Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003772

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50846/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHAPMAN

Between

LAO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
v

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Ahmad, Hanson Law
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Iraq and of Kurdish origin, born in the IKR on 10 February 2000. He claims that he was subjected to abuse by his father and an assault on 14 September 2021 because his father believed that he had damaged/ torn up a copy of the Quran. The Appellant stated prior to this time in June 2021 he had decided to abandon his Islamic faith due to the fact he considered it was too restrictive, but he had hidden this from his father. He also claimed that his father and family were Salafists and he feared them and other individuals including PUK members, who were also Salafists.
2. The Appellant fled Iraq on 18 September 2021 and arrived in the UK on 11 November 2021 and he made an asylum application on 22 November 2021. This application was refused in a decision dated 2 November 2023 and the Appellant appealed against that decision.
3. His appeal came before First-tier Tribunal Judge R Caswell for hearing on 23 May 2025. In a decision and reasons promulgated on 29 May 2025 the judge dismissed the appeal, on the basis that she did not accept that the Appellant had put forward a credible claim for asylum.
4. Permission to appeal was sought in time on 10 June 2025 on the basis of grounds granted by counsel, but was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chohan on 25 July 2025.
5. Renewed grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal were submitted in time by the Appellant’s solicitor on 7 August 2025 on the basis of the following grounds:
(i) Ground 1 asserted that the First-tier Tribunal Judge had erred in fact in relying on assertions of inconsistencies in the Appellant’s responses in his interview and cross-examination. It was submitted that the judge failed to engage with the contextual background of the Appellant’s upbringing in a strict Salafist household when mosque attendance was enforced by his father and that when viewed in this material context the alleged inconsistencies as to the Appellant’s attendance at the mosque, which at times he was compelled to do due to family pressure, albeit he did not attend of his own volition. The inconsistencies were reconcilable and consistent with his account;
(ii) Ground 2 asserted that the judge erred in law at [17] in identifying an inconsistency regarding the number of friends implicated, the Appellant having stated that three friends were involved, one of whom departed early. It was submitted that this was not inherently contradictory when considered as part of the screening interview and subsequent evidence. Reliance was placed on the Court of Appeal judgement in JA (Afghanistan) where Lord Justice Moore-Bick emphasised the unfairness of drawing adverse credibility findings from perceived discrepancies between the screening interview and subsequent evidence;
(iii) Ground 3 asserted that the judge had erred in considering immaterial matters at [18] and this was in relation to whether not 14 September 2021 was a Friday or a Tuesday. It was submitted that this may reflect a misunderstanding or miscommunication rather than a deliberate fabrication and the Appellant’ explanation that he was told it was a Friday was not inherently implausible and should have been assessed in light of the broader evidential context. It was submitted that the Appellant’s response in cross-examination was not irrational or evasive and the dismissal of his explanation as “no real answer” was indicative of a failure to engaged with the substance of his account potentially amounting to a breach of procedural fairness;
(iv) Ground 4 asserted that the judge had failed to give weight to photographic evidence of scarring that the Appellant claimed to have been caused by his father. The basis for the judge’s decision was that no medico-legal report had been provided. Reliance was placed on MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 00641 (IAC) where the Tribunal found it was insufficient for a judge to place no weight on evidence simply because there was no medico-legal report. Whilst this may affect the weight of the evidence it does not render the photographic evidence irrelevant;
(v) Ground 5 asserted that the judge erred in her consideration of the application of Section 8 of the TCEA 2004 in relation to the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in the first safe country i.e. France;
(vi) Ground 6 asserted that the judge failed to consider risk on return and redocumentation of the Appellant, despite the fact that at [10] of the decision, the Appellant’s then Counsel conceded that the Appellant did not wish to advance any arguments based on redocumentation. Ground 6 endeavoured to withdraw this concession and reliance was placed on the case of Davoodipanah [2004] EWCA Civ 106. It was submitted that the judge failed to consider the country guidance case of SMO [2022] UKUT 00110 and that this was an automatic error of law following NA (Libya) [2017] EWCA Civ 143.
6. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens in a decision dated 9 October 2025 in the following terms:
“1. It is arguable that the judge erred by characterising the appellant’s evidence in relation to the his attendance at the mosque as inconsistent. It is also arguable that the judge failed to apply the principles in JA (Afghanistan) [2014] EWCA Civ 450 when giving weight to the inconsistencies between the screening interview and the asylum interview.
2. The other grounds are weaker but I do not limit the grant of permission.
3. The appellant’s credibility is of particular importance in this appeal because of the concession recorded at [10] that if the appellant’s account is true he would be at real risk of persecution on return to Iraq.”
7. The Respondent served a Rule 24 response dated 3 November 2025 opposing the appeal and submitting that in relation to ground 1, that the points relating to the Salafist nature of the Appellant’s household was never advanced before the First-tier Tribunal. In relation to the asylum interview, it was submitted that there was no requestion for an audio recording of the asylum interview and the discrepancies had not been addressed in the skeleton argument or his witness statements. Reliance was placed on the case of MB (admissible evidence interview records) Iran [2012] UKUT 009 (IAC). It was submitted that the judge had other reasons for finding the Appellant not credible, including inconsistencies regarding dates which were found to conflict with objective evidence at [18] and see also [16] and that these matters had not been challenged in the grounds of appeal.
Hearing
8. At the hearing before the Upper Tribunal, Mr Ahmad made submissions on behalf of the Appellant in line with the grounds of appeal. In relation to ground 1 and the judge’s finding of inconsistency at [16], he made reference to questions 41, 57, 61, and 62 of the interview record in relation to the Appellant’s attendance at the mosque. Mr Ahmad submitted that one also had to consider his answers to questions 36, 44, 53, 55, 56 and 70 to 72. He submitted that the Appellant had lost interest in Islam, that his father forced him to attend the mosque on occasion but it was not of his own free will.
9. In relation to ground 2 and inconsistencies regarding the number of friends who were present, Mr Ahmad submitted that at AIR Q.51 it is clear there were three friends in total and one left early. He submitted that it would be erroneous to place weight on the screening interview at page 436 of the bundle on the basis that the interview took place on the same day the Appellant arrived and that 30 minutes in total was clearly insufficient for 46 questions and answers to be recorded along with the relevant declarations, given that all of this was also interpreted. He relied on the judgment of Lord Justice Moore-Bick in JA (Afghanistan) [2014] EWCA Civ 450 who found that the screening interview does not purport to an accurate summary or a verbatim record. He submitted that the judge should have been aware of these factors.
10. In relation to ground 3 and the issue as to whether it was a Friday or a Tuesday when the Appellant was accused of damaging a copy of the Quran, Mr Ahmad admitted that it was a Tuesday and in fact it was neither here nor there as to what day of the week it was given that it was a consequence of the Appellant being forced sometimes to go to the mosque.
11. In relation to ground 4 Mr Ahmad had nothing further to add. In relation to ground 5 and the Section 8 point, he submitted that the Appellant made reference to armed guards when referring to the agents and essentially the Appellant was under the control of the agents, which is why he was unable to make an asylum claim prior to arrival in the UK.
12. In terms of ground 6, Mr Ahmad submitted the judge should have considered SMO [2022] UKUT 00110 and it was an error of law because the judge had failed to do this. The Appellant had stated that he did not have his CSID, page 431 of the bundle, and that return to Iraq was therefore not feasible given that he would be given a laissez passer which would be confiscated upon his arrival and that he would be unable to travel outside the airport without a CSID. He would not be able to attend the CSID office because his CSID would have been no longer valid as it is now digital and he would need the requisite documents to enter into the process.
13. In her submissions, Ms McKenzie sought to rely on the Rule 24 response and Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464. She submitted that the decision was not plainly wrong and that the grounds of appeal were nothing more than a mere disagreement with the judge’s findings of fact. In relation to the reliance of JA (Afghanistan) (op cit) Ms McKenzie submitted that this was not relevant because the key issue there was that the Appellant was a minor whereas in this case the Appellant was 21 at that time and so was not a minor or a vulnerable Appellant who required appropriate safeguards.
14. In relation to 2.1 of the SEF at AB 440 she submitted that there was no reference to the contextual background of the Appellant’s Salafist household raised in the ASA or at AB 420, and it was unclear whether it had been advanced anywhere else and so the First-tier Tribunal Judge was unable to consider this point. Ms McKenzie sought to rely on the decision in Lata [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC) and submitted that it was not for the Upper Tribunal to consider issues that favourably arise. She submitted there was no legal error in the judge’s evaluation of credibility.
15. Upon a question from me, Ms McKenzie accepted that the Appellant had, when interviewed, made reference to the factors he was raised by a father who was very strict because he was a Salafist, but she submitted that this was not further particularised and so there was no error by the judge on that basis with reference to ground 1 and ground 2.
16. In relation to ground 3, she submitted that the judge considered the Appellant’s claim in light of the objective evidence, see [18] of the decision and reasons and that this was sustainable. Ms McKenzie submitted that ground 4 was nothing more than a mere disagreement with the judge’s findings of fact. The judge is not an expert in relation to scarring and making a finding and without an expert report she was entitled to place little or no weight on that evidence. Ms McKenzie sought to rely on the Supreme Court judgment in KV (Sri Lanka) [2019] UKSC 10 in relation to the role an expert would play when considering a scarring report, in particular it needs to be considered whether it is self-inflicted by proxy.
17. In relation to the Section 8 point set out at ground 5, Ms McKenzie submitted that the judge was entitled to make an inference based on the Appellant’s behaviour and failure to claim asylum in France and there was no legal error.
18. In relation to ground 6, Ms McKenzie submitted that the Upper Tribunal did not have jurisdiction in relation to the withdrawal of the concession made by Counsel on the day before the First-tier Tribunal. She submitted the concession could only be withdrawn by Counsel before the same judge and given it had been left as a concession it was now too late to withdraw it and it remained binding.
19. In reply, I asked Mr Ahmad for authority in relation to the withdrawal of concessions and he sought to rely on NR (Jamaica) [2009] and AK (Sierra Leone). Ms McKenzie submitted the recent case of MH (Albania) was not of relevance. I indicated I would take judicial notice of the most recent and relevant case law on the withdrawal of concessions.
20. Mr Ahmad responded briefly to the other submissions made noting that the issue of the Appellant’s Salafist background was accepted by the Respondent in the refusal letter, which also made reference to the background evidence. Mr Ahmad submitted if I were to find a material error of law that the appeal should be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal for full consideration of the claim and the Appellant’s credibility. Ms McKenzie agreed with that approach.
Decision and Reasons
21. I find that the First tier Tribunal Judge erred materially in law in her assessment of the Appellant’s appeal, for the following reasons.
22. I find that the context of the Appellant’s fear of Salafists was front and centre of his claim: see e.g. AIR 13 and this was accepted by the Respondent in the refusal decision, but was not taken into consideration by the judge when assessing the Appellant’s credibility and that of his claim, as argued in Ground 1.
23. I further accept that in his witness statement the Appellant stated that he stopped practising Islam in June 2021 and only attended prayers at the mosque when his father forced him to and the judge failed to give proper or adequate reasons for finding that his credibility was undermined by what she termed a “confused” explanation. Particularly when an applicant is interviewed through an interpreter any explanations may not necessarily be succinct and consistent and I consider that the judge erred in making an adverse finding in respect of the Appellant’s credibility in this regard at [16].
24. I find that the Appellant provided a clear explanation in his interview at AIR 51 that he went to the mosque with 2 friends but then one left early leaving the Appellant and one friend, who were seen and subsequently accused of tearing the Quran. Whilst there is a slight variation between his accounts as given in the screening and asylum interviews, I accept the submission that, as set out in JA (Afghanistan) (op cit) care must be taken in relying on inconsistencies as between the screening and asylum interview. I note and accept that in that case the applicant was a minor, whereas this Appellant is not, however, I consider that it is intended as a principle that goes beyond the facts of that case as per Moore Bick LJ at [25]:
“25. In my view the common law principle of fairness which underpins the decision in Dirshe requires the tribunal to consider with care the extent to which reliance can properly be placed on answers given by the appellant in his initial and screening interviews and, as I have already indicated, I do not think that it is a foregone conclusion that the Upper Tribunal would decide that they could properly be given the degree of weight which the First-tier Tribunal gave them.”
25. I find it was open to the judge to take a point against the Appellant at [18] regarding when the Quran was damaged - whether it was a Friday, as he claimed whereas in reality given it was 14 September 2021 it was a Tuesday, I do not consider that this was sufficient reason to reject the entire credibility of the claim, given that it was not the Appellant’s case that he was in the mosque but rather he was outside but near the mosque late at night.
26. I find the judge was entitled to treat with some caution and not to give appreciable weight to the photographs of marks on the Appellant’s body that he stated were scars caused when his father beat him, on the basis that there was no medico-legal report available. This does not mean that she attached no weight to this evidence, albeit I find it is unclear what weight she did attach to this evidence when considering the claim in the round as no analysis has been provided.
27. I find the judge was entitled to find the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France undermines his credibility. Again, however, there is no analysis or reasoning as to the impact of this on her assessment of the credibility of the claim as a whole.
28. With regard to the attempt to withdraw the concession made by counsel representing the Appellant at the hearing before the First tier Tribunal, Mr Ahmad was able to offer only limited assistance as to the relevant jurisprudence on the point. I have considered judgments in AK (Sierra Leone) [2016] EWCA Civ 999 per Jackson LJ who reviewed the caselaw to date with regard to the withdrawal of concessions holding:
“34. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Davoodipanah [2004] EWCA Civ 106 an issue arose about a concession made by the Secretary of State. Kennedy LJ, with whom Clarke LJ and Jacob LJ agreed, said that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal had power to allow withdrawal of a concession. The tribunal would exercise that power in order to do justice in the circumstances of the case.
35. In NR (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 856 the Home Office Presenting Officer made two different concessions at separate hearings. The first concession was that if the appellant was a lesbian, she would be at real risk on return. The second concession made at a separate hearing was that the appellant was indeed a lesbian and in a relationship with a woman called Ms S in 2006 and 2007. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal allowed the Secretary of State to withdraw both the concessions. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision. Goldring LJ, with whom Lloyd LJ and Mummery LJ agreed, stated at paragraph 12:
"As Kennedy LJ makes clear, the Tribunal may in its discretion permit a concession to be withdrawn if in its view there is good reason in all the circumstances for that course to be taken. Its discretion is wide. Its exercise will depend on the particular circumstances of the case before it. Prejudice to the applicant is a significant feature. So is its absence. Its absence does not however mean that an application to withdraw a concession will invariably be granted..."
29. Notably, the focus of the jurisprudence has been the withdrawal of concessions made by the SSHD, rather than by an appellant’s representative. Mr Ahmad was not able to assist in terms of why counsel representing the Appellant before the First tier Tribunal conceded the issue of risk on return based on difficulty in redocumentation. On the face of it one would not have expected such a concession to have been made, given that the Appellant claimed he was not in possession of his civil identity documents and could not access them from his family because they have disowned him, as is recorded by the judge at [8] of the decision and reasons. Given that the renewed grounds of appeal and Mr Ahmad sought to argue that this concession should not have been made and was seeking to withdraw it, I would have expected to see a witness statement from Mr Holmes as to basis of his instructions to make the concession, which is recorded by the judge at [10] of the decision and reasons.
30. I have concluded, however, that the judge cannot be held to have erred in failing to consider any risk on return arising from a lack of documentation when a concession appears to have been made at the outset of the hearing that the Appellant was not seeking to advance any argument based on difficulty in redocumentation and that concession was maintained before her. It is not open to the Appellant’s representatives to seek to argue that matter before the Upper Tribunal as a new issue when it falls outside the scope of establishing whether or not the First tier Tribunal Judge made material errors of law.
31. However, for the reasons set out at [22]-[24] above, I find that the judge made material errors of law such that her global finding on the Appellant’s credibility cannot stand. There is a paucity of reasoning and analysis weighing up the elements of the claim which were accepted against those that were not. Given that the judge’s errors may have infected her perception of the Appellant’s credibility as a whole, I have decided to set the decision aside and remit the appeal for a hearing de novo.
32. If it is intended to withdraw the concession made by his counsel at the last hearing then it will be open to the Appellant’s representatives to do so given that it will be a fresh hearing,. But, for the avoidance of doubt and having regard to the caselaw, they should offer an explanation as to (i) why the concession was made; (ii) whether the concession was made on instructions; (iii) whether the Appellant would be prejudiced if the concession is maintained.
Notice of Decision
33. The decision of the First tier Tribunal contains material errors of law. I set that decision aside and remit the appeal for a fresh hearing before a different First tier Tribunal Judge.

Rebecca Chapman
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 February 2026