Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003773
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00254/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10th March 2026

Before

THE HON. MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

LD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms E Fitzsimmons, instructed by Turpin Miller LLP
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8th December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity owing to the nature of the claim.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
(1) Introduction
1. The appellant, a Vietnamese national born on 16th March 1981 (and now 44 years old), appeals, with leave granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Oxlade, promulgated on 25th March 2025. Judge Oxlade dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 5th January 2024 to refuse her protection and human rights claim, by which she claimed that she was at risk of serious harm and/or trafficking should she be returned to Vietnam, following a deportation order made on 27th September 2022.
2. Ms Fitzsimmons informed us at the beginning of the hearing that the appellant had gone missing in September 2025, but stated that she and her instructing solicitors had the necessary instructions to proceed with the hearing.
3. The appellant’s representatives had submitted a bundle running to 835 pages and a skeleton argument, but no skeleton argument had been submitted on behalf of the respondent.
(2) Background
(2)(a) The Appellant’s Immigration History
4. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in 2015. In 2017 she was referred under the National Referral Mechanism (“NRM”) as a potential victim of trafficking and she claimed asylum. On 8th January 2019 a positive conclusive grounds decision was made in relation to her claim to have been a victim of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation between 1998, when she was 17 years old, and 2015.
5. The appellant’s 2017 asylum claim was summarised by First-tier Tribunal Judge Fowell as follows:
“Her account is that her mother ran up large debts in Vietnam and in 1998, when she was 17, men came to take her away and she was made to work as a prostitute in order to pay it off. They kept her for many years. In 2006 she was trafficked to China and then in 2013 she was taken to France in a cargo ship with about 30 other women. After about two years there, she escaped and made her way to the UK where she slept rough and, on 13 April 2017, claimed asylum. She added that about two years after she was first trafficked she had a son, now 19. He was born in 2000 and she was allowed to return home to have the baby before being taken away again. He grew up at her family home but since her escape he has been threatened. On 16 July 2016 men had come to the house, she says, and broke his leg.”
6. The appellant’s asylum claim was refused by the respondent on 18th February 2019 and her appeal against that refusal was dismissed by Judge Fowell on 17th October 2019. Judge Fowell made the following factual findings:
“39. I do not therefore accept her account of her family being targeted, or that her son has disappeared or that her brother has been beaten to death or otherwise died. I find that the appellant is not a credible witness and so I can place no reliance on her account beyond the facts found by the NRM. I take these to include her account of her trafficking, including that she had a son who is now 19.
40. Although I place no weight on the certificates, there is no reason to suppose that if manufactured they used incorrect biographical details. According to these, [the appellant’s] parents would be 82 and 85 respectively. By the same reasoning her brother is 48. On a common sense view there is at least a real risk or possibility that her parents have now passed away, regardless of the reliability of these documents. She should however be able to rely on support on return from her brother, and to some extent from her son and her neighbour. There is nothing to suggest that her family home would not be available to her on return, and I note that her brother’s death certificate shows that the place of death was in the same village as the parents, so was either living in the same house or nearby.
41. As to her health, there is no recent medical evidence (i.e. from 2019) and the report from Doctor Walland from January 2018 records that she was on antidepressants when last seen in July 2017. However, given the accepted fact of her trafficking, and given its long duration, I accept her evidence to the extent that she is still receiving some treatment for her mental health, although the lack of documentary support strongly suggests that it is improving.
42. Finally I do not accept that there is any continuing debt owed to the traffickers, as has been suggested. It would be very surprising if there were after so many years of exploitation.”
7. Judge Fowell held that: (a) the existence of family support was a key issue on the appeal; (b) he was not satisfied that there was a risk of re-trafficking on return; and (c) there was family support available to the appellant which sufficiently mitigated the risk of persecution or other serious harm on return.
8. The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal was dismissed and her appeal rights were exhausted in August 2020.
(2)(b) The Appellant’s Conviction
9. Judge Oxlade summarised the criminal proceedings against the appellant as follows:
“6. On 14th February 2021 she was arrested for conspiracy to produce and supply cannabis during the period 1st January 2020 and 13th May 2021 (“the period”). On 8th September 2022, after a two week trial, she and her co-defendant ([“TW”]), were convicted (“the index offence”); she was sentenced to a term of 8 years and 2 months, but he (having a previous conviction for the same offence) was sentenced to term of 9 years and 2 months imprisonment.
7. In his sentencing remarks (“JSR”) the Judge noted that the Appellant and her co-defendant were high up in the organisation, and at the centre of a drug production and supply operation, with an estimated weight of 500KG for the period, a value of £2 million, and a street value of £5.5 million. It was a well-organised, wide-ranging, and serious conspiracy. The cannabis farms stretched west from Bristol to Slough, and north to Bolton, there were 80 properties, and both she and her co-defendant were particularly associated with 2 properties in London, which were the hub of production and supply. They worked as a team, and exploited others who were more vulnerable; they refused to co-operate with Police when arrested.
8. As to her relationship with [TW], the Judge interpreted the jury’s verdict as acceptance that they were partners in both the business and intimate sense.
9. The Judge said that they were convicted on overwhelming evidence; he could not understand how they could have chosen to plead not guilty; he remarked on the Appellant’s account and said that her evidence was littered with untruths and lies, from start to finish. He remarked on the Defendants use of Encrochat - used primarily by those in the criminal fraternity - used by them both for sending and receiving messages on it, and when arrested they were in possession of ‘phones using it. The Appellant was heard at the police station to be talking of young men at the production site as “my boys”, who were themselves being exploited, being young and vulnerable. There was evidence of the drug production life-style enjoyed by them both – high-end clothes and cars, and payment of IVF treatment for her in Bristol of £10,000.”
(2)(c) Subsequent Developments
10. On 27th September 2022 the respondent made a deportation order against the appellant. On 12th December 2022 the appellant made a protection claim, as defined in section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The respondent refused that claim on 5th January 2024 and the appellant appealed against that refusal to the First-tier Tribunal.
(2)(d) The Hearing before Judge Oxlade
11. The appellant’s appeal was heard by Judge Oxlade on 11th February 2025. Judge Oxlade identified the issues before her as follows:
“(i) Having conceded that she was convicted of a particularly serious crime, whether or not the Appellant has rebutted the presumption that she constitutes a danger to the community, (“issue 1”);
(ii) In light of the FTTJ findings on her asylum claim and credibility generally, applying Deevaseelan, whether there is new evidence/context, which should give rise to fresh findings, (“issue 2”), and depending on the outcome of issue 1 which if found against her would exclude entitlement to rely on the refugee convention, so whether or not she can succeed on an asylum claim, or alternatively Article 3 ECHR, on the same facts;
(iii) Whether or not she has made out an alternative Article 3 ECHR claim (“issue 3”), on the basis of her mental health, and risks arising on return therefrom
(iv) Finally, whether or not the Appellant has shown on the facts that there are very compelling circumstances, above and beyond the exceptions 1 and 2, set out in s117C (4) and (5) of the 2002 Act, which should outweigh the significant public interest in her deportation (“issue 4”).”
12. The appellant gave evidence. She had also provided six expert reports, namely:
(a) Three reports from Ms Lisa Davies, a Forensic Psychologist:
(i) A Psychological, Trafficking and Risk Report dated 31st March 2024. (37 pages, plus cover pages and appendices.)
(ii) An Addendum Psychological, Trafficking and Risk Report dated 10th July 2024. (8 pages, plus appendices.)
(iii) A Second Addendum Psychological, Trafficking and Risk Report dated 6th January 2025. (15 pages, plus appendices.)
(b) Two reports from a Trafficking Expert, Ms Christine Beddoe:
(i) A Human Trafficking Report dated 8th July 2024. (60 pages.)
(ii) An Addendum Human Trafficking Report dated 22nd January 2025. (22 pages, plus appendices.)
(c) A Country Expert Report from Dr Tran Thi Lanh Anh (“Dr. Tran”) dated 15th May 2024. (51 pages.)
13. The evidence adduced by the appellant also included:
(a) An email from her former support worker, Rachel Caddick, at Unseen, a charity providing support to trafficking victims under the Modern Slavery Victim Care Contact.
(b) An email from her former psychologist, Mary Griggs, who provided the appellant with support under the MSVCC and said she believed the appellant’s co-accused, “TW”, interpreted for the appellant during one of their sessions.
(c) The Secretary of State’s own records, which indicate the appellant’s NRM documents were sent to TW directly. TW had proposed giving his legal representatives’ details to the Home Office for the appellant and a safeguarding referral had been made in relation to TW following the appellant’s previous substantive hearing.
(d) The appellant’s GP records from 2016 to 2018, which contained references to the appellant feeling threatened by those around her and refer to a friend interpreting, who admitted that he would like her to be his girlfriend.
(e) A Salvation Army assessment.
(3) Judge Oxlade’s Decision
14. Judge Oxlade found against the appellant on all four issues.
(3)(a) Judge Oxlade’s Decision: Credibility
15. Judge Oxlade started by dealing with the credibility of the appellant’s evidence. She said:
“19. In the JSR, the trial Judge said that her evidence was littered with untruths and lies, and misrepresentations of reality from start to finish; there was overwhelming evidence of the involvement of the Appellant (and [TW]) in the criminal enterprise; the jury’s verdict indicates that they were found to be partners in both the business and intimate sense; the Judge spoke of aspects of the case which showed her involvement (use of Endochat, connection to cannabis groves, speaking of ‘my boys’, whom were exploited working on these farms) and they were sentenced on the basis of equal partnership – her sentence being reduced because it was her first offence. The Judge could not understand how they chose to pleaded not guilty in light of the overwhelming evidence.
20. The obvious point to make is that at trial the Appellant had an opportunity to explain her case, and was convicted by a jury being satisfied of her guilt to a high standard – beyond reasonable doubt – which is a far higher standard that both the NRM and Tribunal apply. Had she had been exploited or acting under duress as is now argued/implied, I am confident that such an argument would have been advanced, and had there been a reasonable doubt arising as to the lack of her free will, then she would not have been convicted. I enquired and was advised that there is no suggestion that she is seeking to overturn the conviction.”
16. Judge Oxlade noted at [20] that the appellant, having had an opportunity to explain her case, had been convicted of guilt to a high standard, far higher than the NRM and Tribunal apply, and that:
“… Had she been exploited or acting under duress as is now argued/implied, I am confident that such an argument would have been advanced and had there been a reasonable doubt arising as to the lack of her free will, then she would not have been convicted”.
17. At [23] Judge Oxlade said as follows:
“It is said by the Psychologist and in submissions that the Appellant’s vulnerability - manifesting itself in trauma bonding - means that she did not discern Mr [TW] as a bad person, or a person who was doing bad things to her, and that she is still (in 2025) finding it hard to reconcile that this is the reality. However, this is undermined by the Appellant’s evidence in cross-examination when seeking to explain why the verdict and JSR (from 2022) are wrong: she said that she was ‘totally innocent of the offence; everything that was done wrongly, was done by [TW]’, which suggests that she does recognise his failings and attributes blame to him. She also said ‘I feared him and if I said anything against him, there maybe consequences to me’. I do not find that the two are reconcilable – that she both failed to recognise that he was a bad person/did bad things for her, but yet feared the consequences if she said anything against him because of consequences to her. I reject her claims that the case went against her because it seems everything and everybody was against her; rather, there was ample evidence against her, and that her attempts to undermine it were revealed as lies”.
18. At [24] Judge Oxlade addressed the appellant’s evidence that TW had inveigled himself into every aspect of her life, including subjecting her to IVF. In relation to the IVF, he found that the appellant had struck a bargain for money and “expressly said in cross-examination that she did so willingly” and that that “undermines the argument being made on her behalf that she was being exploited by him, rather it was a financial Transaction”. Judge Oxlade noted as follows:
“Dr Davies (3.0.35) in her addendum says that the Appellant has failed to give a full and detailed account of her involvement in these offences, has withheld essential information about her contact with [TW] and underplayed the extent of her relationship with [TW]”.
19. Judge Oxlade’s conclusion on the issue of the appellant’s credibility was as follows, at [26]:
“In short, I find that the credibility assessments made in both the previous asylum appeal and the criminal proceedings about the Appellant and her case are accurate and reliable, and reflect my own assessment of her as an unreliable witness.”
(3)(b) Judge Oxlade’s Decision: Issue 1
20. In [27] to [33], Judge Oxlade dealt with issue 1, on which she concluded that the appellant had not rebutted the presumption that she constituted a danger to the community. In particular, he said as follows at [29]:
“In her witness statement the Appellant says that she regrets her offence and is sorry for the offence, but in cross-examination (and as reflected in the reports) says that she was wrongly convicted and did nothing wrong; the latter position reflects her true position. The first steps towards rehabilitation is accepting guilt, without which an argument as to rehabilitation is inevitably significantly weakened”.
(3)(c) Judge Oxlade’s Decision: Issue 2
21. In [34] to [38], Judge Oxlade dealt with issue 2, concluding that there was no real risk on return. In that context, she addressed the relationship with TW as follows at [35]:
“… The obvious concerns that the FTTJ had about the relationship that the Appellant and [TW] had arose from her saying one thing, and then another, without explaining the stark differences; this has been exposed in the criminal case - as the Appellant simply telling a multitude of lies - and misrepresentations of matters which bear no relation to the truth. I have also found that to be the case before me, as is apparent from the paragraphs above. It is also the case that Ms. Davies concluded that the Appellant had chosen to underplay her relationship with [TW]. In essence, it suits her to blame him now for everything that has gone wrong.”
22. In the context of issue 2, Judge Oxlade said as follows about the expert evidence at [37], which included saying that she had concerns regarding Ms Beddoe’s impartiality:
“Whilst I acknowledge the new country expert evidence of Dr Tran, his report does not provided evidence which has undermined the core findings in the FTTJ findings, as to the availability of support at home and lack of risk from debt-bondage. The Appellant relies on the report of Ms. Beddoe who is a specialist advisor on human trafficking and child exploitation; however, as Dr Tran is the country expert, I consider that his expertise on Vietnam is to be preferred. I also have concerns over the impartiality of Ms Beddoe, who has not interviewed the Appellant, and does not appear to acknowledge/give any weight to the fact that the Appellant bears responsibility for being involved in criminal activity, herself exploiting vulnerable others in the process, and underplaying the relationship choices that the Appellant made with Mr. W, including that she made positive choices to undergo IVF to obtain money, and when cross-examined said that she did so ‘willingly’. That being so, I place limited weight on the report of Ms Beddoe”.
(3)(d) Judge Oxlade’s Decision: Issue 3
23. Judge Oxlade dealt with issue 3 at [39] to [42], concluding that the appellant had not established that her mental health issues meant that she was at risk, on return to Vietnam, of experiencing conditions which would violate Article 3 ECHR.
24. The existence of mental health issues was not disputed. Judge Oxlade noted in [39] that there was clear evidence of medication and therapeutic input which was ongoing and in [40] she said as follows:
“The Appellant relies on report of Ms Davies, in her fresh assessment of the Appellant’s mental health, which concludes that she has PTSD and depression, which arise from her experiences as a trafficked woman. This is not a surprising outcome from the experiences which the Appellant has endured, and not challenged by the Respondent. There is some evidence of medical care available there, and medication, particularly from the NGO operating in the field.”
25. Judge Oxlade addressed the issue of suicide risk as follows at [41]:
“However, in my assessment the only aspect which would give rise to engagement of Article 3 ECHR, would be the assessment of the suicide risk posed. Her opinion is that the Appellant currently has a low to moderate risk, which will increase to high in the event of a forced return to Vietnam; she also opines of the high risk of re-trafficking absent of family there. Though she considers protective factors, the weight that I can give to her opinion is limited because it does not adequately explain why little or no weight is given toa the fact that her son is acknowledged to still live there, to work, and for the possibility of the Appellant and him to be reunited. Though it is said that the risk of re-trafficking is a prospect which would affect the Appellant’s mental health adversely, as she has a home available, a son to whom she could turn, a neighbour, and now new found language and IT skills, I am not satisfied that the reasons for the original trafficking continue to exist. The question is not whether the Appellant’s suicide risk stems from a voluntary act, but an involuntary one – one that is impulsive and uncontrollable. As the addendum report of Ms Davies acknowledges that – in respect of Mr W – the Appellant would decide what disclosure to give to whom, rather than provided an unguarded and honest account, it has to be acknowledged that there has to be a considerable chance that the Appellant will speak of suicide and threaten to do so, for effect. She has been shown to seek to manipulate the truth on numerous occasions; that being so, I do not find her to be reliable in this respect. I therefore place no weight on this aspect of Ms Davies report.”
26. Judge Oxlade concluded her discussion of issue 3 in [42], as follows:
“The submission that her mental health could deteriorate on return or the risk of returning sufficient to engage Article 3 ECHR. I find that issue 3, is against her.”
(3)(e) Judge Oxlade’s Decision: Issue 4
27. At [43] to [49], Judge Oxlade addressed issue 4, concluding that there were no very compelling circumstances outweighing the significant public interest in deporting the appellant.
(4) Ground 1: Failure to apply Presidential Guidance
28. There were 6 grounds of appeal against Judge Oxlade’s decision, which we will consider in turn. The first concerns the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010, which states, in paragraph 15, that:
“The decision should record whether the Tribunal has concluded the appellant ... is a child, vulnerable or sensitive, the effect the Tribunal considered the identified vulnerability had in assessing the evidence before it and thus whether the Tribunal was satisfied whether the appellant had established his or her case to the relevant standard of proof. In asylum appeals, weight should be given to objective indications of risk rather than necessarily to a state of mind.”
29. The appellant contends that:
(a) The judge failed to record whether the appellant was to be treated as a vulnerable witness and/or the effect this was considered to have had on her evidence.
(b) According to AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] 4 W.L.R. 78; [2017] EWCA Civ 1123, at [30], “Failure to follow [the IAC’s guidance notes on vulnerable appellants] will most likely be a material error of law”.
(4)(a) Ground 1: Submissions
30. The applicant submitted that the judge did not deal with her application to be dealt with as a vulnerable witness, which was based on the conclusive grounds decision and the expert evidence that she presented with PTSD and depression. In particular, there was no reference to vulnerability in [18] to [24], where the judge dealt with the appellant’s credibility.
31. The appellant also placed particular reliance on Ms Davies’ evidence. When dealing with the appellant’s mental health and her relationship with TW, Ms Davies accepted that the appellant had not given a full picture, but thought that there was more disclosure to come. However, her opinion was that she did not consider that the appellant was lying or malingering in respect of her mental health condition.
32. In response, Mr Wain pointed out that AM (Afghanistan) was fact-specific and that the judge was cognisant of the appellant’s reliance on vulnerability. He referred to [1.10.1] of Ms Davies’ first report, in which Ms Davies confirmed that the appellant was able to provide a coherent account of her experiences and that there should be additional measures in place to safeguard the appellant’s wellbeing.
(4)(b) Ground 1: Decision
33. Ms Fitzsimmons confirmed that there was no challenge to the conduct of the hearing. It was not suggested that the judge should have done anything in the hearing to address the appellant’s vulnerability. The complaint was solely about the judge’s decision.
34. Ms Fitzsimmons submitted that there was quite conceivably a “Mibanga point”, but this was not pleaded and, in any event, as explained in S v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1153 at [32], Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367 is capable of being misunderstood, it is not intended to place judicial fact finders in a form of forensic straitjacket and there is no rule of law as to the order in which a judicial fact finder must approach the evidential material before them.
35. A failure by a judge to refer specifically to the Joint Presidential Guidance Note in a decision is not necessarily determinative of the decision being flawed. As noted in the grounds, the Guidance states in paragraph 3 that:
“The consequences of such vulnerability differ according to the degree to which an individual is affected. It is a matter for you to determine the extent of an identified vulnerability, the effect on the quality of the evidence and the weight to be placed on such vulnerability in assessing the evidence before you, taking into account the evidence as a whole”.
36. Judge Oxlade acknowledged that she was obliged to apply Devaseelan and thus the context for her decision was Judge Fowell’s decision, in which Judge Fowell noted, at [28], that the appellant was a vulnerable witness and had been found by the NRM to be a victim of trafficking. Judge Fowell noted that he needed to take account of the appellant’s vulnerabilities in making his assessment in the light of the difficulties the appellant may have experienced, for example in recalling events, explaining them or concentrating Judge Fowell therefore had addressed the appellant’s account in relation to her asylum, article 3 and article 8 claims and her return to Vietnam in the light of her vulnerabilities. Judge Fowell also addressed the issue of trafficking and return/relocation to Vietnam. AM (Afghanistan) does not exclude a fact-sensitive approach when dealing with vulnerability.
37. Moreover, at [32] Judge Fowell addressed the role of TW in the appellant’s appeal. At that stage the appellant maintained that she and TW were simply friends, despite TW’s statement to the contrary and her own witness statement, which was quite specific that they had been in a relationship for the past three years and that they wanted to have children together. As Judge Fowell said:
“No explanation was given for such a stark shift in her evidence, and if [TW] is simply a friend, then it is even more difficult to understand why he has been so extensively involved in preparing her appeal.”
38. There are references throughout Judge Oxlade’s decision to the appellant’s vulnerability, for instance at [23], which was in the context of her assessment of the appellant’s credibility. Moreover, Judge Oxlade noted at [39] that it was accepted in Judge Fowell’s decision that the appellant had mental health problems and there was clear evidence of medication and therapeutic input, which was ongoing. Judge Oxlade specifically made reference at [40] to the appellant’s mental health condition, stating:
“The Appellant relies on report of Ms Davies, in her fresh assessment of the Appellant’s mental health, which concludes that she has PTSD and depression, which arise from her experiences as a trafficked woman. This is not a surprising outcome from the experiences which the Appellant has endured, and not challenged by the Respondent.”
39. Thus, the judge, when considering the evidence overall, did not ignore the difficulties which the appellant might have had in telling her story.
40. As to the effect of the appellant’s vulnerability, however:
(a) Ms Davies stated at [1.10] of her first report (dated 31st March 2024) that the appellant was “able to provide a coherent account of her experiences”.
(b) Ms Davies recommended adjustments to the manner of questioning and ensuring adequate breaks but, was we have noted, Ms Fitzsimmons confirmed that there was no challenge to the conduct of the hearing.
(c) Ms Davies suggested that the appellant’s vulnerability manifested itself as trauma bonding, but Judge Oxlade rejected this for the reasons given at [23].
41. Overall, we are not persuaded that the judge erred in law in her assessment of the appellant’s vulnerability in the context of the evidence as a whole. The judge was well aware of the mental condition presented by the appellant and, on reading the decision as a whole, it is inconceivable that it was not factored into an assessment of the evidence. There is no material error of law on ground 1.
(5) Ground 2(i): Inadequate Reasoning in dealing with Ms Davies’ Evidence
42. Ground 2 contains two separate complaints. The first concerns Ms Davies’ evidence and the second concerns Ms Beddoe’s evidence. For ease of reference, we have divided ground 2 into grounds 2(i) and 2(ii).
43. Ground 2(i) is that the judge did not give clear reasons for rejecting parts of Ms Davies’ evidence, notably:
(a) her opinion that the appellant would be at a high risk of suicide if she was deported; and
(b) her opinion that the appellant’s mental health and experiences of exploitation provided an explanation why her account of her relationship with TW and of her offence was inaccurate.
(5)(a) Ground 2(i): Submissions
44. Ms Fitzsimmons submitted that Ms Davies was a very experienced forensic psychologist who had interviewed the appellant for a number of hours, albeit over video and with the assistance of an interpreter.
(5)(a) Ground 2(i): Submissions: Suicide Risk
45. Ms Davies addressed suicide risk in [3.5] of her first report. Her opinion was that she assessed the appellant’s current risk of suicide as low to moderate, but increasing to high in the event of removal from the UK.
46. Ms Fitzsimmons submitted that the judge’s approach to suicide risk in [41] was speculative and paid insufficient regard to the evidence. The appellant had a history of attempting suicide and multiple risk factors for suicide. The evidence contained in the appellant’s assessments by the Salvation Army and by her former psychologist, Mary Griggs, also identified a history of suicide attempts and risk. Ms Davies used psychological testing and her expertise to reach her conclusion on the appellant’s risk of suicide and the judge was wrong to place no weight on her conclusions.
(5)(b)(ii) Ground 2(i): Submissions: The Relationship with TW
47. At [3.0.36] of her third report, Ms Davies said as follows:
“Whilst [the appellant] has underreported the extent of involvement she had with [TW], and has not been able to put forward a full and detailed account of her offending and involvement in the cultivation of cannabis, I do not consider that she has provided an untruthful account of her experience of mental health symptoms, and I did not detect malingering, exaggeration or distortion in relation to her description of her mental health functioning which is consistent with the observations of other professionals, as recorded in her medical records. I remain of the view that [the appellant] has likely been exploited by [TW] in the UK and there remains a need to investigate him fully in respect of his exploitation and intended exploitation of [the appellant].”
48. Ms Davies went on to express the opinion that: the appellant had experienced a form of trauma bonding, or so-called ‘Stockholm syndrome’, with TW; this would explain why she had not been able to provide a consistent, coherent explanation of their relationship; she did not understand the full extent of his exploitation of her; and further disclosures were likely to come over time, once she had established a supportive and therapeutic relationship. At [3.0.34] Ms Davies expressed her opinion that TW “should be fully investigated as to his role in the exploitation of” the appellant.
49. Ms Fitzsimmons submitted that the judge failed to give weight to this aspect of Ms Davies’ report, simply reiterating Ms Davies’ conclusion that the appellant’s account was not accurate, but not addressing the reason why Ms Davies assessed that this was the case, i.e. that the appellant had been exploited by TW. Given the centrality of this issue to the appeal, the judge was required to do so and to explain how the expert’s findings and methodology were challenged. The judge had substituted her lay opinion for expert opinion evidence and it was not clear from the decision why the judge had done so. Ms Fitzsimmons also submitted that the judge had failed to recognise the point that the appellant was now acknowledging that TW was a bad person.
(5)(b)(iii) Ground 2(i): Respondent’s Submissions
50. Mr Wain submitted that the judge had sufficiently engaged with the expert evidence and had reached findings which were open to her. Ms Davies opined that the appellant was not being untruthful, but there was a tension between that and the criminal finding to a higher standard. The issue of credibility was a matter for the judge, who saw and heard the appellant’s oral evidence and who engaged with this issue throughout the decision. Mr Wain also submitted that there were clear inconsistencies in the account given by the appellant in her oral evidence which were not addressed in the experts’ reports
(5)(b) Ground 2(i): Decision
51. As the Court of Appeal said at [18] of Herrera v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 412, it is necessary to guard against the temptation to characterise as errors of law what are in truth no more than disagreements about the weight to be given to different factors, particularly if the first tribunal had the advantage of hearing oral evidence. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] 4 WLR 48; [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2(iii)], the Court of Appeal confirmed that:
‘An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration.”
52. Although JL (medical reports-credibility) China [2013] UKUT 00145 (IAC) concerned medical reports, the principles set out apply to expert reports more generally. The material parts of the headnote state:
“(2) … The more a diagnosis is dependent on assuming that the account given by the appellant was to be believed, the less likely it is that significant weight will be attached to it (HH (Ethiopia) [2007] EWCA Civ 306 [23]).
(3) The authors of such medical reports also need to understand that what is expected of them is a critical and objective analysis of the injuries and/or symptoms displayed. They need to be vigilant that ultimately whether an appellant’s account of the underlying events is or is not credible and plausible is a question of legal appraisal and a matter for the tribunal judge, not the expert doctors (IY [47]; see also HH (Ethiopia) [2007] EWCA Civ 306 [17]-[18]).”
53. As stated in Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367 at [24], decisions as to the credibility of an account are to be taken by the judicial fact-finder and, in their reports, experts, whether in relation to medical matters or in relation to in-country circumstances, cannot usurp the fact-finder's function in assessing credibility. Critically, when assessing credibility, for example at [21], the judge factored into her assessment of the expert reports the appellant’s own oral evidence before the judge, which post-dated those reports.
54. In our judgment, the judge engaged sufficiently with the expert evidence and reached findings which were open to her.
(5)(b)(i) Ground 2(i): Decision: Suicide Risk
55. In our judgment, the judge gave an adequate explanation in [41] for her decision to place weight on Ms Davies’ opinion concerning the risk of suicide if the appellant were to be removed to Vietnam. In reverse order, the judge gave, in essence, two reasons for her decisions:
(a) Insofar as Ms Davies relied on the appellant’s account of what would happen if she were returned to Vietnam, the judge found that that account was not reliable. In all the circumstances of the case, including those addressed by the judge when considering the appellant’s credibility, that was a finding which the judge was entitled to make.
(b) Insofar as Ms Davies relied on her own assessment of what would happen if the appellant were returned to Vietnam, the judge found that Ms Davies had not adequately addressed the protective factors which would exist in Vietnam, namely that the appellant had a home available in Vietnam, a son to whom she could turn, a neighbour and newfound language and IT skills.
56. The appellant clearly does not agree with these findings, but we do not consider that they disclose an error of law. Ultimately the judge was entitled to find that Ms Davies’ conclusions on suicide were not supported by the underlying facts.
(5)(b)(i) Ground 2(i): Decision: The Relationship with TW
57. It was an unusual feature of this appeal that, as the judge noted:
(a) The appellant had been tried in a criminal court and had therefore had an opportunity to put her version of events before the jury, but she had not at that stage disclosed the account which she relied on for the purposes of her appeal, namely the exploitative nature of her relationship with TW. [Ms Fitzsimmons confirmed that the appellant did not run a “cut throat” defence at the criminal trial, i.e. a defence blaming TW for her conduct].
(b) The appellant had given evidence at her trial and the jury had disbelieved the account which she gave to them.
58. In those circumstances, there were many factors for the judge to take into account in assessing the appellant’s credibility, all of which were addressed by the judge, namely: Judge Fowell’s findings [4-5 & 26]; the appellant’s evidence before the jury [19 & 25-26]; the nature of the defence advanced by the appellant before the jury [20]; the appellant’s evidence before the judge [21-23 & 25-26]; and her alleged exploitation by TW and the expert evidence relating thereto [13-15 & 23-25].
59. It is also the case that Ms Davies’ opinion had certain unusual features, as noted above:
(a) She considered that there remained a need to investigate TW fully in respect of his exploitation and intended exploitation of the appellant: ordinarily, an appellant would be expected to have carried out all necessary investigations in advance of the hearing of her appeal.
(b) She considered that further, unspecified disclosures were likely to come from the appellant over time, once the appellant had established a supportive and therapeutic relationship: ordinarily, an appellant would be expected to present the whole of her case at the hearing of her appeal.
60. However, as the judge noted in [23], despite these opinions expressed by Ms Davies, the appellant was able to give evidence before the judge that she was totally innocent of the offence and that everything which was done wrongly was done by TW, whom she said, according to the judge at [36], was a “bad person”.
61. In our judgment, the judge was entitled to deal with this aspect of Ms Davies’ evidence as she did in [23] and [24] and it is not arguable that the judge failed to give weight to the relevant aspects of Ms Davies’ evidence or to explain her reasons for not accepting that evidence.
(6) Ground 2(ii): Inadequate Reasoning in dealing with Ms Beddoe’s Evidence
62. Ground 2(ii) is that:
(a) The judge was wrong, at [37], to prefer the evidence of Dr Tran to that of Ms Beddoe, since the two reports were not in conflict and they addressed separate issues: Dr Tranh was instructed to assess the country conditions/risk in Vietnam and Ms Beddoe was instructed to assess the appellant’s account of her trafficking, including the inconsistencies in her account, and risk of being re-trafficked both in the UK and in Vietnam.
(b) The judge was wrong, at [37], to state that she had concerns regarding Ms Beddoe’s impartiality.
(6)(a) Ground 2(ii): Submissions
63. Ms Fitzsimmons submitted that the judge was wrong to prefer the evidence of Dr Tran over that of Ms Beddoe for two reasons: (i) they had been instructed for different purposes; and (ii) they both expressed the opinion that the appellant would be at risk of re-trafficking on return to Vietnam.
64. She also submitted that the grounds given by the judge for expressing concerns about Ms Beddoe’s impartiality were incorrect and/or inadequate, in that:
(a) The judge noted that Ms Beddoe had not interviewed the appellant, but Ms Beddoe was under no obligation to do so.
(b) The judge said that Ms Beddoe did not appear to acknowledge/give any weight to various factors, but in fact Ms Beddoe had addressed those factors in her reports.
(6)(b) Ground 2(ii): Decision
65. We note that [37] forms part of judge’s consideration of issue 2. Judge Fowell had found that he was not satisfied that there was a risk of re-trafficking on return. Judge Oxlade asked herself whether there was new evidence/context which should give rise to fresh findings.
66. We note also that there is a tension between the two aspects of the appellant’s case concerning the judge’s expressed preference for Dr Tran’s report: although they were instructed for different purposes, Ms Beddoe and Dr Tran both expressed the same opinion on the same issue, i.e. whether the appellant was at risk of re-trafficking on return to Vietnam. As to that, Ms Beddoe addressed the objective conditions concerning trafficking in Vietnam in paragraphs 98-106 and 136-140 of her first report and Dr Tranh addressed those conditions throughout his report.
67. In [37], the judge expressly referred to the different areas of expertise of Ms Beddoe and Dr Tran. That was the context in which the judge said in [37] that Dr Tran’s “expertise on Vietnam” was to be preferred. It was no part of the appellant’s case before us that Ms Beddoe had a greater expertise on Vietnam than Dr Tran. In those circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Judge Oxlade preferred Dr Tran’s expertise on Vietnam to that of Ms Beddoe.
68. As for the judge’s expression of concern over Ms Beddoe’s impartiality:
(a) While Ms Beddoe may not have been obliged to interview the appellant, the fact that she had not done so was clearly relevant to the assessment of her report.
(b) The judge said that Ms Beddoe:
“does not appear to acknowledge/give any weight to the fact that the Appellant bears responsibility for being involved in criminal activity, herself exploiting vulnerable others in the process, and underplaying the relationship choices that the Appellant made with Mr TW, including that she made positive choices to undergo IVF to obtain money, and when cross-examined said she did so ‘willingly’. That being so, I place limited weight on the report of Ms Beddoe’”.
(c) As the appellant has pointed out, there are references in Ms Beddoe’s report to the appellant’s criminal activity (although not her exploitation of others), her relationship with TW and her IVF treatment. To that extent, it can be said that Ms Beddoe did acknowledge those matters, but the judge was still entitled to observe Ms Beddoe did not appear to give any weight to the matters listed by the judge.
(d) The judge also relied on the evidence given by the appellant at the hearing, noting that she said in cross-examination that she “willingly” chose to undergo IVF to obtain money from TW. This evidence was not available to Ms Beddoe, but the judge was entitled to find that it portrayed a very different picture of the appellant from that presented by Ms Beddoe.
69. Although MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC) at [25] sets out that part of an expert’s duties include providing information and expressing opinions independently, it may be that, in addressing what she perceived to be the limitations on Ms Beddoe’s evidence, the judge would have done better not to question Ms Beddoe’s impartiality. However, any error on the judge’s part in questioning Ms Beddoe’s impartiality was immaterial in the light of her conclusion that Ms Beddoe appeared not to have give any weight to matters which the judge clearly regarded as significant, coupled with the judge’s consideration of the appellant’s evidence at the hearing. In all the circumstances, we consider that it was open to the judge to decide to place limited weight on Ms Beddoe’s report.
(6)(c) Ground 2: Postscript
70. We were concerned by the length of the experts’ reports in this case, which we have set out above. In total, excluding appendices, Ms Davies reports’ consisted of 60 pages, Ms Beddoe’s reports 72 pages and Dr Tran’s report 51 pages.
71. The Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal (“the SPT’s Practice Direction”) was made on 1st November 2024 by the Senior President of Tribunals with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor under section 23 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. It provides as follows in paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2:
“9.1. Expert reports should be as concise as possible and focused on the issues in dispute which are within the author’s field of expertise. Lengthy and discursive commentary which is not directly relevant to the disputed issues is not conducive to the proportionate despatch of judicial business in 13 accordance with the Overriding Objective of the Procedure Rules and procedural rigour.
9.2. An expert report must not exceed 20 pages. The party adducing the expert evidence may apply in writing, with reasons in support of the application, for an expert report exceeding 20 pages, or for any addendum reports, to be served.”
72. We observed at the hearing that the experts’ reports significantly exceeded the 20-page limit set out in paragraph 9.2 of the SPT’s Practice Direction. We invited submissions on this and we were provided with an appellant’s note dated 9th December 2025, in essence submitting that 4 of the 6 reports were compiled prior to 1st November 2024. Perhaps more importantly, those reports appear to have been filed before 1st November 2024, in advance of a hearing on 23 September 2024 which was adjourned.
73. It is certainly the case that Ms Beddoe’s 25-page report of 17th January 2025 could have been rejected by the judge. We leave open for decision in another case, if necessary, whether the 20-page limit applied to reports filed before 1 November 2024, but relied on at a hearing after that date.
74. That point will increasingly be of historic relevance only, but this case illustrates a further point, which may remain of continuing significance. Again, it is unnecessary for us to decide the point, but we do not consider that a party can avoid the 20-page limit by relying on two or more reports from the same expert, particularly in the absence of an application to adduce the same.
75. Different considerations may apply in different circumstances, such as may arise, for instance, if, after a report has been filed, a new point arises which requires a further report from the same expert. However, we draw attention to the fact that the 20-page limit in paragraph 9.2 of the SPT’s Practice Direction is only one aspect of the general rule in paragraph 9.1 that expert reports should be as concise as possible. A report which consists of 20 pages or less will not necessarily be as concise as possible.
(7) Ground 3: The Appellant’s Alleged Exploitation by TW
76. By Ground 3, the appellant contended that the judge failed to take into account relevant considerations and/or failed adequately to explain her reasons for dealing with various aspects of the evidence relating to the appellant’s alleged exploitation by TW. In particular, the appellant made these contentions in relation to the evidence referred to in [13] above and the representations made on her behalf on 28 January 2025 to the Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority (“the IECA representations”).
(7)(a) Ground 3: Submissions
77. Ms Fitzsimmons submitted that the evidence referred to [13] above was recorded by professionals and authorities, primarily in the context of safeguarding concerns rather than as the result of the appellant’s own account. This was highly relevant to the consideration of the appellant’s account of her exploitation, vulnerabilities and mental health and therefore her credibility. This evidence was so extensive and significant that it was not open to the judge to reach her conclusion without giving reasons for not accepting it. The failure to deal with this evidence was a material error of law.
78. The IECA representations detailed the appellant’s claim that TW had been selling her for sex and had exploited her in relation to the IVF treatment which she underwent. Ms Fitzsimmons submitted that, if the judge rejected the appellant’s account of being sold for sex by TW, she was required to say why and that the judge’s conclusion at [24] that the IVF could properly be characterised as a “financial transaction” ignored the evidence that TW was exploiting her and was inadequately explained.
79. Mr Wain submitted that the judge can be taken to have taken into account relevant considerations and was not required to set out all of the evidence. At [21] to [24] the judge had referred to the cross-examination of the appellant and the judge was not required to discount the appellant’s oral evidence.
(7)(b) Ground 3: Decision
80. In our judgment, the issue of the appellant’s alleged exploitation by TW was front and centre in the judge’s decision and was addressed throughout the determination. Moreover, in dealing with the appellant’s alleged exploitation, the judge referred to various strands of the evidence: see, in particular, [13] to [15], [20], [23] to [25], [28], [31], [34] and [35].
81. For instance, at [20] the judge noted that the appellant, having had an opportunity to explain her case in the criminal trial, had been convicted by the jury, applying the criminal standard of proof, and that
“had she been exploited or acting under duress as is now argued/implied, I am confident that such an argument would have been advanced and had there been a reasonable doubt arising as to the lack of her free will, then she would not have been convicted.”
82. We have dealt above with other aspects of the judge’s decision which concerned the alleged relationship with TW. For the purposes of ground 3, we note also [15], in which the judge expressly referred to the perception of numerous individuals/agencies that TW’s involvement with the appellant was concerning. It cannot be said that the judge failed to take account of this evidence. However, the judge also took account, inter alia, of the appellant’s own evidence at the hearing: see, in particular [22] (in which the judge referred to “my own assessment of her evidence”), [23], [24] (in which the judge referred to the appellant’s evidence about the IVF treatment), [25], [35] and [38] (in which the judge again referred to the appellant’s evidence concerning the IVF treatment).
83. In accordance with Volpi v Volpi, we are bound to assume that the judge took the whole of the evidence into consideration unless there is compelling reason to the contrary. In our judgment, there was no such compelling reason in the present case. As to the judge’s reasons, the judge, as we have explained, dealt extensively with the appellant’s alleged exploitation by TW, but the judge was not obliged to refer to every aspect of the evidence in her decision. Moreover, we note that much of the evidence referred to in [13] above predated the criminal trial and that the IECA representations contained the appellant’s own statement of her case, about which she was able to, and did, give evidence in the hearing.
84. Accordingly, we conclude that ground 3 does not disclose any error of law on the part of the judge.
(8) Ground 4: Error of Law in Finding the Appellant to be an Incredible Witness
85. Ground 4 is that, by reason of the matters complained of in grounds 1 to 3, the judge erred in finding the appellant not to be credible.
86. In support of ground 4, the grounds of appeal go on to submit that:
(a) The judge conflated credibility with the appellant’s ability to provide an account, failed to explain why she was not being treated as a vulnerable witness or, if she was, what effect this had on the appellant’s evidence and failed to give consideration to relevant evidence.
(b) Ms Davies, having assessed the appellant over a period of nine hours and 45 minutes over eleven months, stated in her report at [3.1.9.] that she concurred with the opinions expressed by Ms Beddoe regarding the presence of trauma bonding and that: the appellant appeared to be shifting her views about TW’s friendship; trauma bonding would explain why the appellant had not been able to provide a consistent, coherent account of their relationship; and further disclosures were likely to come over time.
(c) In the light of this evidence that the appellant was shifting her views, the judge was wrong to find, at [23], that the appellant’s oral evidence that “I feared him and if I said anything against him, there may be consequences for me” was not reconcilable with the appellant “failing to recognise that he was a bad person/did bad things for her”.
(d) In fact, the appellant’s position in oral evidence was consistent with Ms Davies’ finding in January 2025 that the appellant was beginning to shift her views in relation to TW.
(e) It was also highly relevant that the appellant had recently disclosed, also in January 2025, that TW had sold her for sex.
(f) The appellant denied her offence at trial and that is why there was no consideration at trial of her being exploited by TW. Consequently, the judge was wrong to find at [20] that: “Had she had been exploited or acting under duress as is now argued/implied, I am confident that such an argument would have been advanced (at trial), and had there been a reasonable doubt arising as to the lack of her free will, then she would not have been convicted”.
(8)(a) Ground 4: Submissions
87. Ms Fitzsimmons relied on the grounds as set out above. She submitted that it was difficult because the picture of the appellant and her vulnerability was still evolving and further disclosure by the appellant was going to take time and would not be resolved in merely one month.
88. Mr Wain referred to [17] and submitted that there was no conflation in relation to credibility and that the weight to be given to the evidence was a matter for the judge.
(8)(b) Ground 4: Decision
89. Since ground 4 is alleged to depend on grounds 1 to 3, which we have dismissed, ground 4 also falls to be dismissed. We have already dealt in substance in the context of grounds 1 to 3 with the additional matters relied on in ground 4. In particular, we have dealt with the judge’s handling of the issues concerning the appellant’s vulnerability, her alleged exploitation by TW and the expert evidence in relation thereto.
90. Insofar as it was alleged that the appellant’s position was shifting and that she was likely to make further, unspecified disclosures, we note that the judge had to make an assessment on the evidence presented at the hearing. That evidence included the appellant’s evidence that “everything that was done wrongly, was done by [TW]” (see [23]), that she “was taken advantage of by [TW]” (see [28]), that she “did nothing wrong” (see [29]) and that TW was “a bad person” (see [36]). In the light of all of the evidence, the judge rejected the appellant’s account of her relationship with TW.
91. It is a non-sequitur for the appellant to submit that it was because she denied her offence at trial that there was no consideration at trial of her being exploited by TW. One of the potential defences available to the appellant at trial was to rely on her alleged exploitation by TW. The judge considered why she did not rely on that defence and reached a conclusion, at [20], which was open to her.
92. Contrary to the allegation in ground 4, the judge did consider the evidence which had arisen since the criminal trial, including the expert reports and the appellant’s evidence at the hearing. The judge fully engaged with the evidence, as can be seen from a reading of the whole decision.
93. We find that ground 4 does not disclose any error of law.
(9) Ground 5: Country evidence
94. Ground 5 is in two parts:
(a) The first part is that the judge was wrong to suggest, at [37], that Dr Tran did not provide evidence on debt bondage, when Dr Tran considered the issue of debt bondage at length and concluded at [1.16] that “In my professional opinion, the risk remains alive for the Appellant despite the nine years that have passed since she escaped her former traffickers in 2015”.
(b) The second part is that the judge was wrong to conclude at [40] that “There is some evidence of medical care available there [in Vietnam], and medication, particularly from the NGO operating in the field.”
(9)(a) Ground 5: Submissions
95. Ms Fitzsimmons submitted that the judge’s treatment of Dr Tran’s evidence was inconsistent and confused, particularly in relation to debt bondage.
96. Mr Wain submitted that this appeal rested on Devaseelan principles and the appellant had previously been found not to be credible in relation to debt bondage.
(9)(b) Ground 5: Decision
97. The first part of ground 5 is misconceived. The judge did not find, at [37], that Dr Tran did not provide evidence on debt bondage. Rather, the judge said at [37] that Dr Tran’s “report does not provide evidence which has undermined the core findings in the judge’s findings as to the availability of support at home and lack of risk from debt-bondage”.
98. As has been explained, the context was that Judge Fowell had held that he did not accept that there was any continuing debt owed to the traffickers and that he was not satisfied that there was a risk of re-trafficking on return. Dr Tran gave evidence about debt bondage in Vietnam and its common use as a control mechanism in human trafficking, but Judge Oxlade had to decide whether there was reason to depart from Judge Fowell’s findings in the present case and she was entitled to conclude that there was not.
99. As for the second part of ground 5, the judge found, at [41], that the only aspect of the appellant’s case which would give rise to the engagement of Article 3 was the assessment of the suicide risk posed. In other words, other aspects of her case, such as the alleged absence of treatment for her PTSD and depression in Vietnam, did not engage Article 3.
100. The judge’s modest statement, at [40], that “There is some evidence of medical care available there [in Vietnam], and medication, particularly from the NGO operating in the field” appears to be based on the relevant Country Policy and Information Note on Vietnam: Mental Healthcare (summarised in paragraph 47 of the respondent’s decision letter), with which Dr Tran did not take issue, although Dr Tran emphasised the limited nature of the relevant mental health care available.
(10) Ground 6: Consideration of the Issue of Treatment in Vietnam
101. Ground 6 is that the judge was wrong not to explain why she considered that the appellant’s PTSD was not sufficient to engage Article 3, having regard, in particular, to Ms Davies’ opinion at [6.0.9] that:
“I would assess her mental health functioning as likely to evidence a deteriorating trajectory if forcibly returned with an increase in intrusive, avoidant and hyperarousal symptoms of PTSD, reduced mood and appetite, increased sleep disturbance and increased hyperarousal and hypervigilance. I am unable to comment upon the availability of medication in Vietnam but note that in my opinion [the appellant] requires specialist antitrafficking support and trauma focused interventions in addition to medication.”
(10)(a) Ground 6: Submissions
102. Ms Fitzsimmons submitted that the judge failed to consider the appellant’s ability to access treatment for her PTSD and whether this engaged Article 3.
103. Mr Wain submitted that the judge made a significant point at [41] when she referred to the presence of the appellant’s son in Vietnam and that the judge was right to note that consideration of the son was not in the expert’s report. There may be issues around access to and paying for treatment, but the judge was saying that the appellant has a son who works and that that had not been taken into consideration when considering access to treatment and the weight given to those reports. The judge accepted overall that the appellant had difficulties, but the assessment of the severity of her illness was relevant and the appellant simply did not reach the Article 3 threshold.
(10)b) Ground 6: Decision
104. The judge accepted that the appellant was suffering from PTSD and depression and also referred, at [42], to the prospect that her mental health would deteriorate on return. There may be words missing from, or a grammatical error in, [42], but, taken in the context of her discussion of issue 3 as a whole, it is clear that the judge was of the opinion that, apart of the potential suicide risk, the appellant’s mental health did not engage Article 3. The relevant threshold is set out in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] AC 633 and we note that this was not addressed by Ms Davies in her reports.
(11) Notice of Decision
105. We find no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, which will stand, and the appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

The Hon. Mr Justice Lavender, President
Date: 5th March 2026