UI-2025-003704
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003704
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68082/2023
LP/14053/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9th February 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
Between
TA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Swain of Counsel, instructed by Londinium Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 29 January 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, who is a national of Bangladesh, appeals against the respondent’s decision dated 15 December 2023 refusing his asylum claim made on 5 December 2019.
2. The appellant’s appeal was initially dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 14 April 2025. However, that decision was set aside by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge R Frantzis on 18 December 2025, with certain findings preserved, on the basis that it was vitiated by a material error of law. A copy of the error of law decision is annexed below.
3. The appeal now comes before me for remaking.
Anonymity
4. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in respect of the appellant. There has been no application to set aside that order. While I recognise the strong factors in favour of open justice, in the present case I am satisfied that it is appropriate to continue the anonymity order given that the appellant seeks international protection.
Background
5. The background to the case is set out at [2] of the error of law decision. I do not therefore repeat it here.
The hearing
Issues in dispute
6. In the error of law decision, DUTJ Frantzis preserved the First‑tier Tribunal’s findings that (a) the appellant had come to the adverse attention of the Bangladeshi authorities as a result of his political activities as a member of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP); and (b) the appellant’s removal to Bangladesh would not breach his rights under Article 3 ECHR on medical or suicide grounds. The remaining issues in dispute are therefore as follows:
a. Whether the appellant faces a real risk of harm on return to Bangladesh on account of politically motived criminal charges filed against him there; and
b. Whether the appellant’s removal to Bangladesh would amount to disproportionate interference with his right to a private life under Article 8 ECHR.
7. Mr Swain, on behalf of the appellant, accepted that the Article 8 claim would stand or fall with the protection claim.
Evidence
8. I had before me the following documents:
a. The 420-page composite bundle, including both parties’ evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (“CB”); and
b. The Home Office’s Country Policy and Information Note Bangladesh: Political situation (Version 1.0; December 2024),
9. I also heard evidence from the appellant and from his brother‑in‑law, AR. Their evidence is set out in their witness statements and recorded in the record of proceedings and is therefore not repeated here save where it is necessary to do so.
Legal framework
10. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof is upon the appellant. As per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
a. Taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason;
b. Considering the credibility of the account, the appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason;
c. The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
d. There would not be sufficient protection available; and
e. The appellant could not internally relocate.
11. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the appellant.
Findings
Asylum
12. It was accepted by the First-tier Tribunal that, prior to coming to the UK in 2010, the appellant had been a member of the Chatra Dal from 2007 and was appointed joint secretary for his area in 2008. The Chatra Dal is a student organisation affiliated with the BNP. The Tribunal also accepted that, as a result of his political activities, the appellant was attacked on 1 September 2009 by activists associated with the Awami League, then the ruling party in Bangladesh, and that false charges were subsequently brought against him, alleging involvement in a bomb detonation and the assault of a government servant.
13. The appellant maintains that the criminal charges remain outstanding and that, notwithstanding the deposition of the Awami League government on 5 August 2024, sympathisers within the police and judiciary persist. He therefore contends that he continues to face a risk of persecution on return to Bangladesh.
14. In support of his appeal, the appellant relies primarily on two documents. The first is a country report dated 31 October 2024 written by Mr Saqeb Mahbub [CB/55]. The second is a letter dated 23 March 2025 purportedly written by an advocate based in Sylhet named Abdul Gaffar who the appellant says is his lawyer [CB/48-49].
The advocate’s letter
15. I first deal with Mr Gaffar’s letter as I can do so briefly. I set out its contents in full, although I have removed details that might identify the appellant:
“Hope you are doing well against all odds. Want to know the latest status of the case filed
against you. For your kind information, case No. […] [name of police station],
dated: 01/01/2009, Section: 143/332/333/353 of the Explosive Ordnance Act of 1908
(Amendment-2002) including Section 3/4/5 of G.R- 09/2009.
The said case is pending in court. As you are absconding, issued warrant of arrest against
you and directed the police to arrest you as soon as possible. Moreover, fascist Awami
League terrorists are regularly raiding your house in search of you.
Arrest, torture and jail-tyranny at the hands of RAB police on one hand and fear of loss of
life at the hands of Awami League terrorists, it is not safe for you to return to the country
in such a critical situation. If you return to the country, there is a fear of losing your life.
So stay where you are. In such a situation, think carefully and make a decision.”
16. Mr Parvar advanced several criticisms of the letter, all of which I accept. His first criticism was that its contents were, as he put it, “astonishing,” given that it is purportedly written by the barrister instructed to represent the appellant in long‑running criminal proceedings. He was entitled to characterise it in that way. The letter comprises only three short paragraphs and provides virtually no information about a criminal case that the appellant maintains has been ongoing for 16 years. It would be reasonable to expect the advocate to outline the current status of the proceedings and any steps or enquiries undertaken on the appellant’s behalf – particularly following the recent change of government – rather than simply stating that the case is “pending”. Instead, the references to “jail tyranny at the hands of RAB police”, “fascist Awami League terrorists”, and the recommendation that the appellant should not return to Bangladesh give the document the character of a political polemic. Furthermore, the reference to the arrest warrant, which was issued on 11 January 2010 [CB/311], cannot have been new information to the appellant. Overall, the letter is vague and of limited evidential value.
17. Mr Parvar’s second criticism was that the letter states the charges were brought on 1 January 2009, which is inconsistent with the appellant’s account that the charges were filed in September 2009 after he was attacked by Awami League activists.
18. His third criticism was that no identification or supporting material has been provided to confirm that the author is in fact a professionally regulated barrister in Bangladesh. Mr Parvar submitted that, given the First‑tier Tribunal relied on this point when attaching little weight to Mr Gaffar’s letter, it is surprising that the appellant did not seek to remedy this deficiency before the remaking hearing in the Upper Tribunal.
19. For the reasons set out above, I find that little weight can be attached to Mr Gaffar’s letter.
The country evidence
20. I therefore turn to the report of Mr Mahbub. He describes himself as an independent expert on the Bangladeshi legal and justice system. He is an advocate in Bangladesh, where he has practised for eight years, and has also been called to the Bar of England and Wales. Mr Mahbub states that he has worked for the United Nations Development Programme on justice‑reform initiatives implemented in partnership with the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, as well as on the “Judicial Strengthening Project” undertaken with the Supreme Court. He further explains that he has acted as a consultant for organisations including USAID, UNHCR, and a local human rights NGO, Bangladesh Legal Aid and Trust Services.
21. Mr Mahbub’s conclusion is that following the ousting of the Awami League government, the BNP is “no longer the de facto “enemy of the state”…but the interim government and the army’s stance regarding BNP and political parties in general is still unclear and largely volatile.” He says that “Until a stable government is installed, BNP is likely to be in the sidelines of the political spectrum and often at the receiving end of political violence”: see 2.19.
22. At 2.20, Mr Mahbub says:
“With regard to cases filed during the AL regime, there is no indication as of yet that they will be lifted or that they will be tried favourably for defendants or on merit considering the political circumstances. The senior civil leadership of the government, which has an agenda to break old cycles of political harassment, has weak control of the state machinery as the lower tiers of the police and magistracy largely remain unchanged and is still manned by AL loyalists. In these circumstances, the likelihood of harassment and persecution of defendants who have criminal cases against them remains.”
23. That passages must also be read in light of what Mr Mahbub says at 1.21-1.24 regarding the judiciary. He writes that the independence of the Bangladeshi judiciary was significantly eroded after the Awami League came to power in 2009. Appointments to the higher courts became driven by political loyalty, while recruitment to the lower judiciary, though nominally merit‑based, reportedly included political vetting. Judicial independence suffered a further serious blow in 2017 when the Chief Justice resigned and left the country following a constitutional ruling adverse to the government. Throughout the Awami League’s tenure, the judiciary was widely viewed as an instrument used to target opposition figures, with politically motivated cases filed by police and bail routinely denied by the courts.
24. Following the fall of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, Mr Mahbub writes that protesters forced the resignation of the Chief Justice and other senior judges of the Appellate Division. However, he says that judges in the lower courts have largely remained in post, with only a small number temporarily removed from duties. Although no new cases have been filed against opposition groups since the political change in August 2024, the many cases brought during the Awami League era remain in place. Mr Mahbub states that the future of these cases, particularly for senior and grassroots BNP figures, remains uncertain given that much of the judiciary is still viewed as aligned with the former ruling party.
25. At 3.3, Mr Mahbub assesses the appellant’s political profile as “low-level/mid-level” and at 3.4 he says that BNP members “are subject to attacks and violence in broad daylight by AL, Charto [sic] League and are not afforded any protection by the police or army under the current political climate.”
26. Mr Swain submitted that significant weight could properly be placed on Mr Mahbub’s report. Mr Parvar, however, argued that little weight should be attached to it. He contended that although Mr Mahbub may have expertise as a lawyer, he is not an expert on the political dynamics of Bangladesh, including developments under the new government. Moreover, he argued that many of the sources relied upon by Mr Mahbub were what he described as “random websites”, including articles written by unnamed authors. I set out below two of the examples identified by Mr Parvar.
27. The first issue concerns the source relied on for the assertion at 1.6 of Mr Mahbub’s report. There, he states that the Awami League “continues to gather and organize both inside and outside Bangladesh. On 21 October 2024 ex-leaders of Awami League’s student wing Chatra [sic] League rallied in the early hours of the morning calling for support for Sheikh Hasina.” Mr Parvar submitted that the source for this claim, at footnote 14, is an online news article on The Business Standard website written by an unknown author regarding a group of former Chhatra League leaders who staged a demonstration protesting the arrest warrant issued for Sheik Hasina and demanding a withdrawal of the case lodged against her. He invited the Tribunal to note that the accompanying photograph depicts only a handful of demonstrators, which, he argued, does not support the proposition that the Awami League is gathering and organising to any significant extent. Mr Parvar is right to make that point. Moreover, the fact that former Awami League supporters now take to the streets to protest arrest warrants and criminal charges against their former leader serves only to underscore that they no longer wield the power and influence they once did.
28. The second issue relates to 1.24. There, Mr Mahbub acknowledges that the change in government means that no new criminal cases have been filed against the Awami League’s opposition. However, he goes on to claim that
“all cases filed during the AL regime remain, barring iconic cases against BNP’s acting chairman and his mother…For senior and root-level BNP leaders and activists, the fate of cases against them remains to be seen, particularly with a judiciary still populated by AL loyalists for the most part.”
29. The paragraph relies on a single source, cited at the end of the reference to the “iconic cases” against the acting chairman: an article in The Financial Express dated 13 October 2024, which reports a BNP standing committee member’s complaint that the criminal cases had not yet been withdrawn. If Mr Mahbub possessed the level of expertise he claims, it is surprising that the only support he identifies for the proposition that criminal cases against opposition figures remain in place is a lone article quoting a single BNP official. I also note that the article was published only two months after the Awami League was forced from power. Given that short interval, it is perhaps unsurprising that limited progress had been made by that stage in withdrawing all politically motivated cases. As Mr Parvar also noted, that same article is relied upon elsewhere in the report, in particular twice at 2.7.
30. At 2.20 of his report, Mr Mahbub states that, “With regard to cases filed during the AL regime, there is no indication as of yet that they will be lifted or that they will be tried favourably for defendants on merit considering the political circumstances,” and he continues: “In these circumstances, the likelihood of harassment and persecution of defendants who have criminal cases against them remains.” At 2.21, he further asserts that the torture and detention of individuals, particularly those held by the police, are unlikely to have changed even under the new government. I note that neither paragraph is supported by any cited source. However, I do take into account that this accords with 13.3.6 of the respondent’s CPIN, which quotes from an International Crisis Group (ICG) report on the first hundred days following the fall of the Awami League. This says that while the interim government has replaced senior police officers implicated in abuses, “These measures alone are unlikely to be sufficient” to reform the security forces, which have been “stacked with AL supporters”.
31. The CPIN also refers to the status of politically motived charges brought under the Awami League government. At 13.3.5 it again quotes from the ICG’s report:
“‘The interim government has already taken several steps to restore the judiciary’s independence. Under pressure from student demonstrators, the former chief justice resigned shortly after Hasina fled, with a respected jurist, Syed Refaat Ahmed, taking the job. Unjust cases filed against protest leaders in July and August are being dropped; earlier charges against opposition figures are also expected to be withdrawn gradually. On 21 September, the new chief justice outlined judicial reforms aimed at addressing the “crisis of public trust”. His main plan is to abolish the executive’s control of promotion and transfer of judges, creating instead a separate secretariat under the Supreme Court to select the most capable jurists. In the meantime, the interim government has transferred and promoted more than 300 lower court judges. A senior judge told Crisis Group that his colleagues already feel a new freedom. “The biggest change is the level of politicisation and pressure that we faced before – nothing like that is happening now”,
32. I find that greater weight can be placed on the CPIN insofar as it relies on the ICG report, given that the ICG is a respected NGO, than on Mr Mahbub’s evidence concerning historic false charges. The ICG report is dated 14 November 2024 and therefore post‑dates the complaints made by the BNP standing committee member quoted in the Financial Express article on which Mr Mahbub relies. It also post-dates Mr Mahbub’s report. Given the volume of false charges reportedly filed against political opponents, it is perhaps unsurprising that, by November 2024, the interim government had been unable to identify and withdraw all such cases. The report also refers to steps taken by the interim government to restore judicial independence. Accordingly, while I accept that it is plausible, as Mr Mahbub suggests, that some junior members of the judiciary may have undergone political vetting when appointed under the Awami League, they now operate within a less politicised environment and under new leadership. The fact that one BNP member, shortly after the change in government, expressed the view that progress was not being made quickly enough is not, in my judgment, evidence of sufficient weight to indicate that no progress is being made in annulling historic charges.
33. It is also noteworthy that criminal proceedings have been initiated against former Awami League members, including Sheikh Hasina, who has since been convicted and sentenced to death in absentia, which shows that the judiciary is willing to try members of the former regime. While I accept that some Awami League loyalists may continue to hold positions within the executive, police, and armed forces, as noted by Mr Mahbub at 1.27, it is also clear that several senior officials and officers have been removed from their posts: see Mr Mahbub’s report at 1.14 and the CPIN at 13.3. I find that the evidence before me does not establish, even to the lower standard, that those who remain in office retain the same capacity to persecute political opponents as they did under the previous regime. In particular, neither the CPIN at section 13 nor Mr Mahbub’s report at 1.12–1.15 records any specific abuses carried out by the police against BNP members following the fall of the Awami League government.
34. On consideration, I do have concerns regarding Mr Mahbub’s purported expertise. He is a lawyer with eight years’ experience in practice, which is not an especially long period, and his status as a practising advocate does not, of itself, establish expertise in the Bangladeshi judicial system, still less in the workings of government. Even taking account of the advisory work he states he has undertaken for international organisations and NGOs, he does not demonstrate the level of authority that, for example, an academic specialist might be expected to possess. This is reinforced by the absence of any indication in the report that Mr Mahbub has conducted first‑hand research, including into the status of the appellant’s criminal case. As Mr Parvar observed, the majority of the cited materials are publicly accessible online news articles. Furthermore, as he also submitted, the fact that Mr Mahbub includes an entire section on psychiatric care in Bangladesh – an area in which he is plainly not an expert – indicates a willingness to offer opinions on matters outside his competence. This necessarily affects the weight I can attach to his evidence.
Whether the appellant faces a real risk of harm on account of the criminal charges
35. As a general observation, it is unfortunate that neither party was able to provide country evidence more recent than late 2024. Mr Mahbub’s report is dated 31 October 2024, while the CPIN dates from December 2024. It is reasonable to assume that the situation may have evolved significantly after the interim government took office in August of that year. The burden of proof lies, of course, with the appellant and, as Mr Parvar submitted, it is surprising that no updated evidence – such as an addendum report from Mr Mahbub – was filed in the lead‑up to the remaking hearing. Had the situation failed to improve or, indeed, deteriorated, one might reasonably have expected the appellant to adduce evidence to that effect.
36. Having given careful consideration to the evidence before me, I find that greater weight can be placed on the CPIN, which draws upon a broader and more authoritative range of sources than Mr Mahbub’s report, which relies predominantly on news articles. As noted above, 13.3.5 of the CPIN records that, by November 2024, the interim government was already taking steps to withdraw politically motivated charges, and significant measures were underway to reform and depoliticise the judicial system. Even if the charges against the appellant have yet to be withdrawn, in oral evidence the appellant confirmed that he has instructed a lawyer in Bangladesh who one would expect he can make representations on his behalf to have the case dismissed. For reasons given above, while I am satisfied that Awami League sympathisers may remain in the police force, on the evidence before me the appellant has failed to establish that it is reasonably likely that they would torture him on return. Furthermore, the example cited by Mr Mahbub of a political case he has personally handled suggests that, even under the Awami League government, BNP members facing criminal charges – including charges of murder – were nonetheless able to secure bail pending trial: see footnote 1 of his report.
37. I have also explained why little weight can be placed on Mr Gaffar’s letter. If the criminal proceedings were in fact ongoing, and the arrest warrant remained in place, it is difficult to understand why the appellant could produce only such an unsatisfactory document in support of his case.
38. I acknowledge that AM gave evidence that he was aware criminal charges had been brought against the appellant because people he knows in Bangladesh had told him so. When asked how they knew this, he said it was because they were involved in politics. Asked what they had told him, he replied:
“So, he was involved in the student political activist, and they were trying to silence them in a way that they don’t speak up, and the issue is that they fabricated all these cases, and one of these is my brother‑in‑law and if he was to return he would be arrested on entry.”
Mr Parvar submitted that little weight could be placed on AM’s evidence because he is the appellant’s brother‑in‑law and therefore has an interest in supporting his appeal. I accept that a degree of caution is appropriate. However, in any event, I do not consider that AM’s evidence materially advances the appellant’s case given the preserved findings of fact.
39. Having considered the evidence in the round, and even applying the lower standard of proof, I find, for the reasons set out above, that the appellant has failed to prove that it is reasonably likely that he faces a real risk of persecution on return to Bangladesh arising from the false charges filed in September 2009.
Risk of harm as a BNP member
40. More generally, I find that the appellant has failed to establish that he is reasonably likely to face a real risk of harm simply by virtue of being a member of the BNP. Although the BNP is not part of the interim government, it was the principal opposition party during the Awami League’s tenure and has a membership running into the millions: see 5.3.2 of the archived CPIN Bangladesh: Political Parties and Affiliation (Version 3.0, September 2020), as referenced at 9.3.1 of the current Political situation CPIN.
41. The most recent CPIN records incidents of violence directed at former Awami League members (see 12.3.3). It also notes, at 12.4.2–12.4.3, violent clashes between BNP factions concerning control of businesses previously held by Awami League members and refers to concerns about indiscipline within the BNP itself. There is no indication that the appellant would be involved in any such factional disputes. Moreover, the CPIN contains little to suggest that BNP members currently face a real risk of harm from former Awami League supporters or from the interim government.
42. Mr Mahbub acknowledges at 2.9 of his report that “state violence against BNP activists has drastically reduced,” although he maintains that “threats remain in local communities from AL influentials.” He relies on two incidents reported in the Dhaka Tribune. The first relates to an attack said to have been carried out by “Awami League activists” on the convoy of the central president of the Jatiyatabadi Shecchasebok Dal (a volunteer wing of the BNP) in Gopalganj on 13 September 2024, shortly after the Awami League lost power, resulting in one dead and 50 injured. The second report, dated 6 September 2024, concerns a local BNP leader in Gazipur who was beaten to death. Mr Mahbub notes that the local BNP general secretary claimed this was perpetrated by Awami League activists. However, what he fails to mention is that the article also reported that, contrary to the general secretary’s account, “Locals say that the clash resulted from a skirmish for dominance between two factions of the BNP.” This aligns with the information at 12.4.2 of the CPIN. This omission is concerning and further undermines the weight I can place on Mr Mahbub’s report. In any event, these two incidents do not demonstrate a broader pattern across the country sufficient to establish a real risk of harm to the appellant personally.
43. During the hearing, Mr Parvar drew the appellant’s attention to the claim in Mr Gaffar’s letter that “fascist Awami League terrorists” were regularly raiding his house in search of him. The appellant said he was aware of this because his mother had told him, and that it had been occurring since 2010. When asked why he had not mentioned this in his witness statement, he initially replied, “They go there all the time, since the arrest warrant.” When pressed further, he said he believed he had included this in his witness statement. I have read that statement, and he did not mention any regular raids on his home. Had local Awami League supporters been raiding the appellant’s house for 16 years – in circumstances where his oral evidence was that the authorities knew he was abroad – it is reasonable to expect that he would have included such a significant detail in his account. His failure to do so undermines his credibility, and I find this to be an embellishment of his claim.
Conclusion on asylum
44. For the reasons given above, I find that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant faces a real risk of persecution on return to Bangladesh.
Humanitarian protections and Articles 2 and 3 ECHR
45. For the same reasons, the appellant is not entitled to humanitarian protection and his return would not breach Articles 2 and/or 3.
Article 8 ECHR
46. Mr Swain accepted that the Article 8 claim would stand or fall with the asylum claim. As I have dismissed the protection appeal, I find that any interference with the appellant’s private life arising from his removal to Bangladesh would be proportionate when weighed against the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.
M R Hoffman
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
5th February 2026
Annex: The error of law decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003704
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68082/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
…………………………………
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE R FRANTZIS
Between
TA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Swain (Counsel)
For the Respondent: Ms K Khan (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)
Heard at Field House on 4 December 2025
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant or his family, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 14th April 2025 (“the Decision”), of the First-tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) to dismiss his appeal brought on Refugee Convention grounds under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Background
2. The broad factual background to the appeal is not in dispute between the Parties. The Appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, asserts that he would be at risk on return to that country due to his political opinion. The Appellant claims that he joined the Chatra Dal as an activist in 2007 and was appointed Joint Secretary for his area in 2008. As a result of his political activities he was arrested and detained for 2 weeks in 2007, attacked by Awami League activists on 1st September 2009 and there is a warrant for his arrest based upon false charges of detonating a bomb and assaulting a government servant. If returned the Appellant fears he will be arrested, detained and killed. The Appellant left Bangladesh in 2010, he entered the United Kingdom on an unknown date and claimed asylum on 5th December 2019. The Respondent refused his claim.
Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
3. The Appellant appealed against the refusal of his claim.
4. In dismissing the appeal, the FtT made the following findings:
“21. I do not accept the respondent’s submissions on credibility. As to the detail of his role as Joint Secretary, the appellant has provided details of who he worked under, the things he was asked to do and specifically the tasks he would undertake in arranging meetings and what would happen in meetings. The account given by the appellant Is not vague and is sufficiently detailed.”
“28. Given the limited challenge, which I have not accepted, and considering the documents in the round, even taking into account the impact of the s8 behaviours, I accept that the documents are reliable and that the appellant came to the adverse attention of the authorities in Bangladesh.”
“31. I prefer the objective evidence contained in the CPIN. It is more up-to-date than the report submitted by the appellant and matters have moved on between October and December 2024. The police have returned to work and commissions have been set up on police, judiciary and in respect of corruption. By the time of the CPIN there had been major reshuffles in the police and 300 redeployments in the judiciary. It seems that significant progress was made between October and December 2024. The CPIN takes into account the alliances of law enforcement agencies and also details the release of political prisoners which indicates a willingness and ability to fairly address politically motivated prosecutions”
“33. On the issue of risk I find that, given the objective evidence, the appellant has not evidenced a real risk of either persecution or serious harm. In accordance with the CPIN there would also be sufficient protection available to the appellant. In those circumstances there would be no reason for the appellant to need to internally relocate.”
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. The Appellant’s grounds for permission to appeal (“the Grounds”) contend that the FtT’s finding that the Appellant was not at risk was irrational or unreasonable in view of the findings made in his favour. The Grounds aver that the FtT failed to properly assess the expert evidence relied on by the Appellant.
6. On 8th September 2025 the Upper Tribunal granted permission to appeal to this Tribunal.
7. Before me, both advocates made oral submissions for which I am grateful. It was accepted that Grounds 1 and 3 materially overlapped. It was common ground that the FtT’s positive credibility findings at [21-28] were not in issue. Furthermore, neither the Grounds of Appeal nor the advocates before me sought to go behind the findings of the FtT in dismissing the appeal on Article 3 ECHR medical grounds [34-46].
Discussion
8. For the reasons set out below, I am persuaded that the Decision of the FtT to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal on Refugee Convention grounds involved the making of a material error of law.
9. It is common ground that the FtT had accepted the Appellant’s account that he was the subject of a warrant for his arrest based upon false charges of detonating a bomb and assaulting a government servant.
10. The FtT did not reject the expertise of the barrister, Saqeb Mahbub, who was relied upon by the Appellant to demonstrate the situation that he would face in Bangladesh even after the advent of the Interim Government. The expert evidence of Mr Mahbub, dated 31st October 2024, provided (with my emphasis) that:
a. “2.20 With regard to cases filed during the AL regime, there is no indication as of yet that they will be lifted or that they will be tried favourably for defendants or on merit considering the political circumstances. The senior civil leadership of the government, which has an agenda to break old cycles of political harassment, has weak control of the state machinery as the lower tiers of the police and magistracy largely remain unchanged and is still manned by AL loyalists. In these circumstances, the likelihood of harassment and persecution of defendants who have criminal cases against them remains.”
b. “2.21 Under the current political context, the torture and detention of individuals, especially those held under police custody, are unlikely to have changed significantly despite the change in government. This is due to the practices within law enforcement which has long been criticized for human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention and the use of torture. Successive governments, regardless of political affiliation, have maintained control over law enforcement agencies, often using them to suppress dissent. Without substantial institutional reforms and accountability mechanisms, these practices are expected to persist, even during the term of the interim government”
11. The FtT preferred the background information contained in the Respondent’s CPIN on the political situation in Bangladesh dated December 2024 (“the CPIN”) for the reasons set out at [31] of the Decision. Despite Ms Khan’s helpful submissions, I am driven to the conclusion that the findings of the FtT in this regard cannot stand. That is because:
a. The reasoning of the FtT, that the report of Mr Mahbub predates the CPIN and so the latter is “more up-to-date”, does not stand up to scrutiny when the sources of the information contained with the CPIN are interrogated. In particular, the reference to the release of political prisoners comes from a source dated 16th August 2024 from the OHCHR entitled “Preliminary Analysis of Recent Protests and Unrest” (Footnote 100) and the major reshuffles in the police are referred to in sources dated 13th & 28th August and 1st September 2024 (Footnotes 197, 198 & 199). These dates in the CPIN predate the report of Mr Mahbub;
b. The CPIN itself contains reference (with my emphasis) to the fact that:
i. “the government has replaced senior officers implicated in abuses under Hasina’s regime. These measures alone are unlikely to be sufficient, however. Trust in the police remains low and morale is poor, with officers worried about being attacked or charged for their role in the crackdown on protesters under Hasina’s regime. A mid-level officer said little had changed inside the force, adding that personnel are upset that the government has taken no action against those responsible for killing police officers in the aftermath of Hasina’s flight” [13.3.6]; and
ii. “Unjust cases filed against protest leaders in July and August are being dropped; earlier charges against opposition figures are also expected to be withdrawn gradually” [13.3.5].
I have considered Ms Khan’s submissions on this point but nowhere in the Decision is there evidence that the FtT analysed the evidence of Mr Mahbub and that from the CPIN cited directly above, gong to the risk to the Appellant arising from the outstanding charges against him in the context of appropriate standard of proof. That is a material error of law.
Disposal
12. I have taken account of the Parties’ submissions and given careful consideration to the Joint Practice Statement of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal concerning the disposal of appeals in this Tribunal.
13. I have found a material error in relation to the assessment of risk to the Appellant in Bangladesh arising from the outstanding charges against him and to that extent I set aside the Decision. I preserve the findings at [21-28 and 34-46] as they did not involve the making of a material error of law. For the avoidance of doubt, because the FtT found that the appeal on Article 8 ECHR Grounds fell with the appeal on Refugee Convention grounds, that finding [47] is also set aside.
14. In light of my analysis above, I find that the appropriate course, as agreed by the Parties, is for the matter to be retained in the Upper Tribunal and listed for re-hearing on the sole issue of the risk arising to the Appellant on his return to Bangladesh.
Notice of Decision
The Decision of the FtT involved the making of a material error of law. I allow the appeal and set aside the Decision. I preserve the findings at [21-28 and 34-46]. The appeal will be re-heard in the Upper Tribunal.
I make the following directions:
i. The matter is to be listed in the Upper Tribunal for 3 hours on the first available date at Field House.
ii. No later than 14 days prior to the resumed hearing, the Parties must upload to CE-File and directly serve on the other Party any further evidence or written submissions they intend to rely upon.
Roxanne Frantzis
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
11th December 2025