Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003667

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59960/2024
LP/01003/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 28th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MOXON

Between

IJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Islam, Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House via CVP on 21 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), dated 30th May 2025, which upheld the Respondent’s decision to refuse the Appellant’s claim for asylum.

Background

2. The Appellant is a national of Pakistan. He claims fear of harm from government agents, including members of the Pakistan army, as a consequence of his political activities. He claims that his source of fear is the same as that of his sister, who has been granted refugee status in the United Kingdom. The Respondent contends that threats to the Appellant were from the Taliban and tribal elders; that these are not government agents; and that there is sufficient protection and reasonable internal relocation options in Pakistan.

3. The Appellant’s appeal against the refusal of asylum was heard by the Judge on 13th May 2025. Before the Judge was a bundle containing the Appellant’s appeal witness statement in which he detailed, at paragraphs 12 to 17, that his political activity was undertaken with his sister, who successfully claimed asylum “…on the same grounds as me”. The bundle contained a corroborative witness statement from the sister.

4. Within the Judge’s determination, dated 30th May 2025, she concluded, at paragraph 24, that the Appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution from the authorities in Pakistan. Whilst he has a well-founded fear of the Taliban in Pakistan, the Taliban are not state actors. She concluded, at paragraph 25, that there was a sufficiency of protection in Pakistan and, at paragraph 26, that the Appellant could reasonably relocate internally.

5. The Judge made no reference to the Appellant’s sister’s circumstances or her evidence, save for where it pertains to consideration of the Appellant’s family life in the United Kingdom.

Permission to appeal

6. Permission to appeal was refused by another Judge of the First-tier Tribunal and so the Appellant submitted renewed grounds to the Upper Tribunal. Those grounds were headed as follows:
a. Failure to consider material evidence and flawed application of sufficiency of protection test
b. Failure to consider the successful asylum claim of Asia Jamil, sister of the Appellant
c. Failure to consider oral evidence and determination seemingly made on papers
d. Misapplication of Internal Relocation test
e. Improper assessment of material evidence
f. Best interests of children not fully considered and improper application of Article 8 of the ECHR

7. Permission to appeal was granted by a judge of the Upper Tribunal on 24th September 2025:

“2. I consider grounds 1 - 5 taken together are arguable. The appellant’s sister, who has been granted asylum, gave oral evidence and the judge did not explain why he either rejected her evidence or considered it irrelevant to the appellant’s claim. It is also arguable that the judge did not give adequate reasons for rejecting parts of the documentation/relying on the absence of evidence from the brother (the appellant has explanations why the brother in Pakistan would not provide evidence and why the clerk in the police department would have provided evidence for him which explanations arguably should have been considered, the letter said to be from the Taliban does have a date stamp). Those points are arguably material to credibility and are therefore relevant both to whether the appellant is at risk from the authorities and/or whether the appellant, in his specific circumstances, could obtain sufficiency of protection. Whilst the judge found the appellant could relocate in Pakistan, if the judge was wrong in his assessment of threat from the authorities or erred in respect of his assessment of credibility more generally so that he was wrong in assessing that the appellant received no threats in Islamabad then his assessment of internal relocation is arguably also flawed.

3. Whilst I see nothing in ground 6, as the judge appears fully to have considered the points raised about the relationship between the appellant and his sister’s children, I do not seek to limit the grounds.”

Hearing

8. The papers were contained within a 432-page composite bundle, together with a skeleton argument on behalf of the Appellant, dated 14th January 2026. I was assured there was no other documentation.

9. No Rule 24 response was provided by the Respondent and at the outset of the hearing Mr Tan stated that the appeal was not resisted. He accepted that it was unclear on reading the determination what evidence by the Appellant’s sister was provided or considered by the Judge. He accepted that the Judge fell into error by failing to consider the Appellant’s sister’s grant of refugee status. It is not disputed that she has been granted that status.

10. Both Mr Tan and Mr Islam invited me to allow the appeal and to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing with no findings preserved. Mr Tan accepted that any re-hearing should extend to consideration of Article 8 ECHR.

Discussion and analysis

11. There is no dispute that the Appellant’s sister has been granted refugee status in the United Kingdom. Both she and the Appellant provided evidence before the Judge, at least in writing, that their claims for asylum were based on the same broad narrative background. It is unclear from the Judge’s determination whether the Appellant’s sister gave oral evidence.

12. The Judge was required to evaluate any similarities and differences in the Appellant’s and sister’s asylum claims and any reason to uphold the refusal of international protection for the Appellant, despite the backdrop if it having been granted for his sister.

13. Whilst generally detailed and thorough, the Judge’s determination did not touch upon this significant issue.

14. I have carefully reminded myself of the guidance of the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at paragraph 2(iii) and (iv):

“(iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

(iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.”

15. I have considered the summary of settled case authorities detailed within paragraph 26 of Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 which includes, at paragraph 26(ii):

“(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45]”

16. I have also reminded myself of the merits of concise decision writing, as outlined within the ‘Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions’, dated 4th July 2024.

17. However, and notwithstanding the judicial restraint that I am required to exercise, I am satisfied that the Judge erred in law by failing to acknowledge the Appellant’s sister’s successful claim for asylum; failing to analyse the reasons for that successful claim; and failing to consider whether it was on the same grounds as those pursued by the Appellant. She was required to reach those findings; outline them within her determination; and then give them anxious scrutiny when grappling with whether the Appellant’s claim could or should be treated differently to that of his sister.

18. The Judge did not outline why there would be sufficient protection for the Appellant despite it being absent for his sister, and why the Appellant could reasonably relocate internally whereas his sister could not.

19. The absence of any reference to the sister’s refugee status in the determination provides compelling reason to believe that this evidence was overlooked (Volki v Volki, paragraph 2(iii)) and, in any event, the weight of that feature of the evidence has not been subject to proper assessment by the Judge (2(iv)). Given the significance of the refugee status of the Appellant’s sister when considering the Appellant’s appeal, it is reasonable to infer that silence as to the fact indicates that it was not taken into account (Ullah, paragraph 26(ii)).

20. As agreed with both parties before me, the omission amounts to an error of law and is material as it relates to the core of the claim for international protection, namely adverse attention arising from political activity undertaken by the Appellant and his sister.

21. I therefore allow the appeal on grounds 1, 2 and 3. Having done so, I need not consider grounds 4 and 5.

22. Ground 6 relates to the Article 8 ground of appeal before the Judge. I agree with Mr Tan that seeking to preserve any findings in relation to the Article 8 analysis would serve little purpose as the First-tier Tribunal shall be required to consider the Article 8 circumstances at the time of the re-hearing, whenever that shall be. In any event, the Judge was required to analyse the relationship between the Appellant and his sister as part of the consideration of the relationship between the Appellant and his sister’s daughter, which may inform the assessment of the best interests of that child. Having failed to take any adequate account of the sister’s evidence, the findings in relation to Article 8 are infected.

Disposal

23. The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, 12(2), provides that the Upper Tribunal, upon setting aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, may (i) remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions for its reconsideration, or (ii) re-make the decision.

24. When deciding whether to remit the appeal or to retain it for the decision to be re-made, I have given careful consideration to the Joint Practice Statement of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal concerning the disposal of appeals in this Tribunal:

"[7.2] The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to re-make the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:-
a. the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party's case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or
b. the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal."

25. I took note of paragraph 7.3 which provides:

“Remaking rather than remitting will nevertheless constitute the normal approach to determining appeals where an error of law is found, even if some further fact finding is necessary.”

26. Having considered the practice statement recited and the decision of the Court of Appeal in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and that of the Upper Tribunal in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46, and in the light of the overriding objective, I am satisfied that the appeal falls within paragraph 7.2(b) as I agree with the parties that it will be necessary to undertake an assessment of all the evidence when reaching a decision.

27. The matter shall therefore be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing. None of the findings of the Judge are preserved. The re-hearing shall be before a different judge.

28. The First-tier Tribunal shall issue any necessary directions in readiness for the rehearing, but I remind the parties of comments made during the hearing:
a. The Appellant should provide any updated evidence to support his Article 8 ground of appeal given that the First-tier Tribunal shall be considering circumstances as they are when the hearing is undertaken;
b. For the First-tier Tribunal to evaluate whether the Appellant’s sister’s grant of asylum was upon the same / similar factual matrix as the Appellant’s claim, it will be assisted with all relevant documentation, including the Appellant’s sister’s screening and asylum interview records; and
c. The Respondent should review its refusal decision in light of the grant of refugee status to the Appellant’s sister and, if refusal is maintained, outline why the Appellant ought to be treated differently.

Notice of Decision:

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error on a point of law and is set aside and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.

DUTJ Moxon
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23rd January 2026