Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003774

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62793/2024 LP/01181/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

MG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Joshi of Joshi Advocates Limited
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
PRELIMINARY
1. It was agreed by the parties that all relevant documents are contained in the composite bundle, in addition to which, the Respondent relied upon a skeleton argument dated 5 February 2026.
2. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Egypt. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know his identity.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. The Appellant was born on 1 January 2000 and is a national of Egypt. He entered the UK on 21 September 2022 and claimed asylum on the same day. His claim was refused on 24 April 2024. He appealed. It is apparent that his appeal was brought on international protection, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds: in relation to the latter, the Grounds of Appeal dated 30 April 2024 make express reference to articles 3, 5 and 8 ECHR.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
4. His appeal was heard on 15 May 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Cohen (“the Judge”) and was dismissed on 9 June 2025. Permission to appeal was refused on 29 July 2025 by FTT Judge Saffer. Permission was, however, granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor on 17 September 2025.
5. An error of law hearing on 21 November 2025 resulted in a decision that there was a material error of law in that the Judge had not considered the Appellant’s ECHR ground of appeal or made any decision on that. Further, the different standard of proof applicable to human rights grounds had not been considered.
6. The function of the Upper Tribunal, on re-making, was stated to be to consider whether the Appellant’s claim on ECHR grounds is made out to the required standard.
7. It is against that background that the appeal is listed for hearing before me to remake the decision.

The preserved Findings of Fact
8. The Judge’s findings as to the Appellant’s credibility at paragraphs 29, 32, 33, 37 and 38 of the determination were preserved. These are:
29. Having considered the evidence before me in the round, I find that I do not accept the Appellant’s account as to having been falsely accused of being associated with Muslim Brotherhood by the Egyptian authorities…
32. I find it troubling that there is no reference whatsoever to the allegations by the Egyptian authorities that the Appellant was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in the screening interview. I readily accept that there will be cases where little detail is given but the basic subject is referred to, or the bare bones of a factual account is given. Here, it is common ground that there is no reference at all to this claim, and instead an altogether different claim is relied upon. This is in circumstances where it is clear from the Appellant’s written evidence that he appreciated the severity of the Muslim Brotherhood allegations after his mother received an arrest warrant accordingly in April 2021 which he states led to him relocating to Alexandria. The Appellant’s explanation that he did not tell the Respondent about the allegations in respect of the Muslim Brotherhood because there was no official court order makes no sense in light of the fact that the Appellant also had no official court documents in respect of the allegation of pushing a colleague off a building site. The fact of the arrest warrant, and the Appellant’s fears and actions in response are entirely at odds with his evidence that he did not tell the Respondent about these allegations when he came to the UK because he hoped it would all go away.
33. In oral evidence the Appellant said that he returned to the family home - albeit he spent most of his time outside of the house - in June 2021. The Appellant accepted in cross-examination that the police only came to his house once in August 2022. The Appellant said that, ‘Eventually the police came to my house, in August, this is when my mother told me things are getting scary you have to leave’. When it was put to the Appellant that the police had only come once in August 2022 and it seemed that they were not actively pursuing him the Appellant said that ‘I think they were looking for me seriously because the person who came to my house in August was someone from national security, not just a police officer’. The trouble with this evidence is that the Appellant clearly explains in his witness statement that it was the police from Alexandria who came to his home in August 2022 in respect of the false allegation of pushing his colleague off a building site. There is moreover no mention in that statement of any officers from ‘national security’. This is a clear inconsistency that goes to the core of the Appellant’s account. If the visit in August 2022 was indeed in relation to the Muslim Brotherhood allegation the Appellant’s explanation for not raising this when he claimed asylum makes even less sense.
not state when or how he sent the documents to the Appellant and does not refer to the Appellant’s brother, and there is no evidence from the Appellant’s brother or their communications that led to the Appellant’s brother sending the Appellant the documents in January 2024. There is moreover no evidence from the Appellant as to the various steps that were taken to obtain these documents. It is not possible to understand the background to these documents being obtained…
37. The expert report is detailed and includes a careful assessment, particularly at paragraph 45, of the reasons why the expert has reached his conclusions. There is some force to Mr Thakurdin’s submission that it would have assisted the Tribunal to understand specifically what the respective hallmarks and features of the documents were in order to properly understand the expert’s opinion, but I have no reason to doubt the expert’s evidence that the Appellant’s documents indeed contain key hallmarks matching the samples that he has and is unable to disclose. I do find that there is greater force in Mr Thakurdin’s submission that the expert’s stated expertise lies more generally in the Middle East (Gulf) and not specifically in the Egyptian legal system. While the expert states he has considered hundreds of official Egyptian documents, this is not the same thing as having an in-depth understanding of the Egyptian legal system including the arrest and court processes. The expert concludes that the documents are ‘very highly likely’ to be genuine. In the circumstances I attach moderate weight to the expert report.
38. When considered in the round I find that the issues with the Appellant’s account and evidence are so significant that even when taken together with the documents and expert report I cannot find that the Appellant has substantiated his claim for international protection. The Appellant’s claim is not coherent. In all the circumstances I find that the inability of the Appellant to sufficiently explain why he did not refer to his claim in relation to the Muslim Brotherhood at the time that he claimed asylum, the clear inconsistencies in the evidence before me, and the failure to show that the documents can be relied upon means that he has not demonstrated to the balance of probabilities that he is at risk on return on the basis of his imputed political opinion in being accused of being associated with Muslim Brotherhood.
9. Paragraph 34 of the Judge’s decision is not among the preserved findings of fact. Ms Ahmed submitted that it should be treated as an impliedly preserved finding, in order to make sense of para.38. Ms Joshi’s submission was that para.34 should not, expressly or impliedly, be preserved. Her submission is that para.34 requires re-consideration and invited me, in effect, to reconsider the weight to be placed upon the documents. Paragraph 34 states that:
On their face the Appellant’s documents together with the expert report are compelling evidence in support of his claim and I remind myself that the expert concluded that the documents were ‘very highly likely’ to be genuine. However, I find that I agree with the Respondent that the Appellant has not demonstrated that the documents can be relied upon. The Appellant’s witness statements do not explain who sent him the documents and any communications which led to him receiving them. In cross-examination the Appellant was asked who sent the documents. The Appellant said that there were two sets of documents received: the first set which comprised the arrest and court documents and the second set which was the letter from the lawyer. The Appellant said that his lawyer obtained the documents. The first set were sent by his brother and the second set were sent by his lawyer. The Appellant said that he received the first set in January 2024 and the second in July 2024. I take into account that he has DHL envelopes to this effect. The letter from the lawyer does not state when or how he sent the documents to the Appellant and does not refer to the Appellant’s brother, and there is no evidence from the Appellant’s brother or their communications that led to the Appellant’s brother sending the Appellant the documents in January 2024. There is moreover no evidence from the Appellant as to the various steps that were taken to obtain these documents. It is not possible to understand the background to these documents being obtained.

The hearing before me
10. I have been provided with a consolidated bundle of documents and a skeleton argument on behalf of the Respondent.
11. In reaching my decision I have had regard to all the evidence before me, whether or not it is specifically referred to.
12. The parties were in agreement that the re-making hearing should proceed by way of submissions.
13. The consolidated bundle provided to me includes the Appellant’s witness statement dated 26 January 2024 and an expert report dated 16 April 2025 by Dr Hasan Hafidh, as to the authenticity of documents relied upon by the Appellant.

Submissions of the parties
14. The Appellant’s submission is summarised as follows:
(a) The fact that he did not mention the political basis for his asylum claim initially in his screening interview should be considered in light of the limited nature of a screening interview, and having regard to the fact that he did refer to it in his substantive asylum interview i.e. before his asylum claim was decided;
(b) If the above credibility issue was removed from the equation, the only credibility point against the Appellant was the alleged discrepancy as to whether officers who visited his home were police or national security;
(c) Against that point would need to be balanced the “moderate” weight the Judge was willing to give to the report of Dr Hafidh who considered the official documents to be “very highly likely” to be genuine;
(d) The overall assessment should be that the lower standard application to a human rights appeal was met, and the appeal should be allowed.
15. The Respondent’s submissions are summarised as follows:
(a) Reliance was placed on the refusal letter, Respondent’s review and skeleton argument;
(b) Paragraph 34 of the FTT decision should impliedly be preserved or, alternatively, paragraph 38 identifies the basis for placing limited reliance upon the documents adduced by the Appellant;
(c) The “moderate” weight placed on the expert report is either a neutral assessment, or at least, less than significant weight.
(d) Looked at in the round, weight is for the Judge, and even applying the lower standard, the identified difficulties with the Appellant’s evidence are so significant that there could not be a finding that his article 3 ECHR rights would be breached. In essence, the human rights claim stands or falls with the asylum claim.

The issue for determination
16. It should be recorded that no factual basis for a human rights claim separate to the factual basis for the asylum and protection claims was advanced on the Appellant’s behalf. The issue for determination is therefore whether, notwithstanding the decision on his asylum and protection claims, the application of the lower standard of proof in relation to an ECHR claim should result in his human rights appeal being allowed.
17. The Appellant invites the conclusion that it should, on the basis of there having been limited adverse credibility findings and a finding that the expert report should be given moderate weight in relation to the authenticity of documents indicating the interest of the criminal justice system in the Appellant.
18. The Respondent invites the conclusion that the adverse credibility findings are to be considered alongside the moderate weight to be given to the expert report, and that the overall analysis should be that there is no real risk or reasonable likelihood of the Appellant being subjected to treatment breaching article 3 ECHR.

Analysis
19. An appellant in a human rights appeal who asserts that his or her removal from the United Kingdom would violate Article 3 ECHR must show a "reasonable likelihood" or "real risk" of Article 3 harm.
20. In relation to the relevance of documents, in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT* 00439, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal at [35] held that:
In all cases where there is a material document it should be assessed in the same way as any other piece of evidence. A document should not be viewed in isolation. The decision maker should look at the evidence as a whole or in the round (which is the same thing).
21. There were two core issues upon which the Judge found the Appellant to lack credibility. The first was the failure to mention, in the course of his screening interview, the later-asserted political basis of the claim for asylum. The Appellant’s account in relation to this was that he did not have documents in relation to the alleged political grounds, but, as the Judge noted at [32], the Appellant also had no official documents in relation to the allegation that he had pushed a colleague from a building site. Ms Joshi sought to argue that the relevance of this late disclosure of the true basis of claim was minimal, because the Appellant had disclosed his political reasons for seeking asylum before the Respondent’s decision was made. I consider, nonetheless, that the advancement of a difference basis for seeking asylum at the screening interview, and the later change to assert political involvement, is a matter relevant to the Appellant’s credibility.
22. The second is an identified discrepancy in relation to the identity of the officers who came to the Appellant’s home [33], the finding about which is preserved.
23. In the holistic assessment as to the reliance to be placed on the official documents the Appellant adduced, it is necessary to take into account the expert report. The Judge considered that “on their face” and together with the expert report, the documents were “compelling evidence” in support of the claim [34]. What follows is careful analysis of the exert report, with which I respectfully agree.
24. The Judge then went on to consider, as required by Tanveer Ahmed, “in the round” the balance between the credibility issues in relation to the Appellant’s account and the positive view he had taken of the expert report, attributing “moderate weight” to that report [37]. The balancing exercise can be seen at [38] and, again, I respectfully agree with the Judge’s analysis.
25. There is an overall lack of coherence in the Appellant’s claim, taking into account his failure to set out his political basis of claim in his screening interview. The reason he gave for that was lack of supporting documents, however, that explanation applied equally to the basis of claim he did advance, i.e. the allegation that he had pushed someone from a building site. There was also an inconsistency in relation to the officials who had sought him out at home. Those factors have to be looked at alongside the documents he produced, and the expert report as to the authenticity of the official documents, which is in my view appropriately to be given moderate weight, taking into account the qualifications and expertise of Dr Hafidh.
26. The findings of the Judge at paragraph 34 were not preserved by the error of law determination. Ms Ahmed’s position that these are implied or imported into paragraph 38 may be correct to some extent, as paragraph 34 provides context to paragraph 38. No additional evidence has been adduced in support of this re-making hearing to address the Judge’s concerns set out at paragraph 34.
27. Looking at matters in the round, I conclude that it is appropriate to take into account the matters set out at paragraph 34 in the holistic analysis that is required. Even without those matters being expressly or impliedly preserved, however, I am satisfied that the Appellant is not able to establish, even to the lower “real risk” or “reasonable likelihood” standard, that he would experience ill treatment breaching article 3 ECHR on return to Egypt.
28. No other human rights grounds were advanced in argument.
29. The moderate weight attributed to the documents (by reference to the expert report on them) is outweighed by the Appellant’s failure initially (at screening interview) to make reference to the basis of claim he later advanced. I do not agree that this should be disregarded as an aspect of credibility because the political basis of claim was mentioned at substantive interview. There was an opportunity to mention the true basis of claim at screening interview, and the Appellant did not take it. I take into account also that he did not give a coherent explanation for that failure. Added to the assessment is the discrepancy regarding whether it was local police or national security who visited the Appellant. The overall analysis, looking at matters in the round, is that the Appellant is not able to overcome even the lower threshold in relation to establishing the likelihood or risk of a breach of ECHR rights.
30. The appeal on ECHR grounds is therefore dismissed.

Notice of Decision
1. The anonymity order in respect of the Appellant remains in force.
2. The Appellant’s appeal on ECHR grounds is dismissed.
3. The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

Sian Davies

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber