Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003828

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66667/2023 & LP/12106/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NAIK KC

Between

MU
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Gazzain, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Introduction
1. This is an appeal by the Appellant against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal Judge SJ Clarke (the Judge) who dismissed the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim.
2. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh who entered the United Kingdom on 28 October 2009. He claims that he would be at risk on return there on account of his political opinion, namely that he had been active for the BNP since 2003 and had held major positions of responsibility and has been organising protests and political activities opposing the former ruling party the Awami League and on account of which he suffered a brutal attack on 8 September 2008. He claimed to have fled to the United Kingdom on a student visa on 28 October 2009 and been politically active in the United Kingdom. He claimed asylum on 24 August 2017 and this was refused by the Respondent more than 6 years later on 5 December 2023. The Appellant now claims he fears reprisals from the Awami League, despite the interim government being in power, including from high raking officials who continue to serve and whom he claims are working against the BNP and their members and supporters. He did not claim to have been detained by the Awami League authorities.
3. The Respondent accepted in the decision letter that the Appellant was politically active both in Bangladesh and in the United Kingdom, but did not accept that the authorities in Bangladesh, then the Awami League, had any adverse interest in the Appellant. As noted by the Judge at paragraph [6] of the determination, the Respondent concluded that the Appellant had provided inconsistent evidence which was lacking in detail and in part implausible or inconsistent with the external objective evidence She also raised section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004.
4. Before the Judge the issues in dispute as recorded at paragraph 10 of the determination were:
i. Whether the Appellant has a genuine threat to his life and liberty in Bangladesh that merits asylum protection.
ii. Whether there is state protection available to the Appellant against the threat or does he have an internal flight alternative
iii. Does the Appellant’s claim merit humanitarian protection as an alternative
iv. Does the decision breach the Appellant’s family and private life in the United Kingdom contrary to Article 8 ECHR and section 55 BCIA 2009.
5. The Judge rejected the Appellant’s credibility of his past account and to be at risk on return on account of that history including inter alia rejecting that there were false charges brought against him and an arrest warrant. Further that although there were photographs of his injuries and a letter from the hospital that treated him, there was no envelope provided for that letter.
6. The Appellant further relied on his political activism in the United Kingdom as the basis for resisting removal to Bangladesh. At paragraph [31] the Judge accepted that the Appellant may have attended demonstrations in the United Kingdom but she found that this was as a low-level supporter and she did not find that he stood out in any particular way. There was a letter from the BNP leader but she found that as he did not attend the hearing to give evidence she placed less weight on what he stated therein.
7. The Judge further rejected that the Appellant’s profile would bring him to the attention of the authorities on return now. She found at [36] that the Appellant would not have an active interest in politics “upon return to his country”. She noted that he had never been arrested and she had rejected the claimed attack on him in 2008 which in turn indicates that the Appellant was of no interest to the Awami League when they were in power. She noted that here may well still be elements of the Awami League living in the country but did not find that the Appellant faced any real risk of harm upon his return.
8. The Respondent also stated in their decision letter that the Appellant’s evidence did not demonstrate high-level political activity. The Appellant in response had submitted that this conclusion was incorrect and addressed this in his witness statement before the Judge [10] and [13] that he had held leadership roles within the BNP in Bangladesh, including as President of the Chandpur Government College BJCD unit. Moreover his case was that in the United Kingdom, he had remained active within BNP United Kingdom, organised and participated in political rallies and campaigns, and had personally contacted key EU and British politicians regarding persecution in Bangladesh. He stated that he had done this openly, under his real name, and his photos and videos have been published and circulated on social media, including on BNP-affiliated platforms. Hence his claim was that these actions have been documented and shared widely, and clearly risked attracting attention from the Awami League and the then Bangladeshi authorities. He relied on a bundle of approximately 500 pages of evidence before the Judge of documentary evidence relating to the Appellant and objective evidence relating to Bangladesh.
9. Finally the Judge rejected the Appellant’s private life on Article 8 grounds [39] to [41]. She noted that he had a wife and child in the United Kingdom, but concluded at [42] that the Appellant could continue his family life in Bangladesh if not this year then next year and although there would be “some” disruption to the family life if his wife intended to remain in the United Kingdom with the child. She found that the child’s best interests were to be in a family unit with both parents present and that this could be achieved if the wife chose to return to Bangladesh with the child and that the best interests of the child were not “paramount” [43] and that the public interest in effective immigration control outweighed the positive features she had set out in favour of the Appellant [44]. Hence she dismissed the appeal in a determination dated 28 April 2024.
Grounds of Appeal
10. The Appellant sought permission to appeal by way of a notice filed on 10 May 2025 on the basis:
(i) that the Judge had materially erred in law in her reasoning by concluding as she did that she rejected the Appellant’s account in part because of the absence of corroborative evidence by way of the envelope accompanying the hospital letter contrary to the approach in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at [4] and [86] and noting that this is a pre-Nationality and Borders Act 2022 case (Ground three); and

(ii) that the Judge in reaching her adverse credibility findings in respect of the Appellant from [15] onwards failed to adopt the Lucas approach (approved by the UKSC in MA(Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49) when considering his evidence (Ground four).
11. Permission to appeal was granted by FTTJ Oxlade with reference to the errors identified in grounds three and four, but on all grounds on 19 August 2025.
12. The Respondent filed a rule 24 notice on 3 September 2025 addressing the application of MAH (Egypt) and MA(Somalia) and inviting the Tribunal to uphold the decision.

Hearing
13. At the hearing before me to determine whether the Judge had materially erred in law in dismissing the appeal, I heard submissions first from Mr Gazzain for the Appellant.
Appellant’s Submissions
14. His submissions on Ground one under five heads were:
15. First, that that the judge had made irrational findings with respect to her findings on the Appellant’s credibility (as set out at para [8] of the grounds). The Judge made a finding that the Appellant had failed to mention his arrest warrant and the filed charges against him. First (which is not noted in the grounds of appeal) he noted that the Appellant did mention this prior to his substantive asylum interview. In his preliminary interview on 24 May 2019 (at page 550) before his 2021 substantive interview and that there is no refence to this key fact in the Judge’s reasoning in paragraph [15]. Second in any event he submits that this was not fatal to his account. It was mentioned in his substantive interview and he was cross-examined on in it. The Judge should have made a finding including with reference to his oral evidence as to whether this was accepted or not.
16. Second, he submits that the Judge’s findings at paragraph [32] as to the Appellant’s extent and significance of his sur place activity were irrational. The Appellant’s evidence was that he had evidence of contact with various UK officials (at page 40) and letters to and from political leaders and photographs with UK leaders (at page 420). The Appellant had organised a seminar in the House of Lords (at page 75). He regularly posted on Facebook and he had 12 thousand followers from which the Tribunal should draw the inference that a substantial number of them are political followers. Proper weight should have been given to those activities in the United Kingdom by the Judge.
17. The third aspect of the rationality challenge to the Judge’s approach was in respect of the Appellant’s witness and the evidence that when he went to Bangladesh he was detained. The Judge dismissed the evidence on the basis that the witness could not have identified the Appellant from a photograph as noted by the Judge in her determination at paragraphs [29 to 30].
18. The Judge concluded at paragraph [30] that the Appellant had never mentioned that the witness identified him from a photograph and concluded that this omission and failure to mention this earlier was a “big gap in the evidence”. However in paragraph [29] the Judge makes no mention of the fact that this question was not asked of the Appellant, only of the witness, with reference to paragraph 11 of his witness statement (page 304) and para 5 (page 303). The Appellant did not address this in his witness evidence and Mr Gazzain submitted that it was not clear whether this was addressed in cross-examination at the hearing.
19. The fourth challenge was to the Judge’s finding at paragraph [26] that the Appellant not been detained as in turn showing that he was not of interest to the authorities and hence not at risk. His submission was that this was not a requirement in order to demonstrate risk and that the Appellant had had been brutally attacked in 2008 (as noted with reference to the photographs at pages 64 to 66) which showed that he was of interest to the authorities.
20. His fifth challenge (although that was not how the ground was framed in para 12 of the grounds) was that were the case to be reheard (i.e. if a material error were to be found on other grounds) there would be expert evidence addressing regime change.
21. As to Ground two, Mr Gazzain submitted (relying on paragraph 15 of the grounds) that the Judge had made incomplete findings in the paragraphs cited there for the reasons set out there. He further specifically relies on the findings at paragraph 35 and the risk on return despite it being post regime change with reference to the CPIN and with regard to the one page evidence admitted (as noted at paragraph [9]).
22. He submitted that the Judge had failed to give proper reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s profile with reference to her findings at paragraph [36] in relation to the Appellant’s Facebook activity set out at page 314, and page 331 which showed hundreds of posts which highlight his sur place activity.
23. His second challenge was to the Article 8 ECHR proportionality assessment. His submission was that the Judge erred in omitting from her assessment the Appellant’s social work and benefit to the community from her analysis. At page 312 of the bundle there was evidence of his care work during the Covid-19 pandemic and the importance of his healthcare service for vulnerable adults in the community for a number of years which should have been taken into account by the Judge on which she made no reference or finding. She only found that he has been in the United Kingdom without leave for a long time and the public interest would outweigh other factors.
24. As to Ground three Mr Gazzain submitted that the Judge had erred in her approach in requiring corroborative evidence as set out in paragraph [15] where she found that the Appellant had not produced the arrest warrant. This was addressed in his oral evidence before the Judge. It was not addressed in his witness statement. It was raised in the decision letter and in the PIQ in 2019 but he was not asked about it in his substantive interview. The Judge states that there was no mention of the arrest warrant at the first opportunity, but this is an error of fact. He did state this in his PIQ but it was not followed up in interview. Here there was a letter from his lawyer and other corroborative evidence, e.g. photographs of his injuries. It was wrong of Judge to require the Appellant produce it. In the decision letter (at page 522), the Respondent accepted the Appellant’s political activity and the credibility of his political activity.
25. At paragraph 21, the Judge notes that there was a letter from the hospital but nothing to show how the Appellant had received that documentation, however he explained in cross-examination that his brother had sent it to him. Agan the Judge erred in requiring corroborative evidence in order to accept the credibility of that document and that account.
26. In support of Ground Four Mr Gazzain addressed the Lucas direction and asserted that the Judge made a number of flawed findings: she failed to indicate weight positive and negative in respect of her findings on credibility. There are a number of paragraphs where it is not clear whether the Judge accepted the Appellant’s version or not.
27. In respect of Article 8, he noted at page 274 evidence of the Appellant’s volunteer service records to which the Judge made no reference.
Respondent’s submissions
28. Ms Lecointe for the Respondent submitted with respect to Grounds one and two as to the claimed irrationality and lack of reasons on behalf of the Judge that she was entitled to reject the plausibility of the Appellant’s claimed account and that it was not corroborated.
29. At the time of the SSHD’s review in January 2025 there had been several indications to the Appellant to produce further evidence, but this bundle was only produced the week of the hearing, hence the SSHD’s review and decision were taken before sight of that bundle. Hence the comments as to why there was no corroborative evidence in support of the Appellant’s account and why it was produced later were open to her and the Judge was right to consider his credibility on the basis of its timing and these were open to her. One year after the review that the bundle was made available. She submitted that some of those documents would have been readily available and could have been submitted to the SSHD for her consideration earlier. Hence the Judge was right that that the Appellant had had ample time to provide evidence, as noted in the Respondent’s Review dated 20 January 2025 (at page 691), noting that the decision under appeal is dated 5 December 2023 (page 722).
30. In her submission the Judge was entitled to consider the availability of the additional evidence especially as the SSHD had drawn an adverse inference and questioned why certain documentary evidence was not present. With regard to the additional evidence it became the first point of assessment when weighed against the Appellant’s oral evidence. Credibility was an issue and the Judge said that she had considered it in the round. The Judge did not find that the Appellant was truthful witness as she set out in paragraphs [15 to 21]. The photographs of the injuries did not bring any further clarity to the substance of the claimed attack. With regard to the weight to be attached to the letter from the hospital that was a matter for the Judge and she was entitled to give it little weight. The hospital letter was from 2021 referring back to an admission in 2008. Whilst the SSHD was not concerned about the lack of the envelope in the decision letter, there had been no reference to the hospital letter in the decision letter, it was neither accepted nor rejected. As to his account the SSHD accepted the Appellant’s political opinion but reached the view that this would not put him at risk on return. With regard to photographs the Judge was correct to assess the photographs and the documentary evidence as she did. She submitted that if this aspect of the claim failed, then the Appellant could not establish that there was any adverse attention from the Awami League and nor that their claimed interactions were truthful, which does go back to issue of the veracity of the photographs. The photographs do not reflect anything in the hospital letter when one looks at them. They are not necessarily of the Appellant nor do they show that this was his hand. The Judge was correct in para [26] to note that the Appellant had not been detained and that he was only a low-level political activist.
31. There was a lengthy bundle of evidence before the Judge and it was not necessary for her to itemise every piece of evidence. It was not an irrational or an unreasoned decision. Applying Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC) and Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at para 2(4) as to the validity of findings of facts, weight is a matter for the trial judge. A balanced consideration should be upheld unless it is irrational or insupportable.
32. Here there was a volume of evidence but this showed that the Appellant was not a high profile political activist. As to the Facebook evidence, there was no indication that simply having 12,000 followers was an indication of a high political profile. Ms Lecointe submitted that a person can obtain followers, and submitted that from her own knowledge one can buy followers – 400 at a time. There was no evidence that they are genuine followers nor who they are. Thus this was no indication to confirm that the Appellant has a high profile in political activity.
33. The Respondent’s case is that the Judge was clearly correct at paras [29 to 30] to discount the photographic and witness evidence and that the Appellant attended events in the United Kingdom does not appear to demonstrate the level of activism he claims.
34. At paragraph [32] the evidence shows that the Appellant has written to British MP’s and received responses, but there was no evidence as to how far they had been progressed, such as meetings nor any further action. She submitted that it was a fair assessment by the Judge of the evidence on this ground at paragraph [32]. Whilst it is clear that the Appellant has written to MPs and politicians but there is no evidence that having written a letter and received a courteous response that this has roused anyone into action and hence it adds little to his case. The Judge was not rejecting the credibility of his account as to this, but was right to conclude that it does not add anything to his assertion that he is a high-profile political activist. This material has not been published, nor has it been seen by anyone in a position of authority in Bangladesh that would be at all interested.
35. Ms Lecointe relied on the Respondent’s review dated 20 January 2025, the rule 24 response dated 3 September 2025 addressing MAH, the standard of proof and the discussion of the decision and rule 339L that corroborative evidence is not required unless certain criteria are met, they are not compulsory requirements properly applying para 77 of MAH, it does not follow that corroborative evidence is not required. NB I note that this paragraph states:
“It is important to appreciate the legal effect of these provisions. What both Article 4(5) of the Qualification Directive and para. 339L of the Immigration Rules provide is that, where certain criteria are met, corroborative evidence is not required. It does not follow from this that, where one or more of those criteria are not met, corroborative evidence is required. The correct legal position is accurately summarised in the Home Office guidance, which I have quoted above. In those circumstances the decision-maker (here the tribunal of fact) must still consider whether, on the facts of the case, it is appropriate to give the appellant the benefit of the doubt, bearing in mind the relatively low threshold of "reasonable degree of likelihood"
36. In the circumstances of this case, Ms Lecointe raised whether it was appropriate for the decision-maker to give the Appellant the benefit of the doubt and that it was appropriate when trying to undertake that exercise to include timeliness and the nature of the evidence produced late in the day. She accepted that there was no legal requirement to have corroborative evidence and she rejected the contention that the judge concluded that this was a legal requirement or standard applied here.
37. If there were corroborative evidence, when discussing the inconsistencies and the lack of evidence, this would have helpful especially where the issued had been raised by the Respondent. Here the Respondent had not seen volume of evidence before the hearing. It was submitted 2 days before the hearing, hence only the Presenting Officer would have had any opportunity to look at it and only the day before and not institutionally the Home Office.
38. She referred to para 339L of the Immigration Rules and the guidance in MAH. Rule 339L provides:
It is the duty of the person to substantiate the protection claim or substantiate their human rights claim. Where aspects of the person’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects will not need confirmation when all of the following conditions are met:

1. (i) the person has made a genuine effort to substantiate their protection claim or substantiate their human rights claim;
2. (ii) all material factors at the person’s disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant material has been given;
3. (iii) the person’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the person’s case;
4. (iv) the person has made a protection claim or made a human rights claim at the earliest possible time, unless the person can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and
5. (v) the general credibility of the person has been established.
39. Here she submitted and especially as the Appellant was aware that credibility was an issue raised by the Respondent and that his facts were rejected and the decision maintained in the Respondent’s Review, the Appellant was clearly on notice that supplementary evidence was required and should be produced in a timely fashion.
40. She submitted that there were five factors which the First-tier Tribunal should have taken into account:
41. First where there was genuine effort on the part of the Appellant in providing the evidence, second whether there was a satisfactory explanation for the lack of any material, third whether his statement is coherent and plausible against the objective evidence, fourth whether he claimed asylum at the earliest opportunity or has given a feasible explanation for his failure to do so, and fifth whether the Judge when considering his general credibility has given sustainable reasons for her conclusion. Here the Judge referred to the finding that the Appellant was inconsistent, and his failure to claim asylum earlier, she found that he failed to mention his arrest warrant at [17] to [19], and she submitted that despite this having been mentioned by the Appellant in his PIQ there was no material error of law in the Judge’s approach or reasoning. This was a core part of his asylum claim and it only had a brief mention in the PIQ. This was not a material error when considering his account as a whole, applying rule 339L and the timing of his claim and his immigration history.
42. In any event as to the changed country situation, the Judge addressed at paragraphs [34-35] the profile of those who are at risk in Bangladesh and reached her reasoned conclusion at [36] that the Appellant had a very limited profile and is of no interest to anybody in authority on return. She referred to paragraphs [4 and 5] of the Respondent’s Rule 24 reply and its reference therein to the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in MAH at paragraphs 30-33 and that “It will be a matter for the AIT to decide whether the general evidence is sufficiently strong to counteract what we have called the negative pull of the appellant’s lies” and that paragraph 339L justified the Judge’s approach. The Judge clearly considered objective material at [34-35] of the determination, and the fact she still concluded there was no risk to the Appellant, indicated there was no strong objective evidence before the Judge to counteract the “negative pull” on credibility. Even if the Appellant was found credible, there was still nothing in the objective evidence to demonstrate he could still be at risk. Overall, the Judge was entitled to conclude as she did, and there was no material error of law.
43. In reply, Mr Gazzain submitted that as to the materiality of the errors, the starting point is paragraph [15] and it is clear that here the assessment of the Appellant’s case was based on a material mistake of fact as to the evidence before the Judge and its relevance and provenance. Second and in any event whilst having 12000 Facebook followers does not of itself make him high profile, the Appellant’s political activity in the United Kingdom, speaking at for example the House of Lords’ seminars for the BNP raise his profile and put him at risk. He had produced the photographs after he claimed asylum and he produced the hospital letter in order to seek to corroborate his account.
Analysis
44. In my judgment the Judge materially erred in law in the following ways such that her findings as to her rejection of the credibility of the Appellant’s account and also the nature and degree of his sur place activities and any consequent risk on return were not properly reasoned and cannot be relied on.
45. First the Judge erred at paragraph [15] in finding for the reasons that she gave that the Appellant was not the subject of false charges and that there was not an arrest warrant out for him. She was wrong to conclude on the facts here as she did, that if such a warrant had existed the Appellant would have mentioned this at the first opportunity rather than very late in the day. It is clear from the evidence in the bundle that was before the Judge that the Appellant had raised this in his PIQ in 2019 although it was not followed up in the asylum interview by the Respondent. This is a clear mistake a fact which has a direct bearing on her adverse credibility findings. Although the Judge gives other reasons for rejecting his credibility it is clear that the starting point was flawed and materially so.
46. Second in any event the Respondent accepted that the Appellant has been politically active in Bangladesh. At paragraph [16] the Judge finds the Appellant has provided some supporting evidence to show he was politically active in Bangladesh, but she concludes he does not have an active interest in politics now and would not on return to his country [36]. Taken together with the accepted findings of the Respondent as to his activity in the United Kingdom this is not sustainable.
47. Third this is further consistent with his account that he is politically active in the United Kingdom and when that account is considered in light of the substantial bundle of evidence which he provided before the Judge as to the nature and breadth of his activity in the United Kingdom, (which the Respondent by virtue of its the timing of its submission, did not have the opportunity to consider and was therefore not addressed in the refusal letter nor in the Respondent’s review), it fell to the Judge to consider it for herself against the submissions made by the presenting officer. There is no record of those submissions which is unfortunate. At paragraph [36] the Judge finds that the Appellant has a very limited profile in the United Kingdom. However properly considered the evidence of the Appellant attending demonstrations in the United Kingdom, the letter from the BNP leader, the activities with various United Kingdom public officials including at the House of Lords, the lobbying letters to parliamentarians and others in the United Kingdom, does not demonstrate that his political activism is that of a low-level supporter. To that end when assessed against the background evidence at the time along with his Facebook profile and his 12,000 followers it cannot properly be concluded that the Appellant has a very limited profile and would be of no interest whatsoever upon his return to Bangladesh to anybody in authority as the Judge found. Her findings at paragraph [36] are not ones she was entitled to reach in light of that evidence which was before her and are thus unsustainable. Furthermore in the face of the substantial evidence of the Appellant’s political activity in the United Kingdom which is not disputed, the Judge was not entitled to conclude as she did that the Appellant does not have an active interest in politics if he returned to his country, even though he was never arrested there (and even if she had been entitled to reject the claimed attack upon him, although I have found that that finding cannot stand).
48. In respect of her Article 8 findings, I accept that in light of her finding as to the rejection of the credibility of his asylum claim, had that been sustainable, the Judge may have been entitled to conclude that the Appellant’s removal to Bangladesh would also not be disproportionate. Although he migrated to the United Kingdom lawfully as a student in 2009, he has been in the United Kingdom for 15 years most recently working in the care sector, and he only claimed asylum in 2017. He waited six years for a decision until 2023, but that claim was rejected by the Respondent. Prior to his asylum claim, the Appellant was refused leave to remain on the basis of his private life claim. In 2022 the Appellant married and then had a child who was 18 months old at the time of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal and who has been treated by the Respondent as his dependent. The Judge found that although his wife has limited leave as a student here, the Appellant would be able to return to Bangladesh alone and his wife and child could visit him there or they could return together. However if the Judge was wrong, as I have found to have rejected the credibility of the Appellant’s asylum claim, the proportionality of his removal falls to be reconsidered against the correct factual background. If his protection claim is made out, or even if it is now found to be credible, including the Appellant’s reasons for not claiming asylum earlier, then even if it is later determined that there is now no future risk on account of the recent change of government or in any event, that history is a factor which is relevant to the proportionality of removal now when set against the long delay in determining the asylum claim by the Respondent and the justification for separation of the Appellant from his wife and child in the United Kingdom whilst she completes her studies here, and having regard to the child’s best interests of the family living together. Of course that will have to be evaluated against the statutory public interest considerations, including that he formed his family life with his wife at a time when he had no leave to remain, but his marriage took place and the child born at a time when his asylum claim was pending and had been for some nearly 6 years, which delay is relevant should that claim be made out as credible. I make no findings as to that but remit the Article 8 issue along with the protection claim for those reasons.

Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
2. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by another Judge with no findings of fact preserved.

S Naik KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 January 2026