Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003798

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01708/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9th March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRAVES

Between

B
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Lecointe, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Lee, Counsel for Wilsons Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 2 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, a national of Algeria, appeals against the decision (“the decision”) of a Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal sitting in the First-tier Tribunal (“the judge”), dated 23 April 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent of 18 March 2024, refusing his asylum and human rights claim, made on 23 August 2022.

2. It is worth noting that the appellant now has new solicitors, who have reportedly struggled to obtain information from his previous representatives to assist with this appeal.

3. In summary, the appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) was that he had been an “activist of the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie (MAK)” (WS3). The respondent’s report, “Response to an Information Request – Algeria: MAK political organisation”, says the aim of this group is to support the independence of the ‘ethnic Berber’ or predominantly ethnic Amazigh Kabiyle region of Algeria and its aim for self governance.

4. Specifically, the appellant told the respondent at interview (AIR) that his activities for MAK comprised of regularly attending mass protests in Algiers in 2019, attended by millions of people, where others like him who were Amazigh were killed, and where he “carried the Amazigh flag” (AIR41, AIR50) and that he “used to say a lot on social media, I used to put it on my personal account”. The appellant’s case was that after four months of attending the demonstrations, the police came to his home having identified him through social media, and he was arrested and detained for one week, and accused of “carrying the Amazigh flag not the national flag” (AIR62), but because at that time it was not illegal (AIR71), he was released without charge, but his phone was first ‘wiped’. The appellant said on 26 October 2019 a high ranking official made an announcement on television, and fearing imprisonment he fled the country that day. In his witness statement (WS7) he says he has provided the respondent with photographic evidence of him “carrying the Kabylia flag. The Algerian authorities announced in national television that anyone who carries the Kabylia flag will be arrested.”

5. The respondent did not say whether it was accepted the appellant was of Amazigh ethnicity, but did not accept he was a supporter of MAK, that he was a political activist, that he was of adverse interest or that he had established any posting on social media that would attract risk then or now.

6. By the date of hearing there was an additional basis of claim, which was not found credible by the judge and since the appellant makes no challenge to those findings, it does not need to be addressed further.

7. The judge did not find the appellant’s claim in relation to having attended demonstrations waving a Kabylia or Amazigh flag to be credible, or of being arrested and detained on that basis, and found that he had not demonstrated there were pictures and posts of him doing so on social media. The judge did not accept the appellant was a genuine supporter of MAK or that he would be at risk on return for that reason.

The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal and the grant of permission to appeal

8. The appellant appeals against the decision, with permission from a judge of the Upper Tribunal, granted on 17 September 2025. There were criticisms of the grounds being rambling and insufficiently particularised but permission was granted on two grounds that it was possible to elicit from them, which were:

i) It is arguable that the judge did not consider the background evidence in the appellant’s bundle;
ii) It is arguable the findings about flags lack sufficient clarity;

9. The respondent’s Rule 24 response asserted that there was no error of law, the judge had regard to the background evidence [at 30] and reached a reasonable conclusion in relation to flags, since all of the photographs the appellant submitted showed him wearing the national Algerian flag, and in only one photograph was he depicted carrying another flag, which did not look like a photograph of a demonstration at all.

10. The appellant then instructed solicitors who prepared a skeleton argument which aimed to distil the grounds into five separate grounds as follows:

(i) That the judge erred in his approach to the appellant’s evidence regarding the ‘Kabylia’ and ‘Amazigh’ flags in that he has misunderstood or mis-recorded the appellant’s evidence on this point [at 35]. The appellant has asked that the recording of the hearing is obtained.
(ii) That the judge left out of the account material evidence regarding the hostility of the Algerian authorities towards the Amazigh flag during the protests in 2019 [ at 52].
(iii) That the judge erred in his construction of what the appellant said during his asylum interview [at 56] and that this materially affected his view of the appellant’s credibility.
(iv) That, given its timing and the context in which it was taken, the judge erred in the characterisation [at 57], of the photograph of the appellant with an Amazigh flag, as ‘opportunistic’.
(v) That the Judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s account of his inability to produce further social media evidence [at 59].

The Hearing

11. I have before me a bundle running to 285 digital pages (‘B1-‘) containing the documents relevant to the appeal before me, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal as well as the skeleton argument of 6 pages.

12. At the start of the hearing I asked whether the parties were seeking a listening appointment in relation to the recording of the FtT hearing, or wished to proceed with submissions, and if the former, I would need to have some clarity on what the purpose was of the listening appointment.

13. I noted that the judge in the FtT decision had criticised the absence of any country information to assist him with identifying what the various flags were in the pictures relied on by the appellant, but had felt confident he could say even in the absence of that, that all of the photographs showed the appellant wearing the Algerian national flag. In only one photograph could the appellant be seen holding a different flag, and what the country and other evidence did not do, at the FtT and even by the date of hearing before me, was identify whether that flag was or would be perceived to be the MAK, Kabylia or Amazigh flag.

14. I raised that the appellant was relying in ground 1 [at 4-6 skeleton argument] on the judge being in error as a result of misrecording his evidence on flags. The appellant now said that there was only one flag for the MAK movement, and one flag for the Amazigh and Kabylia movement and no others. In the interview, the appellant said the MAK flag was ‘yellow red and blue’ (AIR33) and the letter in the middle was the Amazigh letter ‘Z’ (AIR38) and that the MAK flag was ‘not the Amazigh flag’. The appellant has been consistent in saying that the green and yellow flag he was holding in the single image [at B62] was not the MAK flag. He said, and Mr Lee went outside to clarify his instructions were accurate, that there was the MAK flag and only one other flag which was for the Kabylia and Amazigh people and this was the flag he was pictured carrying at demonstrations that was identified on social media by the authorities.

15. I said I had some limited personal knowledge of some of the country background relevant to this appeal. While this did not provide me with any particular expertise on the identification of flags, it was not at all obvious to me that this flag the appellant was pictured holding [at B62] was in fact the Amazigh flag. The judge had recorded in the decision having considered the images from the demonstrations showing other people, not the appellant, waving a blue, green and yellow flag in the pictures, with a red symbol. At B156 was a news article which has an image of that blue, green and yellow flag with a red symbol, which the caption describes as the ‘Berber flag’, Berber being the former name given to the Amazigh people, which could suggest this is the Amazigh flag. I struggled to understand whether it assisted the appellant to obtain a recording in which he claims he would have said there is no other flag associated with the Amazigh movement, which left the question of what this green and yellow flag at B62 could have to with the movement. Ultimately Mr Lee said I could infer that the judge, when assessing the image of the appellant holding that flag, understood it to be significant and different from other flags and there was a symbol on it that was similar to that on the other Amazigh flags.

16. Both representatives made submissions on all points, and Mr Lee said if permission was not going to be granted on ground 1 then there he requested an adjournment for a listening appointment. I indicated that I would reserve my decision and now provide this below with reasons.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Ground 1

17. I have considered the evidence that was before the judge. At the heart of the appellant’s case is his account that he attended what are known as the ‘Hirak demonstrations’ in Algeria, which lasted for some months in 2019, and which related to President Bouteflika’s announcement in February 2019 that he would serve a fifth term, and which ultimately led to him resigning in April 2019 [CPIN 5.1-5.2, B156]. The appellant said at interview he was one of millions who attended those protests. He says what attracted adverse interest, was images and posts on his social media account showing him waving the Amazigh or Kabylia flag at those demonstrations.

18. The appellant criticises the judge at the FtT for making incorrect findings about what flags represented which movement, yet the judge made the point that he was not given clear images and country information to address those questions. The appellant told the respondent at interview that there was a flag for MAK, and a separate flag for the Amazigh people which he did not describe, but was recorded to have referred to as ‘the Amazigh flag’. In his witness statement, he referred to ‘the Kabiyle flag’ (WS4, WS7) without addressing whether this is a third flag, or the same as the MAK or Amazigh flags. It is perhaps understandable, in the absence of any country information or explanations, that there will be a need for clarity.

19. In oral evidence, the appellant was recorded to have said the Amazigh flag came first, which is for all Amazigh people of North Africa, then the flag for the Kabylia movement, the latter being ‘yellow blue and red’ [at 35] and was referred to the image [B62] of him holding the green and yellow flag and said that had the ‘Kabylia symbol on it’, but does not appear to have asserted it was the Amazigh flag, or the MAK flag. The appellant now says the judge misunderstood his evidence, because the Amazigh and Kabylia flags are one and the same, and there is a separate flag for MAK.

20. Ultimately, given MAK is a movement for the autonomy of the predominantly Amazigh Kabylia region and people, and the Amazigh are a people stretched across multiple countries, not confined to that region, even if there was an error by the judge in recording that the appellant claims to have carried the Kabylia flag rather than the Amazigh flag, it is not a material one. That is because the judge found the appellant has not established that he has been pictured holding either flag at a demonstration. It was open to the judge to find he had not established the image of him with a green and yellow flag shows him holding the Amazigh or MAK flag at a demonstration. That is even more so since he appears to say there are no other flags connected with those people or movements than the two described.

21. I therefore find it is not necessary to adjourn for a listening appointment, where regardless of whether there was some conflation of language, it makes no material difference to the finding or evidence.

Ground 2

22. The appellant also says the judge failed to take into account country information relevant to the events relied upon.

23. When making an assessment of credibility it is necessary to place the account in the context of norms and circumstances in the country where it takes place and to view it through the lens of available country information. The judge had concerns about the absence of country information to support the appellant’s claims of mass demonstrations in Algiers, finding ‘I was unable to identify any background information specific to the 2019 demonstrations in the papers before me’ [at 49] and the reports available ‘were not helpful in placing any political unrest specifically in Algiers in 2019’ [at 51].

24. Ultimately the judge was prepared to accept ‘on balance’ that demonstrations may have occurred, but was plainly troubled by the ‘paucity of background evidence relating to these demonstrations in 2019’ [at 52]. What is difficult to assess, is the relevance of this point to the overall assessment of credibility, in that while the appellant was given the benefit of the doubt, and it was not an adverse point taken against the appellant that there was no country information to support these demonstrations having happened at all, there is a question over whether the country information supporting elements of the appellant’s account would have had a positive impact on credibility.

25. The judge plainly went with some care through the two information response reports from the respondent, and the second CPIN of October 2024 but did not refer to any country information being in the appellant’s bundle in the list of relevant evidence [at 18] or when considering whether there was country information to support mass demonstrations in Algiers in 2019.

26. I note the January 2025 Algeria: Actors of Protection CPIN references the Hirak demonstrations in 2019 and the treatment of protestors at 5.1.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 6.1.3, but that is not listed as one of the country reports the respondent placed before the judge, which would no doubt have been of assistance. In the appellant’s bundle were articles, albeit some way through the bundle, which includes one dated 22 June 2019, referring to ‘massive peaceful protests filling the streets and cities all across Algiers’ [B153] which comment specifically on attendance by the Amazigh community and people waving Amazigh flags at the protests. A second article in similar terms from July 2019 [B156] again comments on ‘weekly protests’. The third article from June 2019 references ‘massive nationwide protests that drew tens of thousands of protestors carrying Algerian and Amazigh flags’. Given the detailed review of the other country reports by the judge, and the explicit concern raised about the absence of country information to support any protests in Algiers, it would appear that the judge’s attention was not drawn to these articles, which were behind evidence about the other new basis of the appeal, and so were perhaps not considered.

27. The above issue was further compounded by the judge’s finding that “there is no background evidence before me to suggest that carrying a Kabylia flag or Amazigh flag at the 2019 demonstrations … led to the arrest and torture of anyone” [at 52].

28. The three articles cited above all reference an announcement by the Algerian armed forces Chief of Staff that “demonstrators who brandish the Amazigh flag during protests .. threaten national unity” and orders had been given to security forces to “strike with an iron hand” any demonstrators seen to “tamper with the nation’s unity”. Another article refers to the arrest of 34 people for the offence of ‘attacking national unity’ because their “crime was to have brandished the flag of the Berbers”. I find the evidence strongly suggests again, that the judge did not have sight of these articles, and that will have had a potential impact again on the credibility assessment overall, but also potentially on the assessment of risk on return.

29. I find these are errors in the decision, capable of affecting the assessment of overall credibility.

Ground 3

30. The appellant also argues there was a mischaracterisation of his answers at interview (AIR62), where the judge relied on his evidence at interview being that he was “carrying the Amazigh flag not the national flag” being inconsistent with the images which clearly show him wearing the national flag throughout. This was an adverse credibility point. I accept that there is some basis to the appellant’s argument, in that the question at interview related to the reasons given for the appellant’s arrest by the police, which were that he was “destroying the safety and stability of Algeria...he was from a higher authority...the media describe Amazigh as a minority, and carrying the Amazigh flag not the national flag...these accusation come from high ranks of the army, he was on TV and he mentioned it”. While the answer was jumbled, it is arguable it does not say that the appellant told the respondent that he did not wear the national flag at the demonstrations. When read together with the three articles referred to above, it is questionable whether it was open to the judge to find this was an inconsistency capable of damaging credibility.

Ground 4

31. While I would hesitate to go behind a judge’s analysis of what weight to place on evidence, but where there are concerns about the reliability of evidence, I am mindful that the question of assessment and weight may well be infected by or relate to some of the adverse findings above. Mr Lee argued some of the criticisms of the photograph [at B62] were not sustainable, such as the comment it was ‘opportunistic’, that the photograph was taken in seclusion away from other people, and the implication it was posed for the purpose of the claim, given it appeared to have been taken when the appellant was still in Algeria, in the context of walking on a roadside with other demonstrators, potentially leaving the demonstration, and where a closer inspection showed there were people within a few metres of the appellant.

32. I find that taken cumulatively the grounds do amount to an error of law, particularly as it is difficult to separate individual points from the overall assessment of credibility, and the impact other findings will have on the assessment of documentation, which must be assessed in the round. I have not addressed Ground 5 since I have already found a material error of law which warrants a fresh assessment of credibility.

33. I therefore find it has been established that there is a material error in the decision. Given that relates to the core issues of credibility, but also risk on return, no findings can be preserved.

34. I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and further considered in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). However, bearing in mind the appellant has new solicitors, and the hearing will be de novo and the availability of the two tier appellate system, I have remitted the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh, before a different judge.

Notice of Decision

35. The First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of errors of law and so it is set aside with no findings preserved and the appeal is allowed, but only to the extent that it will be heard again by another judge in the First-tier Tribunal.

H Graves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 March 2026