Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003780

First-tier Tribunal No: RP/50102/2023
LR/00035/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
5th November 2025

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
CRAS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Ms S Jegarajah, Counsel, instructed on a Direct Access basis
For the respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Aleksic (“the judge”), promulgated on 8 July 2025. By that decision, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims.

2. For reasons set out in due course, I have concluded that the judge did not make any material errors of law and that his decision will stand.

3. The appellant has been found to be an Indian national, born in 1996. He is the son of what had been his co-appellant in linked appeals before the judge. The judge allowed his mother’s appeal on protection grounds. There is a relatively complex family history and background to the claims put forward on appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, all of which is set out with admirable clarity by the judge at [4]-[9] and [17]-[21] of his decision. The agreed schedule of issues listed by the judge at [17] contains the following in relation to the appellant:

(a) whether the appellant would be at risk as result of familial affiliation with the LTTE; and/or

(b) whether the appellant would be at risk as result of Christian activities conducted in India; and/or

(c) whether the appellant had mental health problems which were relevant to either the protection claim, or the human rights claim; and/or

(d) whether the appellant’s removal would violate Article 8, either in respect of the relevant immigration Rules or on a wider basis.

4. The appellant was legally represented by Counsel at the hearing. The judge treated as established facts certain matters which are been conceded by the respondent, namely: that the appellant’s mother had been married to a member of the LTTE (that being the appellant’s biological father); that the mother was currently married to an individual who had actively preached Christianity in India; and the appellant had in the past been beaten and threatened in India for spreading Christianity.

5. In a thorough and conscientious decision, the judge found against the appellant in all respects: [44]-[47], [53]-[63], [64]-[78].

The grounds of appeal and the grant of permission
6. Four grounds of appeal have been put forward. First, it is said that the judge erred when concluding that the appellant was not at risk on return to India. Specifically, it is said that the judge failed to engage with country evidence contained within the relevant CPIN and that he “artificially compartmentalised” the constituent elements of the appellant’s protection claim, “contrary to” HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31. Second, it is said that the judge made “perverse and illogical” credibility findings: there is inconsistency in those findings given the acceptance that the appellant had been beaten and threatened in the past. In addition, it is said that there is a “disproportionate emphasis on lack of corroboration”. Third, the judge is said to have failed to properly consider medical evidence and the appellant’s vulnerability. Fourth, the proportionality assessment under Article 8 is said to be “legally deficient” both in respect of family and private life.

7. Permission was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on all grounds, although I note that the focus of the reasoning related to the fourth ground only.

Rule 24
8. The respondent provided a detailed rule 24 response.

The hearing
9. Without any prior notice, and after the hearing had in fact commenced, Ms Jegarajah made an oral application to amend the grounds.

10. When asked why the application had not been made earlier, Ms Jegarajah informed me that she had been off work for a period of time and had only recommenced three days before the hearing. She confirmed that she had had sight of the papers in the case on 9 October 2025, but had not sought to apply to amend grounds at that stage.

11. Ms Jegarajah proceeded to set out the basis for the proposed amendment. She submitted that the point she wished to rely on was “Robinson obvious”. She submitted that evidence contained in the interviews of the appellant and his mother indicated that the family unit had been “in hiding” for significant periods of time prior to departure from India and that the judge had overlooked this evidence when assessing risk. She highlighted a number of passages in the interviews which she said were relevant. I took a careful note of all references and they are in any event a matter of record. She submitted that the Q Branch of the security services had in fact been looking for the family unit as a whole, including the appellant.

12. Ms Jegarajah accepted that none of the points she was raising had been put to the judge, whether in writing or orally.

13. I gave Mr Terrell time to consider the application and the evidence said to support it. To his credit, he was prepared to address me on all relevant matters without seeking an adjournment.

14. In the circumstances, I concluded that the best way forward was for me to hear Ms Jegarajah’s submissions on the proposed amendment and the existing grounds, hear what Mr Terrell had to say in response, and then to reserve my decision on the appeal. That decision would encompass a conclusion on whether the proposed amendment should be permitted.

Conclusions
15. As a general matter, I remind myself that appropriate judicial restraint should be exercised before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. In the present case, it is clear that the judge put in a very great deal of care into producing his decision. The appeal before him involved complex and interlinked issues. He read and heard evidence from a variety of sources.

The application to amend the grounds
16. For the reasons set out below, I refuse permission to amend the grounds of appeal.

17. First, the timing of Ms Jegarajah’s application paid no regard whatsoever to the principle of procedural rigour. Notwithstanding her time off work, there had been no attempt to make a written application to amend in advance of the hearing. I can see no good reason for this failure. An application could at least have been made in the days running up to the hearing. To compound matters, the application was not even raised by Ms Jegarajah at the outset of the hearing: it appeared to emerge only after she began making references to interview evidence which did not feature in the existing grounds. In my view, the timing could hardly have been more unfair and prejudicial to the respondent and in contravention of basic requirements of procedural rigour.

18. Second, the proposed amended ground cannot on any rational view be described as “Robinson obvious”. Ms Jegarajah’s submissions and the attendant numerous references to at least three interviews spoke for themselves: the point sought to be made was not in any way obvious. Indeed, the opposite is true. The contention that the family unit had been “in hiding” involved cross-referencing different interviews, attempting to re-create or reinterpret a complex chronology, whilst at the same time overlooking the basic principles that a judge need not refer to each and every aspect of the evidence considered and need not set out each and every step in their reasoning.

19. Third, and following from the preceding reason, the application to amend flies in the face of the proper approach to first-instance appeals and onward appeals, as set out in, for example, Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC) and TC (PS compliance - “issues-based” reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 164 (IAC). None of the convoluted matters sought to be raised by Ms Jegarajah were put to the judge. The effect of the application to amend is to re-argue the appellant’s case as it might have been, but was not, put forward initially.

20. Fourth, it is unarguably the case that the judge had regard to all of the evidence before him, including that relating to the family’s movements within India. His decision is as thorough as one could hope for in this jurisdiction and is strongly indicative of a comprehensive assessment of the evidence as a whole. Beyond that, as already mentioned, a judge need not in any event set out all of the evidence considered. Further, I agree with Mr Terrell’s submission that the judge’s decision demonstrates that he was entitled to conclude that the Q Branch had no specific interest in the appellant, as opposed to the appellant’s sister and/or his mother. Ms Jegarajah consistently submitted that the whole family had been targeted by Q Branch from 2017 onwards, but it is indisputable (and was clearly open to the judge to find) that the appellant was issued with an Indian passport in 2019 and that he had been able to leave the country and re-enter without incident: see for example [44] and [55]-[56]. A number of the interview references related to events pre-2017 and thus appeared to be irrelevant. Other references related to the appellant’s sister being in hiding and/or the mother asserting that the authorities had been interested in the sister. All-told, the evidential picture was unclear and not materially inconsistent with the judge’s overall assessment of the appellant’s circumstances in India between 2017 and his departure in 2021.

21. In light of the foregoing, the proposed amended ground has no arguable merit.

22. Even if I had granted permission, the amended ground would not have been made out for the reasons already provided and in light of what I say below.

The pleaded grounds
23. Ms Jegarajah maintained reliance on the pleaded grounds of appeal, although she made no further submissions on them.

24. Ground 1 is not made out. The judge clearly had regard to the relevant CPIN on religious minorities when conducting his risk assessment: [57]. The ground fails to point to any country evidence which materially undermined the judge’s assessment and which supported the appellant’s case. In addition, and contrary to the assertion made, the judge avoided compartmentalising individual elements of the appellant’s case, as he made clear at [61].

25. Ground 2 is not made out. The fact that the judge accepted that the appellant had been beaten and threatened in the past did not of itself oblige him to then conclude that there was a risk on return. The judge took account of relevant considerations pointing against the existence of such a risk: the passage of time, the fact that the incidents were localised, and that the appellant had lived in India for a number of years without repetition. Finally, the corroboration point is misconceived. The judge was not requiring corroborative evidence. Rather, he was taking into account the absence of potentially supportive independent evidence where such evidence was reasonably available and there was no satisfactory explanation for its omission. That was not contrary to binding authority.

26. Ground 3 is not made out. I have not been referred to any medical evidence which indicates that the appellant’s mixed anxiety and depressive disorder might have had any material impact on credibility. The judge was aware of the existence of “some evidence” of medical difficulties (although there was no psychiatric/psychological report) and it is clear that he took this into account. As to the assertion that the judge failed to apply the relevant guidance on vulnerable witnesses, there is no evidence to suggest that the judge was ever asked to treat the appellant (as opposed to his mother) as such a witness. I am satisfied that no such request was ever made and, on the evidence, the judge was not obliged to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness in any event.

27. Ground 4 is not made out. The judge undertook an assessment of all relevant Article 8-related matters which was more than adequate. The assertion in the grounds that there was a “close dependency” of the appellant on his mother was nothing more than that: there is no reference to any evidence in support of the bare assertion. In any event, I am more than satisfied that the judge had regard to all relevant considerations relating to family life. As to private life, the judge did not misapply Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813. The judge had regard to relevant considerations on the very significant obstacles to integration test.

28. The appellant’s appeal fails on all grounds.

Observations
29. The nature of the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction is that there will be criticism (often implicit) of First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decisions when errors of law are found. When no such errors are committed, error of law decisions usually state simply that the conclusions reached were open to the judge in question, without more.

30. The present case deserves something more. It is fair to say that the decision of Judge Aleksic is exemplary. Not only is it thorough, but it contains a clear and logical structure, addressing the various issues arising in the relatively complex linked appeals with which he was concerned. The judge should be commended.

31. My second observation relates to Mr Terrell. His approach to the last-minute amendment application was highly professional and I am grateful for the assistance he provided at the hearing as a whole.

Anonymity
32. I maintain the anonymity direction previously made as this case concerns a claim for international protection.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.

The appellant’s appeal is accordingly dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 28 October 2025