Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003735

PA/60815/2023
LP/11066/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29th December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

FAS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Allison, instructed by Londonium Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr S Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

PRELIMINARY

1. This hearing was conducted as a hybrid hearing, with Mr Walker attending remotely and parties otherwise present at Field House. This mode of hearing was requested by Mr Walker, and was agreed by the Appellant’s representatives. The hearing proceeded without technical difficulty.

BACKGROUND

2. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. His date of birth is 20 September 1994. His application for asylum and humanitarian protection was made on 14 June 2022 and was refused by the Respondent in a decision dated 27 October 2023. He appealed that decision to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was heard on 20 March 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Moore (“the Judge”). The appeal was dismissed by determination dated 31 March 2025. An application was made for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Permission was refused on 23 July 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarke. The application was renewed to the Upper Tribunal. Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor granted permission on 18 September 2025.

3. The core of the Appellant’s claim for asylum and humanitarian protection is that he was a political activist in Bangladesh, having joined the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chatra Dal (BJCD) in 2017, which was the student wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and that on 21 February 2019 he was attacked by activists from the Awami League and their student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL). He said that on 12 December 2021 criminal cases were filed against him from the Awami League and BCL which accused him of throwing cocktail bombs and vandalism and that an arrest warrant had been issued in June 2022.

4. The Appellant arrived in the UK on 11 February 2022 with a student visa for the purpose of studying a Graduate Diploma in Creative Business and Management. He applied for asylum on 14 June 2022, having, he said, become aware that an arrest warrant had been issued for his arrest in Bangladesh.

5. The Respondent, in a refusal letter dated 27 October 2023, accepted that the Appellant had been a member of the BJCD and that he had been physically attacked by Awami League activists on 21 February 2019. His role as an organizing secretary of the BNP was regarded by the Respondent as a low-level role and the Respondent considered that low level members of opposition groups were unlikely to be of ongoing interest to the authorities and subject to treatment that was sufficiently serious to amount to persecution. The Respondent did not accept that the Appellant had been the subject of politically motivated criminal charges, in particular because the arrest warrant was dated November 2022, when he had claimed asylum in June 2022.

6. The Respondent accepted that if the key material facts of his claim were accepted the Appellant would not have sufficient protection from persecution in Bangladesh, and that he could not internally relocate, because he feared the ruling Awami League. After that decision, there was a change of regime in Bangladesh. The Judge’s decision records that, in the light of this change, the Appellant’s case was clarified and was based upon him being subject to politically motivated criminal charges and a corresponding judgment of 8 July 2024 (the latter having been issued subsequent to the Refusal Decision) [11]. The Respondent sought to withdraw the concession contained in the Refusal Decision (i.e. that if the key material factors of the claim were accepted, the Appellant would not have sufficient protection, and could not internally relocate) and this withdrawal being unopposed, was allowed [12].

7. The Judge did not accept that the Appellant was anything more than a “low-level member” of the BNP [40]. It was accepted that the date of the arrest warrant was consistent with the Appellant’s account [41]. The Judge took into account the opinion of Dr M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, Lecturer in Law at the University of Hull, dated 8 November 2024. This included the opinion that the documents resembled case records usually filed with the criminal courts and police stations in Bangladesh [42].

8. However, the Judge identified an internal inconsistency in the complaint and First Information Report, both dated 12 December 2021 (the date of the demonstration the Appellant claims to have attended), but both recording that there had been delay in filing the complaint. The Judge noted that this discrepancy had not been identified by Dr Chowdhury and considered it to detract from the reliability of the criminal charges documents [43].

THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

9. There are four grounds of appeal, all of which seek to challenge the adequacy of the Judge’s reasoning. The challenges are summarised as follows:

(i) Failing to give any or adequate reasons for preferring the Respondent’s assessment of risk to low -level BNP members, in circumstances where the CPIN did not specifically address whether the risk of false criminal charges (identified in the CPIN) was applicable to low-level members;
(ii) Failing to give adequate reasons for rejecting the reliability of the court documents the Appellant relied upon;
(iii) Failing to give adequate reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s contention that the Respondent was under a duty to verify the Appellant’s court documents; and
(iv) Failing to give adequate reasons for the finding that the Appellant was not the organising secretary of the Balaganj Upazila branch.

10. The grounds of appeal were amplified by way of oral submissions. I am grateful to Mr Allison and Mr Walker for their helpful submissions.

DISCUSSION

11. In terms of reasons, I take into account the Practice Direction – Reasons for decisions dated 4 June 2024 issued by the Senior President of Tribunals (SPT). I note paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Practice Direction in particular.

12. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated the need for judicial caution and restraint when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693.

13. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49.

14. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19.

15. I am of the view that there is a material error of law in relation to the Judge’s consideration of the court documents relied upon by the Appellant. In particular, the Judge identified an internal inconsistency in the complaint and First Information Report, both dated 12 December 2021 (the date of the demonstration the Appellant claims to have attended), but both recording that there had been delay in filing the complaint.

16. The Judge noted that this discrepancy had not been identified by the author of the expert report (Dr Chowdhury) and considered it to detract from the reliability of the criminal charges documents: see [43].

17. Mr Allison submitted, and I accept, that the so-called discrepancy was potentially consistent with the Appellant’s case that the criminal case against him was manufactured for political purposes. This issue is to be considered against the backdrop of country information, recorded by the Judge at [38] of the First-tier decision, which notes that the Country Policy and Information Note Bangladesh: Political parties and affiliation Version 3.0 September 2020 (“CPIN”) reports the prevalence of false criminal charges being brought against opposition activists, particularly at paragraphs 10.2.6-10.2.12.

18. Mr Allison’s submission can be summarised as follows: inaccuracy of criminal charge documents is to be expected in circumstances where the charges are manufactured for political purposes. I consider this to be a meritorious submission, having regard to the CPIN referred to above. I take into account that the Judge is the specialist fact-finding Tribunal. However, the Judge’s reasons for the finding that the criminal charge documents lack reliability fail to address the core underlying assertion that the charges were fabricated for political purposes, and that internal inconsistency is capable of supporting the proposition that the documents have been manufactured by the authorities.

19. In essence, the parties were in agreement that the criminal charge documents were unreliable. The issue requiring determination was whether the unreliability arose because the authorities had manufactured them, or whether they were unreliable because the Appellant had done so, or caused them to be produced or created. The Judge’s finding that the documents are unreliable merely states the agreed position and does not go on to address the subsequent necessary steps of giving reasons addressing the basis for the finding of unreliability, and then addressing the consequences of that basis for risk to the Appellant on return.

20. I find this to be a material error of law. In reaching this conclusion, I take into account the fact that there has been a change to the ruling regime in Bangladesh since the Appellant claimed asylum and since his claim was considered by the Respondent. This was the basis for the agreed withdrawal of the Respondent’s concession as to risk on return in the event that the claimed events were accepted. The Judge did not make a finding as to risk on return on an alternative basis in light of political changes in Bangladesh. For that reason, I consider that the identified error of law is material.

21. Having found a material error of law as outlined above, I do not consider it necessary to address the remainder of the grounds of appeal.

22. In light of the above, I consider it necessary to set aside the Judge’s decision.

23. I invited the views of the representatives on future disposal of the appeal.

24. I conclude that the correct approach is to remit to the First-tier tribunal. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I considered whether to retain the matter for re-making in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement.

25. I take into consideration the history of the case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made, as well as the fact that the nature of the error of law in this case meant that the Appellant was deprived of a properly reasoned decision and thereby to a proper assessment of the credibility of his account. I also take into account the changed political situation in Bangladesh since the date of the Respondent’s decision, and the potential need therefore for updated evidence and analysis as to the extent to which the Appellant may be at risk arising from any identified factual matrix.

26. I consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail itself of the two-tier decision-making process and I therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision

(1) The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.

(2) The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.

(3) The appeal is remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by any judge except First-tier Tribunal Judge Moore.

Siân Davies

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 December 2025