Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003659

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01835/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS

Between

SB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Litigant in person
For the Respondent: Ms Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission against a decision of First-tier Tribunal sent on 4 February 2025 dismissing his appeal against a decision dated 28 March 2024 to refuse his human rights and protection claim.
Background and Immigration history
2. The appellant is a national of Pakistan born in 2003. He entered the UK as a Tier 4 student on 14 October 2022. He claimed asylum on 9 September 2023.
The positions of the parties
3. The appellant asserts that he is a gay man. He refused to enter into an arranged marriage and implied to his family/told them the reason for this. His family threatened him and he is no longer in contact with them. He has lived openly as a gay man in the UK. He would be at risk of serious harm in Pakistan on account of his sexuality. The position of the Secretary of State is that if the appellant were accepted to be a gay man who would live openly in Pakistan, he will be at risk of serious harm for a convention reason. The Secretary of State however, decided that the appellant’s account of having problems on account of his sexuality was internally inconsistent, lacking in detail and implausible. Documents submitted in support of his claim were said to be self-serving and relate to his social life only. The respondent did not find the appellant’s account to be credible.
The decision of the First -tier Tribunal
4. The appellant was not represented at his hearing. He gave his evidence through an interpreter. A witness also gave evidence on his behalf. The judge found the appellant’s account to be lacking in credibility for the following reasons: There were inconsistencies between his screening interview and asylum interview, he failed to provide call logs from his father in Pakistan and there were inconsistencies between the evidence of the appellant and that of his witness. The judge attached little weight to the supporting evidence. The WhatsApp evidence of threats had no context; the supporting photographs were all taken after the appellant’s claim for asylum was refused and there was no supporting evidence from dating apps. The judge dismissed the protection and Article 8 claims.
Grounds
5. The grounds are lengthy and not particularly well drafted. They set out various classes of error and then point to various asserted errors which do not necessarily relate to the “headings”. The headings are:
a) Failing to give adequate reasons or adequate reasons on material matters
b) Failing to take into account and or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters
c) Giving weight to immaterial matters
d) Making a material misdirection on law on material matters
6. The grounds were particularised as follows:
i. At [38] the judge was speculative. She has assessed plausibility subjectively. The appellant’s claim that his family were pressurising him was consistent.
ii. The judge impermissibly required corroboration of the threatening phone calls. The appellant was unrepresented and the call records would not have any probative value in any event.
iii. The judge has erred at [40] in finding that there was a discrepancy between the answers in the screening interview and the asylum interview.
iv. It was unfair of the judge to find that the appellant could have provided evidence in a redacted form when he was unrepresented.
v. The judge’s reasoning at [44] was inadequate. The core of the appellant’s claim was consistent.
vi. The judge did not give adequate reasons why the appellant was not an adequate witness and did not give any reasons for finding that MU was not a credible witness.
Permission
7. Permission was granted on 8 September 2025 on the basis that “it is arguable that the First-tier Tribunal misunderstood the chronology as to the appellant’s parents suspecting his sexuality when they raised marriage: following which he told them about it. The answers in the screening interview and substantive interviews are arguably not inconsistent on this point; which was a factor to which weight was given in the credibility assessment.”
8. There was no rule 24 response.
The error of law hearing
9. The appellant appeared in person and represented himself. A court appointed interpreter was present to assist although it transpired that the appellant speaks very good English and did not need the interpreter. Ms Nolan made submissions and the appellant went through each ground in turn describing why he considered there to be an error. He confirmed at the end of the hearing that he had said everything he wanted to say.
Analysis and Discussion
10. I deal with (iii) first in relation to paragraph [40] because this was the ground on which permission was granted.
11. In his screening interview which took place on 28 June 2023, the appellant stated “I am a homosexual. My university fees was (sic) pending. They wanted me to get married. I feel they know about it. I have not told them directly. He told me that he does not want to see me. He said he was not going to pay the fees.” The interview was said to have been conducted in English/ Urdu although no interpreter was used.
12. In his asylum interview dated 28 March 2024 which was conducted with the use of an Urdu interpreter the appellant said that he felt that he could not return to Pakistan when “my family forcing me to get married. I got fed up and told them about myself and then they started making threats to kill me”. He was then asked “Did you tell them over the phone? He responded “Yeah.” He was asked “When was this?” He responded “May 2023.” He was asked “can you tell me about that phone conversation? He responded “They have been forcing me to get married for a few days and if I don’t have any feelings towards the girl then how can I be in the girl’s life? I got fed up over this and mentally depressed and then I told them about my sexuality. They started making threats. Since then I don’t have any contact with them.”
13. He was then asked who made the threats. He responded that it was his father who said “You are an insult to our family and you don’t have the right to live. Wherever I see you. I’ll kill you.”
14. At question 34 he was also asked about the inconsistency between what he had said in the screening interview and what he said in the asylum interview. He was asked “You said in your screening interview that didn’t tell your family directly that you’re gay but you feel they knew. Can you explain this inconsistency?”
15. He responded “I did tell the same thing that they were forcing me to get married, I told them about my sexuality and they made threats.”
16. This apparent discrepancy in this important aspect of the evidence was raised in the reasons for refusal letter at paragraph 9.
17. The appellant did not prepare a witness statement in support of his appeal. The judge turned to this discrepancy at [40] and said:
“I find the appellant’s accounts of the phone call with his father inconsistent. In his SCR he said that he had not told his family directly about his sexuality yet thought they appeared to know. In his subsequent asylum interview and in his oral evidence to the Tribunal, he said something quite different. Given the effect the appellant says this conversation has had on his life, this is a significant issue and the appellant’s lack of consistency on this key issue is something I attach weight to.”
18. Ms Nolan submitted that there is no error in the judge’s approach to chronology. Both the screening interview and the substantive interview took place after the phone call. The judge’s finding that there is a discrepancy between the appellant’s evidence in his screening interview and his evidence in his substantive interview and his oral evidence is consistent with the evidence and a rational conclusion. The judge was entitled to find that this was an important conversation and was manifestly entitled to attach weight to the lack of consistency.
19. The appellant submitted to me that what he was trying to convey was that his father had not been informed of his sexuality by a third party. He was trying to say that he was “shy and scared and was hiding from his father.” He said that he did not directly mention his sexuality. He told his father indirectly that he was not eligible for marriage in a way that his father could understand. He did not say directly that he was a homosexual.
20. I agree with Ms Nolan that there is no error of law. The judge understood the chronology. The judge correctly identified that this was a very important piece of evidence because it related to how the appellant’s family came to learn of his sexuality and the appellant’s evidence was that there was only one phone call when his family became aware of his sexuality. The judge correctly identified that there is a clear discrepancy between saying that this was mentioned “indirectly” and the appellant saying “I told them about my sexuality.” This is not an ambiguous statement and the appellant had the opportunity to clarify this again in cross examination. Indeed, before me he seemed to be reverting to the position that he did not inform his father of his sexuality. I can discern no error in the judge’s approach. The judge was entitled to give weight to this discrepancy when evaluating credibility. This ground is not made out.
21. I also find that the judge did not speculate as to whether the appellant’s family was pressurising him into marriage and did not assess plausibility subjectively. The appellant’s oral evidence recorded at [32] was that his family had never said they wanted him to get married and had taken no steps towards him doing so when he was in Pakistan and that they had not arranged a marriage for him and were continuing to look for a suitable bride at the time of telephone call. At [38] the judge found that it was not credible that the appellant’s marriage became an urgent issue during the temporary period he was in the UK when his marriage had not been arranged. I find that the judge is simply assessing the appellant’s case holistically in the round in the light of the evidence and that his conclusion that this evidence was not persuasive is rational and adequately reasoned. The appellant’s explanation that his family wanted him to be stable amounted to a disagreement with the judge’s finding in this respect. Ground (i) is not made out.
22. At [39] the judge noted that the appellant had failed to provide call logs for the calls in which he was threatened by his father. The grounds assert that the judge impermissibly required corroborative evidence of these calls. The appellant stated that he thought that the WhatsApp messages would prove that threats had been made and that the call record would not in any event demonstrate what had been said in the calls.
23. Although it is trite that an asylum seeker may not always be able to provide corroborative evidence, this was noted at [39] by the judge. The judge formed the rational view however that the appellant could have provided this type of corroborative evidence. The appellant’s explanation in the hearing was that he did not know this was possible (this sat at odds with the reason he gave to me). The judge rationally found that this explanation was not credible when the appellant was sufficiently familiar with mobile phone technology to screenshot WhatsApp messages and email documents and photographs visa his phone. The judge’s reasoning regarding credibility is in respect of the appellant’s explanation rather than the lack of supporting evidence. I can find no error in the judge’s approach. Ground (ii) is not made out.
24. It is asserted that at [42] that it was unfair of the judge to find that the appellant could have provided redacted evidence of meeting gay partners on an app to protect their privacy when he is unrepresented. The appellant said to me that he was not able to provide the evidence from the app for two reasons, firstly because he did not have consent to provide pictures/chats and secondly because of the state of nudity. He did provide some pictures of him and his friend in a state of undress, but this was with consent. I am satisfied that it was rational and reasonable for the judge to have expected to see some corroborative evidence of the appellant meeting partner’s online as this was a central part of the appellant’s case. On a close reading of [42] to [43] the judge makes another point which is that despite the appellant’s reason for not providing this material being that he wanted to protect the privacy of others, that he had provided photographs of at least two men in a state of undress. It seems to me that the point that judge was making was that he did not accept the appellant’s explanation because it was inconsistent with other evidence provided. The issue of consent raised before me was not raised at the hearing. I am satisfied that the judge’s reasoning in this paragraph was fair and tolerably clear. Ground (iv) is not made out.
25. The appellant submitted that the majority of his and his witness’s evidence was consistent, that the inconsistency about Christmas was a mistake and that he is supported by his friend because he is not allowed to work. I am satisfied that the reasoning at [44] is adequate and lawful. The judge was entitled to take a view of the evidence. The judge did not find MU or the appellant to be credible about their relationship because their evidence was vague, there was an inconsistency about whether they met over the Christmas period and the fact that MU supports the appellant financially did not sit well with their evidence that the relationship was one without commitment. The judge had sight of the sea of evidence. The grounds amount to a disagreement with the findings. Ground (v) is not made out.
26. At [44] the judge noted that the majority of the photographs showed the appellant with male acquaintances and at [45] that although the photographs of the appellant with a male at Legs 800 was of some evidential value, the appellant’s oral evidence was that all of the photographs were taken after the asylum application. The judge noted that when the appellant was asked why he had not taken any photos pre-dating the asylum application, his answer was that “he liked these photographs.” The judge found this explanation to be “unpersuasive.” Before me, the appellant said that he had not taken photos as evidence but for the purpose of memories and secondly that he did have previous pictures but chose not to use those as he thought the pictures he submitted were better evidence. This in my view was another attempt by the appellant to give me a new and better explanation than the one given by the appellant at the hearing. The appellant also stated the fact that his witness had provided a statement and come to the hearing was evidence that he is a genuine witness.
27. I am satisfied that the judge was entitled to give little weight to the photographs given the content of the photographs and their timing. In any event the question of weight is for the judge. This ground is not made out.
28. The judge has manifestly had regard to all of the evidence before him, taken into account some significant inconsistencies, identified where evidence could have easily been provided and considered the credibility of the explanations of that evidence not being provided. The reasoning of the judge is cogent, sustainable, and based in the evidence. The decision is rational and lawful.
29. Since I have found that none of the grounds are made out, I uphold the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the protection and human right claim is upheld.
2. The appellant’s appeal against that decision is dismissed

R J Owens

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 January 2026