Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003652
& UI-2025-003653

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/68312/2023 (LP/00205/2025)
PA/54544/2024 (LP/00208/2025)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

(1) SG
(2) HN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. T. Hodson, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms. A. Ahmed, senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellants are both citizens of Nicaragua. Their appeal came before me for a rehearing after I found an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s determination dismissing their appeal.

2. In summary, the Appellants claim that they will be at risk on return to Nicaragua on the basis of their actual or imputed political opinion or will otherwise be at risk of serious harm, principally as a result of the First Appellant’s political activism against the regime of Daniel Ortega.

3. For the reasons given below, I allow the appeal.

Evidence and findings
4. There was a dispute as to the Appellants’ credibility. I heard from both Appellants, who gave evidence via a Central American Spanish interpreter. There were no issues with interpretation raised during the hearing. In assessing their evidence I have also considered the evidence supplied in the composite and update bundles prepared for the hearing.

5. The First Appellant arrived in the UK before the entry into force of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and the Second Appellant arrived after its entry into force. Therefore, a different standard of proof applies to the historic facts of the Second Appellant’s claim (balance of probabilities) than that which applies in the First Appellant’s (the lower standard). This does not however make any difference to my analysis, as I would find them both credible to the civil standard even if it were applicable to both, for the reasons given below.

6. A significant piece of evidence in this appeal which is the videos I was shown at the outset of the hearing. These were said to be from a Nicaraguan news channel (Accion 10) and had every appearance of being professionally-produced news clips. Ms Ahmed did not invite me to find that the clips were fabricated. The videos showed shots from the protests which the First Appellant claimed to attend in 2018. I note that the chyrons within the videos referred to the shots being taken in the neighbourhood which the First Appellant states he was from and where he had described being involved in protests. In the hearing, the First Appellant identified himself in the videos as one of the protestors and also identified his mother as one of the women banging pots and pans as part of the protests. The Respondent invited me to find that these were not images of the First Appellant and his mother. I accept the First Appellant’s evidence on this point for the following reasons:

a. While the person the First Appellant identified as himself in the video is wearing a gas mask, having been able to see the video clearly and having seen the First Appellant in person at length on two occasions I accept that it is likely that he is the person featured. His hair, facial features, and frame are all consistent. It is also relevant that the shots are taken in his home area.
b. The shots of the First Appellant’s mother are less easy to identify as I have not seen her in person. I was provided with some photographs of her, including a photo of her ID card. However, taken together with what I accept to be shots of the First Appellant in their home area, I accept that this is the First Appellant’s mother. Her hair colour, build, face shape, and age are all consistent.
c. The videos are also consistent with the photographs of the First Appellant which appear to show him (as he claims) at protests in 2018. In many of those photographs the First Appellant’s face is partially covered (which was described in subjective and objective evidence as a feature of the demonstrations, given the use of tear gas and state surveillance), and his appearance is consistent across the photos and videos. The First Appellant was able to give clear and coherent evidence about his activities which led to these photographs and videos, which is consistent with the country background evidence about the protests. I place significant weight on this evidence.

7. I also accept that the photographs show the First Appellant participating in protests. Nothing in the photographs gives me reason to question the First Appellant’s explanation that they were taken during the 2018 protests in Nicaragua. Nicaraguan flags feature prominently and the First Appellant has provided a range of photographs taken on different occasions and in different locations. He was able to provide a clear and coherent explanation of the photographs. I accept that they show him engaging in protests as claimed.

8. I consider that the photographs and video evidence are significant corroboration of the First Appellant’s account (whilst noting that there is no requirement of corroboration in protection claims: MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at §86). It depicts the First Appellant engaging in protests as described in his evidence. I give this evidence significant weight.

9. The Appellants’ oral evidence was consistent with their witness statements and interviews. Both answered the questions put to them by Ms Ahmed clearly and frankly, without any attempt to obfuscate or seek to give ‘helpful’ answers. At one stage, when asked about an incident in which she was assaulted by individuals believed to be Ortega supporters, the Second Appellant became distressed in an obviously genuine fashion. There was nothing in either of their oral evidence which gave me any reason to doubt that they were telling the truth. In reaching this conclusion, I take into account the criticisms of their evidence made by Ms Ahmed in closing, including her particular criticism of the First Appellant’s evidence about why he broke up with a previous partner. This was a minor inconsistency, readily explicable by the First Appellant giving a fuller account under questioning. It does not damage his credibility.

10. The Appellants’ account is partially supported by the documentary evidence. The First Appellant has provided a report made to the CPDH shortly before he left Nicaragua. While I acknowledge Ms Ahmed’s submission that the timing of this report could be said to be suspicious, the report is from a legitimate human rights organisation and the contents of the report are broadly consistent with the First Appellant’s account. There are also shots of hostile messages on Facebook which both Appellants state they received from Ortega supporters. I accept Ms Ahmed’s submission that the Appellants have not provided ‘Download your information’ for their Facebook accounts and therefore only put limited weight on this evidence. However, on balance I am willing to give it some, albeit limited, weight when considered in the round with the other evidence. The background evidence confirms that the Ortega regime uses ‘troll farms’ to harass political opponents online, which is consistent with this evidence. I have been provided with some documents confirming that the First Appellant’s relatives have claimed asylum in the USA. While this evidence does not confirm the basis of their claims, it is consistent with the First Appellant’s account that they fled the Ortega regime. There are also photographs of the Appellants at a single demonstration in London protesting against the Ortega regime. I put only very limited weight on this sur place activity as it is a one-off event which occurred after both Appellants claimed asylum. At its highest, it is not inconsistent with their wider accounts.

11. I was also provided with CCTV photographs of what the Appellants submitted was the alley outside the First Appellant’s mother’s shop. There were police officers in the alley, which the Appellants said was consistent with their evidence that the police had been questioning the First Appellant’s mother about his whereabouts. Ms Ahmed somewhat surprisingly sought to contend that these were not photographs of the same location due to some very minor differences which were obviously explicable by the passage of time. I accept that the CCTV shots show an alley with police present. There is no further contextual information beyond the account from the First Appellant. I place only limited weight on the photographs as they do not confirm the account given but are merely consistent with it.

12. The Respondent’s position was that the Appellants were not credible, in particular as a result of what are described as inconsistent or implausible aspects of their account. The Respondent in the RFRL places considerable weight on the fact that the First Appellant did not face ‘adverse attention’ from the authorities during the years after the protests in which he was able to live, work, and marry in Nicaragua, before leaving the country on his own passport. I do not accept that this is a reason for rejecting his account. The First Appellant’s account is that he did face hostility, including online abuse, as a result of his activism, and kept a low profile (including not attending the registry office when marrying the Second Appellant). There is nothing in the country background information to suggest that the state authorities would have issued an arrest warrant had he come to their attention (indeed, there is substantial evidence that arbitrary arrests took place, which suggests arrest warrants were not routinely used). His ability to leave the country is consistent with the uncontested country background information that the Ortega regime is keen to expel and exile political opponents, including by preventing them from returning to the country. I therefore do not treat these as reasons to reject the First Appellant’s account.

13. The Respondent also suggests that there were inconsistencies in the First Appellant’s answers at interview. I do not accept that there were (or, at least, I do not consider that any discrepancies in the answers justify my finding that he is not credible):

a. The Respondent suggests that the Appellant contradicted himself about protests being arranged to commemorate people who were killed in an earlier protest, at which he said no one had died. On a fair reading of the entire asylum interview, it is clear that he was talking about previous protests in which people had been killed.
b. The Respondent considered that there was an inconsistency about the reason why the First Appellant was fired. On a fair reading of the asylum interview record, especially with the benefit of the First Appellant’s clarifying witness statement and oral evidence, I do not consider that he was inconsistent and in any event accept that he was fired for his political activism as the company was owned by Ortega supporters.

14. The Respondent relies upon s. 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 and the fact that the First Appellant travelled through Spain without claiming asylum. The First Appellant stated that he was concerned that there were Ortega supporters in Spain which meant he might face reprisals there. There is no objective evidence supporting that view and I accept that the First Appellant could reasonably have been expected to claim asylum in Spain, which is a safe country with effective protective mechanisms. However, it does not follow that I must reject the Appellants’ account. I do not consider that the totality of the evidence, even when considered in light of s. 8 of the 2004 Act, shows that the First Appellant has been dishonest about his activities. I accept that he had a subjective (albeit not objectively justified) concern about remaining in Spain and I consider that on balance his account is credible for the reasons given above.

15. The Second Appellant’s account was not challenged as extensively as the First Appellant’s. She gave clear and coherent evidence about her experiences including, as I have noted above, clearly genuine oral evidence about the assault she experienced in Nicaragua. She did not seek to embellish her account and her risk profile as well as credibility depends materially upon that of the First Appellant. I accept her evidence.

16. I find both Appellants to be credible. I accept their accounts of what occurred in Nicaragua and accept that they are both genuinely opposed to the Ortega regime (and liable to be perceived as such).
Risk on return
17. Ms Ahmed helpfully confirmed at the hearing that the Respondent’s position, consistent with what is in the RFRL and notwithstanding the contents of the Respondent’s review, is that if the Appellants were found credible they would be at real risk on return to Nicaragua and could not seek sufficient protection or internally relocate.

18. Ms Ahmed did not seek to make any distinction between the risk which the Appellants would respectively face. I accept that the Second Appellant has a different background to the First Appellant and does not claim to have been involved in the protests. However, I consider that she has already been identified as a “golpista” (‘coup plotter’, the term used by the men who assaulted her), likely as a result of her relationship with the First Appellant, and would be at risk as a result of that connection.

19. I accept that the Appellants would be at risk on return. This position is strongly supported by the extensive country evidence adduced on behalf of the Appellants. There is no CPIN or Country Guidance case law regarding Nicaragua but it is clear that the Ortega regime poses a genuine and ongoing risk to actual and perceived political opponents and has particular hostility for opponents who are overseas.

20. I therefore find that the Appellants are at risk due to their actual and / or imputed political opinion on return to Nicaragua. My findings are sufficient to dispose with the question of humanitarian protection and Articles 3 and 8 ECHR but, for the avoidance of doubt, even if I were wrong about the existence of a Convention reason, I find that the Appellants are at a real risk of serious harm on return to Nicaragua and / or face insurmountable obstacles to reintegration.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 March 2026