Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003800

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60919/2023
LP/10710/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
29th October 2025

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
FX
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
And

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr M Murphy, Counsel, instructed by Connaught Law
For the respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant, a citizen of Nigeria, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Bunting (the judge), promulgated on 8 July 2025. By that decision, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. The protection claim was based on the appellant’s relationship with his brother. Both had been active on behalf of the All Progressive Congress party in Nigeria (APC). The brother had been a parliamentarian. It was claimed that the brother had been killed by political opponents and that the appellant himself would also be at risk on return. In respect of the human rights claim, the appellant relied on claimed private and family life in the United Kingdom. He asserted that they would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration into Nigerian society or that removal would otherwise disproportionately interfere with his private life. In terms of family life, the appellant relied on the claimed close relationship with his three children in the United Kingdom.

2. The judge accepted certain aspects of the appellant’s evidence, but rejected others. In essence, he concluded that the appellant was not at risk in his own right following the brother’s death some years previously. As to Article 8, the judge concluded that none of the relevant Immigration Rules could be met and that removal would be proportionate.

3. I express my gratitude to the representatives concise and helpful submissions.

4. For the reasons set out below, I conclude that the judge did not make any material errors of law and that his decision stands. I will address each of the grounds in turn. In so doing, I take account of the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

Reasons
Ground 1
5. Ground 1 contends that the judge failed to consider core aspects of the appellant’s claim and/or failed to give adequate reasons. The judge is criticised for his use of the phrase “whatever the reason for that” at [57] in respect of the cause of the brother’s death. Mr Murphy submitted that this was a central issue and the judge should have made a clear finding as to whether the death had been caused by political opponents.

6. There are two obstacles in the appellant’s path. First, the evidence on how the brother was killed was thin. The appellant had only asserted that he believed it to have been a case of murder and his sister’s evidence was extremely vague. At best, the assertion was based on circumstantial evidence. Second, when considered sensibly and in context, the phrase used by the judge can be read to mean either that the brother had been killed by political opponents or that he had died in some other way: the judge was not excluding the possibility of the former: in other words, he adopted an “either/or” approach. Importantly, and with reference to [56]-[58], it is clear that the judge was basing his conclusion on the absence of risk to the appellant now on the passage of time since the brother’s death (a number of years) and the lack of any reliable evidence to show that there was a continuing interest in the appellant notwithstanding the brother’s death. As Mr Terrell put it, the judge concluded there was no risk to the appellant because there had been no adverse interest in him distinct from his association with his brother. Once the brother died, any interest that might have existed in effect dissipated. The judge was entitled to conclude as he did and there is no error of law.

7. The judge is criticised for failing to specifically consider evidence that the brother’s family had been granted refugee status in Canada. The problem with this aspect of the challenge is twofold. First, the judge did consider the evidence at [42]. Second, the evidence itself says nothing whatsoever about the reasons why the family were granted status (a document which might have contained substantive reasons was not provided at the hearing, or even at this stage). There is no error of law.

8. The remaining aspects of ground 1 have no substance. The judge considered the evidence in the round and issues about the appellant’s business were, at best peripheral. There is no error of law.

Ground 2
9. Ground 2 asserts that the judge erroneously expected/required corroborative evidence from the appellant, contrary to MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216.

10. The judgment in MAH (Egypt) does not preclude the ability of a judge to take account of the absence of independent evidence in all circumstances. It remains the case that where such evidence is said to exist but has not been provided, or where it could have been reasonably obtained but has not been adduced, and where there is no satisfactory explanation for the absence of such evidence, a judge may take this into account when assessing the evidence as a whole. I conclude that that is precisely what the judge did in the present case. For example, the judge was entitled to take account of the fact that Mr Bolu could have been called as a witness, but was not, and that there was no explanation put forward: [52]. Similarly, the judge was entitled to take account of the fact that a number of other documents had not been verified, without any explanation as to why this had not been done: [54]. Those factors were clearly assessed as part of the evidential picture as a whole. They were not decisive to the judge’s overall assessment. I note that in relation to the non-production of a police report, the judge concluded that in any event it was “not surprising” that the authorities did not take any action given the vagueness of the threat: [46]. The judge did not require corroborative evidence and there is no error of law.

Ground 3
11. Ground 3 asserts that the judge should have, but did not, carry out a best interests assessment in relation to the appellant’s children. As with other aspects of the appellant’s challenge, this faces insuperable obstacles. First, it is apparent that the evidence before the judge on the appellant’s claim relationship with the children was, to say the least, threadbare. He made brief references to the relationship in his witness statement, but there was no detail on, for example: the level of contact; his input into their lives; their own views on the possibility of separation; their mother’s views; and what professionals thought separation might entail for the children. Put shortly, there was nothing of substance on which the judge could base an informed best interests assessment. The judge’s observations at [70]-[72] were entirely justified. Further, the judge went on and considered proportionality on the basis that there was family life. That must have included the claimed relationship between the appellant and his children. Whilst the phrase “best interests” does not appear thereafter, the relevant assessment is, I conclude, implicit in what the judge had to say. In any event, even if the judge did occur by omitting the expressly state a best interests conclusion, on what was before him, it is inconceivable that he would have reached a best interests conclusion which was favourable to the appellant to the extent that it could have permitted him to succeed in his appeal (whether taken in isolation or cumulatively with other matters). Ground 3 discloses no material error of law.

Ground 4
12. The final ground asserts that the judge failed to give consideration to the appellant’s oral evidence.

13. There are two difficulties with this contention. First, the judge was obviously aware of the fact that the appellant had given oral evidence: [17]. I am not persuaded that he subsequently forgot to consider that evidence when assessing the appellant’s case. The same applies to the appellant’s witness statement (if in some way that is to be included in the reference to “oral evidence”). The second difficulty is that there is no reference at all to what relevant aspects of the “oral evidence” had been overlooked by the judge. A bare assertion that there is an absence of express reference to the evidence is not sufficient to disclose an error of law. Nothing has been said about how the evidence might have been material to any of the issues addressed by the judge. There is no error of law here. Even if there was an error, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that it is a material error.

14. All of the grounds fail and this appeal must be dismissed.

Anonymity
15. I maintain the anonymity order made by the judge. Different initials have been used at different times, but I am adopting the use of “FX” only. I confirm that this is the same person described as “FMX” by the judge.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 16 October 2025