Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003706
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56795/2023
LP/01542/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 16th of December 2025

Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MOXON

Between
YB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Dingley, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) via CVP on 12 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), dated 29th March 2025, which upheld the Respondent’s decision to refuse the Appellant’s claim for asylum.

Background
2. The Appellant is a Turkish national of Kurdish ethnicity. He entered the United Kingdom pursuant to a short-term study visa on 10th September 2022. He claimed asylum on 9th November 2022. At that time, he was 17 years of age.

3. In summary, he claims that he undertook anti-regime political activity with The People’s Democratic Party (“the HDP”) in Turkey. This resulted in his arrest and detention in March 2022 and him being stopped by police and beaten in June 2022. He claims that after he left Turkey an arrest warrant was issued for his arrest.

4. The claim was refused on 7th September 2023 as the Respondent did not consider the Appellant to be credible.

5. An appeal against that decision was heard by the Judge on 20th March 2025. In a determination, dated 29th March 2025, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s narrative account and dismissed the appeal.

6. He assessed credibility as follows:
a. The Appellant’s account of having left Turkey through the airport with no problems is not consistent with country background evidence [20];
b. There is “a degree of inconsistency” between the Appellant’s visa application and his subsequent asylum claim, but “I…do not find that this inconsistency is of great significance given the Appellant’s age and the fact that the application for the visa was made on his behalf” [21];
c. There is “an element of inconsistency” in the Appellant’s account of being fingerprinted [22];
d. The Appellant’s account of becoming a HDP member and receiving documentation of membership before the age of 18 is inconsistent with background evidence, however the Judge stated: “I do not find this of significance” [24];
e. The Appellant had given an account of being arrested by police in March 2022. In his asylum interview, he made no reference to being tortured or ill-treated whereas in his subsequent witness statement and oral evidence he said that he was handcuffed, insulted and beaten. The Judge did not find it plausible that the Appellant would not mention that mistreatment in his interview given that it was “…one of the two base events of the Appellant’s adverse contact with the Turkish authorities” [25];
f. The Appellant was released from Turkish custody in March 2022 without conditions and was able to successfully apply for a passport in April 2022. Those features indicate that he was no longer of interest to the Turkish authorities. There was no adverse attention between him being stopped by police in June 2022 and him leaving Turkey in September 2022 [25]; and
g. The Appellant stated that his UK-based uncle, CB, had not returned to Turkey since the Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom, whereas CB himself said that he sometimes goes back to Turkey and had done so the previous year, during which he visited and stayed with the Appellant’s father. The Judge found this to be “…a further inconsistency in the Appellant’s account that cannot be completely ignored”.

7. The Appellant sought to rely upon a document referred as a “general commander letter” addressed to the Appellant’s father. This is what the Appellant stated he was referring to when he disclosed that he was subject to an arrest warrant. The Judge considered the document not to be reliable. He assessed the document between paragraphs 29 and 34 of his determination. At paragraph 30 he noted that both the Turkish version of the letter, and the English translation, has the same stamp upon it which “seems somewhat strange” [30]. At paragraph 34 he concluded:

“Having considered the letter in accordance with the guidance from Tanveer Ahmed, I find that little weight can be given to this document. There has been some uncertainty as to how the letter was brought to the United Kingdom and the form of the document, missing any form of official stamp, date or letterheading, the fact that the stamp that is referenced on the letter to an area where the Appellant has not lived since he was 2 years of age and the fact that the document overall lacks the official appearance expected of such a document leads me to conclude on the basis of Tanveer Ahmed that I can give little weight to that document in support of the Appellant’s claim.”

8. The Appellant also sought to rely upon a medical report dated 6th June 2022 detailing that he had presented with minor injuries and had claimed to have been beaten up. At paragraph 35 of his determination the Judge noted that the document does not name who the Appellant claims to have been beaten by.

9. The Judge concluded, at paragraph 36:

“Having considered all of the evidence before me in the round, I find that there are significant inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account and for the reasons given I can give little weight to the documentation supplied by the Appellant in support of his account. I am not satisfied to the requisite standard of proof that the Appellant’s account is credible and I do not find that the Appellant would be at risk of persecution or serious harm in the event of return to Turkey as a result of his claimed support for the HDP and his claim to have come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities as a result of that support. In reaching my conclusion I have taken into account the inconsistencies referred to earlier and in particular, to the fact that on the basis of the Appellant’s account there was no adverse interest in him between the last claimed incident of 6th June 2022 and him being able to leave Turkey on 10th September 2022. I have also taken into account that in accordance with the Appellant’s oral evidence he had a return ticket to Turkey for 7th October 2022 and I do not find it plausible that he would have intended to return to Turkey if he had come to the adverse attention of the authorities as claimed. The only relevant event after June 2022 according to the Appellant was the issue of the arrest warrant in late September 2022 which document, for the reasons previously given, I consider carries little weight.”

Permission to appeal
10. The Appellant submitted three grounds of appeal:

a. Failure to engage with post-departure risk
b. Failure to apply child-sensitive credibility analysis
c. Improper dismissal of corroborating evidence

11. Permission to appeal was granted by an Upper Tribunal Judge on 24th September 2025, as follows:

“1. At first sight, there is not much to large parts of the grounds. For example, the judge specifically engaged with the appellant’s claim to be subject to an arrest warrant, and the fact is that on the appellant’s case he would have come to the adverse attention of the authorities before he left Turkey, even if the warrant was only issued afterwards. The inconsistency the judge noted at [21] was characterised as not being of great significance given the appellant’s age, and the inconsistency the judge appears to have relied on at [24] was that HDP do not give membership cards, but in any event again he did not find it of significance. Moreover the judge specifically did apply Tanveer Ahmed in the context of the appellant’s overall account (see the first sentence of [36]).

2. Nevertheless, taken together there are some points which are arguable and taken together may arguably be material. It is arguable that bearing in mind IA the judge should not have treated the appellant’s ability to exit through the airport on his passport as indicative of a lack of adverse interest in him (but I observe the judge does not appear to have treated it as “conclusive proof” but simply one aspect of inconsistency). It is also arguable that the judge may have expected too much of a child when relying on the discrepancy in respect of fingerprinting (although clearly this was a minor point in the context of the whole). The medical report was potentially an important document for the appellant and whilst the judge began by examining it on classic Tanveer Ahmed principles he also then considered the lack of reference in it to the people whom the appellant claimed had beaten him up. There was arguably no rational basis for the judge to have expected that detail to be contained in the report. So far as the arrest warrant was concerned, on the face of it, the document lacked formality and referred to the wrong place of residence, however it is arguable that background material (assuming of course that the relevant background material had been produced on behalf of the appellant which is not clear) indicates that this may not be surprising.”

The hearing
12. The papers were contained within a 712-page bundle, in addition to a skeleton argument on behalf of the Appellant, dated 1st December 2025, which reiterates the grounds of appeal and responds to the Rule 24 response. I was assured there was no other documentation.

13. In relation to ground 1, Mr Dingley reiterated that the Judge had erred by narrowing the scope of the appeal. He disputed that it was clear from reading the determination holistically that the Judge understood the issues in dispute before him as he had stated, at paragraph 15: “The issue for my determination therefore is whether the Appellant would be at risk of persecution in the event of return to Turkey because he had come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities prior to him leaving Turkey and entering the UK on 10th September 2022.”

14. In relation to the weight given to the fact that the Appellant had been able to leave Turkey through the airport without scrutiny, Mr Dingley relied upon IK (Returnees) [2004] UK IAT 00312, and particularly paragraph 83 which states:

“Additionally, even when the returnee is travelling on his own legitimate passport with a proper Turkish exit stamp, if there is an entry on the databases available at the passport booth, which comprises the GBTS and the border control information, that is sufficiently significant to warrant further inquiries, there is again a reasonable likelihood that the returnee will be transferred for such further enquiries to the airport police station. Again it is not automatic. We note in this context the specific example quoted to us by Mr Kanat of the expatriate Turk from Düsseldorf returning in 2003 for a holiday in Turkey, whose record at the immigration control booth showed a detention on 21 March 1991 because of Newroz activities in Elazig. In that case, he was waved through without being referred for further questioning. We consider that the mere fact of some such entry on the database will not necessarily incur further questioning unless it is considered significant.”

15. He accepted that the caselaw related to returnees to Turkey, rather than those leaving, but stated that the observations are pertinent and that the Judge fell into error in determining that the ability of the Appellant to leave Turkey without scrutiny undermined his credibility.

16. Mr Dingley stated that he did not intend to pursue ground 2. He accepted that the ground could not succeed.

17. Similarly, Mr Dingley did not seek to pursue ground 3 in relation to the arrest warrant / commander’s letter. He accepted that the Judge had not misapplied any objective and / or country background evidence when assessing that document.

18. Mr Dingley maintained, however, that the Judge had fallen into error in relation to his assessment of the medical evidence and that this constituted a material error of law.

Discussion and analysis
19. Throughout consideration of the appeal, I have had regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at paragraph 2:

"The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i. An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii. The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."

20. It is not the role of the Upper Tribunal to substitute its own view in the absence of an error of law and I remind myself of the judgment of Baroness Hale at paragraph 30 of AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49:

“[The decisions of expert tribunals] should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirection’s simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.”

Ground 1 - Failure to engage with post-departure risk
21. The ground of appeal argues as follows:

“2. At §15 of the decision, [the Judge] erroneously narrows the scope of the Appellant’s claim to whether “he had come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities prior to leaving Turkey.” This framing excludes the critical part of the claim that the risk crystalised only after his departure, specifically, the arrest warrant delivered on 28 September 2022, as discussed the Appellant’s witness statement (§12) and the Child Welfare Form [AB/48].

3. This mischaracterisation is a material legal error. The Judge never revisits this issue when assessing the evidence, even though the Respondent accepted the Appellant’s identity and Convention reason. The Appellant consistently maintained that it was only upon hearing of the arrest warrant, while lawfully in the UK, that he formed the settled intention not to return. This error undermines the whole proportionality and risk analysis and breaches section 32(3)(c) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, which expressly allows risk to develop after departure.

4. Furthermore, the FtT erroneously treated the airport exit without incident as conclusive proof of lack of adverse interest, despite IA making clear that such travel is not determinative of risk, especially where arrest warrants or state interest develop after exit §42 and §77 of IA.”

22. The assertions at paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of appeal are based upon a misunderstanding of the Judge’s decision. The Judge did not narrow the scope of the claim. He correctly identified, at paragraph 15, that the Appellant’s case is that he had come to the adverse attention of the authorities before leaving Turkey and at paragraph 26 reiterated the Appellant’s account that he had come to the adverse attention of the authorities in March 2022 and that he was encountered and mistreated by Turkish police in June 2022. The Judge identified at paragraphs 5 and 29 that the service of the arrest warrant is said to have occurred after the Appellant left Turkey.

23. It is evident from reading the determination as a whole that the Judge clearly understood the Appellant’s case and did not mischaracterise it in any way. The Appellant’s case was that he first attracted the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities while he was in Turkey, and that is what the Judge identifies at paragraph 15. The Judge demonstrated full understanding of the issues in the case and made relevant findings on each of those issues, namely whether the Appellant had attracted the adverse attention of the Turkish regime prior to and subsequent to his having left Turkey. Further, whether the Appellant’s account of circumstances and events in Turkey were credible or otherwise was material in considering the evidence that, since he entered the United Kingdom, the Turkish authorities have sought his arrest in Turkey.

24. At paragraph 4 of the grounds of appeal, it is argued that the Judge treated the Appellant’s ability to leave Turkey as “conclusive proof” of lack of adverse interest by the Turkish authorities at the time. The Judge makes no such assertion. Instead, he treated the issue as indicating a lack of consistency. In doing so, he considered the relevant country background information and caselaw:

“16. I have considered the guidance to be found in the decisions in IA (Risk - guidelines - separatists) Turkey CG [2003] UK IAT 34 and IK (Returnees) [2004] UK IAT 00312 to which I have been referred. I have also considered the CPINs for Turkey, “People’s Democratic Party (HDP)” published March 2020 and “Kurds’ published February 2020.

17. I am satisfied that these decisions, read together with these reports, continue to provide real guidance to some of the issues raised in the appeal.

18. The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s account is inconsistent, both internally and with external background evidence.

19. In considering the credibility of the Appellant’s account I have considered all of the evidence in the round, both oral and written, and the submissions made before me. I have also considered the background evidence provided in this case. In his submissions, the Appellant’s representative asked me to bear in mind the fact that the Appellant was still a minor at the time the events which are the subject of his account occurred. I confirm that I have taken that into account when assessing the credibility or otherwise of the Appellant’s account”.

20. In the Reasons for Refusal Letter the Respondent maintains that the Appellant’s claim to have come to the adverse interest of the Turkish authorities is inconsistent with his account at Question 90 of his asylum interview and his statement of evidence form A5.1 that the Appellant was able to pass through Istanbul Antalya airport without a problem, showing his documents to the check-in staff and the Turkish police at the airport. The Appellant suggested at Question 116 of his asylum interview that he had no problems in doing so as he was not wanted at that time. The Respondent’s position is that this is inconsistent with the Appellant’s account that the police inspected his documentation on 6th June 2022, accused him of being a terrorist supporter and beat him up. In the Refusal letter the Respondent states that the Appellant’s claim to have had no problems passing through the airport was inconsistent with the Home Office Fact-Finding Mission - Kurds, the HDP and PKK, October 2019. I have considered that document. The Refusal letter refers to this document suggesting that Kurds are treated with suspicion and while ethnic Turks would have a security check at the airport, Kurds would have a double check. The Refusal letter refers to Page 64 of that document and as was pointed out by the Appellant’s Representative in his submissions, Page 64 does not refer to Kurds in general but specific former State employees being purged from their jobs. Whilst that may be the case, the general tenor of the background evidence shows that Kurds are treated with a high degree of suspicion and I do find it inconsistent that the Appellant claims that he had no problems in passing through these airports after having produced his identification document when on the basis of the Appellant’s account, a check of his identity documentation by the police on 6th June 2022 led to a beating at the hands of the police.”

25. It is clear from reading the Judge’s reasons that he did not consider the ability to leave Turkey via the airport without incident as “conclusive proof” of lack of adverse interest nor did he consider it to be “determinative” when assessing risk. At paragraphs 14 and 19 of his determination the Judge expressly stated that he had considered all of the evidence in the round together with submissions. He demonstrated a clear understanding that the arrest warrant post-dated the Appellant’s travel, but took into account that the Appellant’s claimed adverse attention from the authorities in March 2022 and June 2022, during which he was accused of being a terrorist, was inconsistent with him being able to travel through a Turkish airport without scrutiny.

26. The Judge was entitled to find the Appellant’s ability to leave Turkey without scrutiny was inconsistent with his account of having attracted adverse attention from the authorities prior to his travel. He was not “plainly wrong” to do so. He did not misapply case law or the background evidence. He treated the evidence as he was entitled to do so and his conclusion that the Appellant’s ability to leave Turkey in the manner described is inconsistent with his claim was reasonably open to him. Further, having reached that conclusion, he did not apply it as conclusive or determinative of the appeal but instead considered it in the round with all of the evidence in the appeal in order to determine credibility, as was required of him.

27. Ground 1 of the grounds of appeal is therefore dismissed.

Ground 2 - Failure to apply child-sensitive credibility analysis
28. The ground of appeal argues as follows:

“5. While the Judge claims at §19 to have considered the Appellant’s age when assessing credibility, that assurance is hollow when tested against the specific findings.

6. For example:

(1) At §21, YB is criticised by the Judge for inconsistency in the visa application regarding his arrest, ignoring that the application was made on his behalf as a minor aged 16, and without considering his lack of understanding of the legal distinction between detention and arrest, a distinction which is explicitly recognised in IK (Returnees) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312 at [32].

(2) At §22, the Judge critiques discrepancies about fingerprinting dates, again ignoring the expected cognitive limitations of a 17-year-old recalling bureaucratic events months apart and the effect of trauma.

(3) At §24, the Judge dismisses YB’s account of joining the HDP at 16 as inconsistent with party rules, minimum age 18 and corroborative CPIN evidence about lack of formal membership cards (CPIN: Turkey: People’s Democratic Party / Green Left Party (HDP/YSP) v5, §9.3). But the account clearly stated that he was informally active, performing duties as a supporter rather than being a formal member, a practice corroborated in background materials as plausible for under-18s (CPIN v5 §9.3.1).

7. These findings are irrational and unreasonable given the accepted evidence of YB’s age at the time of these events. The FtT’s approach violates the principle that decision-makers must not punish children for lack of precision in recollection or for age-related cognitive limitations.”

29. Mr Dingley did not seek to pursue that ground of appeal during the hearing and his concession was sensible in all of the circumstances as the criticism within the written grounds of appeal are without merit.

30. Firstly, it does not follow that all inconsistencies within the evidence of a minor should be disregarded. Secondly, it is clear from reading the determination that the Judge clearly had due regard to the Appellant’s age throughout his consideration of the evidence. This was explicitly stated by the Judge at paragraph 19 of his determination.

31. The Judge further reiterated this when assessing aspects of the evidence. In relation to the inconsistencies within the visa application, the Judge stated at paragraph 21 that he did not find the inconsistency to be of great significance given the Appellant’s age and the fact that the visa application was made on his behalf.

32. There was nothing wrong in law with the Judge, having regard to the Appellant’s age as noted at paragraph 19, taking into account material inconsistencies in the evidence and there was nothing inappropriate in his consideration, at paragraph 22, about the inconsistency re fingerprints:

“There is an element of inconsistency in the Appellant’s account about fingerprinting. In his asylum interview Question 43/44 the Appellant stated that he was fingerprinted at the police station on March 21st and this is inconsistent with his statement of evidence form dated 21st February 2023 in which the Appellant stated he was only fingerprinted in Turkey in June 2022 in connection with his application for his visit visa.”

33. The Appellant’s inconsistency was not in relation to the understanding of complex bureaucratic procedure, but was an inconsistency of fact as to whether or not he had been fingerprinted at the police station. His age does not adequately explain why he would have been inconsistent about that.

34. Similarly, there was nothing wrong in law with the Judge having regard to the inconsistencies between the Appellant’s account of obtaining a HND membership card and the objective evidence, as detailed at paragraph 24. The Judge did not, as incorrectly claimed by the grounds of appeal, find that the Appellant had been inconsistent about whether he had been involved in the HDP. The inconsistency was whether he was a member and whether he was issued with membership documentation. In any event, the Judge concluded that the inconsistency was not of great significance.

35. As such, there is no error of law identified in items (1) and (3) of the list of complaints made by the Appellant given that the Judge did not consider the inconsistencies to be significant. There is no error of law identified in item (2) as the Judge drew conclusions that were reasonably open to him in all of the circumstances and upon having the Appellant’s young age at the forefront of his considerations.

36. Even had any of the three complaints identified an error of law, it would not have been material when considered against the backdrop of the credibility findings when taken as a whole, which includes the lack of attention by the Turkey authorities after June 2022; the inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account as to whether he was mistreated upon arrest in March 2022; and the inconsistency between the Appellant and CB about whether CB returned to Turkey.

37. Ground 2 is therefore dismissed.

Ground 3 - Improper dismissal of corroborating Evidence
38. The ground of appeal argues as follows:

“i. Misapplication of Tanveer Ahmed

8. At §29–3_4, the Judge rejects the letter “arrest warrant” in part due to the lack of formal headers and the dual presence of the same stamp on both Turkish and English versions. This suspicion, however, is not rooted in expert handwriting or forensic analysis and ignores that unofficial communication from lower-level gendarmerie units in rural areas is common in Turkey, especially when directed to family members.

9. Moreover, the Judge’s suspicions based on the issuing region (Sancak) ignores the Appellant’s explanation at Asylum Interview Q115 [AB/105] that he is still registered there for ID purposes, an explanation consistent with Turkish ID registration practices. Similarly, the Judge’s rejection of this evidence was speculative and lacked expert support. He also failed to apply the core holding in Tanveer Ahmed that the probative value of a document must be assessed in the context of the overall account, which was otherwise consistent and supported by background country materials on post-Newroz arrests and police surveillance.

ii. Unreasonable rejection of medical report

10. At §35, the Judge applies an unrealistic standard, faulting the report for not naming the assailants. There is no legal or medical basis to expect a physician in Turkey, especially one issuing a forensic certificate on the day of injury, 6 June 2022, to name police officers as perpetrators.”

39. The overarching submission in ground 3 that the Judge failed to apply the principles of Tanveer Ahmed is without foundation. The Judge outlined the requisite test at paragraph 28 of his determination:

“I have considered the documentation supplied in accordance with the guidance from Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] Imm AR 318. This provides that documentary evidence along with its provenance needs to be weighed in the light of all of the evidence in the case. Documentary evidence does not carry with it a presumption of authenticity which specific evidence must disprove failing which its content must be accepted. What is required is an appraisal by the Tribunal of the weight that can be given to a particular element of the evidence taking into account its nature, provenance, timing and background evidence in the light of all other available evidence in the case especially that given by an Appellant.”

40. At no point did the Judge deviate from that test within his analysis of the reliability of both the “commander’s letter” and the medical evidence. The argument that he misapplied the test is without merit.

41. Mr Dingley did not pursue the arguments outlined at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the written grounds. He accepted that there was no objective evidence, either before the Judge or otherwise, that would have undermined the Judge’s analysis of the commander’s letter. That was a sensible concession to make given the lack of objective evidence to support the reliability of the commander’s letter or to explain the lack of formality or the area from which it had been issued.

42. In any event. I do not consider that, had there been an error of law as originally argued, it would be material. That is because there were other sound reasons for rejecting the evidence. The observations by the judge that there was confusion and inconsistencies about the origins of the letter and how it arrived in the United Kingdom is not vitiated by any error of law. Further, as provided by Tanveer Ahmed, the Judge was required to “… consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round”. That includes the adverse findings about the Appellant’s credibility which, as outlined in relation to grounds 2 and 3 of the appeal, were not vitiated by error.

43. The evidence before the Judge was such that he was entitled to reject the commander’s letter and, in fact, in light of consideration of the evidence in the round, would have had great difficulty in justifying a finding that the Appellant had established that the document was reliable. As such, any errors of law in analysing the commander’s letter, had there been any, are not material.

44. In relation to the medical document, the Judge betrayed unreasonable expectations of what should be included. The expectation that the perpetrators of any assault be named on that document is not reasonable and amounts to an error of law. However, as with the commander’s letter, the general findings as to the Appellant’s credibility must be considered when assessing the reliability of the medical evidence. Given those adverse credibility findings, it would have been difficult for the Judge to justify a finding that the Appellant had established that the document was reliable.

45. In any event, even if the medical document was assessed as reliable, it would have been only one piece of evidence before the Judge. A reliable medical letter confirming that the Appellant had been subjected to an assault in Turkey would not, upon the backdrop of the Appellant’s adverse credibility, be sufficient to establish the Appellant’s claim of persecution, even upon the low burden of proof. As such, any error of law is not material.

46. Ground 3 is therefore dismissed.

Conclusion
47. The Judge’s determination contains findings of fact that were open to him and conclusions upon adherence to the relevant legal tests. Any errors of law identified are not material.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.

DUTJ Moxon
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14th December 2025