UI-2025-003690

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 21 Jan 2026
• Promulgation date: 29 Jan 2026
• Publication date: 18 Feb 2026
• Last updated on: 18 Feb 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003690

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59557/2023
LP/00185/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29 January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MOXON

Between

AK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Saifolahi, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House via CVP on 21 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), dated 16th May 2025, which upheld the Respondent’s decision to refuse the Appellant’s claim for asylum.

Background

2. The Appellant is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity from the independent Kurdish region of Iraq (“the IKR”). He claims fear of gangs affiliated with the PUK in Iraq and fears the authorities in the IKR on account of his claimed sur place activity in the United Kingdom.

3. The asylum claim was refused by the Respondent, who did not accept that he had given a credible narrative account.

4. The Appellant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by the Judge in a determination dated 16th May 2025. The Judge did not accept that the Appellant had been targeted by gangs or that any aggressors were acting on account of political, rather than criminal or financial, motives. She determined that, as the claimed aggressors were not government agents, there was sufficient protection in Iraq and that, alternatively, the Appellant could reasonably relocate internally. She did not accept that the Appellant had undertaken any genuine sur place activity or that in doing so he would be at risk of harm upon return to the IKR. She dismissed the Appellant’s Article 8 ECHR ground of appeal and, in relation to his private life, concluded that he had not shown very significant obstacles to his integration into Iraq.

Permission to appeal

5. Permission to appeal was refused by another Judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 17th July 2025.

6. The Appellant submitted renewed grounds of appeal on 31st July 2025 upon the following headings:
1) Unlawful approach to Article 8 – not in accordance – no asylum interview
2) Unlawful approach to credibility – Section 8
3) Unclear finding – unaware of emails
4) Flawed credibility assessment – failure to consider a material factor
5) Business activity – flawed assessment of documentary evidence
6) Business activity - unclear finding
7) Flawed approach regarding the PUK – incorrect standard of proof
8) Flawed assessment of Refugee Convention reason
9) Internal relocation – no proper consideration of material factors
10) Flawed approach - Sur place activity

7. Permission to appeal was granted by a judge of the Upper Tribunal on 22nd October 2025 on all but ground 1:

“5. Ground 1 is misconceived. The appellant contends that he was not offered an asylum interview and therefore the decision was “unlawful”. The Judge, rightly, considered the fact that the appellant had not been interviewed when analysing the evidence. There is no reason to allow the appeal just because the appellant was not interviewed. If it is the appellant’s contention that the decision was “not in accordance with the law” for the purposes of article 8 of the ECHR the grounds are wrong. Decisions that interfere with a persons’ private and family life have to be for a lawful purpose, such as immigration control. A decision is not contrary to article 8 just because a procedural step was not followed.

6. I do not give permission on Ground 1.

7. Ground 5 troubles me a lot. I have not been able to find any of the bundles but if the appellant’s contention is correct then it may be that the Judge has taken a bad point that that it has infected other findings.

8. The other grounds are criticisms of adverse findings. They are arguable.

9. I give permission on all grounds EXCEPT GROUND 1.”

Hearing

8. The papers were contained within a 578-page composite bundle. I was assured there was no other documentation.

9. During the hearing Ms Saifolahi reiterated the grounds of appeal being pursued and Mr Tan reiterated the Respondent’s resistance to those grounds.

10. In relation to ground 2, Ms Saifolahi argued that the Judge had awarded the section 8 consideration “a status of its own” and that there was a fundamental error in the Judge’s approach. Mr Tan contended that the Judge had identified the relevant case law, particularly JT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 878. There is nothing within the determination to indicate that the Judge considered the section 8 considerations to be determinative. The Judge expressly stated at paragraph 114 that she had taken into account the whole of the evidence in the round.

11. Ms Saifolahi stated that she did not seek to abandon ground 3 but had no submissions to make over and above those contained within the grounds of appeal.

12. Ms Saifolahi submitted that grounds 4 and 6 could be taken together and demonstrate a flawed credibility exercise, particularly considering the inconsistency of findings as to whether or not the Appellant had undertaken the claimed business activities. She stated that it was unclear what facts had been found by the Judge in relation to the Appellant’s business activities. Mr Tan contended that the credibility findings were sound. He argued that there had been no inconsistency in the decisions made as the determination relating to the reasonableness of internal relocation was made in the alternative to the finding that there was no well-founded fear of harm, which was the Judge’s primary determination. This was clearly the Judge’s approach who stated in her consideration of internal relocation that it was the Appellant’s account that he had run a business. In relation to the inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account identified by the Judge, Mr Tam argued that, whilst the passage of time can affect memory, the Appellant had not stated at any stage that he could not recall specific dates. Further, the inconsistencies were significant and it was open to the Judge to take them into account when assessing credibility.

13. Ms Saifolahi argued that the mistake made by the Judge in relation to when documents were provided by the Appellant to the Respondent (ground 5) undermines the Judge’s overall credibility assessment. Further, the Judge had found documents unreliable given the location of the interpreter who had translated the documents, yet there is no indication that there had been a breach of the relevant practice direction as the interpreter has included the appropriate attestation. Mr Tam contended that the Judge had given clear and rational reasons as to why she had concerns about the translation and had outlined from paragraph 67 onwards a number of issues that she had identified in the presentation of the documentary evidence. In all of the circumstances, she was entitled to place little weight upon the documentary evidence.

14. Ms Saifolahi submitted that not only did the Judge apply the wrong burden of proof when determining whether the claimed aggressors were members of the PUK (ground 7), she also failed to take into account the background material that supported the Appellant’s case, as summarised within paragraphs 39 to 41 of the determination. Mr Tan contended that the Judge had accurately outlined the relevant burden and standard of proof within her determination and also summarised the objective evidence relied upon by the Appellant. She was entitled to find that the Appellant’s evidence, namely that those harassing him were from the PUK, was speculative.

15. Ms Saifolahi reiterated the criticisms outlined in ground 8 in relation to the assessment of whether there existed a Convention reason. Mr Tan submitted that there was nothing improper with the reference by the Judge to EMAP (Gang violence, Convention Reason) [2022] UKUT 335 (IAC) as it gives broad guidance that is not limited to El Salvador. He added that the Judge had given adequate reasons why she concluded that the claimed aggressors were not politically motivated.

16. Ms Saifolahi argued that the Judge had failed to adequately consider whether there was state protection and reasonable internal relocation options, given the PUK affiliation of the aggressors (ground 9). Mr Tan contended that there was limited evidence before the Judge that PUK affiliates would be able to work together so as to render internal relocation unsafe or otherwise unreasonable. No objective evidence had been provided to support the Appellant’s assertion, at paragraph 26 of his witness statement, that he could not relocate to a KDP-controlled area as the KDP and PUK have strong connections and so he would be found and killed. Mr Tan argued that, in any event, the finding that the Appellant does not have a well-founded fear of harm in Iraq renders the internal relocation consideration redundant.

17. Ms Saifolahi argued that the flawed analysis of credibility taints the Judge’s analysis of his sur place activity (ground 10). Mr Tan did not accept that there were any flaws in the Judge’s general credibility analysis. He further argued that clear reasons had been given by the Judge for rejecting the sur place claim.

Discussion and analysis

18. Throughout consideration of the appeal, I have had regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462, at paragraph 2:

"The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i. An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii. The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."

19. The restricted jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal was also outlined by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, which at paragraph 26 summarised the settled case authorities:

“(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];

(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];

(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];

(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];

(v) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];

(vi) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”

Ground 2 - Unlawful approach to credibility – Section 8

20. The ground of appeal argues:

“The judge erroneously treats Section 8 as a starting-point in her assessment of credibility and/or fails to properly decide the weight she attributes to this factor in her overall assessment (other than finding it potentially damaging to his credibility) [42-49], see judicial headnote in SM (Section 8: Judge’s process) Iran [2005] UKAIT 00116: “Even where section 8 applies, an Immigration Judge should look at the evidence as a whole and decide which parts are more important and which less. Section 8 does not require the behaviour to which it applies to be treated as the starting-point of the assessment of credibility.”

21. The Rule 24 Response contends:

“Ground two asserts that the judge’s approach to section 8 was unlawful as the judge treats section 8 as the starting point in her assessment of credibility. It is submitted that the judge has clearly set out at [49] that she has taken account of the appellant’s behaviour in her overall assessment and finds “it potentially damaging to his credibility”. It is submitted that the structure of the judge’s determination does not establish that section 8 was the starting point of the judge’s assessment.”

22. It is a common misconception by those drafting grounds of appeal that a judge’s thought process will have been in the order as detailed within their determination. In fact, it is often not, with a judge weighing up all of the features of the case, forming conclusions in the round, and then trying to articulate those findings in a sensibly structured written determination.

23. Therefore, the fact that the Judge’s section 8 assessment is detailed at the outset of her credibility findings in her written determination is no indication that she took that assessment as her starting point. As outlined by Pill LJ in JT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 878, at paragraph 16, “…I do not regard the positioning of the section 8 reference in the determination as necessarily fatal.”

24. In JT (Cameroon), it was identified that, in the specific case the Supreme Court was considering, there was “…a real risk that section 8 matters were given a status and a compartment of their own rather than taken into account, as they shall have been, as part of a global assessment of credibility.”

25. The Supreme Court pointed towards a comment made by the First-tier Tribunal Judge within the decision at first instance:

“In all the circumstances, and looking at the evidence in the round, I must apply the appropriate low standard of proof to the Appellant’s account. As set out above, I am satisfied that very serious damage has been sustained to [the appellant’s] credibility by virtue of the operation of Section 8.”

26. I have taken a step back to consider the Judge’s determination and her treatment of section 8. Applying JT (Cameroon), the positioning of the section 8 consideration at the start of the credibility assessment is not in itself a material error of law. I must look at whether the Judge gave it a status and a compartment of its own or whether she took it into account within her global assessment of credibility.

27. It is evidently clear that the latter of those propositions is correct. There was nothing in the Judge’s determination comparable to the extract that had caused the Supreme Court concern. Instead, the Judge demonstrated her understanding of the guidance in JT (Cameroon), which she cited within her determination at paragraph 49:

“The case law provides that taking account of any section 8 behaviours is taking that conduct into account in an overall assessment of credibility and, according such weight as appropriate, JT(Cameroon) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 878. I have taken account of the appellant’s behaviour and in my overall assessment do find it potentially damaging to his credibility.”

28. It is clear from the wording of paragraph 49 that she did not assign undue weight to the section 8 considerations; that she was aware of the “real risk” of which the Supreme Court warns against; and carefully avoided the risk.

29. Further, in summarising her findings that the Appellant had not been undertaking the business activities claimed and had not been targeted by gangs, the Judge stated, at paragraph 75 (emphasis added):

“Considering everything in the round, I have concluded that it remains speculative to suggest that those the appellant says harassed him were the PUK simply because they were masked and drove cars with blacked out windows and without licence plates. The appellant’s evidence lacks real detail as to the instances of threats and harassment on either his family home or the business. Due the limited evidence and the presentation of the oral evidence, I am sceptical that the appellant was running the type of business he claims he was involved in and have concluded this has not been demonstrated even to the lower standard. Considering all the evidence in the round, I concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated even to the lower standard that he was harassed and extorted in the manner claimed or that this was by the PUK or individuals or gangs linked to the PUK.”

30. At paragraph 114 she stated (emphasis added):

“Having considered the whole of the evidence in the round, I find that the appellant has not discharged the burden of proof of having a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason and have concluded that the appellant’s removal would not cause the United Kingdom to be in breach of its obligations under the Refugee Convention.”

31. There is therefore no merit, notwithstanding the location of her section 8 analysis within her determination, to the criticism that she had given section 8 matters “…a status and compartment of their own rather than taken into account…as part of a global assessment of credibility”. She did not give it undue weight, as exemplified by her use of the word “potentially” in paragraph 49 of her determination.

32. The Judge did not fall into the errors identified in JT (Cameroon) and SM (Section 8: Judge’s process) Iran.

33. Ground 2 is dismissed.

Ground 3 – Unclear finding – unaware of emails

34. The ground of appeal argues:

“The appellant claims he was not aware of the emails sent by the respondent requesting further information [60]. The judge fails to make a clear finding on whether the appellant was aware of the emails and deliberately did not respond [50-61]. A clear finding is material to a proper assessment of the appellant’s credibility.”

35. The Rule 24 Response contends:

“Ground three asserts that the judge fails to make a clear finding on whether the appellant was aware of the emails sent by the respondent. The judge notes the appellant’s evidence at [60] that he was not aware of the emails due to his previous representatives not informing him. The judge however finds at [61] that the appellant was aware of the request following receipt of the RFRL but there is no evidence of any steps taken to follow this up. The judge does not make any adverse findings about the previous representatives as they have not been provided with an opportunity to respond. It is submitted that the judge had made a clear finding on the appellant being aware of the request and there being no evidence of any steps taken.”

36. The Judge addressed this matter in paragraph 61 of her determination:

“The WhatsApp messages do not provide cogent evidence of any attempts by the appellant to ask his previous representatives for updates on his case and there is no other documentary evidence to support this. The WhatsApp messages are not evidence of solicitors not responding to emails. Further to receipt of the refusal decision which the appellant certainly had sight of in order to present his appeal in October 2023 and as set out in the statement of 10 June 2024, the appellant was aware that the respondent had requested further information but there is no evidence of any steps taken to follow this up.”

37. As identified within the Rule 24 response, the Judge did make clear findings at paragraph 61 of her determination. She noted that the Appellant had sight of the Refusal and had accepted in his witness statement that the Respondent had requested further information. He had then detailed no steps to “follow this up”.

38. The Judge made findings that were reasonably open to her in light of the evidence, and is not vitiated by any error of law. It was appropriate for Ms Saifolahi not to seek to pursue the point beyond the written grounds of appeal.

39. Ground 3 is therefore dismissed.

Ground 4 - Flawed credibility assessment – failure to consider a material factor

40. Whilst the oral submissions addressed grounds 4 and 6 together, I consider it appropriate to analyse them separately, albeit having regard to the cumulative effect of any errors identified.

41. The ground of appeal argues:

“The judge makes a negative credibility finding regarding the appellant’s business activity based on inconsistencies in his account concerning past events [62-66]. In so doing, the judge fails to take account of a material consideration namely the passage of time i.e., it can be unrealistic to expect an honest person to give precisely the same account of past events from his or her memory when asked about them on different occasions months and years after the events, see TVN, R (On the Application Of) v SSHD [2021] EWHC 3019 (Admin).”

42. The Rule 24 Response contends:

“Ground four asserts that the judge failed to consider a material matter that being the passage of time. It is submitted that the judge has made an assessment of all of the evidence in relation to the appellant’s business activities [62] to [71]. It was open to the judge based on the evidence to find that the appellant has been inconsistent in his evidence as to when he started his business and when he began importing cars from Dubai. The judge was not comparing precise dates [date and month] it was only the years. It is submitted that there is no error in the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s evidence and the finding that the appellant has been inconsistent.”

43. The principle outlined within the grounds, namely “…it can be unrealistic to expect an honest person to give precisely the same account of past events from his or her memory when asked about them on different occasions months and years after the events…” is uncontroversial.

44. However, in the Appellant’s accounts in his 9th January 2023 questionnaire; 9th April 2025 appeal witness statement; and oral evidence were materially inconsistent, as outlined by the Judge at paragraphs 62 and 66 of her determination.

45. The Appellant was inconsistent as to when he started importing cars, saying it was 2001 and then saying 2005. He was inconsistent as to when he started to travel to Dubai for his business, saying it was 2005 and then saying it was 2013, before stating it was 2015-2020. He was inconsistent about when his claimed trouble with the gangs started, initially stating that it was 2013 and then saying it was 2015. He stated for the first time in his oral evidence that, having worked for his father, he set up his own business in 2013. These are not minor discrepancies readily explained by the passage of time but significant inconsistencies about the chronology of core events.

46. As such, the Judge, who had reminded herself of the relevant authorities when considering credibility (paragraphs 27-30), was entitled to treat those inconsistencies as undermining the Appellant’s credibility. She made findings that were reasonably open to her upon adequate consideration of the evidence.

47. Ground 4 is therefore dismissed.

Ground 5 - Business activity – flawed assessment of documentary evidence

48. The ground of appeal argues:

“The judge discounts the documentary evidence supportive of the appellant’s claimed business activity on the basis that they were provided late and were not available to the respondent at the review stage [67][69]. However, this finding is incorrect, unsupported by the evidence and irrational. The documents at AB1 451-457 are duplicates of the documents in the stitched hearing bundle at PDF pages 93-99 and form part of the earlier appeal bundle (AB [8-9]) submitted prior to the respondent’s review. This error materially impugns the assessment of credibility.

Further or alternatively, inadequate reasons are given for placing little weight on the residence permit. It is insufficient to describe the features as “odd” [68], which is contrary to her self-direction at [28] particularly as there is no reasonable alternative comparator.

Further or alternatively, no account is taken of material considerations in evaluating the Investor’s ID and the third copy documents [68], which refer to the appellant by name.”

49. The Rule 24 Response contends:

“Ground five asserts that the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s business activities is flawed and that there are inadequate reasons for their findings. It is submitted that the judge has given clear reasons as to why she has concerns about the reliance that could be placed on the translations [58]. The judge sets out at [67] that it is not clear if the translator specifically declares the accuracy of the translations in the hearing bundle [HB/pg451,455,457].”

50. The documents to which the ground of appeal relates are located at pages 510 to 519 of the composite Upper Tribunal bundle.

51. In assessing the documentary evidence, the Judge, at paragraph 69, correctly reminded herself of the guidance within Tanveer Ahmed [2002] Imm AR 318 which stated, at paragraph 38:

“1. In asylum and human rights cases it is for an individual claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied on.

2. The decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.

3. Only very rarely will there be the need to make an allegation of forgery, or evidence strong enough to support it. The allegation should not be made without such evidence. Failure to establish the allegation on the balance of probabilities to the higher civil standard does not show that a document is reliable. The decision maker still needs to apply principles 1 and 2.”

52. The Judge raised her concerns about the translation of the documents at paragraphs 58 and 67:

“58…Given the appellant’s claims, I find it somewhat incongruous that the translator engaged by the appellant is not only one based abroad and in the IKR but a translator who works in the KRG and is registered with the KRG court when there are UK based translators available not so affiliated. I had some concerns about the reliance that could be placed on the translations given that whilst the declaration broadly conforms to the requirements of the relevant practice direction, the attestation as to authenticity does not specify the particular documents…

67. The translators certificate is identical to the certificate for all translations provided by the appellant in both the HB and AB1 and as such it is not clear that it specifically declares the accuracy of the translations of the documents at AB1 451, 455 and 457.”

53. Practise direction 8.12 details the attestation to be endorsed by interpreters who have translated witness statements. There is no similar practice direction in relation to interpreting other documents. Nevertheless, as outlined by the Judge, the interpreter’s attestation was compliant with the directions that are given at PD 8.12.

54. There is no practice direction requiring the interpreter to specifically identify which document they have translated but, as a matter of simple common sense, an interpreter can be expected to add that detail where there could be any doubt. That was all the more necessary in this case. At pages 511, 513 and 515 of the UT bundle there are the Kurdish versions of documents. At pages 512, 514 and 516 there are the English translations. At page 517 there is the attestation. Not only is the attestation not on the translations themselves, but it does not list which translations it refers to, or how many documents have been translated. The Judge’s observation that “it is not clear that it specifically declares the accuracy of the translations of the documents” was therefore reasonable and the matters identified were capable of undermining the documents to which the Appellant relied.

55. Further, the Judge was entitled to find that the location of the interpreter was “incongruous” given the nature of the Appellant’s claims.

56. The reliability of the documents had to be considered upon the general credibility findings and the Judge had found that the Appellant was not a generally credible witness.

57. As such, whilst the Judge was in error in her assertion that documentation had not been before the Respondent prior to the Respondent Review, this does not materially undermine her assessment of the evidence. Any error of law is therefore not material.

58. Her analysis of the documentation was detailed. It was not necessary for her to have a comparator to be able to assess the reliability of the documents relied upon by the Appellant and, in any event, given that reliability is to be established by the Appellant, it would have been his responsibility to provide a comparator if he believed it to be of potential assistance. The Judge’s analysis as to why she considered the presentation of the permit to be “odd”, and why she did not consider the three documents provided to be reliable, was thorough and not vitiated by any error of law:

“There is a residence permit which gives the appellant’s name next to ‘Name of parent or guardian’ which is odd if it is intended to be his own residence permit with no place for details of the appellant’s own name and the home address given is a series of numbers and letters. There is an ‘Investor’s ID’ with a photo which is not sufficiently clear to be satisfied it is a photo of the appellant. The details included are of a ‘Nationality ID No.’ and ‘Expiry Date: 05-06-2014’ although ‘Valid Until: 31-12-2014’. The translation for the third copy card states ‘Title: NOT Clear’ so it is not known what the purpose of the card or its title is. The photo is not sufficiently clear such that it is not possible to be satisfied that it is a photo of the appellant. The details include that the purpose of business is ‘Export & Import’, ‘Date of Issue: 23-08-2015’ and ‘Valid Until: 31-12-2015’ and ‘Registering No.: 1504 on 03-10-2007’.”

59. Again, that assessment must also be considered in light of her concerns about the interpretation and her general credibility findings.

60. Therefore, whilst the Judge was in error about when documents were provided by the Appellant to the Respondent, that error is not material given her thorough and detailed analysis of the documentation provided and her correct application of Tanveer Ahmed.

61. As such, ground 5 discloses no material error of law and is dismissed.

Ground 6 - Business activity - unclear finding

62. The ground of appeal argues:

“The appears to reject the appellant’s claimed business activity at [62-70] (“I am sceptical that the appellant was running the type of business he claims he was involved in and have concluded this has not been demonstrated…” [75]) but later accepts he has run an export/import business in the KRI [86][117]. These findings are contradictory, and it is unclear whether the Tribunal accepts/does not accept the appellant’s claimed business activity. His business activity is central to the appellant’s asylum claim and a clear finding on this issue is undoubtedly material. Further, it is material to a proper assessment of the reasonableness of relocation [86] and very significant obstacles to integration [117].”

63. The Rule 24 Response contends:

“The judge then makes and assessment of those documents at [68] before finding at [69] that the documents do not demonstrate that the appellant was running his own business at the relevant time. It is submitted that this finding was open to the judge when looking at the documents relied upon.”

64. The ground of appeal does not include an adequately complete quotation of the Judge’s conclusions within paragraph 75 of her determination as it unfortunately only quotes part of the relevant sentence. The full sentence is as follows:

“Due the limited evidence and the presentation of the oral evidence, I am sceptical that the appellant was running the type of business he claims he was involved in and have concluded this has not been demonstrated even to the lower standard.”

65. When assessing international protection, the Judge made clear findings, upon application of the correct low standard of proof, and rejected the Appellant’s account of his business activities in Iraq. As I have outlined in addressing the other grounds of appeal, that finding was not vitiated by any material error of law.

66. The criticism that the Judge made an inconsistent finding about the Appellant’s business activities when considering internal relocation is misconceived. Given that the Judge had rejected the core of the Appellant’s claim, namely that he had a well-founded fear of harm in Iraq, internal relocation needed not be considered. She did so, sensibly, in the alternative. Internal relocation would only apply had the Appellant’s account of fear been accepted. Had it been accepted it could have only been, given the nature of his account, upon acceptance of his claimed business activities and the troubles attracted. That Judge stated, at paragraph 86 that “on his account” the Appellant had been running a business.

67. There is greater merit in the assertion that the Judge made a contradictory finding about the Appellant’s business activities in her analysis of whether the Appellant would face very significant obstacles in integrating into Iraq

68. Her analysis was at paragraph 117 and 118, with the problematic comment highlighted:

“117. The appellant does not point to or rely on any particular obstacles to integration in Iraq or in the KRI to where he will return as discrete from the protection claims made. I have dismissed his protection claims. The appellant is a young adult of working age in good health who was born in Iraq and spent his formative years and the majority of his adult life to date in Iraq. The appellant has worked and run a business in the KRI. The appellant speaks a relevant language, Kurdish Sorani. I refer to my findings above that the appellant on his own account has an INID and can get in touch with his family. The appellant has a wife and children and his father in Sulaymaniyah in the KRI and he can be accommodated with them. Accordingly, the appellant can recover his INID and there is no redocumentation issue. I reach this conclusion taking full account of the relevant case law including SMO.

118. I have conducted a broad evaluative assessment of the circumstances and find that the appellant is enough of an insider and has the capacity to operate day to day and reestablish meaningful private life in Iraq and in particular the KRI to where he will return. Accordingly, I have concluded that there are no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Iraq/KRI and that the appellant has not demonstrated that he meets the private life requirements of the Immigration Rules.”

69. The Appellant had only ever claimed having a business importing and expiring motor vehicles and the Judge had concluded earlier in her determination that he had failed to prove to the requisite low standard that he had undertaken that business. As such, paragraph 117 does demonstrate an inconsistency with the Judge’s core findings.

70. I am satisfied, having read the determination as a whole, that the error was in paragraph 117 and that it is not an indication that the Appellant’s narrative account in relation to his business activities had been accepted. They clearly had not. As such, the error in paragraph 117 does not vitiate any of the Judge’s findings in relation to international protection.

71. I must consider, however, whether reference to the Appellant having had his own business, which was contrary to the Judge’s findings, materially infects the conclusions she reached in relation to very significant obstacles to integration in Iraq.

72. Removing the refence to the Appellant having run his own business does not undermine the Judge’s overall conclusion that the Appellant had failed to show, on the balance of probabilities, very significant obstacles to his integration into Iraq. The relevant findings were that the Appellant had spent much of his life in the IKR and speaks the relevant language; is of working age; has relevant documentation; and has family who could accommodate him. In light of all of those circumstances, and even taking into account that the Appellant had not run his own business, his circumstances fall far short of showing, on the balance of probabilities, very significant obstacles in his integration into Iraq.

73. As such, the identified error is not material and so ground 6 is dismissed.

Ground 7 - Flawed approach regarding the PUK – incorrect standard of proof

74. The ground of appeal argues:

“The judge states that she cannot accept the appellant’s assertion that the extortionists are PUK because of the diverse range of actors [71-72] but in so finding fails to properly apply the correct low standard of proof i.e., a reasonable degree of likelihood or serious possibility that they are so connected, particularly given the judge accepts it is plausible groups aligned or affiliated to the PUK might behave in corrupt or abusive ways. This error is material to the assessment of credibility [75] and a proper evaluation of whether a Refugee Convention reason arises [76-83].”

75. The Rule 24 Response contends:

“… It is submitted that the judge has considered the relevant background evidence and the documentary evidence provided by the appellant at [71] to [74] before concluding that it is speculative for the appellant to say that those who harassed him were the PUK. It is submitted that this finding was open to the judge based on an assessment of the evidence.”

76. At paragraphs 18-22 of her determination the Judge demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of the correct burden and standard of proof to apply in relation to each of the Appellant’s applications including, at paragraph 18 the lower standard of proof applicable to claims for asylum. She does not deviate from that in any part of her determination. The Judge was entitled to find some of the Appellant’s account to be speculative. Her doing so does not betray a misapplication of the burden and standard of proof. Whilst the use of the word “sceptical” can often lead to a suggestion of misapplication, the Judge was careful in that section of her determination, at paragraph 75 (which I have quoted in full at paragraph 29, above), to reiterate the burden and standard of proof.

77. There is therefore no merit in the submission that the Judge misapplied the correct burden and standard of proof at any stage of her decision-making.

78. The Judge gave a thorough analysis of the Appellant’s evidence and concluded, upon application of the correct low standard of proof, that she was not satisfied that the claimed gang were politically affiliated.

79. The Judge gave sufficient consideration to the background evidence and found it plausible that PUK affiliated gangs would seek to extort money. However, she found that, had the Appellant been targeted by gang members as claimed, he had not shown to the requisite low standard of proof that they were politically affiliated or motivated. Her comprehensive assessment was at paragraph 72-75 of her determination:

“72. Having regard to the background evidence and the diverse range of actors, I cannot accept the appellant’s assertion that it is common knowledge that gangs or groups of individuals operating to harass and extort business are PUK because they wear masks and drive blacked out cars even taking account of this being in the appellant’s home area of Sulaymaniyah where the PUK are indicated to be de facto in political control. The explanation is insufficient as to how the appellant knew those he claims were harassing and extorting money were either linked to or were the PUK. Whilst plausible given the background evidence that groups aligned or affiliated to the PUK or, for example, peshmerga linked to the PUK might behave in corrupt or abusive ways; it is not axiomatic that any individuals harassing and extorting money are PUK or even affiliated to the PUK. The appellant refers in the appeal statement to risk in Erbil/Dohuk due Shi’ite militias; the background evidence does not preclude such groups operating in Sulaymaniyah. The appellant’s evidence alters between harassment by individuals, gangs linked or the PUK itself. The background evidence supports that there are groups motivated to extort money or impose ‘unofficial taxes’ from businesses. The appellant relies on the corruption article which refers to mafia style groups or criminal actors operating in the KRI and this is externally inconsistent with a position that the appellant can only have been harassed by the PUK or linked individuals for the reason he provides.

73. The statement does make reference to video and documentary evidence provided with the AB1 stating that pictures showing the attacks to his home in Iraq obtained through Facebook from a neighbour have been provided. The appellant said that there were two sets of footage and they were of the same place which was in front of his house and taken on the same day during daytime and at night and in 2020. The appellant said the footage was of PUK arriving at his house to threaten him and ask for money and was taken by his neighbours CCTV. The appellant asked for the footage and it was sent to him on Facebook in 2022. The appellant was asked why it was not included in the original appeal bundle if the appellant had the footage in 2022. The appellant said he had sent it to his solicitors. The appellant said that it was not for him to tell his neighbour to make recordings when asked why the appellant had not provided footage of all the 7 or 8 attacks. The explanation as to why the video footage or stills of the footage were not provided earlier than very shortly before the hearing is insufficient and it is also unclear why this was not mentioned in the written statement dated 9 January 2023 or the ACQ sent on 8 June 2023.

74. The stills are of masked men on a road between a car and building. The appellant says this is an attack on his house but there is no other evidence to demonstrate that this is an attack of the nature the appellant claims rather than descent from a vehicle followed by entry into a house of some masked men and/or that the building being entered is the appellant’s family home or that the entry is for harassment and/or extortion. There is no particular feature of the stills or footage that indicates the masked men are either the PUK or linked or affiliated to the PUK that is evident or was identified to me. The stills and video footage offer very limited support for the appellant’s statements that he was being harassed and having money extorted by PUK affiliated gangs or the PUK in particular.

75. Considering everything in the round, I have concluded that it remains speculative to suggest that those the appellant says harassed him were the PUK simply because they were masked and drove cars with blacked out windows and without licence plates…”

80. Ground 7 of the appeal, regardless of any error of law identified within, cannot succeed as the Judge was not satisfied that the Appellant was targeted by gangs and so the identity and affiliations of the claimed gang need not be determined.

81. In any event, the Judge’s findings in relation to the gangs were those that were reasonably open to her were not vitiated by any error of law.

82. Ground 7 is therefore dismissed.

Ground 8 - Flawed assessment of Refugee Convention reason

83. The ground of appeal argues:

“The judge makes a material misdirection of law by directing herself in accordance with EMAP (Gang violence, Convention Reason) [2022] UKUT 335 (IAC)[78][80], which provides guidance on gang violence in El Salvador rather than Iraq.

Further or alternatively, the judge fails to properly evaluate the Convention reason on the basis that the appellant will be imputed a political opinion opposed to the PUK (or seen as an opponent) by not paying the unofficial taxes [79][81].”

84. The Rule 24 Response contends:

“Ground ten asserts that the judge makes a material misdirection by directing herself to EMAP (Gang violence, Convention Reason) [2022] UKUT 335 (IAC) it is submitted that the principles set out in EMAP were relevant to the judge’s assessment of whether the appellant’s account falls into the convention reason of imputed political opinion [77] to [81]. It is submitted that the judge has given adequate reasons for finding that the motive was financial and criminal not political.”

85. There was no error in the Judge’s citing of EMAP (Gang violence – Convention Reason) El Salvador CG. She identified, at paragraph 78 of her determination, that it had been referenced by the Respondent and was country guidance in relation to El Salvador but that it “…addresses the issue as to when a context of fear of gangs constitutes political opinion the purpose of a convention reason”. At paragraph 80 she again noted that the authority relates to El Salvador but stated that paragraphs 121 and 122 of EMAP were “illustrative”:

“121. There will be cases at the other end of the spectrum where the motive for persecution is purely criminal. The most obvious example of that would be the shopkeeper subject to extortion by his local clica. The act of extortion itself may be crippling for the shopkeeper, and he may be living in terror of what might happen should he refuse to pay, but absent other features the motive is wholly financial, and criminal in nature. We doubt the gang has given any thought at all to what the shopkeeper thinks about their policies or methods.

122. In between those two poles is the area of overlap where the criminal and the political motivations of the gangs are harder to separate. It is true that punishment for resistance will often be inflicted in pursuit of criminal, economic objectives, but in the context of El Salvador that is not all it is. The subject of extortion who takes a stand and refuses to pay, the victim of violence who turns to the state for assistance, the youth who resists the pressure to join a gang are all in our view likely to be able to establish that an effective cause of the persecution they fear is the opinion or belief that they hold about the gang. The less immediately financial in nature the point of the adverse attention, the more likely it is going to fall towards the political end of the spectrum.”

86. There was nothing incorrect in the Judge’s approach or her careful consideration of the guidance that could be gleaned from EMAP.

87. The Judge concluded the following at paragraph 81:

“I have concluded that the appellant has not demonstrated that any treatment feared from the gang is due a convention reason. Even if I accepted that the appellant was subject to the harassment and extortion claimed and that this was from individuals who were either linked to or were the PUK, the appellant has not demonstrated that the treatment is due a convention reason rather than financial and criminal in motivation.”

88. Those were findings reasonably open to the Judge upon the evidence before her and were adequately reasoned.

89. Ground 8 of the appeal, regardless of any error of law identified within, cannot succeed as the Judge was not satisfied that the Appellant had given a credible account of well-founded fear and, as such, he could not show well-founded fear on account of a Convention reason.

90. In any event, the Judge’s findings in relation the absence of a Convention reason was not vitiated by any error of law.

91. Ground 8 is therefore dismissed.

Ground 9 - Internal relocation – no proper consideration of material factors

92. The ground of appeal argues:

“The judge finds the appellant can relocate to Dohuk or Erbil because the Tribunal does not accept that he has a profile of any significance in the KDP area [85] however, the judge fails to engage with and reach proper findings on material matters namely the appellant’s claim that he (emphasis in bold) “cannot relocate to elsewhere in the IKR as both political parties in the IKR work together and I would be found by the PUK” [84]. The judge’s assessment of the background evidence fails to properly engage with the appellant’s claim in this regard [41].”

93. The Rule 24 Response contends:

“Ground eleven is not material as the judge does not accept the core of the appellant’s claim and did not need to go on to consider internal relocation [83].”

94. Given that the Judge rejected the Appellant’s claimed fear of harm, she did not need to consider internal relocation and if there was any error in her consideration of internal relocation, it cannot be material.

95. In any event, as identified by Mr Tan in his oral submissions, there was no background evidence before the Judge to show support for the Appellant’s claim at paragraph 26 of his witness statement that: “The PUK is highly powerful and influential throughout Iraq and are capable of easily finding me and killing me with no consequence. I cannot relocate to a KDP-controlled area either as both political parties have strong connections with each other meaning I can be found and killed regardless of who controls the area.”.

96. I note that neither the skeleton argument on behalf of the Appellant before the First-tier Tribunal, nor the grounds of appeal or oral submissions of Ms Saifolahi identify any such background evidence that should have been considered by the Judge.

97. The Appellant had included within his bundle various Country Policy and Information Notes. The CPIN – Iraq: Blood feuds, Honour crimes and Tribal violence, dated July 2024, addresses internal relocation at section 5. Whilst it details the ability of tribes to locate people, there is no reference to the PUK and KDP working together so that a person who had acted contrary to the PUK could be located and harmed in a KDP area. Further, no support for the Appellant’s claims can be found within the CPIN – Iraq: Internal relocation. Civil documentation and returns, dated October 2023, which addresses internal relocation at section 3.3. The CPIN – Iraq: Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), dated July 2023, at section 5, is limited to the lack of internal relocation actions where a person has attracted the adverse attention of the state. At section 13, it details the long-standing disputes between the two parties, which undermines the Appellant’s assertion that they would work together for his apprehension.

98. As such, there was no error of law in determining that internal relocation was reasonable and, even there had been, it would not have been material given the Judge’s dismissal of the Appellant’s core account.

99. Ground 9 is therefore dismissed.

Ground 10 - Flawed approach - Sur place activity

100. The ground of appeal argues:

“The errors above materially impugn the assessment of the appellant’s sur place activity [87-90] and the finding that his beliefs are not genuinely held.”

101. The Rule 24 Response contends:

“Ground twelve asserts that the errors above impugn the assessment of the appellant’s sur place activities. The Judge refers to relevant authorities and gives cogent reasons for finding the Appellant would not be at risk of harm due to any sur place political activities [87] to [90].”

102. I have identified two errors in the Judge’s decision making: that the Appellant had not provided documentation to the Respondent prior to the Respondent Review, and the inconsistency in relation to the Appellant’s business activities when assessing very significant obstacles to integration in Iraq.

103. Both errors were minor and did not materially impact upon the safety of the Judge’s credibility findings and her conclusions, whether taken individually or cumulatively.

104. The Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s claims is sound and not vitiated by material error of law and that extends to her assessment of there being no risk of harm arising from the Appellant’s purported sur place activity. There has been no challenge to that assessment over and above that which is parasitic upon one of the earlier grounds of appeal succeeding. There is no suggestion of any error in the Judge’s interpretation of the law or the evidence in relation to the sur place activity claim. No such complaint could be justified as the Judge gave significant and detailed consideration of all relevant features within her analysis between paragraphs 87 and 90, including appropriate reference to BA(Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) and XX(PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23(IAC), together with the available background evidence.

105. Ground 10 is therefore dismissed.

Conclusion

106. The Judge’s determination contains findings of fact that were open to her and conclusions upon adherence to the relevant legal tests. Her decisions were adequately reasoned. Any errors of law identified are not material.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.



DUTJ Moxon
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


23rd January 2026