Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003733
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58027/2024
LP/13916/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

14th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

Y B
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Rai, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family should not be identified, and are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or other any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. I continue the order to anonymise the Appellant. An anonymity order was made in the First-Tier Tribunal. Having considered Guidance note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, the need to protect the identity of the Appellant in the light of his asylum claim necessitates a departure from the principle of open justice.
2. The issue for this Tribunal to determine is whether First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) Judge Long (‘the Judge’) erred in law in her decision dated 18 June 2025 when dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Respondent to refuse his applications under the Refugee Convention and on human rights grounds.
Background
3. The Appellant is a national of Turkey, born in 2004. He is of Kurdish ethnicity. He did not complete military service in Turkey and left his country on 20 September 2022. He arrived in the UK on 10 November 2022 and claimed asylum the same day.
4. The Appellant says he and his family are supporters of the HDP in Turkey, which can be translated to the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party. There is a widely held belief that the HDP are closely aligned with the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) which is a prescribed terrorist organisation in Turkey. He reports that both he and his family were active supporters of the HDP in Turkey. He says that his family had to move from Bingol to Istanbul because of fear of persecution owing to their political beliefs. He was an active member of the youth party of the HDP and attended marches, demonstrations and meetings. He was arrested on two occasions because of his political activity.
5. He says he was first arrested on 20 March 2022. On that day he attended a gathering of about a 1000 people. The police in attendance started to disperse the crowd before beating people with truncheons and using teargas and pressurised water. He was arrested and taken to the police station before being interrogated. He was also beaten and asked questions regarding his uncle, a more senior political figure within the party. He was told that he had a “bad record”, the insinuation being the police knew of his past history. The Appellant was kept in custody for two days before being released.
6. On 1 September 2022, the Appellant said that he attended what appears to have been a celebration for world peace which took place in front of the HDP building. He was one of about 500 people who congregated during the afternoon. The police attended and people started chanting and holding pictures of a Kurdish leader who had been imprisoned. The police started to attack the crowd, and the Appellant was hit with teargas. He left but was arrested again the following morning. He says that he was taken to the same police station and interrogated. He was accused of hitting police and causing criminal damage to a police vehicle, both of which he denies. He states he was also tortured via electric shock because the police were trying to extract information regarding the inner workings of the HDP. He says that it was at this point he was required to sign paper whilst in police custody which meant that he was to become some form of spy for the police. Following this, his father made arrangements for him to flee the country.
7. Since his arrival in the UK, he says a warrant has been issued by the Turkish authorities for his arrest and his father has been threatened.
8. The Respondent refused his claim on 10 November 2022. He appealed that decision. The appeal was heard on 19 May 2025 before the FtT. His appeal was dismissed on all grounds in a decision dated 18 June 2025.
Grounds of Appeal and Grant of Permission
9. He sought permission to appeal the decision of the FtT in grounds dated 1 July 2025.
10. The grounds of appeal advanced can be summarised as follows:
i. The Judge erred in considering the screening interview evidence.
ii. The Judge erred in her assessment of the documentary evidence.
iii. The Judge failed to give reasoned findings for rejecting the Appellant’s evidence that he was an active HDP supporter, that he was detained and persecuted owing to his ethnicity, that his presence at gathering in the UK was to bolster his asylum claim.
iv. The Judge failed to make reasoned findings in respect of the Appellant not having established his familial link to his uncle.
11. He was refused permission to appeal by FtT Judge Farmer in a decision dated 23 July 2025.
12. The Appellant renewed his grounds of appeal on 5 August 2025.
13. He was granted permission to appeal in a decision dated 10 November 2025 by Upper Tribunal Judge (UTJ) Owens. This decision reads as follows:
1. It is arguable that despite the self-direction to YL (SEF) China [2004] UKAIT 00145, the Tribunal, at [35], did not apply the principles in substance, given the age of the appellant and the length of his journey to the UK as well as the judge’s reference to the brevity of the interview. It is also arguable that the Tribunal erred by failing to take into account the medical evidence in respect of the appellant’s mental health issues and that the Tribunal failed to clarify what the appellant meant when he stated that he had “tried to apply for a visit visa” in respect of when this was or why.
2. Arguably, the Tribunal also gave inadequate reasons, at [38], for his finding that the appellant has not proven his links to his uncle despite the family book and the newspaper article.
Hearing
14. The matter came before me in an error of law hearing on 21 May 2026.
15. I had a composite bundle put together by the Appellant’s solicitors running to 269 pages (CB), I also had a composite bundle put together by the UT running to 291 pages (UTB), a Rule 24 reply dated 28 January 2026. I was also provided with a copy of the Asylum Interview Home Office Policy Guidance dated 10 October 2025.
16. I heard helpful submissions from both representatives.
Decision
Ground One
17. Mr Rai focussed on ground one in his oral submissions and said that if this ground was made out the decision must be set aside and the matter remitted to the FtT.
18. The Appellant argues that the Judge erred materially in considering the screening interview evidence. She failed to have regard to the Appellant’s age at the point of the screening interview, he had only just turned 18, she also failed to have regard to the medical evidence when considering his screening interview. The Judge further incorrectly placed weight on the Appellant’s statement that he applied for a visit visa which was refused. Reliance was placed on the Home Office Policy Guidance on Asylum Interviews.
19. I start by setting out the Judge’s findings in this regard:
Credibility and well-founded fear
33. The appellant’s screening interview took place in November 2022. I accept the point alluded to by Mr. Spurling that the screening interview in terms of its content is conspicuous by virtue of its brevity. I am also mindful of the case law YL (SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145 which indicates that a screening interview is not undertaken to establish the detailed reasons leading to an asylum claim. Neither should the interviewer entertain elaborate answers by way of response to questions in that interview. The case goes on to state that matters such as the appellant’s tiredness and physical presentation after a long journey must be considered when assessing the weight of any inconsistencies between the screening interview and subsequent accounts.
34. This is not a case however where there are mere inconsistencies in the appellant’s screening interview in comparison to his subsequent accounts. Rather, there is a failure on the appellant’s part to mention core matters which he later relies upon in support of his claim. Some of the answers he gave in that screening interview now contradict the factual basis of his present appeal. For example, the appellant is asked, at Q5.4, whether he was ever detained either in the UK, or abroad. He responded “no”. He was asked, at Q5.5, whether he had ever been involved with a political organisation, and again the response was “no”. When asked at Q6.2 and Q6.3 whether he had any documents supporting his claim in respect of which he could rely, either then or in the future, he again answered in the negative.
35. There is no medical evidence to suggest that the appellant was suffering from any medical condition such as PTSD or other symptoms which would tend to indicate that he could not participate in the screening interview effectively. I do not view the appellant’s age and tiredness as sufficient for his lack of explanation in respect of what were the key aspects of his claim. The appellant, if his version of events is to be believed, would have left Turkey having only recently been beaten and tortured as a consequence of his political activities. It seems inconceivable that he would not raise such matters upon his arrival in the UK, had he been telling the truth. The appellant in his witness statement said he was prevented by Home Office interviewing staff from providing any greater detail in his screening interview. However, this does not explain why he answered several pertinent questions in the negative, a position he now seeks to distance himself from.
36. I have also considered an utterance the appellant is recorded as saying during his screening interview. It reads: “I tried to apply for a visit visa application legally. But it got refused, I don’t know why”. Whilst this utterance on its own is not determinative of the matter, it does further undermine the appellant’s contention that he had to leave the country urgently owing to the risk of further persecution.
20. What is troubling is the fact that the Judge says at para. 35 of the decision that “there is no medical evidence to suggest that the Appellant was suffering from ant medical condition such as PTSD or other symptoms which would tend to indicate that he could not participate in the screening interview effectively’. The Appellant said in his asylum interview on 6 March 2024 that he was suffering mentally, he had nightmares and had been having these problems for about 18 months to two years, he was taking sleeping pills in Turkey and in the UK, he was also taking mirtazapine here though stopped this recently (AIV Q1-6 CB 225). He also said in his AIV Q112 it was very hard for him to leave his country and his family at age 18, I “it was really unmanageable as I was young and it’s hard to accept this, I have a brother a younger brother and I have never seen him in person or touched him…”. It was noted here by the interviewing officer that he was visibly upset and he was given a break accordingly. Moreover, in his asylum witness statement dated 9 January 2025 he said he was on sertraline and mirtazapine, he was suffering with depression and anxiety. There was a copy of a photograph of a box of mirtazapine 15 mg and sertraline 50mg in the Appellant’s bundle and the photos indicated he had been issued with prescriptions in January 2023 and December 2024 (CB 41-44).
21. There was as such medical evidence and the Appellant’s own evidence before the FtT to show that the Appellant was suffering with health issues and that he had been doing so for some time, including before he arrived in the UK and soon after his arrival here. The Judge appears to have failed to consider the medical evidence and the Appellant’s own evidence on his mental health when looking at this issue. Ms McKenzie referred me to para.29 of the decision where the Judge states she has “borne in mind the evidence presented to me that the appellant has symptoms of ongoing mental illness, for which he is prescribed Sertraline and Mirtazapine.” I have taken this into account but do not consider this alters my view as at para.35 she clearly says there is no medical evidence to suggest he was suffering from any medical condition. As such, this is an inconsistent finding at the very least which is unexplained adequately or at all. I conclude this is a material error of law having regard to R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at para. 9 (ii) and (vii).
22. As part of this ground, Mr Rai also referred me to CB 251 in the AIV where the Appellant is asked if he wants anything else taken into consideration. His response was “I couldn’t give a statement properly when I claimed asylum because I was afraid from the officials.” He also referred me to the fact that the Appellant was not legally represented at the point of the screening interview (CB 199). He says these are matters which have also not been taken into account by the Judge when considering the evidence in the screening interview. I agree that this was all relevant when considering the evidence and omissions in the screening interview. I am mindful when considering these issues that screening interviews are not recorded or read back, his was conducted on entry, he would not have had a chance to rectify any contents within the same soon after owing to a lack of legal representation at the time; see Mapah –v- SSHD [2003] EWHC 306 (Admin) at para.62 for example.
23. It is also argued that the Appellant was 18 years and 2 months of age at the point of his screening interview (CB 210) and this was not considered adequately. Mr Rai submitted that the approach taken at para. 34 by the Judge is contrary to the Asylum Interview Policy Guidance at page 21 which says “If an asylum seeker makes a claim as a child, but their 18th birthday passes before an asylum interview has been conducted, they are legally an adult. An asylum seeker who has recently turned 18 is a young adult and as their asylum claim relates to circumstances experienced as a child, you must take into account their age, level of maturity and experiences when interviewing and deciding the claim. For further details about how to handle these cases, refer to the guidance on Processing children’s asylum claims. The claimant should be interviewed by a decision maker who is trained to deal with asylum claims from children. The claimant must also be given an opportunity to discuss the statement of evidence form (SEF) as it may refer to issues that are child specific.” I note this Guidance refers to the Processing children’s asylum claims Policy Guidance which says, “An asylum seeker who has recently turned 18 is a young adult and as their asylum claim relates to circumstances experienced as a child, you must take into account their age, level of maturity and experiences when interviewing and deciding the claim...The applicant should be interviewed by a decision maker who has completed minors training and be given an opportunity to discuss the statement of evidence form (SEF) as it may refer to issues that are child specific.” Much of what is set out in the Home Office Guidance is well known and common sense.
24. I note that the Judge does refer to age and tiredness at para.34 not being an adequate explanation for the omissions in his screening interview. However, I am of the view that this is not enough when this is put together with the error made in respect of medical evidence. I do consider the approach to be flawed. The Appellant was not only young at the point of the screening interview, but he was also a child when the significant events in his asylum claim occurred, and he was also suffering with health issues and had a long journey. I find that the failure to have regard to relevant evidence regarding the Appellant’s health, to not have further adequate regard to his age and maturity at relevant points, to not consider his evidence on his fears of officials at the point of the screening interview, was a material error when looking at what he disclosed or did not disclose in this brief interview conducted on entry.
25. I also agree that the finding at para. 36 is of concern. There is a line at the end of the screening interview records (not in any box, not in response to any question) where it is said “I tried to apply for a visit visa application legally. But is got refused & I don’t know why.” As Mr Rai submits, the Respondent did not seek to rely on this issue in her decision, she did not produce any evidence of a visit visa application or refusal. It seems from the decision that the Appellant was not asked anything further about this matter either in his interviews or in the hearing. It is unfair to take this into account when this was not taken against him prior to the decision, or further evidenced by the Respondent or explored at all. The Appellant was left as such unable to address this matter adequately or at all; see R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at para. 9 (vi), Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 and TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48. He may well have had an explanation which addresses the Judge’s finding at para. 36. It is not known for example when this application was made, or where it was made to and from, or why it was made because this matter appears not to have been put to him.
26. Whilst other grounds are advanced and the Respondent did defend the decision on other grounds, I cannot say that the decision of the FtT would have inevitably been the same had the above errors not occurred. This is because credibility is a holistic assessment. Indeed the Judge’s decision at para.37 shows that she considered the credibility issues to impact her assessment of the documentary evidence provided by the Appellant owing to the need to look at the evidence in the round. The Appellant’s claim is an asylum claim and deserves “the most anxious scrutiny”; see Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, at 531 and MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at §66. I therefore find the errors I have set out and addressed above to be material.

Notice of Decision
27. For the aforementioned reasons, I find that there are material errors of law in this decision. The decision is set aside.
28. Considering 7.2 of the Practice Statement of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal and the nature of the errors identified, I remit this matter to the FtT, to be heard before any Judge aside from Judge Long.
P. Solanki

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 August 2026