Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003697

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52816/2024
LP/09986/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURGHER

Between

MH
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Paxi Cato, Counsel, instructed by Black Antelope Law
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 19 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant is a Bangladeshi citizen, born on 2 December 1997. He arrived in the UK on 24 February 2022 on a student visa and applied for asylum on 10 November 2022. His application was refused on 15 January 2024.
2. The Appellant appealed against the refusal decision. He asserts that he was an active supporter of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and fears persecution on return due to his political activities and profile.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
3. First Tier Tribunal Judge Clarkson (‘the Judge’) heard the Appellant’s appeal on 6 March 2024 and in a decision promulgated on 12 May 2025 dismissed the appeal. The Judge dismissed the appeal, and found that the Appellant had not demonstrated a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return. The Judge accepted that the Appellant may have attended demonstrations and may have been injured, but concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish risk on return. The Judge also found that internal relocation and sufficiency of protection were available.
4. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell on 11 September 2025.
Anonymity Order
5. The Judge made an anonymity order. There was no request for the anonymity order to be set aside. I conclude that the Appellants’ rights to international protection outweigh the Article 10 rights of the public to know their identity as a party to these proceedings.
The Grounds of Appeal
6. The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal. The essence of the appeal was that the Judge applied the wrong approach to credibility, adopted the incorrect burden of proof, and that the finding that the Appellant had not demonstrated a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return was unsustainable having regard to the Judge’s underlying factual findings.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. I had before me the composite hearing bundle of 491 pages and had the benefit of helpful submissions from both representatives.
Appellant’s submissions
8. Mr Paxi Cato is submitted that there was sufficient evidence from the Appellant both in his witness statement and supported by his oral testimony to prove that the events occurred as claimed. Despite the Judge’s reservations regarding an alleged lack of corroboration the Judge accepted the Appellant’s credibility at various points throughout their decision. Specifically, the Judge found:
8.1 I accept that the Appellant may have been injured while attending one of these demonstrations in 2016, but not necessarily as he described or sustaining injuries. ' [34];
8.2 I accept that the Appellant may have been involved in an incident in 2018 [35)];
8.3 I accept that as a young student and the CP1N evidence at the relevant time he may well have been attending demonstrations as part of the student wing of his party [38];
8.4 I accept that in 2016 and 2018 there was a lot of political conflict and fighting between student wings and that it is plausible that in a small community it might have been known that the Appellant supported the BNP. ’ I accept that there may have been some form of attempted, intimidation by others at his family home...' [39];
8.5 'In summary I accept that the Appellant may have been attacked in demonstrations in 2016 and 2018 and that there may have been threats made towards his family around this time... '[40].
9. Mr Paxi Cato submitted that having accepted that the Appellant may have attended demonstrations and may have been injured, the Judge erred in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish risk on return. He also submitted that the Judge erred in concluding that internal relocation and sufficiency of protection were available.
10. Mr Paxi Cato submitted that the Judge failed to fully consider the Appellant’s evidence in the proper context, and that the Judge erred in seeking corroboration. Mr Paxi Cato referred to the following paragraphs of the Judge’s decision in this regard:
10.1 ‘...the Appellant said he was in hospital for a substantial period of time with a serious injury and that he was still in contact with his family in Bangladesh and had remained in the country for six years after the incident. In these circumstances, it would not be unreasonable to expect him to obtain his medical records, ’ [31]
10.2 ‘The Appellant made his claim for asylum in November 2022 but did not provide medical evidence in regard to the attack at the time’ [31];
10.3 'He did not provide details of the attack beyond saying it was again supporters of the Awami League and did not give details of any injuries sustained nor did he provide evinced [sic evidence] of any treatment in regard to this incident’ [35];
10.4 ‘The Appellant was asked why he had not provided evidence of attending these demonstrations, especially in light of him asserting that he was active on social media. The Appellant said that he can no long [sic longer] log into his Facebook account...’ [38];
10.5 'He did not give details of who they were or that [sic the] nature of the treats [sic threats]’ [39];
10.6 ‘The Appellant did not say how many times this had happened, the dates, or provide evidence from the family members who had received the treats [sic threats]. Nor did he provide evidence of his communication with them regarding the threats.‘ [39].
11. Mr Paxi Cato submitted that the above references demonstrated that the Judge wrongly required implied that corroboration would have been necessary to change their perception of the Appellant’s credibility.
12. It was submitted that the Judge placed undue weight on the absence of documentary evidence, despite the positive findings that the Appellant may have been injured during demonstrations in 2016 and 2018, and that threats were made to his family. The Appellant contends that the Appellant’s internal consistency in his account should have sufficed for a positive credibility finding.
13. When addressing the issues of materiality and relevant country guidance following the case of MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 [14–18], Mr Paxi Cato submitted that the Judge’s positive findings regarding past persecution and threats were not properly weighed against the country evidence, particularly the ongoing risk to BNP supporters. The Appellant maintains that, even if the Judge found some aspects of the account lacking in detail, the core claim of risk due to BNP affiliation was consistent and credible. Mr Paxi Cato submitted that the Judge failed to consider the cumulative effect of the evidence and the country guidance in the round.
14. When considering internal relocation and non-state actors, Mr Paxi Cato submitted that internal relocation was not a viable option due to the extensive reach of the Awami League and its affiliates, the ease of information transfer in the digital age, and the targeting of family members in Sylhet even when the Appellant was residing in Dhaka. It was submitted that the risk from non-state actors, including those who remain sympathetic to the Awami League, remains acute and that state protection is ineffective.
15. Mr Paxi Cato submitted that internal relocation would also have unduly harsh consequences for the Appellant, given the lack of family or support networks, absence of prior residence in alternative locations, and the Appellant’s youth and lack of work history in Bangladesh. The psychological impact on his family and the absence of evidence that his family would be able to provide effective support was emphasised.
16. Mr Paxi Cato referenced the case of Kasolo [2004] UKIAT 00119 [14] which underlines that corroboration is not necessary, and the Judge’s implication that such further detail would have been crucial in assessing the Appellant’s credibility amounts to a material error of law.
Respondent’s submissions
17. Ms McKenzie relied on the Judge’s findings that, given the Appellant’s continued residence in Bangladesh from 2018 to 2022 without incident, and the lack of evidence that his family was harmed, there is no real risk on return. It was submitted that the Judge properly considered the change in country conditions, including the change of government, and found that the evidence did not support a risk to the Appellant who was a low-level BNP supporter.
18. When considering materiality given the statements in MU v SSHD Ms McKenzie submitted that even if the Judge’s reasoning was deficient in some respects, MU v SSHD is dispositive. Paragraphs 14–18 of MU v SSHD make clear that, following the overthrow of the Awami League and the installation of an interim government, there is no longer a real risk of serious harm to BNP supporters on return to Bangladesh. In these circumstances Ms McKenzie submitted that any error in the Judge’s reasoning is not material to the outcome.
19. Ms McKenzie continued that, in light of MU v SSHD and the country guidance, effective state protection is available and internal relocation is feasible for the Appellant, particularly to urban centres such as Dhaka. It was submitted that the Appellant’s low profile does not distinguish him from millions of other BNP supporters who are not at risk.
The Legal Framework
20. The Upper Tribunal is confined to considering whether there are errors of law in First Tier Tribunal decisions. In R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 Brooke LJ summarises what amounts to an error of law at paragraphs 9 and 10
9. When the court gave this guidance in Subesh, it was aware that it would not be of any relevance to an appellate regime in which appeals were restricted to points of law. It may be convenient to give a brief summary of the points of law that will most frequently be encountered in practice:
i) Making perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome ("material matters");
ii) Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters;
iii) Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters;
iv) Giving weight to immaterial matters;
v) Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter;
vi) Committing or permitting a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or the fairness of the proceedings;
vii) Making a mistake as to a material fact which could be established by objective and uncontentious evidence, where the appellant and/or his advisers were not responsible for the mistake, and where unfairness resulted from the fact that a mistake was made.

10. Each of these grounds for detecting an error of law contain the word "material" (or "immaterial"). Errors of law of which it can be said that they would have made no difference to the outcome do not matter. This need to identify an error of law which would have made a material difference to the outcome…
21. The guidance of Singh LJ in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 [86 - 90] sets out a more recent analysis of the approach to corroboration and credibility in asylum cases having regard to the lower standard of proof, the reasonable degree of likelihood. Specifically, there is no requirement for corroboration if relevant criteria are met and it must apply risk assessment, not balance of probabilities.
22. The analysis of Underhill LJ in MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 [14] - [18] provided an updated overview of the Country Guidance in Bangladesh:
16. Mr Collins' response was that the CPIN did not show an unequivocal picture. He noted that the passage quoted said only that it was "unlikely" that BNP members or supporters would face persecution or serious harm from the government, and he drew our attention also to the final paragraph about the inappropriateness of certification. I am afraid that that is clutching at straws. It is quite clear that the term "unlikely" is used in this context to connote no real risk, and that is unsurprising in the context of the overthrow of the Awami League from whom the feared risks would emanate. In so far as the statement about certification implies a degree of uncertainty, it is evidently related to the possibility of risk to Awami League supporters: without going through the full text of the CPIN, one can see that, as I say wholly unsurprisingly, that is the area where there is the possibility of some risks continuing.
17. The truth is that the change of government has wholly changed the picture in such a way that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the respondent will be at risk of serious harm if returned.
Conclusions
23. I accept that there were significant shortcomings in the Judge’s decision regarding corroboration and the approach to credibility.
24. The Judge accepted that the Appellant:
24.1 may have been injured while attending one of these demonstrations in 2016, but not necessarily as he described or sustaining injuries. [34];
24.2 may have been involved in an incident in 2018 [35)];
24.3 as a young student and the CP1N evidence at the relevant time he may well have been attending demonstrations as part of the student wing of his party [38];
24.4 in 2016 and 2018 there was a lot of political conflict and fighting between student wings and that it is plausible that in a small community it might have been known that the Appellant supported the BNP. ’ I accept that there may have been some form of attempted, intimidation by others at his family home...' [39];
24.5 may have been attacked in demonstrations in 2016 and 2018 and that there may have been threats made towards his family around this time... '[40].
25. At [38] the Judge accepts the Appellant’s possible attendance at demonstrations but rejects social media activity. There is an absence of clear reasoning in this regard.
26. At [39] the Judge states that intimidation may have occurred but concludes that the Appellant has no real fear given that he moved away at least five years ago. This explanation did not address why it is said that the Appellant does not have a continuing fear.
27. The equivocal language deployed by the Judge undermines the clarity as to whether definitive findings were being made. If the above paragraphs can be said to amount to definitive findings then I accept the analysis and thrust of Mr Paxi Cato’s submissions that these inevitably undermine the conclusion of the Judge at [40] where he states:
In summary I accept that the Appellant may have been attacked in demonstrations in 2016 and 2018 and that there may have been threats made towards his family around this time but given the length of time that has passed and the length of time the Appellant stayed in Bangladesh after the last incident and his acknowledgement of the change of political power of the BNP and Awami league, I do not accept on the balance of probability that he in fact fears risk on return for his political support for the BNP.
28. In this paragraph [40] the Judge summarises the findings but conflates credibility with risk assessment and fails to outline the correct standard of proof. The Judge failed to apply the disciplined approach outlined in MAH v SSHD, in respect of credibility and corroboration and did not reference the correct standard of proof at [40].
29. I consider that the above passages demonstrate that the Judge’s reasoning was vague and did not properly engage and explain the most relevant evidence to establish the conclusion that the Appellant did not in fact fear risk on return for his political support for the BNP.
30. Finally, I consider that the Judge’s reasoning at paragraph [31] [35] [38] and [39] was reference and the Judge wrongly imposed a corroboration requirement in respect of the analysis of risk, contrary to Kasolo.
Materiality
31. Notwithstanding the errors identified above, I do not consider that they are material to the outcome of the appeal given the Appellant’s status as a BNP member.
32. The Judge concluded at paragraph 46 which stated:
Having considered all of the evidence in the round I do not find that the Appellant has shown to the lower standard a risk of harm, given the change in the position of the Awami league and the evidence of the CP1N if non state actors threatened him, I conclude there would be sufficiency of state protection.
33. The Court of Appeal in MU v SSHD emphasised that the overthrow of the Awami League and installation of an interim government has wholly changed the picture and BNP members and activists will no longer face any real risk of serious harm if returned. The authoritative guidance in MU v SSHD confirms that BNP supporters, including low-level activists such as the Appellant, are not at risk on return. Internal relocation and state protection are available.
34. Mr Paxi Cato stated that there were still risks of serious harm for the Appellant considering internal relocation and non-state actors, and that it would have unduly harsh consequences for the Appellant if he were to return.
35. Mr Paxi Cato submitted that internal relocation was not a viable option due to the extensive reach of the Awami League and its affiliates, the ease of information transfer in the digital age, and the targeting of family members in Sylhet. It was submitted that the risk from non-state actors, including those who remain sympathetic to the Awami League, remains acute and that state protection is ineffective.
36. Mr Paxi Cato submitted that internal relocation would also have unduly harsh consequences, given the lack of family or support networks, absence of prior residence in alternative locations, and the appellant’s youth and lack of work history in Bangladesh. The psychological impact on his family and the absence of evidence that his family would be able to provide effective support was underlined.
37. I do not consider these submissions have force given the current political situation in Bangladesh and the MU v SSHD decision. BNP members no longer face any real risk of serious harm if returned. The Appellant was a low level member unlikely to be of any interest to Awami League and its affiliates, who themselves are more likely to risk of serious harm.
38. Therefore, whilst there are serious shortcomings in the Judge's decision relating to corroboration and credibility ultimately they are not material to the outcome.
39. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Notice of Decision
I find no material error of law and the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarkson will stand.

Benjimin Burgher

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 January 2026