylum in September 2021.
(e) Since arriving in the UK he has remained active online, and with the human rights organisation Nirapod Banglideshi Chaai and with Jel in the UK.
…
34. I then turn to the question of whether the appellant is at risk from non-state actors. As regards objective evidence, my attention has been drawn to the translated posts on pages 142 and 146 of the bundle, in which what appears to be the same individual threatens to “cut [the appellant] to pieces” if he returns to Bangladesh. The year in which these posts were made is not clear but based on the transition date stamp, at the latest they were posted in March 2024. There is no evidence as to who this individual is. If the appellant can identify him he would be able to get the help of the police in ensuring that the individual is dissuaded from carrying out his threat. In his witness statement the appellant states that he receives a lot of online attention and threats, however my attention has only been drawn to this one individual making two threats, and I note that many of the appellant’s Facebook posts provided in evidence appear to attract relatively low numbers of comments of any sort. Based on what he has provided in evidence I find that he has exaggerated the extent of the attention and threats he receives online.
35. The appellant asserted in oral evidence that threats to him and his parents are being made to his parents in Bangladesh, however no evidence has been provided to support these assertions. His second witness statement made in December 2024 did not refer to continuing threats being made to him via his parents. He left Bangladesh four years ago. Applying the lower standard, I do not accept that he continues to be threatened via his parents with death or serious harm. On return he would be able to enlist the help of the authorities should threats to him be made. He has the education and family and political connections to be able to relocate and find suitable work elsewhere in Bangladesh if there were a localised threat to him in his home city of Sylhet. …”
59. As to the further evidence before us, we consider first the weight to be attached to the reports of Mr Solaiman and in doing so, take into account the unsuccessful efforts by the Appellant to obtain permission for him to give oral evidence in relation to this appeal but also that a written process was followed in which the Respondent’s issues with the addendum report were put to him and responded to.
60. We attach very little weight to Mr Solaiman’s reports, for the more specific reasons that follow, which on the whole we found to be of a very poor quality and lacking in relevant detail to the issues to be determined in this case:
a) The reports contain a substantial amount of vague assertions and opinion which is wholly unsupported by any sources. For example, there is no supporting evidence of: the risk of arrest and no state protection [para 17]; arbitrary arrests and ongoing legal threats against opponents of the Awami League [para 25]; any attempted coups [para 54]; or systematic targeting of the Jel or BICs [para 54]; or of the Awami League actively working to take revenge [para 81].
b) A substantial amount of the report is simply copied and pasted from news articles (subject to minor amendments to identify, for example, the name of the student camp being referred to in one article, or to add a specific date where an article refers to a day of the week) without any express recognition that this is what was done by way of quotation. This was the case for all but a few of the news articles cited. The report reads as if Mr Solaiman has written it himself, without the news articles being identified with quotation marks, but when one looks at the sources, the majority of the material is simply copied word for word from various press articles.
c) The quality of the sources cited is questionable and their credibility is not self-evidently assessed or considered by Mr Solaiman. For example, numerous press articles cited have no identified author. The figures from one article (at footnote 13) are quoted by Mr Solaiman, but not the caveat contained in the article itself that states the numbers could not be independently verified. Further, there is no direct reference to some of the source material cited within those articles, such as that in footnote 8 of the reply which refers to a newspaper article about report from Odhikar with no indication the report itself was considered, which would self-evidently be a more reliable source than a news article about it. Similarly, Mr Solaiman has not referred directly to or cited the Human Rights Support Society report referred to in both the addendum report and the reply (footnote 9) or the Human Rights Watch report referred to in the article at footnote 24 and instead relied on news articles about them. In other instances, Mr Solaiman refers only to news articles about press releases from the government rather than considering or citing the press releases themselves. Other than news articles and parts of the legal framework, the report cites only three official sources: one is a research paper on prison conditions (that the link provided does not work for), one is a US State Department Report (from which one paragraph is extracted verbatim, without being identified as a direct quote) and the other is the Respondent’s CPIN.
d) The sources that are cited, or from which extracts are copied into the report from, do not necessarily support the assertions that they are cited for. For example, the article cited in footnote 8 of the reply (itself in response to the Respondent highlighting the lack of any sources in paragraph 25 of the addendum report) does not support the claim that only opposition members still face harassment (the article refers to victims of violence from the BNP, Jel, the Awami League and others not involved at all in politics) nor does it make any reference to any continuing arbitrary arrests or ongoing legal threats to opposition members. The further source identified at footnote 9 of the reply similarly fails to identify a risk or incidents only to opposition members, but also to women, children and those not directly involved in politics and does not address arbitrary arrests or ongoing legal threats either.
e) A number of the extracts included from news articles fail to fairly reflect some of the relevant detail from the same. For example, the article cited in footnote 2 which refers to the backlog of cases also included as a focus the delay in high profile murder cases (rather than any problem with politically motivated cases) and detail as to the courts disposal of constitutional and political cases, as well as reforms to the judiciary that have been introduced to reduce the backlog. The part copied into the report paints only a picture of a growing problem relevant to this Appellant without reflecting changes underway which may affect this. Another example is from paragraph 22 and the article cited at footnote 19, which includes reference to a ministry expectation of nearly 500,0001 people being relieved from harassment cases and includes far more detail as to the process for dealing with such cases, with two different level committees (only one of which is included in the report). This lack of additional is relevant to the conclusion that follows in paragraph 25 which is inconsistent with the information in this source.
f) The report, in places, fails to address the question asked. For example, when asked whether the Appellant’s case could be summarily dismissed without full trial, Mr Solaiman failed to answer the question at all, giving only a very short, generalised answer about the sufficiency of evidence. Given elsewhere in the report he describes the charges against the Appellant as ‘demonstrably false and politically motivated’ it would be reasonable to expect some assessment of the Appellant’s own circumstances in response to this question. A further example is the answer to what is the current situation with the police, law and order in Bangladesh, which begins with a copied section from a news article about ‘Ansar’ with no explanation of what Ansar is or its relevance to the question. There is then little, if any detail, as to the current policing or law and order beyond examples of incidents and no indication as to whether such incidents are of the same volume or seriousness as at any other time in Bangladesh (such as when the Awami League were in power).
g) In other places, the report goes much wider than the questions asked, for example, with opinions and conclusions which do not relate to the questions or preceding paragraphs and assert things like the Appellant being at risk of enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killing, for which no reasons are given.
h) The report fails to explain relevant references. For example, Mr Solaiman states in paragraph 16 that ‘procedural requirements render him unable to defend his case’ because he is overseas and has absconded; but fails to set out what those procedural requirements are or why they weaken the Appellant’s position, particularly in contrast to the later example given of the now Prime Minister returning to Bangladesh having had over 80 charges against him dropped and/or convictions in his absence overturned. In the same paragraph, there is a generic reference to ‘rules of the criminal legal system’ without identifying what they are, in contrast to other sections of the report which expressly set out the relevant parts of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code (with links to the relevant sections).
i) At paragraph 23, Mr Solaiman concludes that there has been no systematic review or dismissal of cases filed during the Awami League government against opposition activities and at 25, that there is no evidence of meaningful steps to quash politically motivated criminal charges. Those conclusions are directly at odds with the preceding paragraphs and the underling sources relied on for them which set out specific procedures in place for review of politically motivated cases; significant numbers of cases being withdrawn already and that the process is ongoing.
j) The report does not address in any meaningful way, if at all, the evidence in the CPIN, which albeit now somewhat dated, sets out material changes in Bangladesh immediately following the fall of the Awami League government in August 2025. Mr Solaiman does not even refer to any such changes or set out any disagreement with any of the contents of the CPIN, much of which does not support the Appellant’s claim and is not consistent with the opinions expressed in the report.
k) A number of sources relied upon are out of date given the political changes since August 2024, in particular in relation to prison conditions and as to incidents of violence (most of those referred to being from the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Awami League government in August 2024).
l) Mr Solaiman relies on the Appellant’s account of ongoing threats to him and his family in Bangladesh as a basis for his conclusion that there would be no option of internal relocation or sufficiency of state protection; despite being provided with the Tribunal’s decisions which contain preserved findings of fact to the contrary and no new evidence being submitted by the Appellant since then.
m) The reply to the Respondent’s concerns did not actually respond substantively to most of the concerns raised. For example, there was no response to the failure to consider the CPIN; there remained a lack of relevant sources cited; there was no response to the inconsistencies raised as to review of politically motivated cases; no response to the failure to take into account preserved findings of fact; no response to the outdated nature of some of the evidence relied upon and in part, simply a recitation of what had already been said without further expansion or explanation.
61. We have born in mind the principles on expert evidence a MOJ and Others [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC), at [paras 23 to 28] and MS (Trafficking – Tribunal's powers – Article 4 ECHR) Pakistan [2016] UKUT 226 (IAC), at [pars 68 to 69] and the Practice Directions of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal (last updated 18 December 2018 and in respect of the First-tier Tribunal, now superseded by the Senior President’s Practice Direction of 2024)In addition, e consider that expert evidence, particularly an expert report which evaluates information publicly available on the internet, of varying accuracy or reliability (so-called ‘Digital Open Source Information’) will assist the Tribunal if :
(i) It is an independent product of the expert. Source material should not be copied into a report as if written by the author. If material is quoted from sources cited, it should be self-evidently identified as such with quotation marks and a web-link to the source and any translation into English provided, if available, so that source can be transparently evaluated.
(ii) It clearly identifies the sources relied upon for the information contained and, so far as possible, uses the primary source (such as a government press release, NGO report or the like) rather than a news article describing a primary source.
(iii) It directly considers the particular facts of an Appellant’s case where asked to do so, applying the general conclusions to those facts; having due regard to any preserved findings of fact.
(iv) In circumstances where issues have been raised on aspects of an expert report by one of the parties, the expert addresses those concerns directly bearing in mind his or her overriding duty to the Tribunal to assist on matters within the expert’s own expertise. Where an expert is based outside of the United Kingdom and does not have permission to attend to be cross-examined, a written process may be followed. Rigour in the format of the report may limit the questions needed of the expert.
62. What weight is attached to expert evidence will vary from case to case, but reports which recite second or third-hand media articles, instead of the primary source evidence, may have less weight. Sources cited without links and unattributed quotations may similarly undermine confidence in the rigour and quality of the report. Our comments apply to both CPINs and independent experts, but the latter is particularly important as it is rare that the respondent will seek to adduce expert evidence. This means that the Tribunal is frequently reliant on an expert adduced by an appellant only, rather than a joint expert.
63. Bearing in mind that an expert may not be permitted to give evidence from outside the UK (as was the case here), if a party challenging the report has set out their general concerns in advance of the hearing with sufficient time for the expert to respond, a fair process may not require the challenging party to file and serve a request for further information, which is no substitute for the ability to cross-examine a witness. It remains open to a party to rely on an expert who is able to give evidence in the UK or from a country where permission to give evidence is forthcoming. In this case, the Appellant knew of the Respondent’s general concerns about the expert report in advance. As we have found, the expert did not answer all of those questions and there were material gaps in the evidence.
64. In contrast to Mr Solaiman’s reports, in this case, CPIN is more balanced and drawn from a much wider range of official sources and we attach more weight to it for those reasons, albeit the report is now materially out of date given it only deals with the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Awami League government up to December 2024 and not any further changes since, including the election in February 2026. As such, it has limited relevance when assessing the circumstances at the date of hearing in this appeal.
65. We attach only limited weight to the letters from Mohd Delwar Hossain, the Appellant’s lawyer in Bangladesh given they lack detail which it would be reasonable to expect in the context of this appeal and do not contain additional information which the Appellant raised for the first time in oral evidence about advice he says he was given by Mr Hossain. In terms of the detail, there is nothing in the letters to address the specific stage which the court case has reached at the date of hearing (or even date of the last letter, despite the court documents stating that the trial was listed for 20 June 2024); no detailed chronology of proceedings; no estimated timeframe for the conclusion of proceedings; no information on any possible application for bail or prospects of success for the same; no clear detail as to the likely outcome; there is no detail on what the Appellant could do to have his case withdrawn or conversely, why such steps have not been taken; why no representations have been made on the Appellant’s behalf; nor whether any bail application could be made and so on.
66. We do not refer specifically to any other documentary evidence (although we have taken it into account) given that the remainder is either less significant, out-dated and/or preserved findings of fact have already been made on it.
67. We turn now to the Appellant’s credibility, which we have considered in the round with all of the evidence. We take into account the positive findings already made in relation to his credibility as set out above, in particular as to his events prior to his departure from Bangladesh and that there is an outstanding arrest warrant for him there, noting Para 339K of the Immigration Rules Contrary to this, we also take into account the preserved findings rejecting his claim to be subject to ongoing threats directly and to his family in Bangladesh; both of which he continued to rely on without addressing those findings or submitting any up to date or further evidence in support of this claim. Whilst the Appellant is not required to corroborate his claim, it is reasonable in the context of this claim and preserved adverse findings, for further evidence, from Facebook or Messenger or from his family, to have been submitted, when it was so readily available. As above, we have no reason to depart from the preserved findings that there are no current or ongoing threats to the Appellant or his family.
68. Despite the earlier positive credibility findings, we do not find the Appellant’s latest evidence before us to be reliable or credible as to what he refers to as his subjective fear on return. In particular, we found his oral evidence to be inconsistent with the available background country evidence (in the CPIN and in his own expert’s report, particularly as to the availability of referral to the inter-ministerial committee), with the evidence of his own lawyer in Bangladesh; nor was it internally consistent about steps that had, or had not been taken. On numerous occasions in oral evidence, the Appellant failed to answer the question put and was unable to offer any rational or reasonable explanation for his answer (such as on how the police could prevent a political referral to the inter-ministerial committee to have his politically motivated case reviewed). His evidence also included many points of detail that he raised only for the first time during his hearing and which were not supported in the material otherwise relied upon. These included, for example, his dialogue with his lawyer in Bangladesh, about how to get the criminal proceedings against him set aside. We accept Ms Clewley’s submission that the Appellant has, effectively, “sat on his hands” by failing to utilise the inter-ministerial committee procedure from outside Bangladesh, in order to bolster his asylum claim. We do not accept as genuine his evidence that he fears that this process would be ineffective.
69. For these reasons we attach little weight to the Appellant’s latest written and oral evidence before us. We also attach little weight to the affidavit from the Appellant’s father given it was vague, lacking in detail and failed to address the preserved adverse findings on threats to him. At its highest, that statement in any event takes the Appellant’s case no further.
70. When considering all of the above in the round, we reach the following conclusions on the three issues in this appeal as follows.
71. First, we do not find that the Appellant has established, even to the lower standard of proof applicable in protection claims, that he has a genuine and well-founded fear of persecution on return to Bangladesh due to his political opinion and opposition to the Awami League. In summary, this is because of the very significant change of circumstances in Bangladesh with the fall of the Awami League government in August 2024; the reforms and steps taken in the immediate aftermath of that to withdraw politically motivated cases, to ensure fairness and remove political bias from state institutions including the police and judiciary; to the elections in February 2026 in which the Appellant’s own political party won 77 seats (which albeit not in power as the BNP won a two thirds majority, does give not insignificant political representation against the Appellant’s predictions).
72. We acknowledge that the process of change is ongoing in Bangladesh, as is the resolution and withdrawal of politically motivated cases such as those against the Appellant; and that there has been unrest and violence (in late 2024 in particular and in the lead up to the election in February 2026) but not that this has been perpetrated solely by the Awami League or only against their opponents. We further acknowledge that during the 15 or so years of the Awami League government, there were many politically motivated appointments to state institutions and many of those individuals remain in post (although measures have been taken to redress this, such as those set out in paragraph 4.1.4 of the CPIN). However, we find that these factors do not establish, against the significant changes that have already occurred, that the Appellant would now be at risk in Bangladesh from the Awami League; nor that they would be able to act against him with state impunity. [The assertions by Mr Solaiman of continuing threats and adverse actions by the Awami League are insufficiently evidenced as to any likely specific threat to this Appellant
73. We do not find that there is anything in the Appellant’s current circumstances that currently places him at risk in Bangladesh. Whilst there is a current arrest warrant for him, there is clear evidence before us of a process which the Appellant has not yet engaged with for referral of the charges against him to be reviewed and withdrawal. Given Mr Solaiman’s description of the charges being ‘demonstrably false and politically motivated’ and that the Appellant has all of his relevant court documents available, as well as local political leadership contacts in Bangladesh; we see no reason why the Appellant’s case could not successfully be referred or that that would take any unduly long period of time to achieve this. In any event, there is no reasoned basis before us as to why the Appellant could not in the meantime successfully apply for bail and in any event, there is no claim based on prison conditions even if he were to be detained.
74. On the remaining two issues, although not strictly necessary to determine given that we do not find the Appellant to be at risk on return, for completeness we also find that he has available to him the options of internal relocation and a sufficiency of state protection. For essentially the same reasons as already given, there has been significant change in the political landscape in Bangladesh and ongoing reform to state institutions such that there is no evidenced basis upon which to conclude that state protection in particular, to the relevant Horvarth standard, would not be available. There remains the option open to the Appellant of internally relocating away from where he was previously detained and tortured and there is no evidence of substance before us that such internal relocation would be unduly harsh.
Human rights appeal
75. The Appellant has accepted that his human rights appeal on the basis of a right to respect for his private and family life stood or fell with his protection appeal. Whilst we have considered, as we must Sections 117 A and B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, nothing in our analysis and findings affects the conclusion that refusal of leave to remain is in accordance with the Appellant’s Article 8 rights.
Costs
76. We had canvassed with the parties the Appellant’s costs application. The Appellant had applied on 12th January 2026 for the wasted costs of the adjourned remaking hearing on 19th December 2025. The parties had been notified of the hearing in a notice of hearing sent the parties on 24th November 2025. The Appellant initially applied for an adjournment on the basis that whilst this Tribunal had granted the Appellant permission to rely on new evidence, the Appellant had asked the expert to produce a report but within the short time permitted the expert had not responded to confirm his ability to produce such a report. Judge Keith initially refused that request on 26th November 2025, stating that:
“The application has been made late. While the application refers to a delay between the ‘finding on 16 October 2025 and the judgment being ‘received on 18 November’, full oral reasons were given on the day of the hearing on 16 October, at which the appellant was legally represented by counsel. Moreover, there is no indication of when or if the report sought would be provided, so that to delay is merely in the hope that a report will be provided at some point in the future.
77. The Appellant then applied on 2nd December for an extension of time to file and serve a consolidated bundle, including the expert report, by 12 December, for the hearing on 19th December. Judge Keith granted that request on 8th December, stating that:
“The appellant’s application for an extension of time to adduce further evidence and to file and serve a composite bundle is granted. The extension is granted until 12 December.
Once the Respondent has had a chance to review the evidence, she is directed to notify the Appellant and the Tribunal at the earliest opportunity if :
(1) any additional evidence is disputed;
(2) she foresees a need for any expert to be called to give oral evidence and to be cross-examined;
(3) she envisages any risk of needing to apply for an application to adjourn the hearing in light of the new evidence.”
78. The bundle was duly filed on 9th December. We observe that CE-File cannot be used for service of documents. On 16th December 2026, the Respondent applied for an adjournment of the hearing on the basis that:
“The remaking hearing is set for Friday, 19 December 2025. The appellant’s updated evidence has not yet been received. Furthermore, even if it is to be received before the hearing there is limited time available to the SSHD to consider such evidence. Under the circumstances the SSHD wishes to seek an adjournment of the scheduled hearing.”
79. The Appellant wrote promptly on 17th December 2025, objecting to the adjournment and stating:
“We are surprised to note that you did not receive the bundle which was provide to the SSHD via email to UTdirections@homeoffice.gov.uk on 09/12/2025. Please find our email attached.
Therefore, we respectfully oppose the adjournment request of the hearing and request that this matter proceed as listed on 19/12/2025, given it was the SSHD’s oversight in missing the email with the evidence.”
80. Judge Keith refused the adjournment application on 18th December 2025, stating:
“The respondent’s application is refused, at this stage, as being premature, as it appears that the new evidence was filed by 12 December. However, in the earlier directions, given that the extension of time was close to the hearing date, the respondent was directed, once she had an opportunity to review the evidence, to confirm if:
(1) any additional evidence is disputed;
(2) she foresees a need for any expert to be called to give oral evidence and to be cross-examined;
(3) she envisages any risk of needing to apply for an application to adjourn the hearing in light of the new evidence.
The respondent may renew the adjournment application once she has reviewed the evidence and has complied with the above directions.”
81. The Respondent renewed her application on 18th December, stating:
“Due to operational reasons, I have today been allocated this matter to present. I have now read the expert report in question. It is my opinion that further clarification is necessary. This may require the expert to give evidence and be cross examined. As an example, paragraph [15] of the report states that “[r]eports from credible human rights organisations and local media confirm that opposition members still face harassment…” It is not apparently clear as to which credible human rights organisations the expert is referring to. A further example is that at [12] the expert states that the interim government is preparing to withdraw 11,448 political harassment cases filed against inter alia Jamaat-I Islamis Bangladesh. Further down in the same paragraph there is reference to parties being allowed to send lists of politically motivated cases to inter-ministerial committee. Jamaat seems to have handed in 1,200 cases on 27 April 2025 and that about half have already been cleared. It is not clear from the expert’s report as to why an application could not be made on behalf of this appellant where there seems to be a good chance that he will be cleared.
Further to the above SSHD seeks an adjournment for the expert to be given an opportunity to clarify contents of his report, and hence for a just resolution of this appeal.”
82. Judge Keith then reached the following decision:
“The Respondent’s application to adjourn the remaking hearing listed for 19th December 2025 is GRANTED, Instead, there shall be a case management review hearing listed at 2pm on 19th December, to be conducted if possible via CVP. Joining details will be sent as soon as possible. The purpose of the review hearing will be to give further directions, in order to progress the case.
Reasons
The respondent’s renewed application has been referred to Judge Keith. He is conscious that the Appellant has not had the opportunity to respond, but given the urgency of the application and the lateness of the hour, he regards it as appropriate to make a decision on an interim basis. The Respondent has identified specific areas of clarification sought in relation to the expert evidence, so that live expert evidence will be necessary, On the assumption that the expert is based in Bangladesh (the correspondence address and contact details confirm this) and HM Government Guidance is that ,“We have not been able to obtain the agreement of the Government of Bangladesh to our request to allow individuals to voluntarily give evidence from Bangladesh ….Requests can be submitted on a case-by-case basis but the FCDO are unable to confirm whether a response will be received,” steps will need to be taken either for such a request to be made or for the expert to attend in person. In the circumstances, it is appropriate to adjourn the substantive hearing tomorrow, but to progress the case with further directions at a case management hearing tomorrow.”
The parties’ positions
83. The Appellant says that by the time Judge Keith had reached his decision late on the afternoon of 18th December (4:49pm), Counsel had been briefed for the full hearing. The Respondent had missed the Appellant’s email of 9th December, but that was her default. The Appellant was a vulnerable party who was self-funding.
84. The Respondent refers to the 1. Presidential Guidance Note No 1 of 2015: Wasted Costs and Unreasonable Costs [14] which states “In Ridehalgh “unreasonableness” was defined as follows:
“Unreasonable also means what it has been understood to mean in this context for at least half a century. The expression aptly describes conduct which is vexatious, designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case and it makes no difference that the conduct is the product of excessive zeal and not improper motive. But conduct cannot be described as unreasonable simply because it leads in the event to an unsuccessful result or because other more cautious legal representatives would have acted differently. The acid test is whether the conduct permits a reasonable explanation. If so, the course adopted may be regarded as optimistic and as reflecting on a practitioner’s judgment, but it is not unreasonable.”
85. The Respondent points to the power to award wasted costs under Section 29(5) of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 being for “(a)as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative, or (b)which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the relevant Tribunal considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.” The Respondent relies on case Cancino (costs – First-tier Tribunal – new powers) [2015] UKFTT 59 headnote 10 which states “Orders for costs under Rule 9 will be very much the exception, rather than the rule and will be reserved to the clearest cases.”
86. The Respondent added:
“10. At no time did the SSHD act unreasonably. It is noted in the error of law decision stated [41] The parties have leave to adduce any updated evidence but I have indicated to the parties that if this is by way of any expert evidence, in accordance with the well-known guidelines in TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48, any expert report should be adduced in good time to allow the opposing party to raise any issues or concerns and if necessary for that expert to be given the opportunity to comment and/or to be called to give evidence if that is regarded as appropriate. It was only on receiving the email of 8 December from the Tribunal that the SSHD became aware that an expert report was being submitted. The Appellant’s representatives did not copy in or forward their adjournment requests or requests for an extension of time to the SSHD at any point. Acknowledging the Appellant’s bundle was received on 9 December to a shared inbox, at it’s highest the bundle/expert report was sent to an inbox and received by the SSHD 8 working days before the hearing. Applying Judge Keith’s reasoning at [41] this is not in good time and coupled with the failure of the representative to include the SSHD in correspondence to the Tribunal which indicated that an expert report was actually being provided.”
Decision on costs
87. The Tribunal does not regard the Respondent’s failure to identify the email on 9th December with the new evidence until 16th December as amounting to a negligent or unreasonable act, in the ‘Ridehalgh’ sense. True it is that the 9th December email was missed, but we also observe while it remained possible for the hearing to have proceeded, when Judge Keith permitted the Appellant an extension of time to rely on new evidence, his directions anticipated that if the expert’s evidence were contested (which it was), the Respondent may need to make an adjournment application. In the circumstances, (and in retrospect), the dispute over the evidence meant that the hearing was likely to be adjourned. The issue is whether the delay of a week between 9th and 16th December, because of the error, constitutes a delay amounting to negligence. While the consequence of the renewed application of 18th December meant that a brief fee was incurred, the delay was until 16th December. We are not satisfied that the delay amounts to conduct amounting to professional negligence. It was an oversight, but one in the context of an extension of time given to the Appellant, which meant that timings were tight, through no fault of the Respondent. For these reasons, no order as to costs is made.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law and as such it was set aside.
The decision on the appeal is remade as follows:

The appeal is dismissed on protection grounds.
The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

No order as to costs

G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22nd June 2026

ANNEX – ERROR OF LAW DECISION

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003646
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/66977/2023
LP/00718/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEITH

Between

‘SU’ (Bangladesh)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Karim, Counsel, instructed by Barclay Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. These written reasons reflect the full oral reasons which I gave to the parties at the end of the hearing.
Background
2. The appellant is a Bangladeshi national, who had brought asylum and human rights claims. His claims were made before the changes introduced as a result of Sections 31 to 36 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, so the previous principles and standard of proof apply in relation to the protection claim. I say no more about that.
3. The appellant’s appeal was heard by a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal, Judge Cottis, who in a decision heard on 6th May 2025, dismissed the appeals on both grounds. I summarise his reasons and then explain the grounds of appeal and my conclusions on whether the Judge erred in law.
4. In simple terms, the appellant was, and is, a supporter of Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibi or ‘BICS’, which is a student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami or ‘JeI’. The Judge had identified the issues, at §9 of the judgment, as being whether the appellant had faced ‘problems’ in Bangladesh before he left the country due to his affiliation to BICs/JeI; whether there was a real risk that he would be of adverse interest from political rivals in Bangladesh (the Awami League or ‘AL’) due to his association with JeI in the UK, and finally, for the purposes of any human rights claim, whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles on return.
5. The Judge made significant findings in the appellant’s favour. Very broadly speaking, the Judge accepted most of the appellant’s claim as credible. These positive findings were in relation to allegations numbered §§11(a) to (e), namely that the appellant had been an active member for BICS before he left Bangladesh in 2021 and had held increasingly senior positions before leaving. During the same period, he had been an online activist. He had been very vocal against the AL government which had attracted the adverse attention of AL members who harassed him. In March 2014 he had been arrested, detained for around a month, tortured whilst in police custody, before being released on bail. He was subsequently bailed and failed to appear at court hearings and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest in Bangladesh. He remained in hiding in Bangladesh and left to study in the UK and subsequently claimed asylum. He has remained active, online, in the UK with a human rights organisation associated with Jel. Of note and in fairness to the respondent, the Judge considered but rejected his claim as to whether he had received threats online and via his parents by virtue of the online posts in the UK.
6. Understandably, the Judge’s focus, in the context of the positive findings in the appellant’s favour, had been on the change in the general situation in Bangladesh since the appellant’s departure, because of the AL’s government’s fall from power in the period from August 2024. In summary, the Judge had concluded that notwithstanding the prior adverse interest, in light of that changed situation and a Country Policy and Information Note (‘CPIN’): Political situation, Bangladesh, December 2024, based on a range of recent sources, and without any external evidence provided by the appellant which postdated it, members of JeI or BICS were presently at no real risk of persecution.
7. At §29, the Judge had taken into account that the AL had corrupted the Bangladeshi police force and used it as a tool to suppress political opponents, and that some officials remained in place and that it would take time to replace them all, but noted that many leading and mid- level AL officials had been removed and measures were being taken to reform the police. The Judge accepted at §30 that there was an outstanding arrest warrant against the appellant, and on that basis, he was likely to be detained on arrival or shortly after arrival. However, the Judge went on to find that significant efforts had been made to remove all AL-supporting police officers, who were being prosecuted for their actions and that rogue actors in the police would be nervous about mistreating their political opponents in custody, for fear of repercussions. In that context, the Judge concluded that AL-supporting police would be very unlikely to mistreat the appellant, given investigations into their prior conduct. The Judge also noted at §31 that the appellant was not likely to be detained for very long because the authorities would have no interest in pursuing false and politically motivated charges, which is what the appellant had said they were. This was consistent with background evidence that charges had been dropped against political opponents of the Awami League and of political prisoners being released.
8. The Judge considered the reforms of the judiciary, steps that the appellant would be able to take to have charges against him dropped, letters from a lawyer and assistance from his family. The risk from the authorities had significantly diminished following the fall of the AL government and that there was no reasonable likelihood or real risk of persecution.
9. The Judge went on to consider, at §34, the risk of persecution by non-state actors. He rejected claims of threats via Facebook, finding that the appellant had exaggerated his evidence. He rejected the claim that threats had been made via the appellant’s parents. In the alternative, on return, he would be able to enlist the help of the authorities, should threats be made to him. The Judge rejected his protection claim.
10. I add at this stage that I discussed with Ms Isherwood at the beginning of the hearing as to whether the respondent accepted that sufficiency of protection and internal relocation were not options for the appellant, in her decision to refuse the protection claim and subsequent review. I say more about this later in these reasons.
11. The Judge also concluded that there would not be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Bangladesh, notwithstanding his absence because of his familiarity with Bangladeshi culture. The Judge concluded, by reference to Section 117B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, that the respondent’s decision to refuse leave to remain was proportionate.
The grounds of appeal
12. The appellant raises four grounds of appeal, and the grant of permission was not limited in its scope. Once again, I do no more than summarise them.
13. Ground (1) was that having made significant findings in respect of the appellant’s credibility, the Judge did not appear to have considered or applied paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules, namely that the provision that where somebody has already been the subject of persecution or serious harm, that would be regarded as a serious indication of a well-founded fear of persecution unless there are good reasons to consider that it would not be repeated. The Judge’s reasons at §31 that the detention would not be “for very long”, was ill-defined and entirely speculative.
14. Ground (2) was that the Judge had erred in failing to reconcile his reasoning at §27, namely a significant and durable change, with the reasoning at §29 which stating that the “situation in Bangladesh remains rather unstable,” and that it would “take time” to appoint neutral officials. At §32, the interim government was “in the process of reforming the judiciary.”
15. In relation to ground (3), the Judge had not given adequate reasons for explaining why the appellant would not be at risk in his home area from the AL supporting non-state actors. Given the period of time in which they had ruled in Bangladesh, those AL activists had not disappeared, the government remained transitional and there was not sufficiency of state protection. The Judge not addressed and made findings following on return to Bangladesh, as a consequence of the appellant’s profile and likely continuance of activities, noting the authorities of HJ (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 and RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38.
16. The final ground, ground (4), was in relation to the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant would only be detained for a short period (§37). This followed a conclusion that the appellant was not at real risk of wrongful detention (§33), which was insistent with the finding that he would be detained (§30) and the appellant’s case that the charges against him were politically motivated (§31). Moreover, the finding on the duration of detention was speculative. In addition, the respondent’s own guidance (Private Life: caseworker guidance) stated that a very significant obstacle would or could include prosecution. This was so particularly in light of the November 2023 CPIN, ‘Bangladesh: Actors of Protection’, which referred to the harsh and life-threatening prison conditions (§7.1.2).
The respondent’s Rule 24 response
17. The respondent responded that there was no error of law. In relation to ground (1), although paragraph 339K was not cited expressly, it was tolerably clear from the reasons that the Judge had applied it. The Judge was conscious of their findings that the appellant was largely credible, but their focus, noting that they had referred to having considered all of the evidence (§11), was that the country situation had changed. That had been as a result of the fall of the AL government, and the reform of the Bangladeshi judiciary and the police (§29 to §33). This was the answer to the challenge on the basis of Paragraph 339K. There were good reasons to conclude that persecution would not be repeated. Those findings were evidence-based and drawn from the December 2024 CPIN and corroborated by the appellant’s own submissions.
18. In relation to ground (2) and the durability of the change, the Judge had reached a nuanced conclusion, concluding that whilst some AL-supporting officials remained, transitional measures were ongoing. Those residual factors did not amount to a real risk of persecution and that was supported by evidence in the December 2024 CPIN, at Sections 13.3.5 and 13.3.6. This ground risked ‘cherry-picking’ the evidence.
19. With regard to ground (3) and alleged errors with regard to non-state actors and sur place activities, the Judge expressly considered this at §34 to §36, in particular the social media evidence.
20. In relation to ground (4) Article 8 ECHR and very significant obstacles, once again the Judge had expressly taken into account relevant matters, including at §38.
21. I turn to the parties’ respective positions and summarise the gist of the oral submissions.
The appellant’s position
22. Mr Karim emphasised the Judge’s findings, which included that the appellant had been detained for a month by the Bangladeshi authorities. The Judge’s finding that future detention would not be for very long was unexplained and unclear. If it had meant ‘fleetingly’ or ‘short,’ the Judge could have said so. It was also unclear what specific evidence the Judge had based this on. On the basis of MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216, and paragraph 339K, the Judge’s reasons were insufficient.
22. With regard to ground (2) and the durability of change, there was an inconsistency where the situation was found to be “unstable,” and the government was “in the process” of reform. The December 2024 CPIN, at §13.3.6, referred to police having returned to duty, there had been replacement of senior officers, but the measures were unlikely to be sufficient, as trust in the police remained low.
23. In relation to ground (3), the Judge had failed to consider adequately the continuing risks from non-state AL-supporters in the appellant’s home area, the viability of internal relocation and the extent to which the appellant could reasonably expect state protection. The Judge had raised both issues at §§16(d) and (e) but had failed to engage in them in any detail. Importantly, the respondent’s refusal letter had expressly accepted that if the appellant’s fear were well-founded, there would not be sufficiency of protection, nor the viability of internal relocation. In fairness to the respondent, the refusal decision itself predated the change in the regime but notably the respondent’s review, which postdated that, did not resile from that position. In essence, it appeared on the face of it that by the hearing itself, the respondent’s case was not that there would be sufficiency of protection or viability of internal relocation, only for it to change its mind at the last moment.
24. With regard to ground (4), to emphasise again, this was in the context of wrongful detention and prior torture. How that could be said not to be a very significant obstacle to integration was simply insufficiently reasoned, particularly where in the November 2023 CPIN had referred to describing the prison conditions in Bangladesh as harsh and life threatening. As to any suggestion that this issue had not been raised before the Judge, at §15(p), Mr Karim’s submissions had been summarised as including that arrest and detention, even for a minimal period, would be sufficient to amount to a very significant obstacle.
The respondent’s position
25. Ms Isherwood reiterated that paragraph 339K was, in substance, applied. The Judge had explained why, notwithstanding the prior adverse interest, police would be unlikely to ill-treat the appellant whilst he was in detention and the Judge was entitled to rely on the evidence as a whole, including the CPIN. She suggested that an argument about the conditions of prisons had never properly been argued, and this was effectively an attempt to argue a new point. She cautioned about taking passages of the CPIN out of context and asked me to consider the wider passages. Whilst some AL-supporting officials remained in place, measures were being taken. The Judge was entitled to consider all of this, as reflected in a recent Court of Appeal decision of MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812. At §14 and §17, unusually, the Court of Appeal remade the original appeal decision by dismissing the appellant’s asylum claim, notwithstanding that he had received prior adverse attention whilst in Bangladesh.
26. In relation to ground (2), the answer to this was that the Judge had unarguably considered the changed position and had been entitled to conclude at §43 that the appellant would not be at real risk. In relation to ground (3), the argument as to sur place activities had also been considered at §34. In relation to internal relocation and sufficiency of protection, these had not been properly argued before the FtT. Ms Isherwood accepted that the refusal letter was potentially problematic.
27. Finally, in relation to ground (4), the Judge had made findings in relation to very significant obstacles which were open to him on the evidence.
Discussion and conclusions
28. I caution myself against the danger of cherry-picking particular aspects of evidence or takin out of context passages of the judgment. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the Judge erred in law.
29. I accept that the Judge was unarguably entitled (and needed) to consider the change in the country circumstances in Bangladesh. Where there had been prior adverse interest, while there did not need to be an express reference to paragraph 339K, the context was of findings that the appellant had been detained by the authorities for a month and tortured in Bangladesh and would be detained again on return there.
Ground (1)
30. First, I do not accept that the appellant had failed to argue before the Judge that even detention for a minimal period would not amount to a breach of his human rights. The summary of this was at §15(p) of the judgment. Even if it were otherwise, the Judge has found that the situation is “unstable,” he does not explain what “not likely to be detained for very long” means in terms of duration, or the evidence for supporting the conclusion, beyond general motivations in pursuing prosecutions. The Judge found that officials would be unlikely to mistreat the appellant, but it is unclear whether, for example, detention for a month would be not “very long,” how the “unstable” situation would impact on officials’ treatment of the appellant or impact on general prison conditions, and why any detention would be not very long. That is not say that the evidence only pointed in one direction; or that the fact of detention alone must inevitably lead to the conclusion that the claim of persecution is well-founded, but I am satisfied that the Judge erred by speculating as to the period of time or failed to explain his reasoning; did not explain the period of detention; and did not reconcile the two references to the instability of the situation with a finding that there was no real risk of ill-treatment, either on the basis of general conditions or on the basis of active mistreatment by officers. I am satisfied that the judge’s decision was not safe and cannot stand. The Judge erred on Ground (1).
Ground (2)
31. Ground (2) substantially overlaps with ground (1), in terms of the reasoning as to the “significant and durable change in the political situation”(§27). Noting the risks of highlighting particular phases in the judgment, I am also satisfied that the ground goes beyond this. The Judge erred in failing to resolve his conclusion on a significant and durable change with his findings that the “situation” was “unstable” (§29) and reform “in the process”(§32). The two conclusions are irreconcilable without further explanation, and material to the Judge’s analysis of ongoing risk to the appellant. MU is not authority for a proposition that the Court of Appeal has given country guidance that there is no longer a real risk, on the basis of a durable change. The Judge erred on ground (2).
Ground (3)
32. The Judge’s error was in part, in failing to consider that the respondent had changed her clearly stated position that there was not sufficiency of protection and that internal relocation was not viable. While this related to fear of state actors, the same potential analysis applied to non-state actors. While the Judge was entitled to find that threats made online to the appellant or via family members were exaggerated, where the Judge also found that he had engaged in ‘sur place’ activities in the UK (§11(e)) and there was no suggestion that he would not continue to engage in political activity on return, the Judge had proceeded on the basis that he could ask for help “of the authorities” and could “find suitable work elsewhere in Bangladesh if there were a localised threat” (§35). However, the Judge did not explain how this was reconciled to the respondent’s refusal decision and review, other than brief arguments at §14(e) and (f), or to explain how the conclusions could be reconciled to the “unstable” position regarding the police, or that the appellant had held increasingly senior positions, which might attract attention outside his home area. The Judge also erred on ground (3).
33. Finally, in relation to ground (4), which also overlaps with ground (1), I am satisfied that the conclusions with relation to very significant obstacles, on the basis of the fact of, or period of future detention, also contained errors of law on the same basis as ground (1).
34. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Judge erred such that his decision cannot stand. However, in doing so, it is important that I preserve findings that have not been undermined by the errors.
Preserved findings
35. The first set of preserved findings is in relation to the summary of the appellant’s claim, which the Judge had expressly found as having occurred, at §§11(a) to (e). In summary, the appellant did suffer prior adverse interest whilst in Bangladesh and has remained active online in the UK. I also preserve the findings however where the Judge did not find in the appellant’s favour and in particular, at §34, that the appellant had exaggerated the extent of the attention and threats that he had received online while in the UK, and that to date, he does not continue to be threatened via his parents.
36. I do not preserve the findings at §35 that on return, the appellant would be able to enlist the help of the authorities, or internally relocate, should threats be made. These issues will need to be considered further in any remaking.
Disposal of the appeal
37. I have considered in remaking how I should resolve the outstanding appeal. I first reject Mr Karim’s submission that this is a case where there is only one answer that I should remake the appeal today in the appellant’s favour. However, I do accept his submission that this is a case in which it is appropriate to retain remaking in the Upper Tribunal, and there is no disagreement from Ms Isherwood. I remind myself of §7.2.(a) and (b) of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. There was no suggestion that the effect of the errors was such as to deprive the appellant of a fair hearing. The nature and the scope of the necessary fact-finding, in light of the preserved findings, is very limited.
38. There are substantial findings that have been preserved, as I have already outlined.

Notice of Decision
39. The appellant’s appeal succeeds. The FtT Judge’s decision is not safe and cannot stand, subject to the preserved findings set out above. Remaking is retained in the Upper Tribunal.
Directions
40. The remaking will be by way of an in person hearing at Field House for three hours, with a Bangladesh Sylheti interpreter. The parties have leave to adduce any updated evidence but I have indicated to the parties that if this is by way of any expert evidence, in accordance with the well-known guidelines in TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48, any expert report should be adduced in good time to allow the opposing party to raise any issues or concerns and if necessary for that expert to be given the opportunity to comment and/or to be called to give evidence if that is regarded as appropriate.
41. With regard to preparation of the bundles these should be in electronic format indexed and text searchable. Any witness statement should comprise the entirety of evidence-in-chief.

J Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30th October 2025