Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003730

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01114/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS

Between

Mohammed Al- Khatib
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Chakmakjian, Counsel, instructed by Kilby Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Lebanon. He appeals with the permission of the Upper Tribunal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the decision of the respondent on 15 December 2022 refusing him leave to remain on human rights grounds.
2. The appellant has lived in the United Kingdom for almost twenty years. For a lot of that time he has lived there without permission. In extreme summary outline, it is his case that the First-tier Tribunal Judge did not explain adequately his decision that the appellant could reestablish himself in Lebanon, particularly having regard to the appellant’s health difficulties and that the Article 8 balancing exercise was carried out incorrectly. I stress that these are summaries of detailed arguments and are intended only to be an introduction to my Decision and Reasons.
3. I begin by considering carefully the Decision and Reasons of the First-tier Tribunal. This shows that the appellant’s date of entry to the United Kingdom was a matter of some dispute and it was certainly his case that he was present in the United Kingdom on 5 February 2006 (the Decision and Reasons refers to “2026” but that must be a mistake). The appellant claimed asylum in August 2006 when the application was refused but he appears to have remained in the United Kingdom. He was granted temporary admission in 2012 and claimed asylum again in April 2014. That application was refused in April 2015. On 16 September 2015 the appellant applied for leave to remain as the spouse of a German national. The application was refused, which decision he appealed successfully and he was issued with an EU residence card on 5 December 2017 valid for five years and expiring on 5 December 2022.
4. On 19 March 2022 he applied for indefinite leave to remain based on long residence claiming that he had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for ten years. The refusal letter indicated that there was an outstanding application for indefinite leave to remain but then said that the appellant did not qualify for indefinite leave to remain. He had not achieved twenty years’ residence and there were no very significant obstacles in the way of his reintegration into Lebanon. It was against that decision that the appellant appealed. It was the appellant’s case that he had in fact been residing in the United Kingdom for twenty years. Additionally, if he had not been residing in the United Kingdom for twenty years, there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into Lebanon or there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences for him if he were required to leave the United Kingdom. The judge also indicated he had to look at the possibility that the decision that breached the appellant’s Article 8 rights outside the Immigration Rules.
5. The judge found the evidence of the appellant’s arrival in the United Kingdom to be unreliable and found that he had probably not been in the United Kingdom before, or much before, 6 August 2006, when he first claimed asylum. The respondent had recorded the appellant saying that he arrived in the United Kingdom in 2006 and also 2005. The appellant relied on the earlier date giving evidence in other proceedings. The judge looked at the evidence carefully and concluded that the 2005 arrival date had not been made out. The judge then turned his attention to whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Lebanon or whether there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences for him or a family member if he were required to leave the United Kingdom. The judge found clearly and emphatically that there were no such obstacles. The judge said that the appellant had been brought up in the Lebanon and had close relatives still living there including his mother aged 65, who lived in a village and brothers who lived elsewhere and it was reasonable, the judge found, to expect them to provide a home for the appellant while he established himself.
6. The judge found that the appellant in the United Kingdom has the ability to run and work the entire business and this satisfied him that the appellant had the competence and adaptability to make a living in Lebanon. Significantly the judge said in paragraph 25:
“Whilst he has some mental health issues I am satisfied that they can be effectively treated in Lebanon. They are not so severe that they have prevented him from working in the UK. The Appellant has shown that he is able to return and integrate in Lebanon because he returned there on a number of occasions when his brother was ill during the five years when he had leave to remain in the UK as a spouse. He claims he was in Lebanon when there was the large explosion in the port and that this has adversely affected him. I am not satisfied that this would create an obstacle to integration on return.”
7. The judge then looked for unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or a family member. He stated the appellant’s marriage was not explained. The judge was given no reason to find that the appellant’s removal would be harsh on his “wife”, if she is still properly described as such, as they appear to be living apart. The judge found nothing that would warrant a decision to allow the appeal outside the Rules on Article 8 grounds.
8. When conducting the balancing exercise the judge expressly directed himself that the appellant had had nineteen years of residence of which just under eight had been lawful, that he had been self-sufficient and had problems with his mental health and his claimed fear of returning to Lebanon because he had witnessed an explosion there. The judge found that he had probably had enough English to manage and integrate and support himself in the United Kingdom but the judge found the important things were that the appellant had no permission to be in the United Kingdom had somewhere else to go. He dismissed the appeal.
9. There is a short entirely apt Rule 24 notice from the respondent, which I have read. It is entirely apt but the points made do not need to be set out.
10. Mr Chakmakjian prepared the grounds of appeal and the amended grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal and conducted the case in the First-tier Tribunal as well as appearing before me. I outline now the amended grounds of permission. The use of the word “amended” distinguishes them conveniently from the grounds relied on when a similar application was made unsuccessfully by the First-tier Tribunal. I am particularly interested in paragraph 9 of the amended grounds, which states: “General conditions in Lebanon have rapidly and substantially deteriorated following the Israel/Gaza conflict, which has since drawn in Hezbollah forces in Lebanon and attracted numerous Israeli air strikes and ground offensives, along with mass displacement.”
11. Ground 1 is entitled “Failure to consider material evidence”. Paragraph 11 is particularly helpful because it sets out with clarity matters in the bundle which the appellant says have not been considered. Five examples are given and the ground says at follows:
“a. Objective evidence about the current, exceptional crises in Lebanon causing formidable humanitarian and economic challenges [AB/156-157];
b. Widespread internal displacement due to conflict, combined with ‘extraordinary concern for Lebanon to continue to feed itself’ [AB/157];
c. FCDO evidence regarding prolonged economic crisis, conflict resulting in military activity, airstrikes and risk of kidnapping;
d. The Supplementary Bundle, admitted by IJ [the Immigration Judge], containing three news articles from April 2025 regarding two Israeli airstrikes on Beirut in the days preceding the hearing of this appeal;
e. Nationwide healthcare crisis [AB/157] and evidence estimating that 90% of individuals needing Mental Health services are left untreated [AB/116].”
12. Ground 1 also contends that proper regard was not shown for the appellant’s vulnerability. He is said to suffer from PTSD, anxiety and depression and the broad evidence suggested that he would not be treated in Lebanon. Findings about the family’s ability to support him did not take into account the dire poverty that they and a lot of other people in Lebanon were facing. Ground 2 complains there was an improper and legally inadequate Article 8 assessment. The judge’s consideration was quite short and was generally inadequate. Ground 3 alleged procedural unfairness. The judge had found that the appellant had not shown that he had been in the United Kingdom earlier than August 2006 when the Secretary of State had accepted that he had been there since February 2006 and that point should not have been left in the air without being put to him.
13. I consider particularly now the points raised under paragraph 11. The objective evidence about the crisis in Lebanon is at pages with the printed number 213 and 214 of the Upper Tribunal bundle (the numbers 156 and 157 appear in manuscript). This refers to the humanitarian situation in Lebanon and Israel and says that more than 60,000 Israelis have been displaced from northern Israel September 2004 and that Lebanon has been experiencing what the World Bank has described as “among the worst economic crisis globally since the mid 19th century”. Lebanese gross domestic product dropped 36% between 2019 and 2021 and the country generally was declassified to a lower middle-income country from an upper middle-income country. Other similar points are made. Disease was increasing because of various shortages and difficulties and according to the UNHCR people were emigrating from Lebanon to Syria in significant large numbers. On a slightly more positive note, aid was being provided.
14. The concern about access to mental health services is, I find, overstated in the grounds (I am certainly not suggesting that this was malicious or in any way improper but it is a matter of interpretation). Reference is made to the appeal bundle at page 116. This is printed page 173 of the bundle. This states:
“It is estimated that 90% of individuals needing MH [mental health] services are left untreated [31]. This treatment gap can be attributed to several factors, including insufficient financial resources, the societal stigma attached to mental illness, a scarcity of qualified MH providers, and misdiagnosis.”
15. The same report says her mental health services are delivered through multiple sectors. In her submissions Ms Keerthy argued that it does not mean that 90% of people who want mental health services cannot get them. Rather there are people who need them but for whatever reasons are not prepared to access their need. There are difficulties but there is also provision.
16. Mr Chakmakjian’s submissions closely followed the printed grounds and are all the more helpful for that.
17. However I can see no basis for criticising the judge’s approach to Article 8. The judge was clearly aware of the contacts the appellant had made in the United Kingdom. There are none of the strong family links that can sometimes assist an appellant seeking to remain in the United Kingdom. Clearly with residence close on twenty years it would be surprising if he had not built up some significant private life but the judge was aware of that and it is impossible to say that he did not evaluate it fairly.
18. Against that there were clear findings by the judge that the appellant had somewhere to go and could be expected to make his living.
19. The judge’s assessment of the appellant’s mental illness is, I find, fair. The appellant is able to hold down a job in the United Kingdom; this does not mean he is not poorly and does not mean he does not need treatment. However, he is not a man who needs hospital care and there is no basis at all for speculating that he would be disinclined to seek treatment that he needs. The judge dealt with it adequately.
20. The third point, relating to procedural unfairness, does cause me more concern because the appellant went into the hearing thinking that everybody accepted at least that he had been in the United Kingdom since February 2006 but the finding that it was in fact August 2006 does not change that. All the judge was doing was looking at the evidence that he knew to be reliable and that was the evidence that he found most persuasive. I am confident the judge would not have reached a different conclusion if he found that the appellant had been in the United Kingdom for a few months longer.
21. It would have been better if the judge had either not made the finding or asked for specific submissions on the point but I cannot regard the failure to do that as a material error.
22. I sit back and reflect on this. The evidence of political disruption is illuminates concerningly the state of life in Lebanon. I do not mean to be flippant when I say that is a very worrying sign indeed when a large number of people seem to prefer life in Syria and the country is, if not strictly in a state of war, apparently in state not very far from it. It is not an ideal place to go to live but it is the appellant’s country of nationality and it is impossible to say that the judge has not considered the things he says he has considered and reached a conclusion that was open to him.
23. It is clear that the appellant has not lived in the United Kingdom for long enough to have established a right to be there unless there were some particular circumstances that put things in a different light. The judge has carefully looked for them. He said that he had considered the necessary evidence. He has been addressed by experienced and capable Counsel. It is impossible to find that these obvious concerns were not in the judge’s mind and I cannot look at this Decision and Reasons and say that he has not given things adequate consideration and reached a conclusion open to him. I must therefore find that although I fully understand why permission was granted (if I may say that respectfully) the appeal must be and is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
24. This appeal is dismissed.

Jonathan Perkins

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 February 2026