Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003677
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55495/2024
LP/01330/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LINDSLEY

Between

NM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S. Karim, of Counsel instructed by Liberty Legal Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who was born in September 1998. He left Bangladesh in October 2018 and went as a domestic labourer to Qatar where he spent three and a half years in a situation of forced and abusive labour arranged by Shanti Enterprise. He was then brought to the UK via Turkey and arrived on 1st May 2022, where he was abandoned by his “employer”. He claimed asylum on 7th September 2022.

2. His application for leave to remain on protection and human rights grounds was refused on 8th January 2024 although it was accepted that he had been coerced into becoming an unpaid domestic worker and was mistreated by his employer who was violent and detained him unlawfully, and that he had received threats from the agency in Bangladesh who said he should not return to that country.

3. His appeal to the First-tier Tribunal was dismissed on all grounds after a hearing on 19th May 2025. He appealed to the Upper Tribunal and for the reasons set out in the error of law decision of the Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge, appended as Annex A to this decision, it was found by consent that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law and that the appeal should be remade in the Upper Tribunal. It was agreed by both parties that there was no need to call evidence and that the remaking hearing would be proceed by way of submissions only.

4. Mr Karim applied to admit the expert report of Mr Saqeb Mahbub, a barrister and advocate of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh dated 25th April 2026, which formed part of the bundle for the hearing but was submitted late (only 8 days prior to the hearing rather than 14) with respect to directions. Mr Nappey, whilst formally opposing the introduction of the report after the time period provided in directions confirmed he was able to deal with the report if we proceeded to hear the appeal. I admitted the report as evidence likely to assist the Tribunal.

5. There are two issues which it is agreed need to be determined: firstly whether the appellant can succeed in his humanitarian protection claim which in turn needs an examination of whether he would face a real risk of serious harm in Bangladesh from the agency/MS, and whether there is sufficiency of protection or the reasonable possibility of finding safety via internal relocation in Bangladesh; and secondly whether he can succeed in relation to his Article 8 ECHR private life claim either by reference to the Immigration Rules at Appendix PL on the basis of very significant obstacles to integration or under Article 8 ECHR when looked at more broadly.

Preserved findings

6. The Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge preserved the First-tier Tribunals findings as to the facts and background to this appeal, in so far as they describe the appellant’s circumstances at the date of the First-tier Tribunal hearing, as follows:
a. [46] – [55]
b. [58], but excluding the concluding sentences from “however, I consider it pertinent…”
c. [59]
d. [61]-[66]
e. [68] in respect of the finding regarding the appellant’s fears of the agency

7. In summary these paragraphs set out the following. The evidence of the appellant with respect to his fear of Musa Bin Shamsher (MS) whom the appellant said he understood he had spoken to on the telephone when he made his initial enquiry about work, as agency staff said that was who he was speaking to, as he was head of the employment agency that had placed him with his abusive employer. He believes that MS has powerful high level political connections and influence over the police. He therefore believed that he would be at risk from the agency and MS wherever he went in Bangladesh.

8. It is found however by the First-tier Tribunal that it is not reasonably likely the appellant actually spoke to MS or that he would have personal knowledge of the appellant, although it is not disputed that the agency was an unscrupulous operator and that the appellant was charged a fee that put him in a situation of vulnerable debt-based coercion. It is found that MS is linked to the agency and that he has some political connections and influence, albeit, on the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal he was linked to the Awami League and Sheikh Hasina, and clearly they are no longer the governing powers in Bangladesh. It is accepted that the agency has motive to try to recover their fees from the appellant. It is accepted that the appellant’s parents have experienced shouting and screaming threats to try to recover this money from them and that they are honestly afraid to go to the police as they mistrust them.

9. The appellant is currently supported by people in the UK and charities. He is in contact with his family but says his father is elderly and has no income to support him, and that he cannot support himself in Bangladesh as he has no skills or educational certificates. It is found however that he is in good physical health and could do work which is found in the informal sector in Bangladesh. It is accepted that he attempted suicide whilst in Qatar and again about two years after arrival in the UK. His evidence is that he currently having some investigations into his mental health, but there is no supporting documentary evidence of this, and so at the time of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal the evidence was that he had no mental health problems, and that he would be able to re-establish private life ties with the assistance of NGOs who try to protect against trafficking in Bangladesh.

10. It is found that the appellant has genuine subjective fears of being killed, kidnapped for forced into slave labour once again by the agency in an attempt to protect their reputation. However on the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal it was not found to be reasonably likely that the agency would kill the appellant to protect their or MS’s reputation as this might put them at risk of law enforcement enquiries and would mean that they could not recover their costs by putting the appellant in a situation of further enforced labour, but it was accepted that the agency would be motivated to recover the money they claim the appellant owes them in the form of recruitment fees and costs.

11. These findings are preserved subject to up-dating evidence which may displace them. The only new evidence before me is that of the expert report of Mr Saqeb Mahbub.

Submissions - Remaking

12. Mr Karim made submissions for the appellant, and relied upon his skeleton argument. In brief summary he submits as follows. He argues in relation to the protection claim it is noted that it is accepted that the appellant was coerced into becoming an unpaid domestic worker who was unlawfully detained and mistreated by his “employer”, and that threats were made to him and his family by the agency who urged him not to return to Bangladesh. It is accepted that the appellant is genuinely subjectively afraid of being killed or forced again into slave labour.

13. It is argued that weight should be given to the report of Mr Mahbub who is not only a senior lawyer but also has qualifications in the academic study of politics which make him an appropriate expert. It is argued that this report shows MS was affiliated with the Awami League and has a number of family connections high up in politics, including his son being a recently elected state minister in the BNP government. It is argued this shows MS has the clear ability to influence state authorities. The report concludes that MS is powerful due to his political history, his economic resources and his networks including family, and that this power enables him to exert influence at the local, regional and national level. Mr Mahbub concludes that as MS has such power that anyone who might expose him would be at risk of intimidation or adverse treatment, and so the appellant would be a real risk of his facing serious adverse consequences on his return to Bangladesh.

14. It is argued for the appellant that he cannot relocate in Bangladesh away from the local risk from the agency, who have been found to have tried to intimate his parents and who, in turn, are found to have understandable distrust of the police which is in keeping with paragraph 13.3.6 of the CPIN Bangladesh Version 1 December 2024.. It is found by the First-tier Tribunal that the agency is linked to MS. This link means that the appellant cannot relocate away from his home area with safety due to MS’s reach. In any case it would also not be reasonable to expect this appellant to relocate as he has mental health issues due to his horrific treatment as a trafficked person, who is clearly vulnerable and has attempted suicide in the past. The appellant’s case is that he does not have good relationship with his family as he has not sent them money, and they are poor and do not understand why, and the agency has threatened them. It is argued that the appellant would be vulnerable to being re-trafficked elsewhere in Bangladesh as it is found by the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant’s passed experiences make him vulnerable to further exploitation and notable that “The Government of Bangladesh does not meet the minimum standards for elimination of trafficking”.

15. Mr Karim argues in relation to the Article 8 ECHR claim that the appellant can show very significant obstacles to integration on return to Bangladesh because of his past adverse experiences of being trafficked to the UK which means more than little weight could be given to his private life ties in these exceptional circumstances, the medical evidence, the past suicide attempts, the inadequate facilities for threating those with mental health problems in Bangladesh, his genuine subjective fear, the country conditions, his absence from Bangladesh since 2018, and his lack of any effective family support. In any proportionality exercise it was argued in the skeleton argument that the appellant should be given leave under the VTS Immigration Rules as a person who has been trafficked in order to assist his recovery due to the psychological harm he has suffered, but this argument was abandoned by Mr Karim at the hearing.

16. Mr Nappey argues that weight should not be given to expert report of Mr Mahbub as the author is not a country of origin expert but is a barrister, and so is not qualified to provide an expert opinion on the power of MS, and further it is argued that he was not provided with full documents, including the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, that parts of the language are unprofessional, and the conclusions on the reach and influence of MS are based entirely on speculation. In any case ultimately the report does not show why such a wealthy and well connected person as MS would be interested in the appellant who was trafficked in 2018 and has not had any direct contact with him.

17. With respect to the protection appeal, it is argued, in short summary, by Mr Nappey for the Secretary of State that there is no real risk of re-trafficking. MS does not have reach or influence, the agency has no reach outside of the appellant’s home area, and that neither the agency nor MS have any interest in the appellant outside of the home area. Even if it were accepted that MS has reach/ the ability to exert influence he has no motive to track the appellant. So although past harm is accepted by the respondent there is good reason to believe that it will not repeat itself if the appellant were to return to Bangladesh. This is because the appellant has options to seek police protection against the agency, who to date have only made verbal threats against his family who continue to live in the home area. This is in the context of the Bangladeshi authorities taking steps to deal with trafficking risk and of increased prosecutions in this area, and the authorities being generally willing to protect non-politically aligned individuals. It is not made out that MS would have motive or ability to affect police protection in the home area.

18. In any case if, in the alternative, which is not accepted, there is found to be a real risk in the home area from the agency and no sufficiency of protection from the police, it would be reasonable for the appellant to internally relocate within Bangladesh. The appellant has not evidenced any current mental health problems or treatment, and this would also be reasonable for other reasons set out in the preserved findings including he is an able-bodied man with some education who would be able to seek employment, who has some family contact and who had been able to integrate himself within the UK. Neither the agency nor MS would have interest or ability to pursue him on return if he were to relocate within Bangladesh.

19. With respect to the Article 8 ECHR appeal it is argued that there are no very significant obstacles to integration, which is a very demanding test. The appellant has historically spent significant time in Bangladesh and is familiar with the country, culture and language. He is in good health, has no barriers to employment, is not having any medical treatment or therapy for mental health problems (and has not had any during his time in the UK), and he has shown he can form relationships with people and charities whilst in the UK. The appellant attempted suicide whilst in the situation of forced employment, which is no longer applicable, and in Bangladesh there is treatment for mental health issues including anti-depressants. Whilst the appellant has been found to have a subjective fear of return without evidence of mental health issues this has not been shown to affect his ability to re-integrate, and his removal would therefore be proportionate under Article 8 ECHR.

Conclusions - Remaking

20. I first consider the updating evidence of Mr Mahbub and whether it is evidence to which weight can be given. I find that weight can be given to the report for the following reasons. Mr Mahbub has completed an appropriate declaration in which he confirms inter alia his duty to the Tribunal, that he has read the IAT Practice Direction on Expert Reports and that the report is his independent view and he has included all relevant information whether favourable or not to the appellant. Whilst he is professionally primarily a lawyer with rights of audience in the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh he also done a post-graduate research degree (LLM) at the LSE on secularism and the constitution in Bangladesh which explored politics and has worked providing opinions to many NGOs and organisations such as the World Bank and USAID on projects including those related to the rule of law and the political situation in Bangladesh. In these circumstances I find Mr Mahbub is an appropriate expert to comment on the political power and position of MS, and whether he might be relevant to the safety of the appellant if he were returned to Bangladesh. I also find that Mr Mahbub has fairly been provided with relevant material relating to the appellant as the respondent’s bundle was provided to him along with the instructions. Whilst it would have been optimal for the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and decision of the Deputy Judge finding an error of law to have been given to him I am satisfied that he had sufficient to address the issues before him and was not prejudiced in any way by not having these decisions.

21. It follows therefore that the evidence of Mr Mahbub may alter some of the conclusions preserved in the findings of the First-tier Tribunal Judge.

22. Mr Mahbub provides convincing evidence that MS is a very wealthy man, who established and ran a “manpower export” company called DATCO Pvt Ltd from 1974, although recently this has been handed over to his son, and has diversified into professional training and IT. Further there is evidence that MS had senior involvement with the Awami League prior to it being banned and connections to very senior politicians both within Bangladesh and on the world stage, and that there have been allegations of corruption and criminal activity against him. His son, BH, has been elected as a member of parliament in February 2026 and is minister for education in the BNP led government. I accept the conclusion at paragraph 9.1 of the decision that MS has “multiple, mutually reinforcing power bases, namely his political history, economic resources, patronage networks and family ties.” As set out in the report his power has been able to endure and adapt to changes in government within Bangladesh, and although he has no formal position politically he has access to multiple possibilities of exerting influence and is a controversial figure. This evidence therefore brings greater clarity and force to the preserved finding that MS has some political influence. I find that MS is a person of significant wealth and the ability to bring influence in Bangladesh.

23. The link between MS and Shanti Enterprise, the agency that trafficked the appellant into forced labour and abuse, is a preserved finding of the First-tier Tribunal, as set out at paragraph 55 of the decision. It is also consistent with the expert evidence giving the history of MS having a long established business involvement with “manpower export”. Another preserved finding is however that it is not reasonably likely that MS “would have direct personal knowledge of the appellant as a recognised individual.” It is the opinion of Mr Mahbub that MS might expose the appellant to intimidation or adverse treatment upon return if he believed that the appellant had acted contrary to his interests, and that this would be supportive of the appellant’s fear of retaliation or coercion due to his past involvement with the recruitment agency. They key question that follows is whether the expert evidence gives reason for me to find that MS would believe that the appellant had acted contrary to his or his family interests. It is the view of the expert that MS’s power “is most concentrated and formidable at the national level” In these circumstances I find to the lower civil standard that MS might be supportive of Shanti Enterprises were they to wish to exert pressure on the appellant to recover their “debt” but I do not find that this evidence provides support for their being a real risk that MS has motivation to track and locate the appellant anywhere in Bangladesh given that there is no evidence, as found by the First-tier Tribunal that the agency Shanti has “power, reach, influence and importantly motivation to actively track and locate him anywhere in Bangladesh”.

24. It has been found and preserved that the appellant is genuinely subjectively afraid of Shanti Enterprises, and that he has been subject in the past to serious harm. As a result, by application of paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules, this must be regarded as a serious indication of a real risk of future harm unless there are good reasons why it would not be repeated. It is accepted that verbal threats have been made to the appellant’s parents in Bangladesh and to the appellant in the UK by the agency. Given the acceptance of the appellant’s trafficking, forced labour and abuse at the hands of his “employer” I find that there is a real risk that the agency would cause the appellant serious harm, by way of putting him back into a situation of forced labour to extract their fee and to avoid any adverse local publicity, or even criminal investigation with respect to their business operation, if he were to return to his home area, and I find that this finding is fortified by the fact that MS might be persuaded to use influence to cause local police not to become involved with any complaint if the agency were to act to remove the appellant back into a situation of modern slavery if simply to avoid adverse publicity to his family business interests; or perhaps more likely that the agency might simply be able to use public knowledge of MS’s position and wealth to persuade the police that it would unwise to intervene to protect the appellant if they became aware that he was being forced into an abusive and coercive labour situation once again. It follows that I find that the appellant would be at real risk of serious harm in his home area as on the particular facts of this case there is no sufficiency of protection in the home area.

25. For the reasons set out above at paragraph 23 there is no real risk of serious harm to the appellant outside of his home area, and so the next question that arises is whether it would be unduly harsh or unreasonable for this appellant to have to relocate internally. This test involves a broad evaluation of all relevant factors.

26. The matters which stand against internal relocation being reasonable are as follows. We must start from the fact that the appellant has been through a prolonged and dreadful experience of modern slavery where he was effectively imprisoned by his “employer”, had to work without pay and was on the receiving end of violent acts such as being punched, kicked and having his hair pulled. He was in this situation for over three year until he was driven to attempt suicide and was brought to the UK by his “employer” and abandoned. He is still left in a state of genuine subjective fear of serious harm from those involved in his trafficking. There is no current evidence of the appellant having any diagnosed mental health conditions but I find that this history makes him a more vulnerable person than someone who had not have these extremely adverse life experiences, and that weight must be given to the fact that in moments of despair it has been shown he will attempt suicide and that he has experienced suicidal thoughts in the UK as per his medical notes. I accept his evidence, as set out in his asylum interview, that his family relationship is complicated by their poverty, the fact that the appellant has been unable to send the hoped for remittances from work abroad and the fact that the agency has been verbally threatening them and that they have been found to be understandably afraid about going to the police. The appellant has family contact but I find will not have any tangible family support with his relocation. The appellant also lacks any work experience beyond his exploitative domestic labour and so has, at the age of 29 years, no normal work place skills or work experience which leaves him vulnerable to entering further situations of abusive or forced employment. The factors on the other side, that are supportive of internal relocation being reasonable, are the appellant’s young age (29years), his physical good health, lack of any diagnosed mental health problems, his being male, his having some education and his having made some friends in the UK giving an indication he might be able to do this in Bangladesh.

27. This is a very finely balanced decision, however ultimately I find that it would not be reasonable to expect this appellant to internally relocate as I find his increased vulnerability due to his lengthy experience of modern slavery and suicide attempts and suicidal thoughts, his state of mind of genuine fear of serious harm, his lack of prospect of any tangible family support, lack of any work qualifications and previous work experience in the normal labour market mean that it would be unduly harsh for him to have to live outside his home area as I find that he would not simply be living a normal life in poverty, as many in Bangladesh do, but be would be struggling with these additional burdens making the relocation unduly harsh. It follows that the appellant is entitled to succeed on humanitarian protection grounds and under Article 3 ECHR, and there is no need to examine his separate Article 8 ECHR appeal as it falls to be allowed with that on Article 3 ECHR grounds.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal erred in law and was set aside.
2. The decision is remade allowing the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds and on human rights grounds.

Fiona Lindsley
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20th May 2026

Annex A: Error of Law Decision

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the Judge’) dated 28 May 2025 dismissing their protection claim. Permission to appeal was granted by the Upper Tribunal on 17 September 2025 and was not restricted to any grounds.

Background
2. In short summary, the appellant is accepted to be a victim of trafficking who was brought to the UK and abandoned here, having suffered ill treatment at the hands of his employer. The appellant asserts that he would be at risk from his traffickers or would otherwise be at risk of similar exploitation if returned to Bangladesh. The appellant further argues that his removal would be contrary to the ECHR.

Discussion
3. I was provided with a Composite Bundle (204 pages). Having heard submissions from the parties I reserved my decision which I now set out below.
4. Ms McKenzie, on behalf of the respondent, confirmed that the Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘SSHD’) conceded the appeal on the issues isolated in the grant of permission to appeal, namely:
“2. The judge arguably failed to reach a clear conclusion about the risk to the appellant in his home area. The judge accepted that the appellant’s family had been threatened and that the threats had not escalated because of the “focus on debt recovery from the appellant himself” [68] but the decision discloses no consideration of paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules and I cannot see that the judge gives any reason for concluding that the threats would not manifest in actual harm (and/or re-trafficking) in the event of the appellant’s return. The first and third grounds establish arguable errors in the judge’s assessment of risk and the analysis of sufficiency of protection thereafter.

3. The grounds which relate to the appellant’s mental health, internal relocation and Article 8 ECHR inside and outside the Immigration Rules are decidedly less persuasive in light of the judge’s assessment of the evidence at [61]-[66]. Whilst I make no direction limiting the scope of the arguments which might be pursued in this appeal, the appellant’s representatives will wish to consider carefully whether the medical evidence provides a proper foundation for the complaints advanced in those grounds.”
5. A concession by the respondent does not bind the tribunal to accept it. However, I am satisfied that the concession was properly made, and I am equally satisfied that the decision did involve a material error of law when assessing risk on return and sufficiency of protection thereafter, for the reasons identified in the permission to appeal.

Preserved findings
6. I preserve the Judge’s findings as to the facts and background to this appeal, in so far as they describe the appellant’s circumstances at the date of the First-tier Tribunal hearing, as follows:
a. [46] – [55]
b. [58], but excluding the concluding sentences from “however, I consider it pertinent…”
c. [59]
d. [61]-[66]
e. [68] in respect of the finding regarding the appellant’s fears of the agency

Disposal
7. I heard submissions from both parties as to whether the underlying appeal should be remitted to the FtT to be heard afresh, or whether it should be retained in the Upper Tribunal to be remade. Ms McKenzie submitted that the matter could be retained in the Upper Tribunal, whereas Mr Collins submitted that the matter should be remitted to the FtT.
8. The starting point is paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal which provides:

“7.2. The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to remake the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:

(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or

(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.”

9. I consider that the extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appal to be re-made is limited. I bear in mind the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I am therefore satisfied that the decision can be re-made in the Upper Tribunal.

Notice of Decision and Directions
10. The Judge’s decision contains material errors of law and is set aside with the findings referred to at [6] above preserved. The decision will be remade at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal. The provisional time estimate for this hearing should be 3 hours, subject to any alternative view by the parties.
11. Any further evidence relied on by either party is to be filed and served no later than 14 days before the next hearing.
12. There must be a skeleton argument on behalf of the Appellant, filed and served no later than 7 days before the hearing.

A. Gill

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 February 2026