Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003809
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58146/2024
LP/01338/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 22nd of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

FC
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Solomon, counsel instructed by Kayders Solicitors Limited
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 1 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. Following an error of law hearing which took place on 9 April 2026, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal decision dismissing the appellant’s protection and Article 8 appeal was set aside, albeit the First-tier Tribunal’s findings in respect of the credibility of the appellant’s account as well as the findings in respect of her Article 3 health claim are preserved. The appeal was retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
Anonymity
2. I have continued the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal. I have considered the public interest in open justice but conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.
Factual Background
3. The appellant is a national of China now aged thirty-six. On 23 May 2022, the appellant entered the United Kingdom during 2019 having been issued a short-term student visa, valid until 30 September 2020.
4. On 19 June 2021, the appellant applied for asylum. The basis of that application was that the appellant feared a loan shark from whom she had borrowed money. The reason she had borrowed this money was to compensate her customers who had suffered harm after using her products. The appellant states that the loan shark forced her to work as a prostitute in China and then trafficked her to the United Kingdom for further forced prostitution work. After arriving in the United Kingdom, the appellant managed to escape from the gang and approached the authorities for help. The appellant fears both the police and the gang in China. In relation to her claim to have been trafficked, the appellant received a negative reasonable grounds decision from the National Referral Mechanism.
5. By way of a decision dated 11 March 2024, the respondent refused the appellant’s protection claim. In short, the respondent rejected the claim on credibility grounds. The respondent made contradictory assessments, stating both that there is no real risk of harm to the appellant because it is considered that state protection and internal relocation are available options on return to China and also that if the key material facts of the appellant’s claim had been accepted, the options of sufficient protection from persecution in China and internal relocation within her home country would not be available to her. Reference was also made to Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 because the appellant misled the Home Office about her reasons for coming to the United Kingdom and she claimed asylum after she was granted leave to enter on a student visa. The Secretary of State rejected the appellant’s claim that there were very significant obstacles to her relocation in China, noting, inter alia, that she had spent most of her life there and had shown remarkable fortitude by travelling to an unknown country.
6. The respondent’s review of 9 June 2025 did not materially alter the respondent’s case.
7. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the respondent’s representative argued that the appellant could seek state protection or internally relocate.
The remaking hearing
8. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine the appellant’s appeal against the decision refusing her protection and human rights claim.
9. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. The appellant attended the hearing but did not give evidence, owing to her mental state. In addition to an earlier psychiatric report from Dr Gupta, there was before me a Clinical Summary dated 10 May 2026 from the appellant’s counsellor, Ms Yip, with whom she has been undergoing therapy since July 2025.
10. Both representatives made detailed submissions, and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary. I should add that Mr Tufan reiterated that there was no challenge to the appellant’s account; in that it was accepted that the events occurred, that she would be at risk in her home area and that she was suffering from chronic PTSD. Both representatives agreed that the only issues for determination concerned internal relocation, whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in China and Article 8 more widely.
11. At the end of the hearing, the decision was reserved.
Discussion
12. In reaching this decision I have had regard to the totality of the evidence before me even where not specifically mentioned. I have been assisted by the relevant Country Guidance decision in HC & RC (Trafficked women) China CG [2009] UKAIT 00027
13. There is no longer any dispute as to the facts of the appellant’s case. The previous judge accepted those facts and there was no challenge on appeal to those findings which therefore stand. The following extract from the FTT decision succinctly sets out those findings.
45. I have considered carefully whether the Appellant has made out her claim to have been the victim of trafficking and forced prostitution.
46. The claim is consistent and credible. The core of it is that the Appellant took out a loan from loan sharks to compensate customers following the TST product scandal, could not repay it, and was forced into prostitution. I bear in mind that the Appellant’s mental health conditions affect her memory, and I am mindful that small errors may appear in the best intentioned evidence, especially including dates. The Appellant has given reasonable explanations for the errors.
14. The appellant provided a further witness statement dated 13 May 2026 in which she provided an update on her mental health and the situation of her family in China. There was no challenge to the content of this statement on behalf of the respondent.
15. In essence, the appellant explained that she has been attending counselling sessions every three weeks since August 2025, that she found therapy emotionally difficult and that it sometimes triggered her symptoms. It had taken the appellant a while to fully trust her counsellor and after sessions, the appellant feels disconnected and withdrawn for days afterwards.
16. The appellant reports continuing to suffer from anxiety, fear, intrusive memories but nonetheless, she was trying her best to engage with treatment and recover. In relation to China, the appellant states that fear of return causes here ‘severe anxiety and emotional distress.’ Furthermore, she had last spoken to her mother and brother in 2024 and had lost contact with them after they relocated and severed contact with her.
17. The appellant continues to rely on a psychiatric report prepared by Dr Gupta, a consultant psychiatrist in general adult psychiatry and rehabilitation which was dated 19 March 2025. There was no criticism on behalf of the respondent of the conclusions reached in this report nor the diagnosis of chronic PTSD. It is of note that Dr Gupta recommended that the appellant have psychological therapy for PTSD and that a copy of his report be sent to her GP at the earliest opportunity both for a referral for therapy but also in relation to his concerns as to the appellant’s physical health.
18. The appellant has been seeing a counsellor since July 2025 when a psychological assessment was made. The counsellor has provided a clinical summary dated 10 May 2026 which sets out the details of the initial mental health assessment, professional opinion, treatment plan and progression. Mr Tufan’s view of this report was that little weight should be accorded to it, because it was not written by a psychiatrist. This is not a valid criticism. The appellant had already seen a psychiatrist and been diagnosed with PTSD before the counsellor assessed her.
19. The counsellor’s assessment is detailed and based on approximately 10 months of therapeutic work. The counsellor does not stray beyond her expertise. The reference in the report to trauma and PTSD presentations are based on what the counsellor observed during her sessions with the appellant and do not amount to a diagnosis of mental illness. I therefore place significant weight on this report.
20. The counsellor refers to the appellant’s thoughts of self-harm, feeling that she would be better off dead and her subjective fear of returning to China. The appellant also described feelings of shame and distress linked to suffering from a sexually transmitted condition which she associates with her sexual exploitation. The clinical opinion expressed in the report is that the appellant is in ‘urgent need of safety, protection, stability, and ongoing therapeutic support in order to facilitate recovery and improve long-term functioning.’
21. The counsellor’s opinion is that removal from the protective safe environment of the UK would ‘likely’ lead to a significant deterioration in the appellant’s mental health and place her at ‘substantial’ risk of further harm. The reasons given by the counsellor are set out below.
19. (FC) has developed chronic trauma symptoms directly linked to her traumatic experiences, contributing to heightened psychological vulnerability. She is therefore in need of long-term trauma-focused therapy. The experience of being protected and supported by authorities can play a critical role in facilitating emotional stabilisation and engagement with trauma treatment. In the absence of stability and safety, meaningful engagement with treatment is likely to remain limited.
20. I remain extremely concerned regarding (FC)’s safety and psychological wellbeing, particularly given the severity of her mental health symptoms and the impact these symptoms have on her ability to care for herself safely and effectively. Concerns are heightened by her fear of organised criminal actors associated with debt bondage, trafficking, torture, threats, exploitation, and sexual exploitation connected to her past experiences.
21. Her current mental state also places her at increased risk of further exploitation and harm. Her mental capacity and psychological functioning are significantly impaired at present, such that she would struggle to support herself independently, secure accommodation, obtain employment, or safely meet her basic day-to-day needs if removed from the United Kingdom. In such circumstances, meaningful access to support services in China would likely be severely compromised.
22. The counsellor anticipated that the appellant will require approximately 36-40 months of treatment for PTSD involving stabilisation and emotional regulation, trauma processing and reprocessing and post-traumatic grown and reintegration. The appellant is currently working through the first stage of this three-stage programme. The appellant currently attends a therapeutic session every three weeks and has been doing so since August 2025.
23. The counsellor makes the following points in her conclusion
36. (FC) is experiencing severe psychological distress. Given her trauma history and clinical presentation, she requires a long-term, structured, trauma-informed treatment plan as outlined above. Stability and continuity of care are essential components of her recovery.
37. Her current mental health difficulties would significantly impair her ability to access and engage with appropriate mental health treatment in China. Furthermore, her psychological vulnerability places her at substantial risk of further deterioration, exploitation, physical harm, and safeguarding concerns should she be removed from her safe environment. Continued treatment and support within the United Kingdom would provide (FC) with the opportunity to continue recovery, rebuild her life, and improve her long-term psychological functioning. As Herman (1992) and Van der Kolk (2014) emphasise, stability is fundamental to trauma recovery.
38. (FC)’s mental health difficulties are significantly exacerbated by her fear of removal from the United Kingdom, separation from her support system, and concerns regarding her ability to safely function independently due to her impaired psychological state.
39. With ongoing therapeutic intervention, psychiatric support, and stability in her circumstances, it is my professional opinion that (FC)’s long-term prognosis can improve positively over time.
Internal relocation
24. In assessing whether it is reasonable to expect the appellant to relocate away from her home area, I have carefully considered the appellant’s personal characteristics. The appellant is still a relatively young woman in her mid-thirties, and she has been away from China for approaching seven years. She has no funds nor property, is heavily in debt to loan sharks, has no support available to her and her family members whereabouts are unknown since they have fled their home to avoid the gangs.
25. I have taken into consideration that the appellant could receive a modest payment from the UK government, that according to HC and RC, the Chinese state is obliged to house and feed its citizens and therefore destitution is unlikely.
26. Headnote 4 of HC and RC states that temporary Hukou registration is possible away from the place a returned trafficked woman was previously registered. In relation to registration, the CPIN China: Modern slavery, Version 2.0, October 2024 at 5.1.7 states as follows:
Whilst reform of the hukou system has taken place as mentioned in the country guidance case of HC & RC there remain 3 some limitations on the ability of migrant workers, rural inhabitants and minority groups to change their workplace/residence and the hukou system is reported to exacerbate migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking for the purpose of forced labour. Not being registered in a hukou area limits access to public services.
27. The temporary nature of Hukou registration indicates that the appellant will, sooner or later, become unregistered and thus denied public services. Mr Tufan accepted that the appellant will be without a Hukou but drew my attention to the fact that 280 million Chinese citizens are in the same position. On that point, I doubt that every one of those 280 million people are facing the same set of circumstances as the appellant, that is, vulnerable, suffering poor mental health, lack any familial support, without the support of others, according to the expert reports, struggle to cope.
28. The counsellor’s report emphasises that the appellant finds it difficult to trust people. Furthermore, the appellant retains a genuinely held subjective fear of those that exploited her. The 2024 CPIN at 11.2.1 states that there is ‘no information’ in the sources consulted about mental health support for trafficking victims. While I acknowledge that mental healthcare is generally available, as established in the CIN China: Medical treatment and healthcare, Version 1.0, July 2022, at 25.1.3, it is stated that the rate of people receiving treatment was low owing to social stigma associated with mental ill health.
29. The appellant, according to the counsellor’s report, is already feeling stigmatised owing to the sexual nature of her exploitation and indeed the Executive Summary of the 2024 CPIN confirms that victims of modern slavery, especially those who have been sex trafficked may experience discrimination or social stigma on return.
30. At this point I remind myself of the opinion of the appellant’s counsellor that the appellant’s current mental state ‘would’ significantly impair her ability to access and engage with mental health treatment in China and, furthermore, that she is at a ‘substantial’ risk of further deterioration, leading to exploitation and physical harm. Returning to the Executive Summary of the 2024 CPIN, the following is said:
There are, however, certain circumstances which may increase the risk of a person being abused or re-trafficked such as the person being homeless, disabled, suffering from a mental illness or those with a lack of education.
31. As set out above, the appellant is suffering from chronic PTSD, anxiety and depression, is without means or support and the evidence is that she would be unlikely to be able to bring herself to access general mental health services owing to her vulnerability and likely, deteriorating mental health state. Indeed, Dr Gupta’s opinion was that the appellant’s perception of ‘a loss of personal safety and loss of support may be a key psychological factor that may impair her ability to seek appropriate and available medical and psychological help for her symptoms of PTSD in China.’ Dr Gupta’s unchallenged opinion was that even with treatment, the appellant ‘may’ be at risk of experiencing other mental disorders like an anxiety or depressive disorder including ‘suicidal ideations.’ The counsellor’s account of her sessions with the appellant have demonstrated that this has become a feature of the appellant’s mental state in the United Kingdom.
32. Considering all relevant matters in the round, I conclude that it would be unduly harsh to expect the appellant to relocate within China in order to avoid those that exploited her.
Very significant obstacles to integration
33. In considering the meaning of very significant obstacles, at [14] of the judgment of Sales LJ in Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, was that ‘the idea of “integration” calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life. ’
34. I find that for the reasons given above in the consideration of internal relocation; there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in China. In making this finding I have taken into consideration that the appellant spent approximately the first thirty years of her life in China, where she was educated and ran a business. Nonetheless, the appellant has been subject to serious abuse and exploitation, is traumatised by those experiences, retains a subjective fear of her exploiters, has no support network, will be facing stigma and discrimination both because she was sexually trafficked as well as owing to her poor mental health. Her knowledge of the way of life, language and culture does not suffice to alleviate these difficulties.
Unjustifiably harsh consequences
35. As I have allowed the Article 8 appeal under a provision in the Immigration Rules, this is positively determinative of the matter. I therefore need not consider the appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim any further.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 June 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email