Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2025-003830
UI-2025-003831, UI-2025-003832
UI-2025-003833, UI-2025-003834
First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/57360/2023
HU/50196/2023, HU/50198/2023
HU/50200/2023, HU/50201/2023
LH/01053/2024
LH/01652/2023, LH/01653/2023
LH/01654/2023, LH/01664/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 30th of April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

TAIBA KHWAJA ZADA
KH. MILAD AHMAD SEDIQI
AHMAD FARID SIDIQI
KHOAJAH NOOR AHMAD KHOAJAHZADA
AHMAD SAMIM KHWAJA ZADA
Appellants
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Tahir, Times PBS
For the Respondent: Mrs Nolan, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellants are citizens of Afghanistan. Their appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Easterman dated 27 May 2025 was allowed by the Upper Tribunal on 18 February 2026. The decision was set aside and the appeal adjourned for re-hearing in the Upper Tribunal.

2. The appellants are relatives of Zakia Manyar (the sponsor), a British citizen. The first appellant is the sponsor’s niece. The second, third and fifth appellants are her nephews. The first, second and fifth appellants live in Pakistan with other family members. The first and fifth appellants are married and have 3 children. The third appellant has returned to Afghanistan. Sadly, the fourth appellant has died.

3. It is not in dispute that the appellants cannot satisfy the Immigration Rules. The issue before me is whether the appellants have family life with the sponsor and whether any interference with that family life is proportionate.

Relevant Law

4. In R (IA) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, the Court of Appeal held:

“113. Bearing in mind the large number of family life cases cited to us, it is ironic that it was not disputed that the appropriate test be applied in a case of adult siblings is that to be found in Kumari at [35]. It will be recalled, as we have now said twice at [10] and [50] above, that “family life for the purpose of Article 8 … is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties””.
…
123. In our judgment, it would be going too far to say that it is wrong to test whether there are additional elements of dependency by reference to the real, committed or effective support provided. But real, committed and effective support is not the test itself, because the level of real support, for example, may be minor or insignificant, whereas the word “dependency” denotes a significant relationship. This is not a semantic point. The ECtHR used the word “dependence” in S v. UK in the context of “cohabiting dependents”, which were its starting point (see [42] above).
…
132. Family life requires close personal ties. It is normally limited to core cohabiting family, but can be extended to adult siblings if they can demonstrate additional elements of dependency involving more than the normal emotional ties. The existence of real, committed or effective support is relevant, but not conclusive. The evaluation of whether family life exists is a fact-sensitive exercise where many factors may be relevant including financial support, physical and psychological health and a combination of other factors.

Adjournment

5. Mr Tahir failed to comply with directions and applied the day before the hearing for an adjournment. The application was refused because there was a clear direction in the decision of 18 February 2026 to notify the Upper Tribunal (UT) of the witnesses to be called. The hearing notice was issued on 10 March 2026 and there was adequate time to prepare for the hearing. There was no reason for why, or date given for when, the sponsor’s daughter went to Italy or why she could not give evidence from abroad.

6. At the hearing before me, Mr Tahir renewed his application for an adjournment on the grounds that the sponsor’s niece was a crucial witness and she was returning from Italy today, but not in time to attend the hearing. Mrs Nolan opposed the application because there was no reason why a witness statement had not been taken from the witness soon after the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal (FTT).

7. I considered the overriding objective and refused the adjournment for the following reasons. Mr Tahir accepted that, given the comments in the decision of the FTT dated May 2025, it was apparent that evidence from the sponsor’s daughter and financial documentation was required. No witness statement had been taken and there was no explanation for the visit to Italy given the notice of hearing was served on 10 March 2026.

8. The appellant’s representatives had ample opportunity to prepare for the hearing and they had failed to comply with directions. A bundle was served on the morning of the hearing containing witness statements dated 20 April 2026. Mrs Nolan was given time to read the bundle. The representative’s behaviour is disrespectful and has wasted court time.

Sponsor’s evidence

9. The sponsor relied on her witness statements dated 30 November 2024 and 20 April 2026 as evidence in chief. She corrected the statement made yesterday and explained that her brother-in-law, the fourth appellant, had been deported to Afghanistan and had died of a stroke. He had not died as a result of the lack of medical care in Pakistan as stated at paragraphs 7 to 11 of her witness statement dated 20 April 2026.

10. The sponsor stated she had remained in contact with the appellants and spoke to them on the phone 2 or 3 times per week. They talked about life in Pakistan and she provided financial help and support. She sent around £1000 per month and her daughter helped her to pay this money. Since the appellants’ visas expired she had sent given money to people in the UK who were from Pakistan and they contacted their relatives in Pakistan. She could not use money transfers because the appellants did not have visas. The appellants used the money for everyday living and food.

11. Her brother-in-law (fourth appellant) and his oldest son (third appellant) had been deported back to Afghanistan. They were on their way to the UNHCR office when they disappeared. She did not know where they were for a month. If the rest of the family were deported, her niece (first appellant), who is an educated woman and human rights activist, would be in danger and could not live in Afghanistan. She was very worried about her. The first appellant said the sponsor was her only hope of getting out of Pakistan last time they spoke. The sponsor stated that the first appellant was like her child.

12. The sponsor stated that her daughter was a doctor earning £70,000 and she was an administrator at Fenwick earning £25,000. They both supported the appellants financially. The appellants in Pakistan could all speak English and were well educated. They were at risk of deportation in Pakistan and they had been waiting for 4 years. The sponsor stated that she was very upset talking about this.

13. In cross-examination, the sponsor stated she had always lived in the UK and had never lived with the appellants. The last time she went to Afghanistan was in 2016. She was in contact with the appellants before the Taliban came to power. They did not need financial support at that time because they were all working. She currently keeps in contact by WhatsApp and messenger. When asked why she had not supplied documentary evidence of her phone calls she stated, “We forgot to provide it. I don’t know.”

14. The sponsor was asked about the money transfer receipts in the bundle. Hoosai Manyar is her daughter and she was the one who sent the money. Hakimzada Bakhtar is the sponsor’s brother and he received the money. He had a visa at that time and was able to collect it. His visa ended 9 months ago. She thought that his visa was extended. The first appellant’s visa ended in 2022. The sponsor stated that nobody had a visa at the moment. Mohammed Sadeqi was her brother. He sent money when she was busy and she gave the money to him. She did not know Amir Emran Hashemi or Milal Mohmand who were named as “senders” on the money transfer receipts. Azizallah Rahymi was her brother. The sponsor accepted there were only a handful of receipts from her and the majority of the financial support came from her daughter. The money was to support two families. In addition to the appellants, her brother, mother, son-in-law, sister and a total of 7 children lived in Pakistan. The money in the transfer receipts was for everyone in Pakistan.

15. The sponsor was referred to her witness statement of 20 April 2026 at paragraphs 7 and 8. She stated there was no death certificate for the fourth appellant because she had not asked for one. The fourth appellant lived with a distant relative and it was not a close relationship so she could not get a death certificate. The third appellant went somewhere else and did not live with the fourth appellant in Afghanistan.

16. The sponsor accepted that some of her family members in Pakistan held medical visas and they had given money to the agent to issue a visa. All the appellants had approached the UNHCR in 2021 when they arrived in Pakistan and any application they made was outstanding. There were no documents and they had just been given numbers which she sent to her solicitor. Mr Tahir confirmed he had a number but he had not put any evidence of it in the bundle. The sponsor and her daughter would continue to support the appellants if entry clearance was not granted. They were not able to live and work in Pakistan and were at risk of deportation.

17. In re-examination, the sponsor stated that she would continue to support the appellants which was not a problem. The problem was that she was worried about them being deported to Pakistan. Applications for entry clearance had been made in respect of all family members and the money transfers were used for rent and food. If she stopped her support they would die. She had not visited Pakistan because the appellants lived in hiding, but she provided financial support. The appellants visas did not allow them to work or get permanent residence.

Submissions

18. Mrs Nolan relied on IA at [113], [119], [125], and [128] and submitted the burden was on the appellants to prove their case. There was a lack of documentary evidence of contact and the respondent did not accept the sponsor provided emotional support as she claimed. The appellants were living with other family members as part of a family unit. Most of financial receipts were from the sponsor’s daughter and the sponsor was unable to identify two of the senders on the receipts in the bundle. All the receipts showed that the money was sent to the sponsor’s brother not the appellants. The evidence was insufficient to establish more than normal emotional ties. It was apparent from [141] of IA that the appellants had to establish their relationship with the sponsor and dependency was different from support. The sponsor was worried about the appellants and she provided some financial support but this was insufficient to establish dependency. The risk from the Taliban in Afghanistan did not assist in establishing dependency (IA at [135]-[136]). Article 8(1) was not engaged.

19. Mrs Nolan relied on [151] of IA and submitted that it was not disproportionate to refuse entry clearance because there was no interference (IA at [161]). The appellants and sponsor had never lived together and the sponsor had not visited Afghanistan since 2016. Financial support only began when the appellants went to Pakistan and would continue if entry clearance was refused. The sponsor’s main concern was deportation and the appellants had “cherry picked” the evidence in the bundle as to the circumstances in Pakistan. They had only provided documentary evidence of visa applications and refusals but there was evidence that the appellants’ visas had been extended.

20. There was no mention in the witness statement dated 20 April 2026 that the appellants had approached the UNHCR in 2021 and there was no documentary evidence to support those applications. There were inaccuracies in the most recent statements made yesterday. The sponsor’s evidence that the appellants were in hiding was inconsistent with the first appellant’s claim to continue her activities as a human rights activist. Considering the evidence holistically, the UT did not have an accurate picture of life in Pakistan capable of establishing very compelling or exceptional circumstances. Although Pakistan was not a party to the Refugee Convention, the government did accept determinations by the UNHCR and there was evidence that those determinations were still under consideration.

21. Mrs Nolan submitted there was no documentary evidence to show that the appellants would be financially independent if they came to the UK. There was no statement from the sponsor’s daughter or documentary evidence of her employment or income. The appellants could not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules and any interference with their family life was proportionate in maintaining immigration control.

22. Mr Tahir submitted that the sponsor was a witness of truth and had given clear and cogent evidence. Applying [132] of IA, family life can be extended to adult siblings where there were additional elements of dependence and support. Article 8(1) was engaged. It was in the best interests of the children to come to the UK because they were not going to school and they were unable to go out. The sponsor was in regular contact with the appellants and the failure to provide documentary evidence of the conversations did not undermine the sponsor’s credible evidence. There were extensive remittances to the sponsor’s brother and the sender of the money was not relevant because the money was sent on the sponsor’s behalf. The sponsor provided the family with support and living expenses for necessities such as food and medicine. The sponsor was the appellants only hope of salvation. They were dependent on her in circumstances of extreme vulnerability.

23. Mr Tahir accepted the appellants could not satisfy the Immigration Rules but they could speak English and would be supported in the UK by the sponsor and her daughter. The appellants were educated and resourceful. They could obtain employment in the UK and would not be a burden on the state. The updated objective evidence painted a stark picture in Pakistan and showed the arrest and deportation of undocumented Afghans. The refusal of entry clearance would have unjustifiably harsh consequences which impacted on the sponsor’s family life. The refusals left the appellants in an unlawful and precarious situation in Pakistan. It was in the best interests of the children to be with their parents in the UK. The refusal of entry clearance was not proportionate.

Findings and Conclusions

24. I have considered all the documentary evidence, oral evidence and submissions in coming to my conclusions and I have considered all the evidence in the round.

25. The sponsor’s credibility is undermined by the correction she made to her witness statement in oral evidence. The statement was dated 20 April 2026 and the sponsor declared that the facts contained therein were true. She provided significant details about the death of the fourth appellant in that statement including the distress it had caused her because he could not get medical help in Pakistan. Her oral evidence that the fourth appellant had been deported to Afghanistan where he died of a stroke is significantly different and there was no explanation for why this correction was not made prior to her signing the statement yesterday. The same evidence is repeated in the first appellant’s witness statement dated 20 April 2026 at paragraphs 13 to 17 and has not been amended. The first appellant’s witness statement contains a statement of truth and a declaration by the sponsor that she read and “faithfully interpreted” the statement to the first appellant in Dari.

26. The sponsor’s explanation for failing to provide evidence of the WhatsApp conversations with the appellants was not credible. It is not credible that she forgot to provide it or that she did not know she had to provide it. Her evidence that she talked about life in Pakistan was insufficient to show that she provided emotional support to the appellants. Her claim to speak to the appellants 2 to 3 times a week was not supported by documentary evidence which the appellant ought to have been able to produce if her account was an accurate and reliable reflection of facts upon which she relied.

27. The sponsor’s claim that she sent around £1000 per month to the appellant was not supported by the documentary evidence in the bundle. The majority of money transfer receipts showed that money was sent by her daughter to the sponsor’s brother who was not an appellant in this appeal. The bundle contained receipts from senders not known to the sponsor.

28. The sponsor’s evidence in respect of the appellants’ visas was vague and not supported by the evidence in the bundle. She stated in oral evidence that her brother’s visa had expired 9 months ago but she failed to explain why the appellants’ visas could not be extended. This undermined her claim that she could no longer send money by money transfer. There was no evidence to support her claim that she sent money to Pakistan with the assistance of Pakistani nationals in the UK. There was no evidence from these individuals to support the sponsor’s evidence.

29. Having reviewed the sponsor’s evidence in the context of all the evidence, I find that the appellants are not financially dependent on the sponsor to the extent that she claimed. I do not accept the appellants are dependent on the sponsor for their day to day subsistence. I accept that she sends some money to her brother and he distributes it to the appellants. On the evidence, the appellants are financially supported by the sponsor’s daughter and several other individuals.

30. I do not accept the appellants are emotionally dependent on the sponsor. There was insufficient evidence before me of the content of those claimed conversations or to show that she spoke to them 2 or 3 times a week. I accept the sponsor is very worried about the appellants and she wants them to be allowed to come to the UK.

31. The appellants are not immediate family members of the sponsor. The sponsor has not seen them since 2016. At that time, they were working and living independently. The appellants and the sponsor have never been part of the same household.

32. It is not in dispute that the correct test is one of establishing “additional elements of dependency” going beyond normal emotional ties. The appellants have failed to establish that they have a significant relationship with the sponsor. I find that the appellants have failed to show they have family life with the sponsor and Article 8(1) is not engaged.

33. Even if I accept that family life exists, there is no interference. Taking the appellants’ claims at their highest, the sponsor has supported them financially in Pakistan since 2021/2022. They live in Pakistan with other family members. The relationship with the sponsor re-formed in the knowledge they did not have the right to enter the UK. The refusal of entry clearance does not change the situation. The sponsor will continue to financially support the appellants. Mr Tahir’s submission that the refusal of entry clearance impacted on the sponsor’s emotional wellbeing to the extent that it was unjustifiably harsh was not made out on the evidence. The sponsor stated she was supported by her daughter who is a GP. There was no medical evidence to show that the sponsor’s emotional integrity was adversely affected by the refusal of entry clearance. There was insufficient evidence to show that any interference would have consequences of such gravity so as to engage Article 8.

34. In any event, the decision to refuse entry clearance is proportionate in the circumstances. The best interests of the children are to remain with their parents. Whilst conditions in Pakistan are stark and a factor to take into account, the fact that the children are unable to go out or attend school is not to be treated as a paramount consideration and is not capable of outweighing the significant weight to be attached to the maintenance of immigration control.

35. I attach significant weight to the public interest because the appellants cannot satisfy the Immigration Rules and there was insufficient evidence before me to show that they could be financially supported in the UK without recourse to public funds.

36. The appellants circumstances in Pakistan, the risk of deportation to Afghanistan, the risk to the first appellant as a human rights activist, the appellants’ education and ability to speak English and the best interests of the children do not outweigh the public interest in this case.

37. The decision to refuse entry clearance is proportionate and does not breach Article 8. The appellants’ appeals are dismissed.

Notice of Decision

The appeals are dismissed on human rights grounds.

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD

I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

J Frances

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 April 2026