Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos UI 2025 003666
UI 2025 003669
UI 2025 003670
UI 2025 003671

First-tier Tribunal Nos:
HU/50742/2025
HU/50743/2025
HU/50744/2025
HU/50745/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

15th July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

FAA
MBA
YA
YuA
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr David Chirico, King’s Counsel and Mr Vijay Jagadesham of Counsel, instructed by the Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit
For the Respondent: Mr Zane Malik, King’s Counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 17 April 2026
Written Submissions Received Thereafter

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. Anonymity was granted by the First-tier Tribunal, and the Respondent has not sought to suggest that anonymity should not continue to apply. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellants are Palestinians resident in the Occupied Territory of Gaza. They appeal against the decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (“the Judge”) promulgated on 30 June 2025 refusing their application for leave to enter the United Kingdom to join family members.
2. The UK family members are refugees. They are MA and his wife IA. MA and IA have 2 children aged 9 and 4. MA and IA are the uncle and aunt of the 3 minor Appellants’ (MBA, YA and YuA). The adult Appellant, FAA, is MA’s father-in-law. MA and IA are the Sponsors for the purpose of the Appellants’ application for entry clearance.
3. My task is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If there is no material error of law then the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellants’ appeal will stand. If I conclude that there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision then I shall either remake the decision or I shall remit the matter for rehearing to the First-tier Tribunal.
4. The Appellants’ Ground of Appeal explain in the introduction that:
“The Appellants are IA’s father/ MA’s father in law (aged 62) and IA’s three minor nephews/ MA’s cousins (aged 12, 15 and 17). IA lived most of her life in Gaza in an extended family home, except for approximately one year after her marriage, and cared for her nephews extensively, sharing an especially close bond. In December 2023, two rockets fell on the home killing most of IA’s family including her mother, several siblings and a number of nieces and nephews; this included the killing of the parents and the younger brother of the three child Appellants. All four Appellants have since been multiply displaced and as set out in the ASA: “The three child Appellants in particular have lost both parents and the First Appellant is himself too traumatised, unwell and impoverished to provide the care that these traumatised, malnourished, destitute, homeless children need especially when they face imminent death with each attack on Gaza.”
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
5. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal itself by way of a decision dated 13 August 2025. The learned Judge observed when granting permission that:
“2. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in failing to consider material evidence and failing to give anxious scrutiny to evidence in relation to financial and emotional dependency. The grounds are detailed and outline several examples of where the above have arguably occurred.
3. In terms of financial dependency, the grounds argue that the determination fails to consider the difficulties faced in sending money to Gaza, the amount sent relative to the amount of money earned by the Sponsor, the lack of other family who could support the Appellants and the termination of aid in Gaza. It is right that whilst some of these issues were considered, it is arguable that these factors were not considered cumulatively nor given anxious scrutiny.
4. Likewise in relation to the issue of emotional dependency, it is arguable that the social worker report was not given anxious scrutiny when considering the views of the children and the bond and emotional attachment described between the Appellant children and the Sponsor’s wife. As such, this is arguably material and an error.”
The Procedural History
6. Following the hearing before the Judge on 23 June 2025 and the grant of permission to appeal thereafter, case management decisions were made to stay this by a panel of the Upper Tribunal comprising Deputy Chamber President Plimmer and Upper Tribunal Judge Grey. The reason for the stay was to await the Court of Appeal’s decision in IA and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516; [2026] 2 WLR 1001.
7. The parties filed a substantial number of documents in this case, including a Rule 24 reply from the Respondent and then a Rule 25 Response from the Appellants thereafter. The main bundle comprises 1943 pages, but there was also a supplementary bundle.
8. I am grateful to all Counsel and to their instructing solicitors for the well prepared and well presented documents and submissions.
The Hearing Before Me
9. The matter was listed for hearing before me on 17 April 2026. There were very significant travel difficulties for all. Mr Malik KC was not able to arrive in Manchester due to very serious public transport difficulties. Mr Chirico was only able to arrive at the hearing via an overnight journey of some 12 hours with stops at various railway stations. Mr Malik invited me to permit him to attend the hearing remotely. Mr Malik said that a fair hearing could take place on a hybrid basis whereby I was at the hearing centre in Manchester with the Appellants’ counsel and whereby Mr Malik attended remotely from his Chambers in London. I put the matter back until later in the day to enable the parties to be ready to proceed whilst I dealt with other cases which were listed before me.
10. A substantial number of documents were filed by the parties, including bundles for the hearing, skeleton arguments from each side and a bundle of authorities. I shall refer to them where necessary in this Error of Law decision. I am not making findings of fact in this decision because that is not the task before me.
11. At the conclusion of the hearing, I granted permission to the Appellants, if so advised, to make further written submissions and for the Respondent to reply in respect of “materiality”.
12. Whilst the parties did provide such documents, unfortunately those were not brought to my attention until a few days ago when I had enquired of Counsel if they had filed any documents. I am grateful to Counsel for their prompt responses.
13. I shall return to those documents below, but I agree with the Appellant’s further note of May 2026 that the Respondent’s written reply dated 27 April 2026 does extend beyond the issues that I had directed that the parties had permission to provide written submissions in respect of. Nonetheless, I deal with the matters raised.
The First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision
14. The Judge’s decision sets out the background and the nature of appeal in helpful and clear terms. Paragraph 3 of the Judge’s decision refers to the relationship between the Appellants (being the Appellants living Gaza and who seek entry clearance) and the “Sponsors” (those persons who live in the United Kingdom and whom the Appellants seek to join here in the UK). The Judge said:
“The Appellants are the father in law and the nephews of the Sponsor, Mr [MA] who is married to the first Appellant’s daughter, Ms [IA]. [IA] married her husband, the Sponsor when she was 18 years old when still in Gaza. Her husband then came to the UK and was granted asylum. [IA] joined her husband in the UK. They have two children. The remainder of the family remained in Gaza. The Appellants initially lived with [IA] and extended family together in the family home before [IA] married. In December 2023 the Appellants’ family home was attacked by airstrike and tragically several family members were killed. The Appellants have been displaced several times and they are currently living in inhumane conditions in a camp. They are dependent on [IA] and her husband for emotional and financial support. Whilst the Appellants do not meet the Rules for the purpose of family reunion, it is argued that there are exceptional circumstances in this case. The Appellants argue that family life is engaged for the purpose of Article 8 ECHR. The decision to refuse entry clearance will result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for all concerned. The three minor Appellants have been impacted by the loss of their other family members. They produce an independent social worker report which concludes that it is their best interest to be reunited with their aunt in the UK with whom they have a close relationship with and whom played a key role in their formative years. Medical evidence is also produced to demonstrate how the decision to refuse the application is also having detrimental impact on Ibtisam’s mental health.”
15. The Judge listed the issues to be considered at paragraph 12 of her decision stating:
“a. Is Article 8 ECHR engaged?
b. Is the quality of the family life such that any decision to refuse leave would significantly interfere with family life?
c. Are there any exceptional circumstances in this case which would render the decision a breach of the Appellant’s rights under Article 8 ECHR?”
16. The Judge heard evidence from FAA and IA and considered the oral and written submissions of both parties. In a reserved judgment, the Judge dismissed the Appellants’ appeals. There were a variety of submissions made on behalf of the Respondent. That included a submission that the Judge was said not to have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Judge found against the Respondent on that lack of jurisdiction issue.
The Judge’s Decision
17. I refer to some parts of the Judge’s decision. The Judge said in part at paragraphs 23 to 22
“I will turn to consider first the relationship between the first Appellant and the Sponsor’s wife. It is [IA]’s evidence that after she married, she moved to live for a time with her husband and his family elsewhere in Gaza. She explained in her evidence, as did the Sponsor, that this was the cultural norm. She maintained contact with her own family however it is agreed evidence that at that time, the Sponsor and his wife had formed an independent family unit away from the Appellants. At that time, it could not be argued that there was any dependency on either party.
24. After the Sponsor left Gaza, his wife states that she returned to live with her own family. It was their evidence that the family had a large building in which there were individual living quarters or flats but the building also had shared communal areas for preparing and eating food. [IA] did confirm that each flat had a lockable door. However, she described how culturally the family would join each other to eat and spend time together. The children in particular would stay overnight in the other family flats and would be cared for by other extended family members. [IA} described how she would provide care for her nephews whilst she lived in this accommodation and that she was effectively their second mother. There was little challenge to this evidence other than the submission from Mr Biggs that even in these circumstances, the Appellants were primarily cared for by their parents who were alive at that time. This was again not disputed. It could be argued on the evidence that prior to [IA] leaving Gaza she formed part of the family unit for the purpose of family life with her nephews.
25. However, [IA] then chose to leave to join her husband, the Sponsor, in the UK. Whilst she was asked if she made the decision freely to leave her family in Gaza, this was a difficult question and one which she found hard to answer in cross examination. Of course, she stated that it was a difficult decision to leave her family however she was married and culturally she was required to join her husband who had fled Gaza and had been granted protection in the UK. On the evidence, I find that [IA] had little choice but to join her husband in the UK.
26. However, this does not detract from the fact that she did leave her family and formed her own family unit in the UK with her husband and children. During this time, prior to the conflict, the first Appellant lived with his wife. [IA] described her father as someone who provided compassion for the whole family however after the war, which destroyed everything, he became a shadow of his former self. It was her evidence however that after she left but prior to the conflict, her father was able to support himself and others. As such, there was no dependency. As such, I find that family life ties broke at this stage.
27. The same applies to the relationship between [IA] and the remaining Appellants. Whilst I accept that they would have remained in contact remotely, [IA] acknowledged that her nephews continued to be cared for by their parents after she left for the UK. They were not dependent on the Sponsor or [IA] during this time and thus the family life ties were broken.
28. I must however consider whether the change in circumstances meant that family life was re-engaged after the conflict began. In terms of financial dependency, I have seen little evidence of this. It is the Sponsor’s evidence that he sent financial support to the Appellants on two occasions, once before Christmas and once in May 2025. The Sponsor was asked how the Appellants were managing financially if he had only sent money to them on two occasions. He referred to the various charitable organisations who offered practical support to the Appellants such as food aid which he stated has now stopped due to the ongoing conflict. I was referred to objective evidence to support this assertion. Whatever the situation with the aid agencies, the fact remains that the Sponsor cannot argue that the Appellants are dependent on financial aid from him and his wife as they have simply not evidenced that sufficient funds have been sent at a reasonable frequency to suggest that the Appellants are dependent on any such support.
29. In relation to emotional dependency, the Appellants and Sponsor have provided evidence of remote contact that has taken place. I noted the contact evidence found at pages 3-116 of the Appellants’ second bundle which included WhatsApp messages with translations. They are from May 2024. There are several references to video calls and voice messages. Having read the text messages, many are questions of how the Appellants are and asking what is happening in Gaza. There are a few messages relating to money and [IA] telling her father that they have started a fundraising campaign. Whilst I accept that this evidence demonstrates that contact has taken place, I do not find that this goes beyond communication which would take place between any other adult child and their parent.
30. Mr Biggs noted the social worker report which considers the role that the first Appellant plays in relation to the care of the child Appellants. Paragraph 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 are particularly relevant in this context and worth quoting in full: Mr [FA]. It is clear from the children’s and Mr [FA]s’ accounts to us that he has taken on the role of their primary caregiver and father figure since the death of their parents in December 2023. He summed up his commitment to them as follows, “I have been entrusted with these children, to look after them, and I have to do it until the end of my life”. It is to Mr [FA]’s credit that he has managed to keep the children alive and to meet their needs to the extent that he has in the context of a protracted and devastating armed conflict. There was evidence from across our assessment that he has been proactive in meeting their holistic needs in the face of significant obstacles, for example the persistence he showed in accessing medical care for [Y] and obtaining funds for [M]’s tuition (3.2.7 & 3.2.20). The children have, in my professional opinion, developed a deep emotional bond with their grandfather and I believe this relationship has been a vital and consistent source of emotional warmth, reassurance and stability (3.31, 3.3.3, 3.3.4). As such, it is my view that Mr [FA]’s parenting has been a vital protective factor for the children, both on an emotional and practical level. However, within their current context, it is simply beyond his control and capacity to adequately safeguard the children and to sufficiently meet their immediate and developmental needs. By way of example, Mr [FA] is currently dependent on the children to go out alone to source food, water and firewood, even though this places them at increased risk from shelling and feral dogs. Another example that he provided was that, as the situation has gotten more desperate, there has been an uptake in children stealing food to survive; Mr [FA] expressed a worry about how he could protect [M] [Y] and[Y] from “the influence of stealing”, highlighting the limitations of his own safeguarding influence.
31. The above shows the role that the first Appellant has taken on in relation to the care of the children and his abilities to do so despite the dire conditions that they face. I find that this evidence shows not only that the first Appellant is capable of providing care to his grandchildren but also is able to care for himself without any dependence on others.
32. In relation to the child Appellants, they were dependent on their own parents after the Sponsor and his wife left Gaza. After their parents were killed, this responsibility fell to their grandfather, the first Appellant. It is argued that the children have a close bond with [IA] given the role that she played in their formative years. Whilst she may have played some role in caring for the children, this was always whilst the children were primarily cared for by their biological parents. The social worker report assesses the relationship between the Sponsor and his wife and the children. The report at 3.5.10 suggests that Ibtisam is uniquely well placed to support the children’s emotional needs as she was seen as an early attachment figure following the care that she provided to the children in Gaza. The children also expressed that in their minds [IA] has taken on something of a maternal figure since their parents’ deaths. However much of this paragraph related to the ability of the Sponsor and his wife to parent, noting their skills in relation to their own children. The report also considered the practicalities, namely that the Sponsor and his wife could provide shelter and food in a place of safety as opposed to the conditions currently faced by the Appellants. These are not relevant considerations for the purpose of assessing family life.
33. I note the evidence from both the Sponsor, his wife and that included in the social worker report in relation to the relationship between the Appellants and [Ma] ([IA]’s sister). The evidence suggests that the bond between them is not as close as that between the children and Ibtisam. This was because [Ma] married and lived elsewhere when the children were younger. They are not as familiar with [Ma]. However the report still indicates that they children consider [Ma] as ‘kind Auntie’ and that she has been providing practical support to the children such as preparing their food. When taken in the round, I find that the evidence supports the contention that the child Appellants continue to have a remote relationship with [IA]. However, I do not find that the children are dependent on [IA] whether emotionally, financially or otherwise. I find that the children depend on their grandfather as a primary parental figure and this care is supplemented by [Ma] and other family members.
35. As such, I do not find that the Appellants have evidenced that their relationships with the Sponsor and his wife go beyond normal emotional family ties. As such, I do not find that family life is engaged.
36. Even if I am wrong about the above, I do not find that the decision interferes and is of such gravity as to engage Article 8 ECHR. It is the evidence from all parties that they have maintained their relationships remotely since the Sponsor and his wife left Gaza. There is no evidence that this cannot continue. The decision simply allows for the continuation of the status quo. The Appellant has not raised the ‘termination’ point, namely the risk of death to the Appellants in Gaza which would of course severely interfere with any continuing family life.”
18. The Judge set out the law and referred to the parties’ respective submissions in relation to the issues she had identified. The Judge concluded:
“49. Taking into account my findings above, I have found that Article 8 ECHR is not engaged. The Immigration Rules are not met for the reasons given above.
50. The public interest lies in the maintenance of effective immigration controls.
51. Even if I was wrong about the above, I considered the proportionality of the decision. To strike a fair balance between the competing public and individual interests involved, I adopt a balance sheet approach.
52. I find that the factors raised by the Appellants do not outweigh the public interest for the reasons set out above.”
The Appellant’s Grounds Summarised.
19. The Appellant’s 2 written grounds of appeal are detailed. The grounds and responses of the parties appear to have varied, probably because of the developing caselaw.
20. Ground 1 contends that there were “Multiple errors of law in regard to Article 8 (1) existence [of] family life”.
21. Ground 2 contends that there were “Additional errors with regards to Article 8 (2) proportionality assessment”.
The Parties Submissions Summarised.
22. In his oral submissions Mr Chirico KC submitted that there was a material error of law in the Judge’s decision and that therefore the matter ought to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a rehearing.
23. Mr Chirico referred to one of the children’s witness statements ‘at page 934 of the bundle which stated that:
“Since my parents died in December last year [IA] has become even closer and more important to me and my brothers. She is the closest person I have now, even closer than my grandfather because even though he is here with us, he is much older and he is also struggling to cope with everything that is going on. Our other aunt, [M] is also with us. [M] is a kind auntie as well but she did not live with us so we are not as close. Before the war started she was always very busy with her husband and her own children including her disabled son so we didn’t see as much of her, she was living in the same area as us but not in the same house. The strongest bond we have now that our parents have died is with [IA].
24. I was also referred to page 494 of the bundle to part of a report by an Independent Social Worker’s (“ISW”) report which had stated:
“Overall, I identify Mrs [IA] as being uniquely well placed to support the children’s emotional recovery needs. This is primarily due to evidence from across our interviews and the bundle that indicates she was an early attachment figure for the children, having reportedly played a key role in providing daily care them during their early childhood (e.g. 3.3.4 of this report; WS of MA (Appellant), para. 5). The children also expressed that since the deaths of their parents, Mrs. [IA] has, in their minds, assumed a role as the maternal figure in their lives (3.3.2; WS of MA (Appellant), paras. 4 & 7). During our interview with Mrs [IA], she expressed considerable warmth, concern and commitment towards the children and insight into their emotional needs, congruent with her account in her witness statements. She also demonstrated further warmth and emotional insight when speaking about her own children, further indicating her capacity to mentalise and respond to children’s emotional needs. Given what we know about the mediating role of relationships with emotionally attuned caregivers (3.2.15), I find Mrs [IA] to be uniquely placed to support the children’s recovery from complex trauma.”
25. Mr Chirico said that the son’s statement was not referred to at all in the Judge’s decision and the Judge had misinterpreted the ISW’s report. He submitted that there were no or no legally adequate reasons for rejecting the ISW’s report. He said that the Judge had made “straightforward” public law errors and that these failures could be seen as a failure to apply anxious scrutiny. Mr Chirico referred to the background, including that for a time, in effect the Sponsor was the 3 children’s mother. He said that she had filled the parental role.
26. Mr Chirico submitted that the law had been clarified with the Court of Appeal’s judgement in IA v SSHD. He submitted that this case dealt more with the requirement for adult Appellants having to show additional elements of dependency.
27. Mr Chirico said that everyone feels great sympathy for the situation that the Appellants find themselves in Gaza and the Respondent correctly highlights that sympathy does not mean that appeals can succeed. Mr Chirico submitted that it was important not to go too far in the other direction either. Namely that the 3 children’s parents were killed by a rocket attack. They need the parental support of their aunt to whom they are the closest. She lives in the UK and they seek to join her. It was submitted that it was important to refer to the children as children. Mr Chirico said that the law permitted such an approach and therefore it permitted entry clearance.
28. Mr Chirico referred to the factual summary set out in his skeleton argument and to the witness statements. I was taken at some length to the case law within the authorities bundle, including in respect of the Strasbourg jurisprudence.
29. I am going to refer to the Respondent’s written and oral submission in detail because of the importance of the case.
30. Mr Malik submitted in summary that the Appellants’ submissions on anxious scrutiny did not somehow qualify the caselaw referred to in the Respondent’s skeleton argument when dealing with whether there was an error of law in the Judge’s decision. Mr Malik said that it cannot be inferred that the Judge did not take certain evidence into account. He said it was necessary for the Upper Tribunal to exercise restraint. Mr Malik said that the Judge had set out the steps in reasoning and the Judge can come to different legitimate conclusions.
31. Mr Malik referred me to the Court of Appeal’s judgement in IA v SSHD, including paragraphs 122, 123, 125, 142, 143, 166 and 167. He stressed that the focus of the appeal must be on the family life within the UK. He submitted that there was no positive obligation to admit every member of the wider family. He submitted that there must be great weight on the Respondent’s policy.
32. Mr Malik submitted that the Appellants’ grounds were no more than a disagreement with the findings made by the Judge.
33. In respect of Ground 1 Mr Malik submitted that the Judge had said at paragraph 13 of her decision that she had considered all of the evidence and that therefore it could be assumed that she did. The Judge noted that the Sponsor had gone on to form her own family. Mr Malik said that the Judge at paragraph 28 had referred to the financial dependency matters. He said that that there was some evidence of some support, but there was no evidence of sufficient funds at a frequent level. Mr Malik said that the Judge dealt with emotional dependency at paragraph 29 of her decision. That states:
“In relation to emotional dependency, the Appellants and Sponsor have provided evidence of remote contact that has taken place. I noted the contact evidence found at pages 3-116 of the Appellants’ second bundle which included WhatsApp messages with translations. They are from May 2024. There are several references to video calls and voice messages. Having read the text messages, many are questions of how the Appellants are and asking what is happening in Gaza. There are a few messages relating to money and [I] telling her father that they have started a fundraising campaign. Whilst I accept that this evidence demonstrates that contact has taken place, I do not find that this goes beyond communication which would take place between any other adult child and their parent.”
34. Mr Malik said that the Judge referred to the ISW’s report at paragraph 30 of her decision and it was also referred to at paragraph 24 of her decision.
35. Mr Malik said that there was no error at paragraph 32 of the Judge’s decision which refers to the Sponsor being “something of a maternal figure”. He said that the Judge knew what the key points were. He submitted that the Appellants’ aunt being the second mother and that was at the heart of the appeal.
36. After referring to paragraph 33 and 34 of the Judge’s decision Mr Malik said that the Judge had considered matters in the round. She concluded that the children were not dependent on IA whether emotionally, financially or otherwise. They were dependent on their grandfather. The Judge said at paragraph 35 that their relationships with the Sponsor and his wife did not go beyond normal emotional family ties. The Judge concluded that family life was not engaged and there was no error of law.
37. Mr Malik submitted that the outcome was inevitable because the Appellants could not meet the test set in IA v SSHD. He said that there were also children in that group of cases which were considered by the Court of Appeal and not just adults.
38. Mr Malik submitted that even if the Judge had erred in law in respect of engagement of Article 8, this appeal had to be fail because of the alternative findings. The Judge had considered proportionality at paragraph 37 with the heading “If I am wrong about that”. The Judge had referred to the relevant statutory framework for the purpose of securing the economic interests of the UK. The balance sheet approach was applied. The Judge concluded that overall, factors weighed heavily against the Appellants including in respect of maintenance and accommodation matters.
39. The Respondent’s skeleton argument dated 10 February 2026 had stated, amongst other things, and with which I entirely agree:
“(1) The FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the UT should not rush to find an error of law in its decisions simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently, as the appeal is available only on a point of law: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678, at [30].
(2) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010 UKSC 49 [2011] 2 All ER 65, at [45].
(3) When it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see Jones v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 [2013] 2 All ER 625, at [25]. Page 2 of 10
(4) The issues that the FTT is deciding and the basis on which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [27]. (5) The judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 [2020] 4 WLR 145, at [34].
(6) It is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case and the mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 [2017] WLR 1260, at [107].”
40. In respect of Ground 1 the Respondent’s skeleton argument stated in part as follows:
“The FTT’s decision that Article 8 is not engaged is plainly correct. The grounds of appeal advanced by the Appellants are untenable in light of the Court of Appeal’s recent judgment in IA and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516.”
…
“The Appellants seek to challenge the FTT’s conclusion that no family life existed within the meaning of Article 8(1). In light of IA, and on the basis of the facts as found by the FTT, it is plain that Article 8(1) is not engaged. The test, as elucidated in IA, is clearly not satisfied. The FTT’s conclusion is manifestly correct, and its reasons disclose no error of law.”
41. The Respondent’s skeleton argument said in respect of the IA v SSHD:
“The Court of Appeal articulated the principles governing the engagement of Article 8(1) in respect of individuals who are not present within the United Kingdom as follows:
(1) If family life had existed between the sponsor in the United Kingdom and the relative abroad, that would not have meant that the article 8 rights of the relative outside the United Kingdom should the main focus of the proportionality exercise under Article 8(2). The main focus of that exercise should be the family life of the person within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom (paragraph 142).
(2) The United Kingdom is not under a positive obligation to admit every member of the wider family of the person within its territory. The person who has ‘the right to respect for his … family life’ under Article 8(1) is the sponsor in the United Kingdom, who is within the jurisdiction of Article 8, and the requirement that ‘there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of [the sponsor's right to family life]’ under Article 8(2) encompasses relatives abroad because interference with the family life of the sponsor necessarily interferes with the sponsor's family life with him (paragraph 143). ”
42. In respect of proportionality, the Respondent’s skeleton argument submitted in part that:
“The Appellants seek to challenge the FTT’s conclusion on proportionality under Article 8(2). As IA makes clear, the principal focus is upon the sponsor in the United Kingdom. Given the obligation to attach considerable weight to the Secretary of State’s immigration policies as articulated in the Immigration Rules, the refusal of entry clearance was plainly proportionate, even assuming the existence of family life within the meaning of Article 8(1). No very exceptional or compelling circumstances justified the grant of entry clearance to the family outside the Rules. The FTT’s conclusion discloses no error of law. Indeed, on IA, the outcome was inevitable.”
43. The Respondent’s skeleton argument goes further to state that in any event the FTT Judge was correct to conclude that the conditions in Gaza were not relevant to the assessment under Article 8 ECHR and that Article 8 must not be used a means of instructing a positive Article 2 or 3 obligation “through the back door”. Nor it was submitted that the Judge had failed to consider the relevant evidence in respect of the assessment of the best interests of the sponsor’s children. Similarly, it was submitted that the Judge had considered whether family life could continue if the Appellants were not granted entry clearance. It was submitted that the Appellant had not sought an adjournment in respect of the refusal of the Judge to admit the late evidence. Finaly, it was submitted that the Appellants had no prospect of establishing that Article 8 is engaged in view of the Court of Appeal’s decision in IA v SSHD.
44. In reply to Mr Malik’s submissions Mr Chirico submitted that if the appeal succeeds on issues in respect of family life, then because paragraph 42 of the Judge’s decision was also flawed then none of the findings could stand. He submitted that it was difficult to predict what a Tribunal might make of the Article 8 matters. There were issues in respect of the impact on IA’s mental health. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 was to be applied as a matter of policy. Mr Chirico submitted that it was not inevitable that that the appeal would fail, although it was possible that it would be.
45. The Respondent’s Rule 24 response dated 11 September 2025 had sought to ‘cross appeal’ despite stating that “the SSHD submits that the FTT’s Decision is not undermined by any material error of law and is correct”. The Respondent’s Rule 24 had also sought a stay of the matter, pending the Court of Appeal’s decision in IA v SSHD.
46. The Appellants had a provided a Rule 25 response. A stay was opposed in view of the need for decision because of the extremely difficult circumstances in which the Appellants were living in Gaza. It was said that it was a matter of life or death for the Appellants. There were also other issues identified in respect of the UK’s family’s mental health and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder that were referred to.
47. The Respondent’s further Written Note dated 27 April 2026, as I have said above, somewhat goes beyond what I had permitted the parties to respond on. Nonetheless, I consider it. At paragraph 2 Mr Malik submitted that the FTT Judge was entitled to find that the refusal of entry clearance was proportionate. He submitted further that,
“Even if there is an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s conclusion as to the engagement of family life under Article 8(1), which is not accepted, there is plainly no error in its alternative finding as to proportionality under Article 8(2).”
48. The Appellant’s reply dated 5 May 2026 to Mr Malik’s note states:
“The post-hearing submissions concern materiality. In this context materiality can be used to refer to (at least) two conceptually different issues: (i) did a previous tribunal’s error of law in fact have no bearing on its own decision-making process? and (ii) should relief be withheld because the outcome would inevitably be the same if the decision were taken afresh?”
…
“[The Respondent] submits that the FtT was “entitled” to find her decision to be proportionate. The Appellants do not agree. this is in any event is irrelevant to materiality. The threshold when deciding whether a hypothetical tribunal remaking a decision would reach the same conclusion is that of inevitability: see SSHD v Robinson [2018] 4 WLR 81”.
…
“[The Respondent] relies on IA and others (RN §3) but identifies no paragraphs in that judgment and omits crucial stages in the Court of Appeal’s reasoning: (i) the Court’s consideration of proportionality was expressly obiter (IA §145); (ii) the Court followed the normal process of first identifying errors of law in the decision below (IA §§ 152, 161, 168) and only then (IA §170) going on to remake the proportionality decision by reference to the facts of that case (IA §§171-174); (iii) the question of inevitability simply did not arise during this process; (iv) the remaking decision does not seek to create a factual precedent; and (v) still less (even if it did) would such factual precedent satisfy the inevitability test, given the sharp factual differences between IA’s case and that of the present Appellants.”
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
49. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
50. I have referred at paragraph 39 above to the way in which the Respondent referred to the settled law in respect of it being of vital importance that I do not interfere lightly with the expertise of the specialist Judge who had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the witnesses.
51. I am prepared to accept too that it matters little in this case that the Judge had granted permission to appeal against her own decision.
52. The legal test to be met by the Appellants to show a material error of law is well known and is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
The Court of Appeal’s Decision in IA v SSHD
53. I have considered the Court of Appeal’s important judgment in IA v SSHD, I refer to some of the decision. At paragraphs 122 and 123 the Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of dependency and explained that:
“122. The real, committed or effective support test is, in our judgment, as we have already intimated at para 68, on a proper analysis different from the additional elements of dependency test. Dependency may in one sense be the other side of the support coin. But “real support” may be provided without any serious dependency. Even “effective support” might be provided without there being meaningful dependency. As Sedley LJ himself acknowledged in Kugathas , the real, committed and effective support test was a reading down of the additional elements of dependency test. The FTT said the same at para 25 where it acknowledged that the sponsor’s real, committed and effective support of family was short of the family being dependent on the sponsor.
123. In our judgment, it would be going too far to say that it is wrong to test whether there are additional elements of dependency by reference to the real, committed or effective support provided. But real, committed and effective support is not the test itself, because the level of real support, for example, may be minor or insignificant, whereas the word “dependency” denotes a significant relationship. This is not a semantic point. The ECtHR used the word “dependence” in S v UK (1984) 40 DR 196 in the context of “cohabiting dependents”, which were its starting point (see para 42 above)”
54. Then at paragraphs 141 to 144 the Court of Appeal said,
“141. The SSHD was partly right to say that, even if family life existed between the sponsor and the brother or the sponsor and family, the article 8 rights of the family were not directly engaged. The true position is rather more nuanced, as the authorities we have cited at paras 87–97 demonstrate. Once family life is held to exist, it is indeed unitary (see Beoku-Betts and Abbas [2018] 1 WLR 533 , for example). But the family life in question is between the sponsor and the brother (or between the sponsor and the family, if that had been found to exist).
142. Moreover, even if family life had existed between the sponsor and the brother or between the sponsor and the family, that would not have meant that the article 8 rights of the brother or the family outside the UK were the main focus of the proportionality exercise under article 8(2). The main focus of that exercise would have been the family life of the person within the jurisdiction of article 1 (here, the sponsor), but that family life had to be considered as being a unitary family life with his brother or the family outside the UK. The unitary family life of the brother with his own family outside the UK is also not the focus of the proportionality exercise.
143. This is not, as the family submitted, a distinction without a difference. As we have explained at para 100 above, the UK as an ECHR state is not under a positive obligation to admit every member of the wider family of the person within the territory of the UK. The positive obligation could only extend, even if such family life existed, to those who have family life (for the purposes of article 8(1)) with that person, in this case the brother (or, as the family argued, the family). Moreover, the person who has “the right to respect for his … family life” under article 8(1) is the sponsor, who is within the jurisdiction of article 8 , and the requirement that “there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of [the sponsor’s right to family life]” under article 8(2) encompasses the brother or the family (as the persons outside the UK) because interference with the family life of the sponsor (which he shares with the brother or with the family) necessarily interferes with the sponsor’s family life with him.
144. Ultimately, therefore, if we had found family life to exist between the sponsor and the brother or between the sponsor and the family, we would have partially upheld this ground of appeal. The UT relied unhelpfully on a series of UT authorities (eg KF (Syria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] UKUT 413 (IAC) and Al Hassan v Entry Clearance Officer [2024] UKUT 234 (IAC) ) rather than on MN v Belgium (unreported) 5 May 2020, Beoku-Betts [2009] AC 115 and Abbas [2018] 1 WLR 533 . Its erroneous reliance on the article 8 rights of the entire family was relevant to its determination in respect of the best interests of the children, as we shall mention under ground 3.”
55. At paragraphs the Court of Appeal said,
“167. The SSHD’s policy is a matter for her and for the UK Government. It is, as we have also already said, not a question of floodgates or numbers likely to apply from war zones across the world. It is a question of respect for the UK’s laws and democratic process. The decision as to what is necessary in UK society to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK is the business of the SSHD and the Government. The courts must, as Lord Reed said in Agyarko , and we would respectfully endorse, attach considerable weight to the SSHD’s immigration policies at a general level, alongside considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case.
168. Again, under this heading, the UT fell into error. It may, understandably, have been driven by its quite natural human reaction to the evidence of what the family were enduring in Gaza. But that reaction should not, in our judgment, have prevented the UT from giving effect to the Government’s immigration policies (which are not, as Lord Reed also said in Agyarko, in general, inconsistent with the ECHR). The UT could only, in effect, override those policies in very exceptional or compelling circumstances, which we do not believe existed here as we shall now explain. Those policies, as we have also said, did not include a resettlement policy concerning Gaza. Had they done so, as we have also said, the balance might have been struck differently.”
Analysis and Consideration
56. I deal first with the Respondent’s “cross appeal”. Mr Malik did not renew that aspect of the SSHD’s grounds and it did not feature in his skeleton argument or during oral submissions. Even if the SSHD was still relying on the “cross appeal”, before me, I conclude that it is without merit and I dismiss it. That is because the First-tier Tribunal clearly did have jurisdiction to hear the Appellants’ appeal.
57. I refer then to the Judge’s decision at paragraph 35 when she said,
“35. As such, I do not find that the Appellants have evidenced that their relationships with the Sponsor and his wife go beyond normal emotional family ties. As such, I do not find that family life is engaged.”
58. I appreciate that the Judge had relied on previous caselaw such as Kugathas and the Court of Appeal’s more recent decision in IA v SSHD was heard after the Judge’s decision. However, what the Court of Appeal decides is declaratory of what the law always was. Consequently, despite the Judge’s decision being lengthy and detailed, it is necessary to look at the decision through the lens of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in IA v SSHD.
59. It is necessary to assess with care whether the Judge materially erred in law by concluding that family life (Article 8(1)) was not engaged.
60. In doing so, it is also necessary to consider the evidence that the Judge considered when coming to her decision. Mr Malik is entirely correct that it is not necessary for a judge to refer to every piece of evidence in their decision and the caselaw makes clear that I must respect the specialism of the First-tier Tribunal. Indeed, the Judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Sponsors at the hearing. Mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision is not sufficient for an appeal judge to allow an appeal and I must not lightly interfere with the expert Judge’s decision.
61. Nor must the situation that the Appellants find themselves in Gaza affect or dilute the necessary legal test for finding an error of law.
62. In my judgment there are 5 aspects in particular that the Judge failed to consider lawfully in her decision which were of very high importance. Had she done so, it is more than likely that she would have come to a different conclusion.
63. First, there was the evidence of IA herself. The Judge minimised the evidence of the bond, continuing link, emotional dependency, effect, cultural imperative and the situation which arose which had led to the ‘mother figure’ being separated from the children and their grandfather in Gaza. I illustrate this by reference to parts of IA’s evidence. This includes at paragraph 3 to 5 of IA’s witness statement dated 9 April 2025. There IA had said:
“3. In relation to paragraph 10 and 11 of the Home Office’s refusal letter, it was very difficult for me to leave my father and nephews and move to the UK. I had to because this is where my husband was. If I had known when I married my husband that we would live in a different country to my family, I wouldn’t have accepted the proposal. For Palestinians, family is absolutely everything. I have a very close relationship with my family. This has not changed because I moved to the UK. I don’t accept that marrying my husband has meant I left my family unit. Emotionally, I remain with them.
4. In relation to paragraph 12 of the refusal letter, I believe that my journey back to Gaza shortly after reuniting with my husband in the UK shows just how much I missed my nephews and how desperate I was to see them. I think this shows how much my family life with them matters to me.
5. In relation to paragraph 13 of the refusal letter, my family are very dependent on me because of the situation. This is an exceptional situation where my family are under constant stress and danger. I am their only hope. They are emotionally dependent on me.”
64. The context of the WhatsApp messages needed to be assessed by the Judge with the extremely limited availability of the internet, the missile attacks and the forced moves from one village to another. If the Judge did not accept these matters, then she should have said so. If she did accept them then it was incumbent upon the Judge to deal with why the Judge found that the contact between the Appellants and Sponsors was actually limited. Namely was the contact limited because of these extreme outside factors because of the War or was the contact limited because that was all the contact that family had sought? Again, the Judge minimised the actual situation on the ground. IA had in fact said in her 9 April 2025 witness statements at paragraphs 10 to 13 that:
“10, In relation to paragraph 25 of the refusal letter, the make up of my family has completely changed since the war. Before the war we were a big family that supported each other and had a home and money. Now we are a very small family and the way we rely on each other is completely different because our circumstances are very different.
11. A few days ago, at the beginning of April 2025, the Israeli authorities asked my family to leave which they did but then they were told they could go back. In that time the area was bombed. Since they said there would be a ceasefire there have been at least five rocket attacks in the area where my family are living. On Eid, Israeli military were shooting at my family but they managed to run away.
12. I spoke to my family last on 06 April 2025. The bombing has destroyed the internet where they are so I can no longer contact them by WhatsApp there so they are having to travel to my maternal uncle’s house where there is internet network.
65. Second was the evidence of MA. His witness statement dated 7 May 2025 explained at paragraph 4 that it was not possible to get money through any legal means to Gaza. That was the background to the financial dependency. Again, the Judge minimised the lack of funds having been provided but the context of why that was so was essential. The Judge needed to explain whether she had taken into account that it was simply not possible to send money in any legal way to Gaza.
66. Additionally, MA had said as follows which the Judge ought to have dealt with when assessing whether family life existed. Again, the Judge minimised this evidence. It was not sufficient to make light reference to this and not to deal with the evidence in its actual form and effect. MA had said:
“… yesterday when we learnt of the rocket attacks [IA] was panicking and inconsolable it impacts the whole family because our children are seeing that. I am struggling too. Obviously right now I am shocked into speechlessness with the loss of my brother and cousin. I didn’t sleep at all last night as a result. I am worried and anxious all the time for my family back home. I am trying to stay strong for my family and because I have to. My little [O] was very close to my brother. They were really good friends. [O] is distraught about the loss of my brother. I have had to keep him off school today because he was too distressed to attend.”
67. Third, the addendum Psychological Expert Report dated 3 May 2025 at paragraph 3.2.7 explained why some of the evidence of IA might be limited. The report also explained that IA should be treated as vulnerable witness. It was with that in mind that the Judge ought to have factored in any perceived deficiencies in the evidence of the explanations of family life directly from IA. The expert had said:
“In addition, [IA] reported that she actively avoids talking about her family’s situation and the desire to be reunited with them. She was clear that she does not want to engage in psychological therapy because talking is too painful and reported that she avoids her friends for the same reason. It is my opinion that, while [IA] would be eager to present her and her family’s circumstances close relationship in a formal setting if this would assist in better understanding their applications, it is my opinion that the process would be extremely challenging for her.”
68. Fourth, the Independent Social Worker’s report 4 May 2025, explained the unique emotional bond between the children in Gaza and IA in the following terms:
“I highlight evidence of a unique emotional bond between the children and the Sponsor’s wife (their paternal aunt) who appears best placed within the family network to offer the physical and psychological safety they urgently need. I conclude that a family reunion, including their grandfather, with their aunt and Sponsor would firmly be in the children’s best interests.”
69. Again, whilst the Judge referred to some of this, it was in rather oblique terms with a minimising of the report. It has to be noted that this was not evidence which was challenged in cross examination. The expert report met the requirements that the report meet the stringent rules that it be an independent report.
70. The ISW’s report correctly referenced the Psychological report that IA referred to the children in Gaza as being ‘her children” albeit they are actually her nephews. This underlined the strength of the relationship between IA, MA, their children (all in the UK) and the Appellants (all in Gaza). Whilst I can see that the ISW report focuses on using section 1 of the Children Act 1989 in terms of the welfare checklist and concentrates on the effect on the children in Gaza, there are important aspects of the report which also required the Judge to deal with how this impacted on whether family life was established. I refer in particular here to IA being the ‘mother’ of the children.
71. Fifth, the ISW’s report identified the unique role of IA, but the Judge minimised this. The ISW’s report stated:
“Overall, I identify [IA] as being uniquely well placed to support the children’s emotional recovery needs. This is primarily due to evidence from across our interviews and the bundle that indicates she was an early attachment figure for the children, having reportedly played a key role in providing daily care them during their early childhood (e.g. 3.3.4 of this report; WS of MA (Appellant), para. 5). The children also expressed that since the deaths of their parents, [IA] has, in their minds, assumed a role as the maternal figure in their lives (3.3.2; WS of MA (Appellant), paras. 4 & 7). During our interview with [IA], she expressed considerable warmth, concern and commitment towards the children and insight into their emotional needs, congruent with her account in her witness statements. She also demonstrated further warmth and emotional insight when speaking about her own children, further indicating her capacity to mentalise and respond to children’s emotional needs. Given what we know about the mediating role of relationships with emotionally attuned caregivers (3.2.15), I find [IA] to be uniquely placed to support the children’s recovery from complex trauma.”
72. The focus is on the UK family as a whole when assessing whether family life exists and if Article 8(1) is engaged. That included IA and MA. It also included their older child (the younger one was born more recently).
73. In my judgment, the Judge’s findings were wholly inadequate against the background of the extensive evidence from various sources, much of it unchallenged, including from experts. The engagement of Article 8(1) was therefore erroneously assessed by the Judge.
74. I conclude that the Judge therefore materially erred in law in concluding that family life was not engaged. I have in mind the Court of Appeal’s important judgment in IA v SSHD. Whilst I do not go so far as was submitted by Mr Chirico that IA v SSHD dealt only with cases relating to adults, the principles remain clear. The focus is on the UK family and not the serious difficulties that the family members in Gaza might be enduring. Each case turns on its merits. The later obiter comments of the Court of Appeal are persuasive, but in my judgment the uniqueness of this case and its facts, as explained more vividly in the ISW’s report are manifest.
75. Indeed, not referring to the important witness statements of the Appellants that referred to IA and MA being parental figures also shows that the Judge’s decision cannot stand. For example, MBA said at paragraph 7 of his witness statement dated 7 November 2024 (which was very important first hand evidence directly from the Appellant and which did not appear to be challenged):
“Before she went to the UK in 2021, [IA] lived with us, altogether as a family. Our parents were always busy but we spent so much time with [IA]. She used to take us to play football, to the beach, to the shops and sometimes she would take us to a restaurant. I have so many happy memories of the time I spent with [IA]…
Since my parents died in December last year [IA] has become even closer and more important to me and my brothers. She is the closest person I have now, even closer than my grandfather because even though he is here with us, he is much older and he is also struggling to cope with everything that is going on. Our other aunt, [Ma] is also with us. [Ma] is a kind auntie as well but she did not live with us so we are not as close. Before the war started she was always very busy with her husband and her own children including her disabled son so we didn’t see as much of her, she was living in the same area as us but not in the same house. The strongest bond we have now that our parents have died is with [IA].”
76. If the Judge did not accept this evidence, then she needed to say why so that the losing party, here including minor Appellants, knew why that was so.
77. I agree with Mr Chirico that the Judge referred to the evidence in a somewhat euphemistic manner. It thereby depicts her error in assessing the evidence fairly in terms of whether family life was engaged. The facts of the Appellants in the Court of Appeal decision in IA v SSHD appear somewhat distant from the facts of this case. The principles from that case though must of course form the basis for the law to be applied. That is certain.
78. In my judgment the Judge materially erred in law in the assessment of family life and so Ground 1 succeeds.
79. In my judgment, Ground 2 which relates to the Judge’s findings and assessment in respect of proportionality were formed by relying on the findings she had erroneously made. Therefore, even though the Judge considered matters in the alternative, she did so on an incorrect basis. Had she considered the facts on a basis which did not show a material error then it is likely that she might have reached a different conclusion.
80. In any event, in my judgment, this case is very distant from it being “inevitable” that the Judge would have reached the same decision even if she had not materially erred.
81. I also note the references by the parties to the finance and accommodation issues in family reunification cases which the parties have referred to in their written post-hearing notes. Those matters will fall for assessment as part of the appeal as a whole and it will serve little purpose if I make this decision even longer to deal with those matters. That is despite those further submissions being helpful.
Conclusion
82. I therefore conclude that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law and I set it aside in its entirety. None of the findings made by the Judge shall stand.
83. Mr Chirico invited me to remit the matter for rehearing to the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Malik submitted that the matter could remain at the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
84. I apply AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I consider whether to retain the matter for remaking here at the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I take into account the history of this case, the nature and extent of findings to be made as well as the nature of the errors in this case. I further consider it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. The appropriate course in this case is that I remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal.
85. Noting the quality of legal representation in this case, I invite the parties to liaise promptly to deal with the matters that I refer to below. That might enable there to be a more efficient listing and hearing at the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal is set aside in its entirety.
There shall be a complete rehearing at the First-tier Tribunal.
The directions for that hearing shall be provided by the First-tier Tribunal, but in view of the matters which arise in this case, I order that by no later than 21 days after this decision is sealed the parties shall provide to the Resident Judge at the FTT the following:
(1) A time estimate for the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal;
(2) A joint document setting out the non-availability dates of Counsel and witnesses who will attend the hearing for the period 13 July 2026 to 22 December 2026; and
(3) Agreed draft directions between the parties including in respect of the dates for the filing and service of bundles and skeleton argument for the hearing. I mention that the bundles provided to me were numerous and far too voluminous. It is likely that the FTT will welcome new bundles which contain only the necessary and required documents for the rehearing.

Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 July 2026