Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003713

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57324/2023
LP/07053/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

17th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

SD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Murphy, Counsel instructed by Colindale Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is 35 years old and is a citizen of Afghanistan. He left his home country in 2015 and eventually, having spent time in Bulgaria, Hungary, Turkey and France arrived in the United Kingdom on 7 April 2017 clandestinely and without leave.
2. Shortly after arriving, the appellant claimed asylum stating he feared persecution by the Taliban because whilst he was resident in Afghanistan, he passed on intelligence to an American Government worker about people growing opium. He stated that this resulted in him being ambushed when driving with his brother-in-law to Kabul, in an attack which resulted in his brother in law being killed and the appellant injured. Following that attack he said that members of the Taliban broke into his house, accusing him of being a spy and threatening him. Fearing that he could not be protected in Afghanistan he said that he fled with the help of an agent.
3. The respondent did not take a decision concerning the appellant’s asylum claim until 22 September 2023 when she refused both that protection claim and also a human rights claim based on the private life the appellant had established during his time waiting for a decision in the United Kingdom. The respondent concluded that the appellant’s claim was not credible, and that the appellant would not be at risk on return to Afghanistan. In relation to the human rights claim, the respondent concluded that the appellant did not meet the requirements for being granted leave under the Immigration Rules because he would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Afghanistan. The respondent further concluded that removal to Afghanistan would be compatible with the appellant’s article 3 ECHR rights and that the depression and stress the appellant suffered waiting for a decision did not amount to a reason to grant discretionary leave to remain.
4. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision and his appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Nolan (the Judge) on 7 April 2025. The appellant gave evidence at the hearing at which he was represented.
The Judge’s Decision
5. On 16 April 2025 the Judge issued a decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal. The Judge analysed the appellant’s evidence about events in Afghanistan at [14] and [15] of her decision and found it to be inconsistent, vague and lacking detail. The Judge considered a statement from a Mr Jaddar at [16] but decided to give very little weight to that evidence. At [17] the Judge considered the appellant’s journey to the United Kingdom and at [18] she considered a report by Professor Aguilar. At [19] – [21] the Judge considered the appellant’s mental health. These paragraphs are relevant to the onward appeal to this tribunal and so it is convenient to set them out in full:
19 . The appellant has claimed to be suffering from a ‘serious mental health condition’. However, he has not submitted any specialist psychologist or psychiatrist report to confirm that claim. The letter from his GP dated 9th January 2025 was written by Dr J Leonhardt, and says that the appellant was initially assessed by the Refugee Asylum Seeker and Migrant Action (RAMA) and he was found to be exhibiting symptoms of trauma and depression which were consistent with PTSD, but also says specifically that the assessment did not constitute full evidence of PTSD. The letter states that the appellant still struggles with his mental health and he has been prescribed medication (Mirtazapine), and also says that he had a setback in August 2024 when he heard that his mother had died.
20. There is also a GP letter dated 24th December 2024 written by Dr A MacGregor which says that the appellant struggles with his mental health, and that he is currently presenting with symptoms of anxiety and depression. I accept that the appellant has some mental health problems for which he is currently prescribed medication, but I find that the appellant has not been diagnosed with PTSD.
21. By his own evidence, the appellant is not currently getting any specialist psychological help, and he said that the medication he receives helps him sleep better at night and makes him feel calmer. I accept that the appellant is suffering from mental health problems as set out by his GP, but I do not find those problems to be of such a magnitude that they would subject the appellant to a risk of serious harm if he was to return either to his home area or else Kabul.
6. At [22] the Judge concluded: “the appellant’s account that he worked as a spy for the US in Afghanistan, and that he would be at risk on return due to those previous activities to not be credible” and at [23] she determined that: “the appellant has not shown even to the lower standard that he would be at risk of persecution or serious harm for any reason if returned to Afghanistan”. She therefore dismissed the appellant’s protection claim. Those conclusions and the decision to dismiss the protection appeal have not been challenged in the appeal to this tribunal.
7. The Judge moved on to consider the appellant’s human rights appeal and having found that there was no suggestion the appellant enjoyed a family life in the United Kingdom, the Judge stated:
28. In terms of his private life, the appellant has been in the UK for around 8 years. I have found above that he would not be at risk of serious harm upon return due to his mental health issues. The appellant still has family in Afghanistan who could assist with his reintegration, including his father, siblings, step-family and his wife. I accept that there was a significant delay between the claim and the decision, which was not the fault of the appellant, and during which time he necessarily continued to build up a private life in the UK. I do not, however, consider that he has been absent from Afghanistan long enough to result in any very significant obstacles to reintegration. He is still familiar with the language and culture, he has his family to assist with reintegration if necessary, and even when his current mental health issues are considered in the round with all the other evidence, I find that there would not be any very significant obstacles to reintegration. Paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) is therefore not satisfied.
29. I have considered whether there are any exceptional circumstances which would warrant a grant of leave to remain outside of the rules, and I have concluded that there are no such circumstances. The appellant would not be at risk of persecution or serious harm upon return. I have found that there would not be any very significant obstacles to reintegration even when also considering his mental health issues. I have considered the factors under s117B, and I accept that the appellant has necessarily built up a private life for himself in the UK during his time here which would be interfered with if he were required to leave the UK. However when considering all the circumstances, I find that the rights of the Secretary of State to maintain immigration control outweigh the rights of the appellant. A decision to require the appellant to leave the UK is not, in all the circumstances, overall disproportionate.
8. Accordingly, having noted that the appellant was not making any claim under Article 3 ECHR, the Judge dismissed the appellant’s human rights appeal.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to this tribunal on a single ground which submitted that the Judge failed to properly assess very significant obstacles to integration under Article 8. The grounds submit that the Judge failed to engage with evidence which suggested that the appellant would not receive treatment for his poor mental health if returned to Afghanistan, conflated the very significant obstacles to integration test in the Immigration Rules with the higher threshold that applies under Article 3 and failed to give adequate reasons for the conclusion that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Afghanistan.
10. In accordance with rule 24 of the Tribunal’s Procedure Rules the respondent served a written response to the appeal to the Upper Tribunal opposing the appeal and inviting the tribunal to uphold the Judge’s decision. The response submits that the Judge reached a rational conclusion that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration and gave adequate reasons for that conclusion in her decision by reference to the appellant’s poor mental health.
11. At the hearing before me Mr Murphy and Mr Parvar made oral submissions consistent with their written arguments. Having heard those submissions I reserved my decision which I now provide.
Analysis
12. It was common ground that application of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules, which applied at the time the appellant made his claim, meant that the appellant would meet the requirements for being granted leave to remain as a result of his private life if he established that he would face very significant obstacles to integration to integration in Afghanistan. In Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932 Lord Justice Underhill explained that “very significant obstacles to integration” represented an elevated threshold which is not met by mere inconvenience or upheaval. He continued “The task of the Secretary of State or the Tribunal, in any given case is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as ‘very significant’”
13. The can be no sensible dispute that this is what the Judge sought to do at [28] of her decision. In that paragraph the Judge identifies the obstacles to integration relied upon as being (i) the length of the appellant’s absence from Afghanistan as a result of the significant delay between the claim and respondent’s decision, and (ii) his “current mental health issues.” As the grounds of appeal correctly identify, these were the obstacles to integration that were raised in the appellant’s skeleton argument. Within the same paragraph, the Judge then assesses those obstacles and concludes: (i) his absence from Afghanistan has not been long enough to result in any very significant obstacles noting that the appellant remains familiar with the language and culture of the country and has his family to assist with integration; and (ii) his current mental health issues “considered in the round with all the other evidence” do not amount to very significant obstacles to integration.
14. In his submissions Mr Murphy argued that the Judge’s assessment of the second of those two obstacles to integration identified, namely the impact of the appellant's poor mental health on his ability to integrate was inadequate. Mr Murphy pointed to the fact that the Judge appears to have accepted that mental health treatment is not available in Afghanistan, accepted at [20] of her decision that the appellant “has some mental health problems for which he is currently prescribed medication” and accepted that “the appellant is suffering from mental health problems as set out by his GP.” Mr Murphy argues that the Judge’s error was to fail to then go on to adequately assess what the impact of the appellant suffering those mental health problems without any treatment will be on his return to Afghanistan.
15. I do not accept Mr Murphy’s submission. As Mr Murphy recognised the Judge made clear findings at [18] - [21] of her decision about the appellant’s mental health condition and the effect that it has on him. Those findings included the fact that the appellant has mental health problems, though not PTSD, for which he is prescribed Mirtazapine. The Judge also recognised the evidence that mental health treatment is not available in Afghanistan. The Judge then considered the appellant’s account of the treatment he is currently receiving, and identified that the appellant’s account was that he is not currently receiving any psychological help and that the effect of the Mirtazapine he is prescribed is to help him to sleep and feel calmer. That was the context for the Judge’s conclusion that the mental health problems the appellant suffers were not of a magnitude that would mean he would suffer serious harm. The Judge therefore considered the gap between the provision of mental healthcare the appellant currently benefits from and the absence of mental healthcare the appellant would face in Afghanistan and concluded that the consequence of that gap would not be serious for the appellant. That was a finding that was reasonably open to the Judge.
16. At [28] the Judge then explicitly brought those findings forward into her separate assessment of the question of whether he would face very significant obstacles to integration. Whilst Mr Murphy is right that the question of whether there would be very significant obstacles to integration is different to the question of whether the appellant would face serious harm, the Judge was not required to repeat those earlier findings when undertaking her very significant obstacles assessment. Neither was the Judge required to again acknowledge the evidence that there is no mental healthcare provision available in Afghanistan. It is plain from her earlier considerations that this was something the Judge had firmly in mind.
17. The Judge was therefore considering whether the appellant’s mental health problems, which did not include PTSD and would not cause him serious harm, would amount to a very significant obstacles to his integration. That was an evaluative assessment which the Judge explicitly undertook. Her conclusion was that the elevated threshold of a very significant obstacle had not been reached. The Judge explains that conclusion by reference to her earlier findings about the appellant’s mental health, the appellant’s familiarity with the language and culture in Afghanistan and the family support she found the appellant would have on return to Afghanistan. These succinct reasons were sufficient to enable the appellant to understand why the Judge reached the conclusion she did.
18. In Azizi (Succinct credibility findings; lies) [2024] UKUT 00065 (IAC) a Presidential panel of this Tribunal re-iterated that a Judge’s determination in relation to an appeal must deal with the principal controversial issues presented to the Judge, and it may be possible in some circumstances to provide adequate reasons in relation to those issues succinctly, provided they deal with the points raised by the party and enable the parties to understand why the decision has been reached. That is precisely what has happened here. The Judge plainly considered the appellant’s mental health condition and she recognised that there would not be healthcare provision for that condition available for the appellant in Afghanistan. Despite this the Judge concluded that nonetheless the appellant’s mental health condition does not meet the elevated threshold of being a very significant obstacles to his integration. She explained that conclusion by reference to her finding that the condition would not cause the appellant to suffer serious harm and also the family support the appellant would receive and his familiarity with Afghanistan.
19. The Judge’s assessment of this controversial issue raised before her was, in all the circumstances adequate, as were the reasons she gave for reaching a conclusion on the issue that was adverse to the appellant. The decision did not involve the error of law that has been asserted.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law and therefore stands.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 November 2025