Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003664
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/54961/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29th December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

Between

ABDULAZEEZ AKOLAWOLE ADEBAYO
(ANONYMITY ORDER SET ASIDE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Mason, Legal Representative, Jackson Lees Group
For the Respondent: Ms C Newton, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester on 1 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his human rights (articles 3 and 8 ECHR) appeal. The decision was sent to the parties on 14 July 2025.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 13 August 2025.
Anonymity Order
3. The First-tier Tribunal issued an anonymity order at an early case management stage. The decision was affirmed by the Tribunal in its June 2025 decision, at [5]-[8], with the reasoning that “there are claims about sensitive personal information and people, including children, who are not party to the proceedings and can have no input on what is said about them”.
4. Open justice requires, generally, that tribunals must conduct their business publicly unless this would result in injustice. Exceptions to the rule must be justified by some more important principle, most often where the circumstances are such that openness would put at risk the achievement of justice which is the very purpose of the proceedings: R (Guardian News & Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates' Court (Article 19 intervening) [2012] EWCA Civ 42, [2013] QB 618, per Toulson LJ at [2] and [4].
5. I observe the Upper Tribunal’s Guidance Note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private.
6. The appellant has been convicted on several occasions, though the convictions are now of some age. I am mindful of the general approach in immigration appeals that convicted persons will not usually not benefit from anonymity orders: Secretary of State for the Home Department v Starkey [2021] EWCA Civ 421, [2021] Imm AR 1106, at [97]-[98].
7. There is no evidence that any adverse publicity might affect the appellant’s children any more than the reporting of their father’s criminal convictions or that he is seeking to remain in this country. I would expect any reporting of this case to be responsible and to bear in mind what is known about the age and circumstances of the children. On balance, it is not in the public interest to maintain the order made in the tribunal below.
8. I set aside the anonymity order made on 14 July 2025.
Relevant Facts
9. The appellant is a national of Nigeria and aged thirty-three. He has been in this country since the age of thirteen.
10. He was granted entry clearance as a visitor and the First-tier Tribunal concluded that he entered the United Kingdom on 14 July 2006. His leave to enter expired in January 2007 and he subsequently became an overstayer.
11. He has one caution for travelling on a train without paying a fare in 2010.
12. Subsequently he accumulated convictions, firstly as a juvenile in 2010 for possessing an offensive weapon in a public place. Then, as an adult, on a count of battery for which he was sentenced to four weeks in a Young Offenders’ Institution, suspended for twelve months (2010); possessing an offensive weapon in a public place, eight weeks in a Young Offenders’ Institution, suspended for twelve months (2010); theft, fine £120 (2013); using threatening, abusive, insulting words or behaviour with intent to cause fear, community order (2015); and possessing a class B drug, no separate penalty (2015). He has no convictions since the age of twenty-two. I confirm that he has not served a custodial sentence.
13. The appellant submitted human rights (article 8 ECHR) representations which were refused in 2015 with an in-country right of appeal. First-tier Tribunal Judge Griffith dismissed the appeal by a decision dated 17 May 2017, finding that the appellant was not dependent on his mother and two sisters who enjoyed leave to remain in this country, nor was he was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with his then partner for the purposes of article 8. There was no evidence that he was present in the lives of his two children, only one of whom had him named on their birth certificate as their father.
14. Upon being detained by the respondent in July 2017, the appellant served further human rights representations which were refused as clearly unfounded in September 2017. The appellant claimed asylum the same month, but it took the respondent almost six years to issue a refusal decision on the claim in September 2023.
15. Meanwhile, the appellant submitted further human rights representations in September 2022. The respondent accepted them as a fresh claim under paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules by a decision dated 15 April 2024 but refused to grant the appellant status. The appellant exercised appeal rights to the First-tier Tribunal.
First-tier Tribunal Decision
16. The appeal was heard by the First-tier Tribunal sitting in Manchester on 27 June 2025. The appellant attended and gave evidence, along with his mother and a sister.
17. As to article 3 ECHR, the appellant relied upon a psychiatric report identifying him to be suffering from PTSD having been robbed in 2011 and stabbed in 2023, the latter placing him for a time in intensive care. The report further identified the appellant as being at significant risk of suicide.
18. The First-tier Tribunal found, inter alia, that the evidence did not satisfy the high article 3 ECHR threshold as the appellant could receive appropriate treatment and support in Nigeria to the extent that he would not self-harm.
19. Turning to article 8 ECHR, the First-tier Tribunal observed section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the public interest. The Tribunal first considered how many children the appellant has. He informed the psychiatrist that he has three, his sister informed the Tribunal that he has five. Having considered the available evidence, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant has four children. In fairness, I accept the appellant may not have included the child on whose birth certificate he is not named. There was no evidence presented from the mother of the elder two, who are aged fourteen and eleven. He last had contact with the older of these two children in 2023. The younger two are aged nine and six. They have the same mother, who supported the appellant for a time during his 2017 appeal. She has provided no evidence in support since this date. The appellant accepted that he has not spoken to his two younger children since he separated from their mother in or around November 2022. It was concluded by the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant does not have a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with any of his children.
20. It was accepted that the appellant has a close relationship with his younger sisters, with whom he lives along with his mother. However, the relationship did not reach the level of mutual support amounting to dependence that outweighs the public interest in immigration control. I am mindful of the recent judgment of the Court of Appeal in IA and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 addressing article 8 family life between adult siblings which post-dates the First-tier Tribunal’s decision in this matter. It does not aid the appellant.

Grounds of Appeal
21. The grounds of appeal were drafted by the appellant’s previous solicitors. Though concise, running to a little over two pages, they do not clearly identify individual grounds of appeal. As recently observed by the Upper Tribunal in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC), at headnote 3:
“Each point of law, where there is more than one, must be clearly and succinctly identified as a numbered ground of appeal with sufficient detail so that the Tribunal and the parties are able to identify the essential issue raised by that ground. The grounds of appeal will rarely need to be lengthy. Each ground of appeal should identify succinctly, in clearly numbered paragraphs or (sub paragraphs).”
22. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds.
23. Ms Mason helpfully confirmed at the hearing that paragraphs 1 to 7 of the grounds constitute an introduction. The grounds themselves are properly to be identified as the First-tier Tribunal failing to:
(i) Provide adequate reasoning.
(ii) Undertake a holistic assessment when deciding the article 3 ECHR appeal.
(iii) Undertake an adequate balancing exercise in respect of article 8 ECHR outside of the Immigration Rules.
24. Paragraphs 8 to 11 of the document are concerned with ground (i); paragraphs 12 to 17 with ground (ii); and paragraphs 18 and 19 with grounds (iii).
Discussion
Ground (i)
25. This ground as drafted is focused on the lack of familial support the appellant will enjoy on return to Nigeria. It is contended that this will result in an article 3 ECHR breach as he has no-one to support him in the country save for his elderly grandmother as all his other relatives have moved to the United Kingdom. The focus of the challenge is directed to the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment at [27] that:
“27. ... The appellant’s mother asserted that her mother was incapable of assisting the appellant but there is no other evidence. I do not know how old she is or any information about her health, other than that the appellant’s mother said in oral evidence that she has age-related illness.”
26. I observe [51} of the decision:
“51. ... He has not shown that ... he has no support there. He has not shown that his grandmother and possibly other relatives would not assist him ...”
27. The appellant contends that the First-tier Tribunal neither accepts nor rejects the claim that his grandmother was incapable of assisting the appellant and makes no findings on the evidence provided about her.
28. Having considered the papers in this matter with care, I conclude that this challenge cannot withstand even limited scrutiny. The First-tier Tribunal observed that save for the mother’s oral evidence, which was very limited in terms, no evidence was produced as to the circumstances of the appellant’s grandmother. It is implicit at [27] that the contention advanced by the appellant is rejected; and expressly rejected in short terms at [51]. The burden rested upon the appellant to establish that neither his grandmother nor any other relative would provide financial or emotional support on his return to Nigeria, and his family would be unable to provide him with a means of accessing accommodation.
29. Ms Mason properly accepted there was no reference to an inability by members of the family in the United Kingdom to provide financial assistance and other support in various witness statements filed with the First-tier Tribunal. Ms Mason also accepted that the author of the grounds of appeal, Mrs Johnrose, represented the appellant before the First-tier Tribunal and it is not contended in the grounds that oral evidence was presented addressing the family’s inability to provide financial assistance and support at the hearing. In the circumstances, the First-tier Tribunal could reasonably and lawfully conclude that the appellant had not satisfied the burden placed upon him to establish that family members would not assist him in Nigeria.
30. This ground is dismissed.
Ground (ii)
31. By means of this ground, the appellant contends that the First-tier Tribunal failed to take a holistic approach to the evidence and his circumstances when considering whether his removal would result in a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health. He relies upon the report of Dr Ghosh, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, dated 4 August 2024. Dr Ghosh opined that the appellant is suffering from PTSD compounded by severe depression. He is a suicide risk. I observe that the conclusion of the First-tier Tribunal that some weight be attached to the report because Dr Ghosh did not have access to other medical information at the time of her report is consistent with the guidance in HA (expert evidence, mental health) [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC), [2022] Imm AR 809 and was not challenged by the appellant before this Tribunal.
32. The appellant submits that the First-tier Tribunal focused solely upon whether appropriate treatment was available in Nigeria and failed to consider (1) that the prospects of returning are exacerbating his feelings of self-harm and (2) that even with family support in the United Kingdom he is not receiving medical treatment.
33. Ms Mason accepted that ground (ii) stood and fell with ground (i). She was right to adopt this position. The challenge advanced by the appellant in respect of article 3 ECHR and health is fundamentally incapable of succeeding, being focused on a lack of support on return, with no challenge to the finding that there is appropriate treatment available in Nigeria and the appellant can access such treatment: AM (Art 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 00131 (IAC), [2022] Imm AR 1021. The question of support has been addressed in ground (i) and the appellant was unsuccessful in his submission.
34. This ground is dismissed.
Ground (iii)
35. The appellant contends that First-tier Tribunal failed to consider the appellant’s private life rights outside of the Immigration Rules, and such consideration required the Tribunal to undertake an adequate balancing exercise taking into account his lack of risk to others in this country, the time he has spent here, his mental health and his lack of family in Nigeria.
36. The significant difficulty for the appellant is that the Tribunal considered whether exceptional circumstances arose rendering refusal of leave to remain a breach of article 8 ECHR by its assessment under paragraph GEN.3.2(2) of the Rules which provides:
“... the decision-maker must consider, on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would render refusal of entry clearance, or leave to enter or remain, a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because such refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant, their partner, a relevant child or another family member whose Article 8 rights it is evident from that information would be affected by a decision to refuse the application.”
37. Having considered the appellant’s personal circumstances from [31]-[42] and connections to his family from [43] to [49] the First-tier Tribunal concluded at [50] and [52]:
“50. For the same reasons as above, I find there are no unjustifiably harsh consequences under paragraph GEN.3.2(2) for anyone. The Appellant is an adult and his relationship with his mother is not unusually dependent. His sisters will be distressed but this is not determinative. Under the circumstances his children will not be disproportionately affected.”
“52. There is no dispute he arrived in the UK on 14 July 2006. He has been in the UK less than 20 years, so he must show that there are very significant obstacles to his re-integration in Nigeria. That is a high threshold, and I find the appellant has not shown very significant obstacles to the balance of probabilities. I adopt the reasons above about medical treatment and support in Nigeria. It has not been shown that, with mental health treatment, he could not work to help support himself. He speaks English, he is a Christian, and he has at least some familiarity with Nigerian culture.”
38. The finding as to GEN.3.2(2) is not challenged before this Tribunal.
39. When considering GEN.3.2(2) the public interest was not placed into the assessment as it was undertaken through a Rule.
40. I accept the First-tier Tribunal should have considered article 8 ECHR outside of the Rules. The question is whether such error is material in this case.
41. In R (Agyarko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 11, [2017] 1 WLR 823 the Supreme Court addressed the weight that is to be given to the Rules in the context of an article 8 ECHR proportionality assessment. Lord Reed observed, at [47], that in considering how the balance is to be struck in individual cases, this panel has to “take the Secretary of State’s policy into account and to attach considerable weight to it at a general level, as well as considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular cases”.
42. Having been unsuccessful on the facts in respect of the article 8 ECHR assessment under the Rules, there is no cogent basis for concluding that countervailing factors favourable to the appellant outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s removal. There are no very compelling or exceptional circumstances. Ms Mason properly accepted that the proper target should have been [50] of the decision, but this ground as drafted failed to challenge the reasoning in that paragraph.
43. This ground is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
44. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 14 July 2025 does not contain a material error of law.
45. The appeal is dismissed.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 December 2025