Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003755
UI-2025-003756

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58561/2024 and HU/58564/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 21st of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON

Between

MR YANG LI JU AND MRS EUN A KIM
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Halliday, Counsel, instructed by Drummond Miller, Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard in Edinburgh on 3 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction & Background
1. The appellants, a married couple, are both citizens of North Korea. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The appellants appeal with permission granted on 18 August 2025 against the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) given on 8 July 2025 to dismiss the appellants’ appeal against the refusal of their claim under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).
2. The basis of the appellants claim is that the appellants have been in the UK since 2013. The first appellant’s asylum claim was refused in February 2016. Prior to coming to the UK the appellants lived in North Korea and later in China. The appellants claimed that they had a right to remain in the UK under the Immigration Rules and removal from the UK to South Korea would be a breach of their private life rights under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”).
3. The respondent accepted that the appellants were North Korean nationals but rejected the appellant’s claim under Article 8 ECHR.
4. The appellants appealed the decision of the respondent and an in person hearing was held on the 19 May 2025. The FtT rejected the appellant’s appeal by written decision of 8 July 2025. The appeal was rejected on the basis that the FtT did not consider that there were any very significant obstacles to integration in South Korea and accordingly the Immigration Rules were not met and that the respondent’s decision does not breach Article 8 ECHR as the interference in the appellant’s private life is proportionate. The appellant’s have appealed that decision.
5. The appeal came before the Upper Tribunal at an error of law hearing on 3 December 2025. At the hearing I heard submissions from the parties and reserved my decision. For the reasons set out below, I find that there was no error of law and I dismiss the appeal.
6. No Anonymity order was sought in either the FtT or here. I have not made any such order.

Grounds of Appeal, Discussion and Conclusions
7. There were two grounds of appeal put forward by the appellants in this case. The first ground of appeal was that the FtT erred in law in that the FtT had failed to properly consider the current level of discrimination faced by North Koreans in South Korea. That the FtT relied upon the country guidance case of GP and others (South Korean citizenship) North Korea CG [2014] UKUT 00391 (IAC) (“GP”) in considering the discrimination issue instead of considering the objective evidence provided by the appellants. The appellants submitted that GP was not relevant on the discrimination issue as that case dealt with discrimination in the context of international protection and not in the context of considering Article 8 ECHR.
8. The second ground of appeal was that the FtT erred in law in that the FT had found that the appellants would be entitled to a resettlement grant (paragraph 17 of the decision) when the objective evidence indicated that this may not be available in the case of North Koreans who have been living abroad.
9. We heard submissions from both Mr Halliday for the appellants and Mr Mullen for the respondent.
10. In deciding whether the FtT’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, we have reminded ourselves of the guidance set out by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], (i) the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently; (ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account; (iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the First-Tier Tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out; and (iv) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law.
The First Ground of Appeal
11. Mr Halliday submitted that the FtT should not have relied upon GP because that was a case that dealt with international protection and not a claim under Article 8 ECHR. Firstly, I do not think that that is quite right. There were two cases before the Upper Tribunal in GP. There was, firstly appellant GP and his family (wife and daughter), there was then a separate case involving MP. The claim of GP and his family did not involve any consideration of Article 8 ECHR (see paragraph 132 of the decision). However, the case of MP did involve a consideration of Article 8 ECHR (see paragraph 144 of the decision). I do not consider that a Country Guidance case is restricted based upon the nature of the claim that was brought in that case – compared to the nature of the claim that is brought in the instant case. In my view the point of a Country Guidance case is that it is guidance about some specific issue in that particular country. I consider that that is clear from the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal of 1 November 2024 which sets out at paragraph 10.1 the following:-
“A reported decision of the Upper Tribunal, the AIT13, or the IAT14, bearing the letters “CG” shall be treated as an authoritative finding on the country guidance issue identified in the decision, based upon the evidence before the members of the Tribunal who decided the appeal. Thus, unless it has been expressly superseded or replaced by any later “CG” decision, or is inconsistent with other authority that is binding on the Tribunal, such a country guidance case is authoritative in any subsequent appeal, so far as that appeal:
(a) relates to the country guidance issue in question; and
(b) depends upon the same or similar evidence.”
12. In dealing with a case involving two North Koreans whom it is proposed to return to South Korea the case of GP is likely to have some relevance. Although I accept that the extent to which it is authoritative will depend upon the specific country issue in question. Mr Halliday made the point that the comments in (9) of the head note to GP specifically reference the issue of discrimination in the context of international protection and not in the context of very significant obstacles to integration under the Immigration Rules/Article 8 ECHR. On that basis the FtT was not bound to follow GP when dealing with a case that was focussed on dealing with the issue of whether there were very significant obstacles to integration.
13. I accept that head note (9) is dealing with discrimination in the context of international protection. I also accept that it does not therefore provide an authoritative position in respect of whether or not discrimination within South Korea may support an argument that there are very significant obstacles to integration. That particular issue is not addressed directly in GP. However, that does not mean that GP is wholly irrelevant to a consideration of the position of the appellants in this case. I consider that it is still relevant for the FtT to have regard to GP on the broader issue of the position of a North Korean being returned to South Korea and on the issue of the discrimination that a North Korean will face if relocated to South Korea. It does not provide an authoritative answer on the position of very significant obstacles to integration. That is an exercise that the FtT must carry out having regard to authorities such as SSD -v- Kamara [2016] EWCA civ 813 (“Kamara”).
14. When I consider the FtT judgment as a whole it is clear that at paragraph 16 the FtT have identified the arguments put forward by the appellants to support their position that there are very significant obstacles. At paragraphs 17 through to 21 the FtT deal with those arguments. In particular at paragraph 20 the FtT deal with discrimination. There GP is relied upon in support of the propositions that North Korean citizens are also citizens of South Korea and that despite an absence in excess of 10 years they will be issued with travel documents and treated as returning South Korean citizens. Further that there is no danger of being sent back to North Korea from South Korea. These are all relevant considerations in the overall assessment (Kamara) and GP is relevant on these issues. On the question of discrimination the FtT do not rely solely upon head note (9) in GP and say that because of GP discrimination is not a consideration. What they say is that they recognise that GP identifies that there may be some discrimination in social integration, employment and housing but critically that it will be mitigated by the time they have spent in a westernised country like the UK.
15. At paragraph 19 the FtT engage with the evidence put forward by the appellants and point out that the evidence does not draw a distinction between those who arrive directly from North Korea and those who have spent considerable time abroad in a Western Country.
16. I agree with Mr Halliday that if the FtT had simply said discrimination is not an issue in this case and does not need to be considered by us because of head note (9) in GP then that would be an error of law. However, that is not what the FtT have done. They have actively considered the issue of discrimination, they have identified that it is a potential issue but having considered all the evidence have concluded that there are grounds for drawing a distinction between the level of discrimination that may be faced by a North Korean immediately moving to South Korea from the position of a North Korean who moves having spent a considerable time in a Western Country.
17. At paragraph 21 the FtT sum up the position again making reference to having considered carefully the reports and other evidence and concluding that they do not meet the Rules under Appendix PL.
18. In my opinion the FtT have correctly carried out a broad evaluative judgment in accordance with the guidelines in Kamara and NC -v- SSHD [2023] EWCA civ 1379 and have made reference to the Country Guidance case where it is relevant. I do not consider that there has been any error of law.
Second Ground of Appeal
19. To amount to an error of law I proceed on the basis that in essence this ground of appeal is an argument that the FtT have made a finding for which there is no evidential basis. The finding was that the appellants “would be entitled to a resettlement grant which would support them in the short term as they settled in and found work.” Mr Halliday pointed to objective evidence provided by the appellants that suggested such support may not be available where North Koreans have been living outside Korea.
20. It is not entirely clear when the FtT state (paragraph 17 of the decision) “They would be entitled to a resettlement grant which would support them in the short term as they settled in and found work” where that support grant is coming from. Mr Halliday thought it was more likely to be a reference to a grant available in South Korea whereas Mr Mullen wondered if it was a reference to a grant from the UK government which will sometimes occur as part of support through the Voluntary Returns Service of the Home Office. However, I note that in GP at headnote (9) there is specific reference to “They have access to resettlement assistance, including housing, training and financial assistance.” The “They” being North Korean migrants moving to South Korea.
21. GP was a case that dealt with North Koreans who had spent time in the UK being removed from the UK to South Korea. That is the same opposition that we have in this case. The statement regarding financial assistance is directly on point with the current case and is part of the Country Guidance. There does appear to be a clear basis upon which the FtT were able to make reference to a resettlement grant, based upon the Country Guidance. I am conscious that the FtT heard the evidence in the case and also conscious that it is not appropriate to adopt too forensic an approach to the reasoning of the FtT. I am satisfied that there is a basis, in GP, for the FtT to find that a resettlement grant is available. The other evidence from the appellants was before the FtT and I have no reason to believe that it was not considered. On that basis I do not consider that there is any error of law on the second ground of appeal.
Conclusion
22. For the reasons set out above I find that there is no error of law.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the FtT did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

S NEILSON
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15.01.26