Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003676
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59154/2024
LP/00078/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
24th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between

AS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr J Collins, Counsel, instructed by Marsh and Partners
For the respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her protection and human rights claims.

2. The appellant is an Albanian citizen born in 1997 who arrived in the United Kingdom in December 2018 and claimed asylum in July 2022. That claim was based on the following grounds. By an act of revenge against her father’s activities, the appellant had been trafficked from Albania to Greece, then to Belgium, and finally to this country. At all stages she had been forced to work as a prostitute. Following her escape from the traffickers in February 2019, she had immediately formed a relationship with an Albanian national in this country, SF, and the couple had a child, E, born in October 2019. The appellant claimed to be at risk on return to Albania from the gang which had originally trafficked her (the original trafficking gang) and/or other trafficking gangs. In respect of the former, she feared that the gang would take revenge on her for escaping in the United Kingdom and/or as a further act of revenge because of what her father had done in the past. That gang would re-traffick or otherwise do her harm. In respect of the latter, the appellant claimed that she would be vulnerable to other unknown trafficking gangs who would seek to exploit her. Article 8 was relied on the basis that her removal would disproportionately interfere with her private and family life, and would be inconsistent with E’s best interests.

3. As a consequence of her claim, the appellant was referred to the NRM and on 7 June 2023 the SCA made a Conclusive Grounds decision that the appellant was a victim of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation. However, she was not granted discretionary leave to remain as result.

4. By a decision dated 18 March 2024, the respondent refused the protection and human rights claims and did not accept any material aspect put forward by the appellant. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FTT).

5. The FTT found that the appellant was a member of two particular social groups: a lone woman and a female victim of trafficking. The FTT found that the appellant had been credible as regards her account of past experiences of being trafficked and that she had a genuine subjective fear of return. It found that the original trafficking gang had not threatened the appellant’s family since she escaped in February 2019. It found that SF could accompany the appellant and E to Albania and in any event the appellant had her mother in Albania who would ‘welcome her back’. Applying the country guidance case of TD and AD (trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) (TD and AD), the FTT ultimately concluded that the appellant would not be at risk of persecution or serious harm, either as a lone woman or a victim of trafficking. The FTT went on to find that in any event there would be sufficient protection available to the appellant and/or she would be able to safely and reasonably relocated within Albania. In respect of Article 8, the FTT concluded that the appellant, SF and E could return together and that there would be wider familial support in that country. There were no very significant obstacles to reintegration. Outside of the Rules, the FTT concluded that removal would be proportionate.

The error of law decision
6. In a relatively brief error of law decision, Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Gill concluded that the FTT had materially erred in law. This was partly based on concessions made by the respondent in advance of the hearing and by the Senior Presenting Officer on the day. It is not entirely clear to me why there was a concession that the FTT erred in finding that SF could accompany the appellant to Albania: it was clear enough that he had no status in the country and had no distinct protection claim of his own. In any event, a material error was deemed to exist. Beyond that, it was found that the FTT erred in failing to adequately engage with the potential reach of the original trafficking gang, which in turn went to the issue of state protection. The errors relating to the protection claim was said to have infected the Article 8 conclusions.

7. The FTT decision was set aside, but a number of findings were preserved:

(a) That the appellant’s father had been a member of a criminal gang;

(b) That the appellant’s father had owed the going money and that she had been targeted as result this;

(c) That the appellant had been subject of trafficking in three countries, and had suffered serious sexual abuse;

(d) That the appellant had been in contact with her mother and Albania and had not been informed of any threats made to the family by the original trafficking gang;

(e) That the appellant had a genuine subjective fear of returning to Albania;

(f) That the appellant and her family did not have a high social status and economic standing;

(g) That the appellant was not well-educated

(h) On her own evidence and in the absence of any medical evidence, the appellant was not, as at January 2025, suffering from stress and anxiety or any other mental health conditions;

(i) That the appellant was in a genuine relationship with SF and that SF was a devoted father to E;

(j) That if SF did not accompany the appellant to Albania, she would in any event have access to shelters and/or a family support network, namely her mother and uncle.

8. The FTT’s finding that SF could accompany the appellant and E to Albania was not preserved.

9. FTT’s conclusion that the appellant came within particular social groups (which was not a finding of fact, but rather a conclusion on the law) had not been challenged by the respondent and was said to have been preserved.

Procedural history following the error of law decision
10. The resumed hearing of this appeal was originally listed in March 2026. However, it transpired that the appellant was pregnant with her second child and was due to give birth in January of this year. A request was made to vacate the resumed hearing in order that the appellant could have some time after the birth in order to prepare herself for the hearing. The hearing was vacated and a new date fixed.

The documentary evidence
11. Despite the appellant’s representative not providing a single consolidated bundle containing all relevant evidence for the purposes of the resumed hearing, I have had regard to the following:

(a) A ‘Composite bundle’, indexed and paginated A1-A350;

(b) A supplementary bundle, indexed and paginated 1-27;

(c) The original Home Office appeal bundle from the FTT proceedings;

(d) The respondent’s current CPINs on gender-based violence, actors of protection, and human trafficking;

(e) The 2024 USSD Human Rights report on Albania.

12. The supplementary bundle includes a new witness statement from the appellant, a witness statement from SF, and evidence of the birth of the couple’s second child, EL, in January 2026.

The oral evidence at the hearing
13. The appellant and SF attended the hearing and both gave oral evidence with the assistance of an Albanian interpreter. I was satisfied that there were no communication difficulties during the course of the hearing.

14. I confirmed at the outset that the appellant was to be treated as a vulnerable witness in light of her history. She was offered breaks, but expressed her desire to ‘get it over with’, as it were. I was satisfied that she understood all questions put to her and was able to participate fully in the hearing.

15. In brief summary, the appellant and SF adopted their respective witness statements (three for the appellant) and were questioned by Mr Collins and then at some length by Ms Ahmed. In chief, the appellant expressed her fear of returning to Albania, even if accompanied by SF. She believed that the original trafficking gang could find her anywhere in the country, that the police were ‘all the same’ and that she would be judged if people found out about her past. In cross-examination, the appellant was challenged about certain aspects of her latest witness statement: in particular: claimed threats made to her uncle, who had then left the country in November 2025; a claim that her mother had left Albania three or four months before the hearing after an argument with the uncle; the claimed extent of contact with the mother; and whether the father was in Germany and was engaged in criminal activity there. The appellant accepted that SF could go to Albania with her, but she remained of the view that the family unit would not be safe.

16. SF confirmed that he was in the United Kingdom unlawfully and had been since the refusal of an EUSS application in 2021. He told me that he had had a partner (presumably an EEA national) who had subsequently left him (which I assume led to the negative decision). SF confirmed that he would go with the appellant and the children to Albania, but that he believed he could not protect them. In cross-examination, he confirmed that he had worked as a chef and as a steel fixer in the construction industry. He stated that his mother had moved to Greece recently. The truthfulness of his evidence was challenged in relation to his status as an overstayer and the circumstances in which he apparently found out about the appellant’s father in Germany. In response to a question from myself, he stated that he could marry the appellant, but not in Albania because he might be in danger there. He suggested that the danger would be linked the appellant’s father, whom he described as being ‘monstrous’.

The issues
17. In advance of the resumed hearing and in the context of the preserved findings and relevant country guidance decisions, the principal controversial issues are as follows:

(a) Is it reasonably likely that the appellant will be at risk on return to her home area of Fier from the original trafficking gang, other unidentified trafficking gangs, or society in general (the ‘kurva’ issue)?

(b) If she is, will she be able to obtain sufficient state protection in that home area?

(c) If she is at risk and cannot obtain sufficient state protection in her home area, can she safely and reasonably internally relocate?

(d) Even if the protection claim fails, would her removal from United Kingdom constitutes a disproportionate interference with her private and/or family life, having regard to the associated rights of SF and the two children?

The parties’ submissions
18. With the principal controversial issues and preserved findings in mind, the parties’ submissions can be summarised as follows.

19. Ms Ahmed relied on the respondent’s refusal letter, review, and skeleton argument provided in advance of the resumed hearing. She submitted that the appellant and SF had been untruthful as regards the departure of the uncle and mother from Albania, the father’s presence and activities in Germany, and the departure of SF’s family from Albania. She submitted that, with reference to relevant considerations set out in TD and AD, there was no risk on return to the home area or elsewhere in Albania. There was no reliable evidence that the original trafficking gang had any ongoing interest in the appellant. The presence of SF would be a significant factor in reducing any potential risk. Sufficient state protection and/or internal relocation were available. Article 8 did not assist because there were no very significant obstacles to integration, neither of the children were ‘qualifying’ for the purposes of the Rules or section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

20. Mr Collins relied on his recent skeleton argument and that of a predecessor which had been relied on before the FTT. He candidly acknowledged that SF would in fact go back to Albania with the appellant and the children and that this might diminish the risk, but not reduce it below that of a reasonable likelihood. He submitted that the evidence concerning the appellant’s uncle, mother and father was plausible. In any event, the family members (including the appellant’s father) were of ‘peripheral’ or ‘residual’ importance. The core risk was said to emanate from the original trafficking gang, which had international reach and an adverse interest in the appellant, or unknown criminal gangs who would seek to exploit the appellant’s status as a victim of trafficking and/or the mother of illegitimate children. A further source of risk was said to be societies adverse view of the appellant.

21. The sufficiency of state protection was not a given and everything depended on the particular circumstances. Mr Collins submitted that whether or not the appellant was accompanied by SF, the police would not be willing or able to provide such protection. There was a risk in the home area of Fier. Elsewhere, it was reasonably likely that the appellant would be located through registration system and/or word-of-mouth enquiries through the community. Internal relocation was therefore not a viable option.

22. Mr Collins emphasised that even if the protection claim failed, Article 8 had to be addressed separately. The appellant’s status as a victim of trafficking was relevant to the assessment of whether there were very significant obstacles and whether removal would in any event be proportionate.

Legal framework
23. This appeal is governed by the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

24. Given the undisturbed conclusion that the appellant falls within two particular social groups (lone women and female victims of trafficking), the first question in the step-by-step approach is answered in her favour. Even if the appellant did not return as a lone woman, the second particular social group would remain.

25. So too is the second question, given the FTT’s preserved finding that the appellant has a genuine subjective fear.

26. Thus, my consideration of the evidence relating to findings on and an assessment of risk on return is based on the lower standard of proof, both in respect of the Refugee Convention and Article 3.

Findings of primary fact
27. I have undertaken a holistic view of the evidence, placing it in the context of the preserved findings, the CPINs, and the parties’ submissions.

The preserved findings
28. For the avoidance of doubt, I reiterate the preserved findings, as set out previously in this decision. Whilst those findings related to the position as at January 2025 (the date of the FTT hearing), I find that there is nothing before me now which materially disturbs them.

Additional findings on evidence post-dating the FTT’s decision
29. I am of course required to consider the evidence provided after the FTT’s decision and which is now relied on by the appellant in support of her appeal at the re-making stage.

30. In so doing, I remind myself of three important points.

31. First, the appellant has been found to be a credible witness in the past and that is a positive indicator of the reliability of the latest evidence, although it is not decisive.

32. Second and bearing in mind the first point, a witness can be truthful about a number of matters, but untruthful or unreliable about others.

33. Third, the appellant is a vulnerable witness and I have taken full account of this when assessing her oral evidence. Having said that, and as I have said previously, she was able to fully participate at the hearing and, taking all relevant circumstances together, I find that her vulnerability had no material impact one way or the other on how her evidence was provided.

34. I find that the appellant, SF, and the two children form a strong family unit.

35. I find that SF has been in the United Kingdom unlawfully since 2021 at the latest. On his own evidence and that of the appellant, I find that SF will in fact return to Albania with the family if this appeal is unsuccessful. Even if he had suggested that he would not return, it would on any view be entirely open to him to do so. I also find that it is extremely likely that SF would in fact marry the appellant very soon after return to Albania: although this might be seen as simply a formal step, the couple will undoubtedly be well-aware of social mores in that country and would wish to take all reasonable steps to present their family unit to Albania society in the ‘best’ way possible, which would include being the married parents of their two children.

36. I find that SF is healthy and has employable skills, in particular as a former chef and steel fixer in the construction trade.

37. On the appellant’s own evidence and in the absence of any current medical evidence, I find that she is not currently suffering from any significant mental health conditions, whether diagnosed or otherwise. There is nothing before me to displace the FTT’s preserved finding relating to the situation as at January 2025. I nonetheless appreciate that she will be feeling anxious about this appeal and the possibility of having to return to Albania.

38. Taking full account of the three points set out at the beginning of this section of my decision, I find that certain aspects of the evidence given by the appellant and SF are untruthful. It may well be that they have simply sought to add to their claim in order to enhance the prospects of success. I make no finding on the specific motivation behind the embellishments, but I emphasise that my adverse findings do not detract from the underlying genuine subjective fear which the appellant has of returning to Albania, based on the uncontroversial fact of her experiences as a victim of trafficking in 2018-2019.

39. The appellant stated in oral evidence that her uncle had been threatened by the original trafficking gang, had closed his business as result, and then left Albania in October or November 2025. No mention of this is contained with her latest witness statement, dated 7 May 2026. Of course, not every omission in written evidence will necessarily lead to an adverse finding. However, the appellant has linked the uncle’s claimed problems to the gang which she says maintains an adverse interest in her: she stated this expressly in her final answer in cross-examination. In other words, she has brought this issue into play. The failure to have mentioned this in the witness statement (made many months after the claimed event) is therefore of significance. In addition, the appellant’s explanation for not including this evidence in her statement was, with respect, weak: she told me that she did not want to include her uncle and instead wanted to him to have a relaxing life with his own family.

40. I do not accept that it is reasonably likely that the uncle was threatened by the original trafficking gang, or that he closed his business and left Albania in 2025.

41. The appellant says that her mother left Albania in approximately April or May 2026, following an argument with the uncle. There are four particular problems with this evidence.

42. First, nothing is said in the latest witness statement. In principle it is possible that the mother left after the statement was signed off. However, the appellant did not say this and the reference to April would indicate that the claimed event occurred before statement was finalised on 7 May.

43. Second, if the uncle left Albania in October or November 2025, it is difficult to understand why the mother did not leave the country until some six months later, if indeed her departure resulted from an argument with the uncle. Further, or in any event, if it was being suggested that the mother left because of threats from the original trafficking gang, there is no evidence of this from the mother and the delay in her claimed departure would indicate the absence of any threats.

44. Third, when asked about her failure to mention the mother in the witness statement, the appellant told me that she tries to forget what has happened, sometimes did not feel well, or could not express herself. As with my finding on the uncle, I regard the explanation as weak. There is nothing to suggest that the appellant was in a poor state of health when finalising the statement, she is, as far as I have been able to ascertain, and articulate individual, and the claimed event happened only recently and not when the appellant’s traumatic experiences of trafficking had first arisen (bearing in mind the absence of medical evidence of ongoing mental health difficulties relating to those experiences).

45. Fourth, when challenged by Ms Ahmed, the appellant stated that evidence of her mother’s departure from Albania could be obtained from border control records. That response highlighted the fact that there is no evidence from the mother herself and/or that there is no suggestion that any evidence from official sources relating to the claimed departure has been sought.

46. Following from the above, it is not reasonably likely that the appellant’s mother has left Albania. The corollary of this is that it is highly likely that the mother still resides in Albania.

47. It was somewhat unclear to what extent the appellant accepted that she maintained contact with her mother. From what she said in oral evidence, combined with the FTT’s preserved finding and answers provided in the asylum interviews, it is highly likely that there is fairly regular contact, albeit not particularly frequent.

48. I find that it is not reasonably likely that the mother is unaware of the appellant’s family circumstances in United Kingdom and it is highly likely that she is supportive of her daughter. I appreciate that the appellant’s history in Albania will have put a strain on the mother/daughter relationship, but it is not reasonably likely that the mother would fail to provide whatever support she could if the appellant returned with all without SF. That is consistent with the FTT’s finding, to the effect that the mother would welcome the appellant back.

49. In light of my findings on the uncle and mother, it is not reasonably likely that the original trafficking gang has made any threats to family members based on any adverse interest in the appellant.

50. I turn to the appellant’s father. His claimed presence in Germany is referred to in the witness statements from the appellant and SF. In respect of the appellant’s statement, the reference is brief and does not appear to suggest that she has a fear of him. In oral evidence, she suggested that he (or others) would want to take revenge on her. SF’s statement clearly places the father as being a source of risk to SF and the appellant. Therefore, the evidence about the father is not in my view merely peripheral or inconsequential. Rather, it is being put forward as a material part of the appellant’s case.

51. I find it not to be reasonably likely that the appellant’s father has gone to Germany and become involved in organised crime there. The appellant appeared to know virtually nothing about this development and how it came to be known of. SF’s evidence was, I find, vague to the point of being evasive. Beyond that, there was no evidence from the claimed friend who had apparently acquired the knowledge about the appellant’s father.

52. I do not accept that SF’s mother has recently left Albania for Greece. Having regard to other aspects of his evidence, but excluding any consideration of the fact that he is an overstayer, I find that it is not reasonably likely that he has included this aspect of his evidence as anything other than a further ‘add-on’ in order to enhance the appearance that the family unit would have no support from relatives if they returned to Albania.

53. Bringing all of the above together, it is not reasonably likely that the original trafficking gang have expressed any adverse interest in the appellant, whether directly or indirectly, since she escaped from them in the United Kingdom in February 2019. It is not reasonably likely that the appellant and SF no longer have close family members living in Albania.

54. I turn to the two children. I find that they are both healthy. The appellant states that E ‘speaks only English and does not like talking in Albanian’. I accept that E will in general prefer to speak English, but it is not reasonably likely that she cannot speak Albanian in any meaningful way. Even if she cannot, with the support of her parents (and probably other family members in Albania), it is not reasonably likely that she would be unable to learn Albanian expeditiously. EL is obviously still very young indeed, and she would easily be able to pick up Albanian as a first or second language.

Conclusions on the protection claim
55. On my findings of primary fact, the appellant would return to Albania, not as a lone woman, but as a victim of trafficking. She has a genuine subjective fear.

56. In my assessment of risk, I begin by directing myself to TD and AD, which remains the most relevant country guidance decision and is relied on by each party. The judicial headnote reads as follows:

‘Much of the guidance given in AM & BM (Trafficked women) Albania C [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC) is maintained. Where that guidance has been amended or supplemented by this decision it has been highlighted in bold:

"a) It is not possible to set out a typical profile of trafficked women from Albania: trafficked women come from all areas of the country and from varied social backgrounds.

b) Much of Albanian society is governed by a strict code of honour which not only means that trafficked women would have very considerable difficulty in reintegrating into their home areas on return but also will affect their ability to relocate internally. Those who have children outside marriage are particularly vulnerable. In extreme cases the close relatives of the trafficked woman may refuse to have the trafficked woman's child return with her and could force her to abandon the child.

c) Some women are lured to leave Albania with false promises of relationships or work. Others may seek out traffickers in order to facilitate their departure from Albania and their establishment in prostitution abroad. Although such women cannot be said to have left Albania against their will, where they have fallen under the control of traffickers for the purpose of exploitation there is likely to be considerable violence within the relationships and a lack of freedom: such women are victims of trafficking.

d) In the past few years the Albanian government has made significant efforts to improve its response to trafficking. This includes widening the scope of legislation, publishing the Standard Operating Procedures, implementing an effective National Referral Mechanism, appointing a new Anti-trafficking Co-ordinator, and providing training to law enforcement officials. There is in general a Horvath-standard sufficiency of protection, but it will not be effective in every case. When considering whether or not there is a sufficiency of protection for a victim of trafficking her particular circumstances must be considered.

e) There is now in place a reception and reintegration programme for victims of trafficking. Returning victims of trafficking are able to stay in a shelter on arrival, and in 'heavy cases' may be able to stay there for up to 2 years. During this initial period after return victims of trafficking are supported and protected. Unless the individual has particular vulnerabilities such as physical or mental health issues, this option cannot generally be said to be unreasonable; whether it is must be determined on a case by case basis.

f) Once asked to leave the shelter a victim of trafficking can live on her own. In doing so she will face significant challenges including, but not limited to, stigma, isolation, financial hardship and uncertainty, a sense of physical insecurity and the subjective fear of being found either by their families or former traffickers. Some women will have the capacity to negotiate these challenges without undue hardship. There will however be victims of trafficking with characteristics, such as mental illness or psychological scarring, for whom living alone in these circumstances would not be reasonable. Whether a particular appellant falls into that category will call for a careful assessment of all the circumstances.

g) Re-trafficking is a reality. Whether that risk exists for an individual claimant will turn in part on the factors that led to the initial trafficking, and on her personal circumstances, including her background, age, and her willingness and ability to seek help from the authorities. For a proportion of victims of trafficking, their situations may mean that they are especially vulnerable to re-trafficking, or being forced into other exploitative situations.

h) Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:

1)       The social status and economic standing of her family
2)       The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3)       The victim of trafficking's state of health, particularly her mental health
4)       The presence of an illegitimate child
5)       The area of origin
6)       Age
7)       What support network will be available.’

57. I have considered the above in a holistic manner and not as some form of artificial tick-box exercise.

Risk from the original trafficking gang in the appellant’s home area of Fier
58. I begin by taking account of the fact that Fier is where the appellant was initially trafficked from in 2018 by a member of the original trafficking gang. The gang clearly operated there, at least in 2018. For present purposes, I am willing to assume that the gang may still have members operating in Fier. I also take account of paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules: the appellant has been persecuted in the past this is a good indicator of future risk, subject to the existence of good reasons why similar persecution would not be repeated.

59. On the findings of fact, both preserved from the FTT’s decision and my own, the original trafficking gang has not demonstrated any adverse interest in the appellant since she escaped whilst in the United Kingdom in February 2019. There have been no threats made directly to her, or to family members. In my judgment, that is a relatively significant indicator pointing towards the absence of any ongoing adverse interest.

60. Of real significance is the fact that the appellant would be returning in very different circumstances to when she was trafficked in 2018. She was then young, single, and vulnerable. On return now she would be accompanied by a stable and capable Albanian partner who could readily become her husband soon after arrival. She will be the mother of two children who, whilst born outside of marriage, would in all likelihood simply be (correctly) perceived as children of the relationship/marriage. They both have SF’s surname and it is not reasonably likely that the couple would have to ‘live a lie’ as to the children’s parentage. Even in the highly unlikely event that the fact that the children were born to the couple before they were married became known, I conclude that this would not of itself be regarded as a significant adverse issue to be held against the family unit.

61. The appellant would not need to seek a shelter for victims of trafficking: she would simply not a lone woman. Further, it is not reasonably likely that she would have to disclose her status as a victim of trafficking to either the authorities or society more generally.

62. The appellant does not come from a family of significant social standing of wealth and she is not well-educated. On the other hand, she does not originate from the north or a rural area of Albania. To an extent, she falls outside of the age bracket most susceptible to trafficking.

63. I do not intend in any way to diminish the impact on the appellant of what she was forced to endure in 2018 and 2019. Yet, on my findings on the evidence before me, she is not currently suffering from significant mental health difficulties.

64. On my findings, in addition to the strong and lasting support which would be provided by SF, the appellant could obtain support of one sort or another from her mother and/or SF’s family.

65. I have considered the possibility of the original trafficking gang locating the appellant after return to Fier. There has never been any suggestion that the gang controls everything that takes place in the town, or that it has a large number of operatives on the ground. Combining this with the passage of time (now some 7 ½ years) and the fact that the appellant’s escape was affected while she was in the United Kingdom and not Fier, there is always a risk that a member of the gang would recognise the appellant on the street, as it were, but I conclude that an application of the lower standard of proof this would not constitute an operative risk.

66. Further, it is not reasonably likely that the gang would locate the appellant’s presence in Fier through the civil registration scheme. I have found that there has been no active interest in the appellant since she escaped in February 2019. It is fanciful to suggest that the gang would in some way have any advance notice of the appellant’s return. Thus, other than by sheer accident (which is not a reasonably likely occurrence), it seems to me as though the only ways in which the gang could potentially discover that the appellant was back in Fier would be either to have some sort of a watch list against which the registration scheme could be constantly checked by the gang, or have corrupt officials continually interrogating the register for the appellant’s name. Each of these possibilities are so remote as to be discounted when applying the lower standard of proof.

67. The continuing presence of the appellant’s father in Albania would not, I conclude, add to or create a risk from the original trafficking gang. For obvious reasons, the appellant has had no contact with him. If the gang maintains an adverse interest in him, it is highly likely (and a matter of common sense) that they would seek to target him and not the appellant, wherever he might be in the country. If the father is in fact abroad, there would still be no risk from the gang, for the reasons I have set out previously.

68. Overall, I conclude that although the appellant would of course be a victim of past trafficking and she would feel anxious about returning to Fier, there are strong reasons why the persecution she faced in the past would not be repeated and that her circumstances on return would not place her at risk of being targeted by the original trafficking gang, either for retribution or re-trafficking.

69. This aspect of the protection claim therefore fails.

Risk of trafficking from unknown criminal gangs in the home area
70. The core of the appellant’s own evidence as to her subjective fear of return has been focused on the original trafficking gang. However, as put forward by Mr Collins, an additional issue relates to other trafficking gangs which might operate in the appellant’s home area of Fier.

71. In light of what I have already said concerning the risk from the original trafficking gang, I can deal with this issue relatively briefly.

72. Essentially for the reasons set out at [60]-[64] above, it is not reasonably likely that the appellant’s circumstances on return would place her at risk of being trafficked or otherwise exploited by unknown gangs which had no prior knowledge of her. She would not be in the especially vulnerable position that many lone female victims of trafficking will find themselves on return. She will be in a strong family unit with the support of at least a committed partner, but very probably also other family members.

73. This aspect of the protection claim fails.

Risk from the appellant’s father in the home area
74. This has not been expressly put forward as a basis of risk, but I deem it appropriate to address the point in brief terms, in part because both the appellant and SF stated that he is dangerous and might pose a risk. I have no hesitation in concluding that there is no reasonable likelihood of the father representing a threat of serious harm to either the appellant or SF. Whether he remains in Albania or not and whether he is engaged in criminal activity or not, it is unlikely in the extreme that he would be able to locate the appellant and/or actually have any inclination to take steps to do her harm even if he was aware of her presence in the country.

Risk from the community on the basis of the appellant being labelled ‘kurva’
75. The concept of ‘kurva’ has been recognised in, for example, TD and AD and AM and BM (trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC). It is an aspect of the rigid patriarchal culture which is particularly prevalent in rural areas in the north of the country. The label can be attached to women known to have engaged in sexual intercourse outside the expected norms.

76. In principle, there is a possibility that the appellant could be labelled as ‘kurva’ by society by virtue of her status as a victim of trafficking for sexual exploitation. However, several factors point against that possibility being anything more than remote. First, the appellant would not be returning as a lone woman with two legitimate children because she would rise as a family unit with SF, the father of those children. The fact that she would not be alone and would have the support of SF is significant, with reference to what is said on the issue in TD and AD. Second, the appellant would not be living in a rural area or the north of the country. Third, even applying the lower standard and bearing in mind that an individual should not have to ‘live a lie’, it is in my judgment extremely unlikely that the appellant’s past would come to be known by the local community in general. If asked about her general circumstances following return, she could quite clearly and truthfully state that she had been living with a partner in the United Kingdom for the last seven years or so and was now returning to Albania with the children. As a matter of common knowledge, Albania is a country well-used to the emigration and then return of its citizens.

77. I conclude that there it is not reasonably likely that the ‘kurva’ issue will place the appellant at any risk in her home area.

State protection in the home area
78. As I have concluded that there is no risk in the appellant’s home area from either the original trafficking gang or unknown gangs, the issue of sufficient state protection does not arise.

79. However, for the sake of completeness I address it in the alternative to my primary conclusions. I conclude that there is in general a sufficiency of state protection for individuals in the appellant’s situation. However, nothing in TD and AD, AD v Sweden, or the CPINs, suggests that anything other than a fact-sensitive approach should be taken when considering whether protection would be effective in any given case.

80. The appellant cannot point to a past failure by the authorities to afford her protection. That is because she did not approach them. That is not to criticise the appellant; it is simply a statement of fact.

81. There is no reliable evidence before me that the original trafficking gang had ever exerted influence or control over the Albanian authorities in respect of her departure from the country. With respect, what the appellant says in her latest witness statement about state protection is somewhat generalised and speculative.

82. I have considered what is said at 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 of the CPIN on actors of protection. Country information suggests that organised crime networks have infiltrated law enforcement and can in effect operate freely outside the law. I accept that the police are restricted by limited resources. It undoubtedly the case that there is corruption in Albania, it being most prevalent among the front-line police. The country information forms an important, but not decisive, context in which the particular circumstances of the appellant must be considered.

83. Taking all relevant matters into account, I conclude that the appellant would be able to obtain sufficient and effective protection if there were indeed a risk in Frier. She would be able to seek protection with the assistance of SF and would not therefore be coming forward as a lone woman. In that context I conclude that she would be willing to approach the authorities. She would be able to truthfully state that she was a victim of past trafficking and required help to prevent a repetition of this (she could, for example, offer the NRM decision as proof of this). Evidence in the CPIN and what is said in TD and AD indicates that the Albanian authorities have made genuine progress in addressing trafficking issues. Further, the appellant would not have to be dealing with the authorities in the north of the country, where the evidence suggests that corruption may well be more deeply entrenched.

84. I also conclude that the appellant could receive sufficient protection from members of the community not involved in criminal activity, but who might, in an alternative scenario, come to know about her past experiences and take it upon themselves to label her as ‘kurva’. With the active support of SF, the appellant would be able and willing to approach the authorities and the general sufficiency of protection would apply because in this scenario there would be no question of potential influenced by criminal elements.

Risk elsewhere in Albania
85. If I were wrong about the absence of risk in Fier, or if the appellant simply did not want to re-establish herself there, I turn to address the possibility of relocating.

86. I do not intend to repeat conclusions previously stated which are also relevant to relocation. My conclusions on risk in the home area should be read across to the question of whether the appellant and her family can safely and reasonably relocate elsewhere in Albania. In addition to those conclusions, I add the following.

87. I proceed on the assumption that the appellant would not seek to relocate to the north of the country or to a rural location.

88. As far as I can see, no evidence has been provided as to whether the original trafficking gang operated throughout Albania. That is not a criticism of the appellant, for she could only really speak to her own circumstances and these involved her being groomed in and trafficked from Fier. My primary conclusion is that the gang only operated in Fier and that there would be no presence elsewhere in the country. If I were wrong about that, I nonetheless refer back to what I have said previously about the absence of ongoing interest in the appellant, the lack of intent and/or ability to trace her, and the availability of sufficient protection.

89. Overall, I conclude that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant would be at risk from the original trafficking gang were she and the family to relocate.

90. It is again a matter of common knowledge that trafficking gangs operate in various parts of Albania not limited to the north or rural areas. Having regard to what I have said previously about the risk from unidentified trafficking gangs in the home area, I also conclude that there is no risk to the appellant from such gangs elsewhere in the country. As in Frier, she would be part of a nuclear family with the important support of SF. In addition to this significant consideration, other relevant factors previously discussed would, cumulatively, take the appellant outside the category of those at real risk of trafficking from gangs with no previous connection to the individual concerned.

91. I conclude that there would be no risk from the appellant’s father elsewhere in Albania. The possibility of him even knowing that she was back in the country is remote in the extreme. Even if he was aware, it is nowhere close to reasonably likely that he would have the inclination and/or ability to track her down and do her serious harm. If he made any threats to do so, I conclude that the appellant would be able to seek and obtain sufficient state protection.

92. As to the ‘kurva’ issue, I conclude that it is not reasonably likely that this would create a risk for the appellant, for the reasons previously stated in relation to the home area.

93. I turn to the question of the reasonableness of relocation. This of course involves a consideration of the appellant’s particular characteristics and any other relevant considerations. The matters I have specifically taken account of are:

(a) The appellant’s past experiences and the undoubted anxiety that returning to Albania would cause as result of what happened to her when last there;

(b) The appellant’s genuine subjective fear of return;

(c) The time she has spent away from Albania;

(d) Her nationality and knowledge of Albanian society and culture;

(e) The absence of any current material mental health conditions;

(f) The loving and supportive presence of SF and the couple’s two children;

(g) SF’s familiarity with Albanian society and culture and his reasonable employment prospects;

(h) The likely support which would be offered by relatives residing in Albania;

(i) The absence of any health difficulties or other adverse matters relating to the two children;

(j) The possibility of a degree of social stigma in the highly unlikely event that all aspects of the appellant’s past came to light, subject to my previous conclusions on the ‘kurva’ issue;

(k) The fact that relocating would by definition involve establishing the family unit in an unfamiliar place, albeit within Albania itself.

94. Having evaluated all of the above on a cumulative basis, I conclude that, whilst there would undoubtedly be challenges, it would be reasonable for the appellant and her family to internally relocate within Albania.

Article 8
95. I start with the Immigration Rules, specifically paragraph 5.1 of Appendix Private Life.

96. I direct myself that the concept of ‘integration’ requires a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the appellant will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in Albania is carried on and whether she would have the capacity to participate in it to the extent that she would have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a daily basis and to build up within a reasonable time a range of human relationships in order to give substance to her private and/or family life.

97. I direct myself that any obstacles to such integration must not simply be ‘significant’, but ‘very’ significant. That represents a demanding test.

98. I direct myself that the appellant’s genuine subjective fear and her status as a victim of trafficking are distinct relevant considerations.

99. I also take into account the best interests of the two children. Whilst I am primarily concerned with the appellant’s ability to integrate on return, it would be artificial to entirely separate this from the children’s circumstances. I am entirely satisfied that the children’s best interests lie in remaining with their loving parents. EL is still of course a baby and cannot be said to have put down any roots in the United Kingdom. She is healthy. On any view, her best interests do not also lie in remaining in this country.

100. In respect of E, she is not currently a qualifying child within the meaning of the Rules or section 117B(6) of the 2002 Act. However, she has resided in the United Kingdom since her birth almost 7 years ago. She is, I assume, now in primary education and will have established a degree of social ties going beyond her immediate family. I have previously found that whilst E prefers to speak English, she either already has a reasonable grasp Albanian, or would be able to develop her ability fairly swiftly with the active support of her parents. She has no material health concerns. On a cumulative basis, I conclude that E’s best interests do not also lie in her remaining in the United Kingdom. Even if I were wrong about that, those interests could not on any view represent a significant factor.

101. In the first place, I conclude that the factors set out at [93(a)-(k)], above, of relevant to my broad assessment of the question of integration. Whilst those factors have been considered in the context of internal relocation, on a sensible approach they would also apply to integration as well.

102. With those factors in mind, I conclude that the appellant would in general have a good understanding of Albanian society and would be able to operate on a day-to-day basis and, within a reasonable time, re-establish human relationships and wider societal connections that would in turn give substance to her own life and that of her immediate family.

103. The two additional considerations referred to at [98] are important. In his skeleton argument, Mr Collins submitted that the appellant would be ‘constantly looking over her shoulder’. I accept that the past experiences combined with the genuine subjective fear is likely to cause the appellant anxiety and lead to her having concerns for her safety. This would represent an obstacle to integration because it has the potential for inhibiting her willingness to engage in ‘normal’ day-to-day life, including engaging with others and going ‘out and about’.

104. This obstacle must be placed in the context of the other considerations I have taken into account. Most important of these is the presence and support of SF. I accept that he would himself have a degree of anxiety about returning to a country he has been away from for some years. Yet, he and is clearly committed to the appellant and their children. It is, I find, beyond doubt that he would do all he reasonably could to help the appellant to integrate. In addition, I regard the two children as being important positive incentives for the appellant to overcome the challenges of return in order to ensure their well-being. Another important factor to emphasise is the absence of significant mental health problems. Again, I do not seek to diminish the trauma of what the appellant has been through in the past, but her current mental health will not in my view represent a significant obstacle.

105. Having evaluated everything, I conclude that whilst the appellant’s past experiences and subjective fear constitutes an obstacle to integration, it will not be ‘very significant’, whether taken alone or in combination with factors such as the length of time out of the country and the need to care for the two children. It follows that paragraph 5.1 of Appendix Private Life is not satisfied.

106. Paragraph 8.1 of Appendix Private Life represents a ‘catch-all’ provision which stipulates that an individual may succeed if the refusal of an application for permission to stay would breach Article 8. To my mind, this is tantamount to bringing a full proportionality balancing exercise within the scope of the rules. Both within and outside the Rules, I adopt a balance sheet approach.

107. On the respondent’s side of the scales there is the following:

(a) The need for effective immigration control, as stipulated by Parliament in section 117B(1) of the 2002 Act;

(b) The appellant and SF are in the United Kingdom unlawfully;

(c) Their relationship was established and carried on at a time when they were here unlawfully;

(d) The family unit would return to Albania together;

(e) There is no risk on return to Albania and, even if there was a risk in the home area, the family unit could reasonably relocate;

(f) There would be no very significant obstacles to integration and to this extent the Rules are not satisfied;

(g) The children’s best interests do not represent a factor weighing strongly against removal.

108. Cumulatively, these factors weigh very heavily in the respondent’s favour and thus against the appellant.

109. On the appellant’s side of the scales there is the following:

(a) The appellant’s status as a victim of trafficking, her past experiences and subjective fear of return to Albania, including the obstacle to integration this is likely to represent;

(b) The length of time the appellant has spent in United Kingdom;

(c) The length of E’s residence in this country;

(d) The length of SF’s residence in this country;

(e) The couple’s genuine desire to maintain their life here and avoid the uncertainty associated with returning to Albania.

110. The first factor set out above carries considerable weight. However, the other factors, taken in isolation or cumulatively, are not in my judgment significant.

111. I accept that the appellant speaks reasonable English. There has been some interaction with the NHS, but this is largely due to the appellant’s pregnancies and a few GP appointments for E. I regard both of these factors as being nothing more than neutral.

112. Stepping back and weighing all of the relevant considerations, I have come to the clear conclusion that the respondent’s decision to refuse the appellant’s human rights claim on Article 8 grounds is not disproportionate and therefore is not unlawful.

Anonymity
113. I maintain the anonymity direction previously made. The appellant is a confirmed victim of trafficking and this appeal concerns a claim for international protection. These two considerations outweigh the strong public interest in open justice.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law and that decision has been set aside.

The decision in this appeal is re-made and the appeal is dismissed on protection and human rights grounds.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 13 August 2026