Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003839

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55884/2023
LP/00461/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

Between

D N
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs T Srindran, Counsel instructed by Qualified Legal Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer, Home Office

Heard at Field House on 20 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Albania. By these proceedings she appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing her asylum and humanitarian protection claims.
2. The appellant arrived in the UK clandestinely in a lorry in April 2021. She claimed asylum on 10 June 2021 on the basis that if returned to Albania, she would be at risk from the individuals who exploited and trafficked her and also from her own family who had made threats to kill her as she escaped from Albania with her ex-partner. A positive conclusive grounds decision from the competent authority dated 24 August 2023 confirmed that her account was both externally and internally consistent. However, on 18 August 2023, while accepting that the appellant had been trafficked, the respondent refused the protection claim.
3. The appellant appealed the respondent’s refusal decision to the First-tier Tribunal. That appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarke (‘the Judge’) on 28 April 2025. The First-tier Tribunal found: (i) the appellant had not shown that her father, a non-state actor, had any influence or power over the authorities in Albania [21]; (ii) that as she had not seen her ex-partner since 2021 in France and did not know his whereabouts, there was no basis for any fear on return to Albania [24]; and, (iii) the appellant had not shown that she had a well-founded fear of persecution [25].
4. In respect of any risk to the appellant on return to Albania as a single woman with two children and without their fathers, the First-Tier Tribunal referred to the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN): actors of protection, Albania, February 2025 and the country guidance case of TD and AD [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC). The First-Tier Tribunal found that sufficiency of protection was generally available in Albania to the Horvath standard [27]-[28] as well as the provision of shelters [38]. Internal relocation was also an option [41]. Accordingly, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
5. The appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal. Permission to appeal was granted by First-Tier Tribunal Judge Oxlade on 19 August 2025.
6. The matter now comes before me to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
7. The appellant and respondent were ably represented by Mrs Srindran and Mr Terrell, respectively. I am grateful to them for their very helpful submissions.
Grounds
8. The appellant brings 3 grounds of appeal against the decision of the First-tier-Tribunal: (i) flawed assessment of risk on return; (ii) failure to give weight to the NRM positive conclusive grounds findings that the appellant is a victim of modern slavery (VOMS); and (iii) a flawed assessment on internal relocation.
9. Granting permission to appeal on all grounds, First-tier Tribunal Judge Oxlade stated that the assessment of risk factors identified in TD was condensed into paragraphs [42]-[43] of the decision. The acceptance of the appellant as a VOMS was not mentioned, such that any weight given is not known or expressed, and the social shame and ostracism identified in the background evidence and TD was not addressed in the decision, nor any findings as to the family’s likely reception of the appellant on return.
Submissions
10. Mrs Srindran on behalf of the appellant acknowledged that Grounds 1 & 2 overlapped. She reiterated paragraphs 15-18 of the appellant’s skeleton argument (ASA) and submitted that the Judge had failed to properly apply the seven factors listed at (h) in the head note of TD and AD within the context of CPIN: actors of protection, Albania (February 2025), namely: (i) the social status and economic standing of her family (ii) the level of education of the victim or her family (iii) the victim of trafficking’s state of health, particularly her mental health (iv) the presence of an illegitimate child (v) the area of origin (vi) age, and (vii) what support network will be available.
11. Mrs Srindran further submitted that in relation to Grounds 2 and 3, the Judge had failed to place any weight on the appellant’s status as a VOMS when assessing the appellant’s risk of re-trafficking, especially in circumstances when the time allocated to a shelter was limited.
12. Mr Terrell on behalf the respondent confirmed that no Rule 24 response had been filed but the appeal was opposed.
13. Mr Terrell submitted that the Judge’s function was to consider the seven factors in (h) of TD and AD, amongst others, when determining whether the appellant was at risk of persecution on account of having been trafficked, and whether they would be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities.
14. In this context, he submitted it was difficult to see how the Judge had ignored re-trafficking when she clearly identified it as a core issue for determination at [10].
15. Far from ignoring the factors in TD and AD, they formed the very basis of the decision. In relation to Ground 1, the Judge at [42]-[43] had explicitly set out the seven factors, including going on to analyse each one in turn to find that the appellant and her children would have access to shelters and that she could contact the aunt with whom she had lived with for three months in 2019 to provide support without her parents knowing of her return. Further, the appellant could access support from various agencies to enable her to return and settle in her country. None of those findings were challenged by the appellant.
16. Mr Terrell further stated that if what is being suggested amounts to a reasons challenge, it is clear that the Judge gave adequate reasons for her findings and decision. At their core, the appeal grounds amounted to nothing more than a disagreement with the decision.
Findings and reasons
17. The core of the appellant’s appeal is that the Judge failed to properly apply the seven factors listed in (h) of the headnote of TD and AD when considering the risk of persecution to the appellant and whether she would be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities. Further, the appellant submits that the Judge made a flawed assessment in respect of internal relocation by failing to consider that the appellant was a victim of trafficking and the risk she faced by re-trafficking.
18. Despite Mrs Srindran’s spirited submissions I have no hesitation in concluding that the grounds do not disclose an error of law.
19. From the outset [10] the Judge identified the appellant as a trafficked woman and that a core issue focused on the question of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation as a viable option.
20. At [22] the Judge considered the case at its highest and at [26] she turned to consider the risk on return to the appellant taking into account the CPIN (February 2025) which confirmed that the state is both willing and able to offer sufficient protection to persons fearing non-state actors, in this case the appellant’s father.
21. TD and AD held that there is a general Horvath standard of sufficiency of protection, but that it would not be effective in every case. In this context, the Judge found at [24] that there was no basis to fear her ex-partner on return at [38].
22. At [40] the Judge specifically considered the issue of re-trafficking at 4.5.1 of the and internal relocation at 5.1.1 of the relevant CPIN and found that in general woman and girls who have been trafficked may be able to internally relocate despite various challenges.
23. At [43] the Judge specifically addressed her mind to the seven factors which she lists and applies to the specific personal circumstances of the appellant. Of note, she recognised the heightened risk to the appellant if she returned to her home area or a rural area but less so if she relocated to Tirana where she had lived and worked for three months before leaving the country. Additionally, the Judge found that the appellant would have access to shelters because of her two young children and that she could contact her aunt for support without her parents knowing, including accessing support from various agencies to help her return and settle thereby demonstrating a network of support.
24. The Judge further found that although the appellant has some mental health issues, mental health support is available in the Albanian healthcare system with shelters providing treatment [39].
25. Overall, the decision is detailed and comprehensive and is unarguably properly reasoned based on the application of the seven factors listed at (h) in the decision of TD and AD and the relevant CPINs. The Judge has provided cogent and sustainable reasons for her findings which were open to her on the evidence. I agree with Mr Terrell’s submission on behalf of the respondent, that the appeal grounds amount to nothing more than a disagreement with the decision.
26. It follows that an error of law has not been made out by the appellant on any of the grounds. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.
Notice of decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarke of 28 April 2025 did not involve the making of an error of law. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

K.A.Khan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 October 2025